LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OP 

CALIFORNIA 

IRVINE 


3CO 


v.l 


THE  "UNITED  STATES"  AND  THE  "MACEDONIAN" 

In  one  of  the  notable  duels  of  tlie  war,  Decatar,  with  the 

"United  States,"  disabled  and  captured  the 

British  frigate  "Macedonian" 


Statesman  Edition 


THE  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVY  DURING 

THE   LAST  WAR  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN.  TO 

WHICH  IS  APPENDED  AN  ACCOUNT  OF 

THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS 
VOLUME  I 


BY 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


PUBLISHED  WITH  THE  PERMISSION  OF  THE 
PRESIDENT  THROUGH  SPECIAL  ARRANGEMENT 
WITH  THE  CENTURY  CO.,  MESSRS.  CHARLES 
SCRIBNER'S  SONS,  AND  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SON! 


NEW    YORK 

THE  REVIEW  OF  REVIEWS  COMPANY 

MCMIV 


COPYRIGHT  1882 
BY  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

This  edition  is  published  under  arrangement  with 
G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  of  New  York  and  London. 


PRINCIPAL   AUTHORITIES   REFERRED   TO 

American  State  Papers. 

Brenton,  E.  P.  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,  1783  to 
1836.  2  vols,  octavo.  London,  1837. 

Broke,  Adm.,  Memoir  of,  by  Rev.  J.  G.  Brighton.  Octavo. 
London,  1866. 

"Captains'  Letters"  in  Archives  at  Washington. 

Codrington,  Adm.  Sir  E.  Memoirs,  edited  by  his  daugh- 
ter. 2  vols,  octavo.  London,  1873. 

Coggeshall,  George.  History  of  American  Privateers. 
New  York,  1876. 

Cooper,  J.  F.  Naval  History  of  the  United  States.  New 
York,  1856. 

Dundonald,  Earl.  Autobiography  of  a  Seaman.  London, 
1860. 

Douglas,  Lord  Howard.  Naval  Gunnery.  Octavo.  Lon- 
don, 1860. 

Emmons,  Lieut.  G.  E.  Statistical  History  of  United  States 
Navy,  1853. 

Farragut,  Adm.  D.  G.,  Life  of,  by  his  son,  Loyall  Farragut. 
Octavo.  New  York,  1878. 

Graviere,  Adm.,  J.  de  la.  Guerres  Maritimes.  2  vols,  oc- 
tavo. Paris,  1881. 

James,  William.  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain.  6  vols. 
octavo,  London,  1837. 

James,  William.  Naval  Occurrences  with  the  Americans. 
Octavo,  London,  1817. 

Lossing,  Benson  J.  Field-book  of  the  War  of  1812.  Oc- 
tavo, New  York,  1869. 

Low,  C.  R.  History  of  the  Indian  Navy,  1613  to  1863.  2 
vols,  octavo.  London,  1877. 

"London  Naval  Chronicle." 


Principal  Authorities  Referred  To 

Marshall.  Royal  Naval  Biography.  12  vols,  octavo.  Lon- 
don, 1825. 

"Masters-Commandant's  Letters"  in  the  Archives  at  Wash- 
ington. 

Morris,  Com.  Charles.  Autobiography.  Annapolis,  1880. 
Naval  Archives  at  Washington. 

Niles    "Weekly  Register." 

Pielat,  B.  La  Vie  et  les  Actions  Memorables  du  St.  Michel 
de  Ruyter.  Amsterdam,  1677. 

Riviere,  Lieut.  H.  La  Marine  Franchise  sous  le  Regime 
de  Louis  XV.  Paris,  1859. 

Tatnall,  Commod.,  Life,  by  C.  C.  Jones.  Jr.  Savannah, 
1878. 

Toussard,  L.  de.  American  Artillerists' Companion.  Phila. 
1811. 

Troude,  O.     Batailles  Navales  de  la  France.     Paris,  1868. 

Ward,  Com.  J.  H.     Manual  of  Naval  Tactics,  1859. 

Yonge,  Charles  Duke.  History  of  the  British  Navy.  3 
vols,  octavo.  London,  1866. 


PREFACE 

THE  history  of  the  naval  events  of  the  War  of 
1812  has  been  repeatedly  presented  both  to  the 
American  and  the  English  reader.  Historical  writ- 
ers have  treated  it  either  in  connection  with  a  gen- 
eral account  of  the  contest  on  land  and  sea,  or  as 
forming  a  part  of  the  complete  record  of  the  navies 
of  the  two  nations.  A  few  monographs,  which  con- 
fine themselves  strictly  to  the  naval  occurrences,  have 
also  appeared.  But  none  of  these  works  can  be  re- 
garded as  giving  a  satisfactorily  full  or  impartial 
account  of  the  war — some  of  them  being  of  the 
"popular"  and  loosely-constructed  order,  while  oth- 
ers treat  it  from  a  purely  partisan  standpoint.  No 
single  book  can  be  quoted  which  would  be  accepted 
by  the  modern  reader  as  doing  justice  to  both  sides, 
or,  indeed,  as  telling  the  whole  story.  Any  one  spe- 
cially interested  in  the  subject  must  read  all,  and 
then  it  will  seem  almost  a  hopeless  task  to  reconcile 
the  many  and  widely  contradictory  statements  he 
will  meet  with. 

There  appear  to  be  three  works  which,  taken  in 

(i)  VOL.  IX.— i 


2  Preface 

combination,  give  the  best  satisfaction  on  the  sub 
ject.  First,  in  James's  "Naval  History  of  Gret 
Britain"  (which  supplies  both  the  material  and  the 
opinions  of  almost  every  subsequent  English  or 
Canadian  historian)  can  be  found  the  British  view 
of  the  case.  It  is  an  invaluable  work,  written  with 
fulness  and  care;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  also  a 
piece  of  special  pleading  by  a  bitter  and  not  over- 
scrupulous partisan.  This,  in  the  second  place,  can 
be  partially  supplemented  by  Fenimore  Cooper's 
"Naval  History  of  the  United  States."  The  latter 
gives  the  American  view  of  the  cruises  and  battles ; 
but  it  is  much  less  of  an  authority  than  James's,  both 
because  it  is  written  without  great  regard  for  exact- 
ness, and  because  all  figures  for  the  American  side 
need  to  be  supplied  from  Lieutenant  (now  Admiral) 
George  E.  Emmons's  statistical  "History  of  the 
United  States  Navy,"  which  is  the  third  of  the 
works  in  question. 

But  even  after  comparing  these  three  authors, 
many  contradictions  remain  unexplained,  and  the 
truth  can  only  be  reached  in  such  cases  by  a  careful 
examination  of  the  navy  "Records,"  the  London 
"Naval  Chronicle,"  "Niles's  Register,"  and  other 
similar  documentary  publications.  Almost  the  only 
good  criticisms  on  the  actions  are  those  incidentally 
given  in  standard  works  on  other  subjects,  such  as 


Preface  3 

Lord  Howard  Douglas's  "Naval  Gunnery,"  and 
Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere's  "Guerres  Mari- 
times."  Much  of  the  material  in  our  Navy  Depart- 
ment has  never  been  touched  at  all.  In  short,  no 
full,  accurate,  and  unprejudiced  history  of  the  war 
has  ever  been  written. 

The  subject  merits  a  closer  scrutiny  than  it  has 
received.  At  present  people  are  beginning  to  real- 
ize that  it  is  folly  for  the  great  English-speaking  Re- 
public to  rely  for  defence  upon  a  navy  composed 
partly  of  antiquated  hulks,  and  partly  of  new  ves- 
sels rather  more  worthless  than  the  old.  It  is  worth 
while  to  study  with  some  care  that  period  of  our  his- 
tory during  which  our  navy  stood  at  the  highest  pitch 
of  its  fame ;  and  to  learn  anything  from  the  past  it 
is  necessary  to  know,  as  near  as  may  be,  the  exact 
truth.  Accordingly,  the  work  should  be  written  im- 
partially, if  only  from  the  narrowest  motives.  With- 
out abating  a  jot  from  one's  devotion  to  his  country 
and  flag,  I  think  a  history  can  be  made  just  enough 
to  warrant  its  being  received  as  an  authority  equally 
among  Americans  and  Englishmen.  I  have  endeav- 
ored to  supply  such  a  work.  It  is  impossible  that 
errors,  both  of  fact  and  opinion,  should  not  have 
crept  into  it ;  and  although  I  have  sought  to  make  it 
in  character  as  non-partisan  as  possible,  these  errors 
will  probably  be  in  favor  of  the  American  side. 


4  Preface 

As  my  only  object  is  to  give  an  accurate  narrative 
of  events,  I  shall  esteem  it  a  particular  favor  if  any 
one  will  furnish  me  with  the  means  of  rectifying 
such  mistakes;  and  if  I  have  done  injustice  to  any 
commander,  or  officer  of  any  grade,  whether  Ameri- 
can or  British,  I  shall  consider  myself  under  great 
obligations  to  those  who  will  set  me  right. 

I  have  been  unable  to  get  access  to  the  original 
reports  of  the  British  commanders,  the  logs  of  the 
British  ships,  or  their  muster-rolls,  and  so  have  been 
obliged  to  take  them  at  second  hand  from  the  "Ga- 
zette," or  "Naval  Chronicle,"  or  some  standard  his- 
tory. The  American  official  letters,  log-books,  orig- 
inal contracts,  muster-rolls,  etc.,  however,  being  pre- 
served in  the  Archives  at  Washington,  I  have  been 
able,  thanks  to  the  courtesy  of  the  Hon.  Wm.  H. 
Hunt,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  to  look  them  over. 
The  set  of  letters  from  the  officers  is  very  complete, 
in  three  series,  —  "Captains'  Letters,"  "Masters' 
Commandant  Letters,"  and  "Officers'  Letters,"  there 
being  several  volumes  for  each  year.  The  books  of 
contracts  contain  valuable  information  as  to  the 
size  and  build  of  some  of  the  vessels.  The  log- 
books are  rather  exasperating,  often  being  very  in- 
complete. Thus  when  I  turned  from  Decatur's 
extremely  vague  official  letter  describing  the  cap- 
ture of  the  Macedonian  to  the  log-book  of  the  frigate 


Preface  5 

United  States,  not  a  fact  about  the  fight  could  be 
gleaned.  The  last  entry  in  the  log  on  the  day  of 
the  fight  is  "Strange  sail  discovered  to  be  a  frigate 
under  English  colors,"  and  the  next  entry  (on  the 
following  day)  relates  to  the  removal  of  the  prison- 
ers. The  log  of  the  Enterprise  is  very  full  indeed, 
for  most  of  the  time,  but  is  a  perfect  blank  for  the 
period  during  which  she  was  commanded  by  Lieu- 
tenant Burrows,  and  in  which  she  fought  the  Boxer. 
I  have  not  been  able  to  find  the  Peacock's  log  at  all, 
though  there  is  a  very  full  set  of  letters  from  her 
commander.  Probably  the  fire  of  1837  destroyed  a 
great  deal  of  valuable  material.  Whenever  it  was 
possible  I  have  referred  to  printed  matter  in  prefer- 
ence to  manuscript,  and  my  authorities  can  thus,  in 
most  cases,  be  easily  consulted. 

In  conclusion  I  desire  •  to  express  my  sincerest 
thanks  to  Captain  James  D.  Bulloch,  formerly  of 
the  United  States  Navy,  and  Commander  Adolf 
Mensing,  formerly  of  the  German  Navy,  without 
whose  advice  and  sympathy  this  work  would  prob- 
ably never  have  been  written  or  even  begun. 

NEW  YORK  CITY,  1882. 


PREFACE    TO    THIRD    EDITION 

{ORIGINALLY  intended  to  write  a  companion 
volume  to  this,  which  should  deal  with  the  oper- 
ations on  land.  But  a  short  examination  showed 
that  these  operations  were  hardly  worth  serious 
study.  They  teach  nothing  new;  it  is  the  old,  old 
lesson,  that  a  miserly  economy  in  preparation  may 
in  the  end  involve  a  lavish  outlay  of  men  and  money, 
which,  after  all,  comes  too  late  to  more  than  partially 
offset  the  evils  produced  by  the  original  short-sighted 
parsimony.  This  might  be  a  lesson  worth  dwelling 
on  did  it  have  any  practical  bearing  on  the  issues 
of  the  present  day;  but  it  has  none,  as  far  as  the 
army  is  concerned.  It  was  criminal  folly  for  Jeffer- 
son, and  his  follower,  Madison,  to  neglect  to  give 
us  a  force  either  of  regulars  or  of  well-trained  vol- 
unteers during  the  twelve  years  they  had  in  which 
to  prepare  for  the  struggle  that  any  one  might  see 
was  inevitable;  but  there  is  now  far  less  need  of  an 
army  than  there  was  then.  Circumstances  have  al- 
tered widely  since  1812.  Instead  of  the  decaying 
might  of  Spain  on  our  Southern  frontier,  we  have 
the  still  weaker  power  of  Mexico.  Instead  of  the 
great  Indian  nations  of  the  interior,  able  to  keep 
civilization  at  bay,  to  hold  in  check  strong  armies, 

(7) 


8  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

to  ravage  large  stretches  of  territory,  and  needing 
formidable  military  expeditions  to  overcome  them, 
there  are  now  only  left  broken  and  scattered  bands 
which  are  sources  of  annoyance  merely.  To  the 
North  we  are  still  hemmed  in  by  the  Canadian  pos- 
sessions of  Great  Britain;  but  since  1812  our  strength 
has  increased  so  prodigiously,  both  absolutely  and 
relatively,  while  England's  military  power  has  re- 
mained almost  stationary,  that  we  need  now  be  un- 
der no  apprehensions  from  her  land-forces ;  for,  even 
if  checked  in  the  beginning,  we  could  not  help  con- 
quering in  the  end  by  sheer  weight  of  numbers,  if 
by  nothing  else.  So  that  there  is  now  no  cause  for 
our  keeping  up  a  large  army ;  while,  on  the  contrary, 
the  necessity  for  an  efficient  navy  is  so  evident  that 
only  our  almost  incredible  short-sightedness  pre- 
vents our  at  once  preparing  one. 

Not  only  do  the  events  of  the  war  on  land  teach 
very  little  to  the  statesman  who  studies  history  in 
order  to  avoid  in  the  present  the  mistakes  of  the 
past,  but  besides  this,  the  battles  and  campaigns  are 
of  very  little  interest  to  the  student  of  military  mat- 
ters. The  British  regulars,  trained  in  many  wars, 
thrashed  the  raw  troops  opposed  to  them  whenever 
they  had  anything  like  a  fair  chance;  but  this  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at,  for  the  same  thing  has  always 
happened  the  world  over  under  similar  conditions. 
Our  defeats  were  exactly  such  as  any  man  might 
have  foreseen,  and  there  is  nothing  to  be  learned 
from  the  follies  committed  by  incompetent  com- 
manders and  untrained  troops  when  in  the  presence 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  9 

of  skilled  officers  having  under  them  disciplined  sol- 
diers. The  humiliating  surrenders,  abortive  at- 
tacks, and  panic  routs  of  our  armies  can  all  be  paral- 
leled in  the  campaigns  waged  by  Napoleon's  mar- 
shals against  the  Spaniards  and  Portuguese  in  the 
years  immediately  preceding  the  outbreak  of  our 
own  war.  The  Peninsular  troops  were  as  little  able 
to  withstand  the  French  veterans  as  were  our  militia 
to  hold  their  own  against  the  British  regulars.  But 
it  must  always  be  remembered,  to  our  credit,  that 
while  seven  years  of  fighting  failed  to  make  the 
Spaniards  able  to  face  the  French,1  two  years  of 
warfare  gave  us  soldiers  who  could  stand  against 
the  best  men  of  Britain.  On  the  Northern  frontier 
we  never  developed  a  great  general, — Brown's  claim 
to  the  title  rests  only  on  his  not  having  committed 
the  phenomenal  follies  of  his  predecessors, — but  by 
1814  our  soldiers  had  become  seasoned,  and  we  had 
acquired  some  good  brigade  commanders,  notably 
Scott,  so  that  in  that  year  we  played  on  even  terms 
with  the  British.  But  the  battles,  though  marked 
by  as  bloody  and  obstinate  fighting  as  ever  took 
place,  were  waged  between  small  bodies  of  men,  and 
were  not  distinguished  by  any  feats  of  generalship, 
so  that  they  are  not  of  any  special  interest  to  the 
historian.  In  fact,  the  only  really  noteworthy  feat 

1  At  the  closing  battle  of  Toulouse,  fought  between  the 
allies  and  the  French,  the  flight  of  the  Spaniards  was  so 
rapid  and  universal  as  to  draw  from  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
the  bitter  observation,  that  "though  he  had  seen  a  good  many 
remarkable  things  in  the  course  of  his  life,  yet  this  was  the 
first  time  he  had  ever  seen  ten  thousand  men  running  a  race." 


io  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

of  arms  of  the  war  took  place  at  New  Orleans,  and 
the  only  military  genius  that  the  struggle  developed 
was  Andrew  Jackson.  His  deeds  are  worthy  of  all 
praise,  and  the  battle  he  won  was  in  many  ways  so 
peculiar  as  to  make  it  well  worth  a  much  closer  study 
than  it  has  yet  received.  It  was  by  far  the  most 
prominent  event  of  the  war;  it  was  a  victory  which 
reflected  high  honor  on  the  general  and  soldiers  who 
won  it,  and  it  was  in  its  way  as  remarkable  as  any 
of  the  great  battles  that  took  place  about  the  same 
time  in  Europe.  Such  being  the  case,  I  have  de- 
voted a  chapter  to  its  consideration  at  the  conclusion 
of  the  chapters  devoted  to  the  naval  operations. 

As  before  said,  the  other  campaigns  on  land  do 
not  deserve  very  minute  attention;  but,  for  the  sake 
of  rendering  the  account  of  the  battle  of  New  Or- 
leans more  intelligible,  I  will  give  a  hasty  sketch 
of  the  principal  engagements  that  took  place  else- 
where. 

The  war  opened  in  mid-summer  of  1812,  by  the 
campaign  of  General  Hull  on  the  Michigan  frontier. 
With  two  or  three  thousand  raw  troops  he  invaded 
Canada.  About  the  same  time  Fort  Mackinaw  was 
surrendered  by  its  garrison  of  60  Americans  to  a 
British  and  Indian  force  of  600.  Hull's  campaign 
was  unfortunate  from  the  beginning.  Near  Browns- 
town  the  American  Colonel  Van  Home,  with  some 
200  men,  was  ambushed  and  routed  by  Tecumseh 
and  his  Indians.  In  revenge  Colonel  Miller,  with 
600  Americans,  at  Maguaga  attacked  150  British 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  n 

and  Canadians  under  Captain  Muir,  and  250  In- 
dians under  Tecumseh,  and  whipped  them, — Te- 
cumseh's  Indians  standing  their  ground  longest. 
The  Americans  lost  75,  their  foes  180  men.  At 
Chicago  the  small  force  of  66  Americans  was  sur- 
prised and  massacred  by  the  Indians.  Meanwhile, 
General  Brock,  the  British  commander,  advanced 
against  Hull  with  a  rapidity  and  decision  that 
seemed  to  paralyze  his  senile  and  irresolute  oppo- 
nent. The  latter  retreated  to  Detroit,  where,  with- 
out striking  a  blow,  he  surrendered  1,400  men  to 
Brock's  nearly  equal  force,  which  consisted  nearly 
one-half  of  Indians  under  Tecumseh.  On  the  Ni- 
agara frontier,  an  estimable  and  honest  old  gentle- 
man and  worthy  citizen,  who  knew  nothing  of  mili- 
tary matters,  Gen.  Van  Rensselaer,  tried  to  cross 
over  and  attack  the  British  at  Queenstown;  1,100 
Americans  got  across  and  were  almost  all  killed 
or  captured  by  an  equal  number  of  British,  Cana- 
dians, and  Indians,  while  on  the  opposite  side  a 
larger  number  of  their  countrymen  looked  on, 
and  with  abject  cowardice  refused  to  cross  to 
their  assistance.  The  command  of  the  army  was 
then  handed  over  to  a  ridiculous  personage  named 
Smythe,  who  issued  proclamations  so  bombastic  that 
they  really  must  have  come  from  an  unsound  mind, 
and  then  made  a  ludicrously  abortive  effort  at  inva- 
sion, which  failed  almost  of  its  own  accord.  A  Brit- 
ish and  Canadian  force  of  less  than  400  men  was 
foiled  in  an  assault  on  Ogdensburg,  after  a  slight 
skirmish,  by  about  1,000  Americans  under  Brown; 


12  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

and  with  this  trifling  success  the  military  operations 
of  the  year  came  to  an  end. 

Early  in  1813,  Ogdensburg  was  again  attacked, 
this  time  by  between  500  and  600  British,  who  took 
it  after  a  brisk  resistance  from  some  300  militia ;  the 
British  lost  60  and  the  Americans  20,  in  killed  and 
wounded.  General  Harrison,  meanwhile,  had  be- 
gun the  campaign  in  the  Northwest.  At  French- 
town,  on  the  river  Raisin,  Winchester's  command 
of  about  900  Western  troops  was  surprised  by  a 
force  of  1,100  men,  half  of  them  Indians,  under  the 
British  Colonel  Proctor.  The  right  division,  taken 
by  surprise,  gave  up  at  once ;  the  left  division,  mainly 
Kentucky  riflemen,  and  strongly  posted  in  houses 
and  stockaded  inclosures,  made  a  stout  resistance, 
and  only  surrendered  after  a  bloody  fight,  in  which 
1 80  British  and  about  half  as  many  Indians  were 
killed  or  wounded.  Over  300  Americans  were  slain, 
some  in  the  battle,  but  most  in  the  bloody  massacre 
that  followed.  After  this,  General  Harrison  went 
into  camp  at  Fort  Meigs,  where,  with  about  1,100 
men,  he  was  besieged  by  1,000  British  and  Cana- 
dians under  Proctor  and  1,200  Indians  under  Te- 
cumseh.  A  force  of  1,200  Kentucky  militia  ad- 
vanced to  his  relief  and  tried  to  cut  its  way  into  the 
fort  while  the  garrison  made  a  sortie.  The  sortie 
was  fairly  successful,  but  the  Kentuckians  were  scat- 
tered like  chaff  by  the  British  regulars  in  the  open, 
and  when  broken  were  cut  to  pieces  by  the  Indians  in 
the  woods.  Nearly  two-thirds  of  the  relieving  troops 
were  killed  or  captured ;  about  400  got  into  the  fort. 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  13 

Soon  afterward  Proctor  abandoned  the  siege.  Fort 
Stephenson,  garrisoned  by  Major  Croghan  and  160 
men,  was  attacked  by  a  force  of  391  British  regu- 
lars, who  tried  to  carry  it  by  assault,  and  were  re- 
pulsed with  the  loss  of  a  fourth  of  their  number. 
Some  four  thousand  Indians  joined  Proctor,  but 
most  of  them  left  him  after  Perry's  victory  on  Lake 
Erie.  Then  Harrison,  having  received  large  rein- 
forcements, invaded  Canada.  At  the  River  Thames 
his  army  of  3,500  men  encountered  and  routed  be- 
tween 600  and  700  British  under  Proctor,  and 
about  1,000  Indians  under  Tecumseh.  The  battle 
was  decided  at  once  by  a  charge  of  the  Kentucky 
mounted  riflemen,  who  broke  through  the  regulars, 
took  them  in  rear,  and  captured  them,  and  then  dis- 
mounting attacked  the  flank  of  the  Indians,  who 
were  also  assailed  by  the  infantry.  Proctor  escaped 
by  the  skin  of  his  teeth  and  Tecumseh  died  fighting, 
like  the  hero  that  he  was.  This  battle  ended  the 
campaign  in  the  Northwest.  In  this  quarter  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  war  was,  on  the  part  of  the 
Americans,  mainly  one  against  Indians;  the  latter 
always  forming  over  half  of  the  British  forces. 
Many  of  the  remainder  were  French  Canadians,  and 
the  others  were  regulars.  The  American  armies, 
on  the  contrary,  were  composed  of  the  armed  set- 
tlers of  Kentucky  and  Ohio,  native  Americans,  of 
English  speech  and  blood,  who  were  battling  for 
lands  that  were  to  form  the  heritage  of  their  chil- 
dren. In  the  West  the  war  was  only  the  closing 
act  of  the  struggle  that  for  many  years  had  been 


14  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

waged  by  the  hardy  and  restless  pioneers  of  our 
race,  as  with  rifle  and  axe  they  carved  out  the 
mighty  empire  that  we  their  children  inherit ;  it  was 
but  the  final  effort  with  which  they  wrested  from 
the  Indian  lords  of  the  soil  the  wide  and  fair  do- 
main that  now  forms  the  heart  of  our  great  Re- 
public. It  was  the  breaking  down  of  the  last  bar- 
rier that  stayed  the  flood  of  our  civilization;  it 
settled,  once  and  forever,  that  henceforth  the  law, 
the  tongue,  and  the  blood  of  the  land  should  be 
neither  Indian,  nor  yet  French,  but  English.  The 
few  French  of  the  West  were  fighting  against  a  race 
that  was  to  leave  as  little  trace  of  them  as  of  the 
doomed  Indian  peoples  with  whom  they  made  com- 
mon cause.  The  presence  of  the  British  mercenaries 
did  not  alter  the  character  of  the  contest ;  it  merely 
served  to  show  the  bitter  and  narrow  hatred  with 
fwhich  the  Mother-Island  regarded  her  greater 
daughter,  predestined  as  the  latter  was  to  be  queen 
of  the  lands  that  lay  beyond  the  Atlantic. 

Meanwhile,  on  Lake  Ontario,  the  Americans 
made  successful  descents  on  York  and  Fort  George, 
scattering  or  capturing  their  comparatively  small 
garrisons,  while  a  counter  descent  by  the  British 
on  Sackett's  Harbor  failed,  the  attacking  force  be- 
ing too  small.  After  the  capture  of  Fort  George, 
the  Americans  invaded  Canada;  but  their  advance 
guard,  1,400  strong,  under  Generals  Chandler  and 
Winder,  was  surprised  in  the  night  by  800  British, 
who,  advancing  with  the  bayonet,  broke  up  the  camp, 
capturing  both  the  generals  and  half  the  artillery. 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  15 

Though  the  assailants,  who  lost  220  of  their  small 
number,  suffered  much  more  than  the  Americans, 
yet  the  latter  were  completely  demoralized,  and  at 
once  retreated  to  Fort  George.  Soon  afterward, 
Col.  Boerstler  with  about  600  men  surrendered  with 
shamefully  brief  resistance  to  a  somewhat  smaller 
force  of  British  and  Indians.  Then  about  300  Brit- 
ish crossed  the  Niagara  to  attack  Black  Rock,  which 
they  took,  but  were  afterward  driven  off  by  a  large 
body  of  militia  with  the  loss  of  40  men.  Later  in 
the  season  the  American  General  McClure  wantonly 
burned  the  village  of  Newark,  and  then  retreated 
in  panic  flight  across  the  Niagara.  In  retaliation 
the  British  in  turn  crossed  the  river;  600  regulars 
surprised  and  captured  in  the  night  Fort  Niagara, 
with  its  garrison  of  400  men;  two  thousand  troop- 
ers attacked  Black  Rock,  and,  after  losing  over  a 
hundred  men  in  a  smart  engagement  with  somewhat 
over  1,500  militia  whom  they  easily  dispersed,  cap- 
tured and  burned  both  it  and  Buffalo.  Before  these 
last  events  took  place  another  invasion  of  Canada 
had  been  attempted,  this  time  under  General  Wil- 
kinson, "an  unprincipled  imbecile,"  as  Scott  very 
properly  styled  him.  It  was  mismanaged  in  every 
possible  way,  and  was  a  total  failure;  it  was  attend- 
ed with  but  one  battle,  that  of  Chrystler's  Farm,  in 
which  1,000  British,  with  the  loss  of  less  than  200 
men,  beat  back  double  their  number  of  Americans, 
who  lost  nearly  500  men  and  also  one  piece  of  artil- 
lery. The  American  army  near  Lake  Champlain 
had  done  nothing,  its  commander,  General  Wade 


1 6  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

Hampton,  being,  if  possible,  even  more  incompetent 
than  Wilkinson.  He  remained  stationary  while  a 
small  force  of  British  plundered  Plattsburg  and 
Burlington;  then,  with  5,000  men  he  crossed  into 
Canada,  but  returned  almost  immediately,  after  a 
small  skirmish  at  Chauteaugay  between  his  advance 
guard  and  some  500  Canadians,  in  which  the  former 
lost  41  and  the  latter  22  men.  This  affair,  in  which 
hardly  a  tenth  of  the  American  force  was  engaged, 
has  been,  absurdly  enough,  designated  a  "battle"  by 
most  British  and  Canadian  historians.  In  reality 
it  was  the  incompetency  of  their  general  and  not  the 
valor  of  their  foes  that  caused  the  retreat  of  the 
Americans.  The  same  comment,  by  the  way,  ap- 
plies to  the  so-called  "Battle"  of  Plattsburg,  in  the 
following  year,  which  may  have  been  lost  by  Sir 
George  Prevost,  but  was  certainly  not  won  by  the 
Americans.  And,  again,  a  similar  criticism  should 
be  passed  on  General  Wilkinson's  attack  on  La 
Colle  Mill,  near  the  head  of  the  same  lake.  Neither 
one  of  the  three  affairs  was  a  stand-up  fight ;  in  each 
a  greatly  superior  force,  led  by  an  utterly  incapable 
general,  retreated  after  a  slight  skirmish  with  an 
enemy  whose  rout  would  have  been  a  matter  of  cer- 
tainty had  the  engagement  been  permitted  to  grow 
serious. 

In  the  early  spring  of  1814  a  small  force  of  160 
American  regulars,  under  Captain  Holmes,  fighting 
from  behind  felled  logs,  routed  200  British  with  a 
loss  of  65  men,  they  themselves  losing  but  8.  On 
Lake  Ontario  the  British  made  a  descent  on  Oswego 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  17 

and  took  it  by  fair  assault;  and  afterward  lost  180 
men  who  tried  to  cut  out  some  American  transports, 
and  were  killed  or  captured  to  a  man.  All  through 
the  spring  and  early  summer  the  army  on  the  Niag- 
ara frontier  was  carefully  drilled  by  Brown,  and 
more  especially  by  Scott,  and  the  results  of  this 
drilling  were  seen  in  the  immensely  improved  effec- 
tiveness of  the  soldiers  in  the  campaign  that  opened 
in  July.  Fort  Erie  was  captured  with  little  resist- 
ance, and  on  the  4th  of  July,  at  the  river  Chippeway, 
Brown,  with  two  brigades  of  regulars,  each  about 
1,200  strong,  under  Scott  and  Ripley,  and  a  brigade 
of  800  militia  and  Indians  under  Porter,  making  a 
total  of  about  3,200  men,  won  a  stand-up  fight 
against  the  British  General  Riall,  who  had  nearly 
2,500  men,  1,800  of  them  regulars.  Porter's  bri- 
gade opened  by  driving  in  the  Canadian  militia  and 
the  Indians;  but  was  itself  checked  by  the  British 
light-troops.  Ripley's  brigade  took  very  little  part 
in  the  battle,  three  of  the  regiments  not  being  en- 
gaged at  all,  and  the  fourth  so  slightly  as  to  lose  but 
five  men.  The  entire  brunt  of  the  action  was  borne 
by  Scott's  brigade,  which  was  fiercely  attacked  by 
the  bulk  of  the  British  regulars  under  Riall.  The 
latter  advanced  with  great  bravery,  but  were  ter- 
ribly cut  up  by  the  fire  of  Scott's  regulars ;  and  when 
they  had  come  nearly  up  to  him,  Scott  charged  with 
the  bayonet  and  drove  them  clean  off  the  field.  The 
American  loss  was  322,  including  23  Indians;  the 
British  loss  was  515,  excluding  that  of  the  Indians. 
The  number  of  Americans  actually  engaged  did  not 


1 8  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

exceed  that  of  the  British;  and  Scott's  brigade,  in 
fair  fight,  closed  by  a  bayonet  charge,  defeated  an 
equal  force  of  British  regulars. 

On  July  25th  occurred  the  Battle  of  Niagara,  or 
Lundy's  Lane,  fought  between  General  Brown  with 
3,ioo2  Americans  and  General  Drummond  with 
3,500  3  British.  It  was  brought  on  by  accident  in 
the  evening,  and  was  waged  with  obstinate  courage 
and  savage  slaughter  till  midnight.  On  both  sides 
the  forces  straggled  into  action  by  detachments. 
The  Americans  formed  the  attacking  party.  As 
before,  Scott's  brigade  bore  the  brunt  of  the  fight, 
and  over  half  of  his  men  were  killed  or  wounded; 
he  himself  was  disabled  and  borne  from  the  field. 
The  struggle  was  of  the  most  desperate  character, 
the  combatants  showing  a  stubborn  courage  that 
could  not  be  surpassed.4  Charge  after  charge  was 
made  with  the  bayonet,  and  the  artillery  was  taken 
and  retaken  once  and  again.  The  loss  was  nearly 

1  As  near  as  can  be  found  out;  most  American  authorities 
make  it  much  less;  Lossing,  for  example,  says,  only  2,400. 

3  General   Drummond  in   his  official  letter  makes  it  but 
2,800;  James,  who  gives  the  details,  makes  it  3,000  rank  and 
file;  adding  13  per  cent  for  the  officers,  sergeants,  and  drum- 
mers, brings  it  up  to  3,400;  and  we  still  have  to  count  in  the 
artillery  drivers,  etc. 

4  General  Drummond  writes:  "In  so  determined  a  manner 
were  their  attacks  directed  against  our  guns  that  our  artil- 
lerymen were  bayoneted  while  in  the  act  of  loading,  and  the 
muzzle  of  the  enemy's  guns  were  advanced  within  a  few 
yards  of  ours."     Even  James  says:  "Upon  the  whole,  how- 
ever, the  American  troops  fought  bravely ;  and  the  conduct 
of  many  of  the  officers,  of   the  artillery  corps  especially, 
would  have  done  honor  to  any  service." 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  19 

equal:  on  the  side  of  the  Americans,  854  men  (in- 
cluding Generals  Brown  and  Scott,  wounded)  and 
two  guns;  on  that  of  the  British,  878  men  (includ- 
ing General  Riall  captured)  and  one  gun.  Each 
side  claimed  it  as  a  victory  over  superior  numbers. 
The  truth  is  beyond  question  that  the  British  had 
the  advantage  in  numbers,  and  a  still  greater  advan- 
tage in  position;  while  it  is  equally  beyond  question 
that  it  was  a  defeat  and  not  a  victory  for  the  Ameri- 
cans. They  left  the  field  and  retired  in  perfect  or- 
der to  Fort  Erie,  while  the  British  held  the  field  and 
the  next  day  pursued  their  foes. 

Having  received  some  reinforcements  General 
Drummond,  now  with  about  3,600  men,  pushed  for- 
ward to  besiege  Fort  Erie,  in  which  was  the  Ameri- 
can army,  some  2,400  strong,  under  General  Gaines. 
Col.  Tucker  with  500  British  regulars  was  sent 
across  the  Niagara  to  destroy  the  batteries  at  Black 
Rock,  but  was  defeated  by  300  American  regulars 
under  Major  Morgan,  fighting  from  behind  a  strong 
breastwork  of  felled  trees,  with  a  creek  in  front. 
On  the  night  of  the  I5th  of  August,  the  British  in 
three  columns  advanced  to  storm  the  American 
works,  but  after  making  a  most  determined  assault 
were  beaten  off.  The  assailants  lost  900  men,  the 
assailed  about  80.  After  this  nothing  was  done  till 
September  I7th,  when  General  Brown,  who  had 
resumed  command  of  the  American  forces,  deter- 
mined upon  and  executed  a  sortie.  Each  side  had 
received  reinforcements;  the  Americans  numbered 
over  3,000,  the  British  nearly  4,000.  The  fighting 


20  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

was  severe,  the  Americans  losing  500  men ;  but  their 
opponents  lost  600  men,  and  most  of  their  batteries 
were  destroyed.  Each  side,  as  usual,  claimed  the 
victory;  but,  exactly  as  Lundy's  Lane  must  be  ac- 
counted an  American  defeat,  as  our  forces  retreated 
from  the  ground,  so  this  must  be  considered  an 
American  victory,  for  after  it  the  British  broke  up 
camp  and  drew  off  to  Chippeway.  Nothing  more 
was  done,  and  on  November  5th  the  American 
army  recrossed  the  Niagara.  Though  marked  by 
some  brilliant  feats  of  arms  this  four  months'  in- 
vasion of  Canada,  like  those  that  had  preceded  it, 
thus  came  to  nothing.  But  at  the  same  time  a  Brit- 
ish invasion  of  the  United  States  was  repulsed  far 
more  disgracefully.  Sir 'George  Prevost,  with  an 
army  of  13,000  veteran  troops,  marched  south  along 
the  shores  of  Lake  Champlain  to  Plattsburg,  which 
was  held  by  General  Macomb  with  2,000  regulars, 
and  perhaps  double  that  number  of  nearly  worthless 
militia; — a  force  that  the  British  could  have  scat- 
tered to  the  winds,  though,  as  they  were  strongly 
posted,  not  without  severe  loss.  But  the  British 
fleet  was  captured  by  Commodore  MacDonough  in 
the  fight  on  the  lake;  and  then  Sir  George,  after 
some  heavy  skirmishing  between  the  outposts  of  the 
armies,  in  which  the  Americans  had  the  advantage, 
fled  precipitately  back  to  Canada. 

All  through  the  war  the  sea-coasts  of  the  United 
States  had  been  harried  by  small  predatory  excur- 
sions ;  a  part  of  what  is  now  the  State  of  Maine  was 
conquered  with  little  resistance,  and  kept  until  the 


Preface  to  Third  Edition  21 

close  of  hostilities ;  and  some  of  the  towns  on  the 
shores  of  Chesapeake  Bay  had  been  plundered  or 
burnt.  In  August,  1814,  a  more  serious  invasion 
was  planned,  and  some  5,000  troops — regulars,  sail- 
ors, and  marines — were  landed,  under  the  command 
of  General  Ross.  So  utterly  helpless  was  the  Demo- 
cratic Administration  at  Washington,  that  during 
the  two  years  of  warfare  hardly  any  steps  had  been 
taken  to  protect  the  Capitol,  or  the  country  round 
about;  what  little  was  done  was  done  entirely  too 
late,  and  bungled  badly  in  addition.  History  has 
not  yet  done  justice  to  the  ludicrous  and  painful 
folly  and  stupidity  of  which  the  government  found- 
ed by  Jefferson,  and  carried  on  by  Madison,  was 
guilty,  both  in  its  preparations  for,  and  in  its  way  of 
carrying  on,  this  war ;  nor  is  it  yet  realized  that  the  - 
men  just  mentioned,  and  their  associates,  are  pri- 
marily responsible  for  the  loss  we  suffered  in  it,  and 
the  bitter  humiliation  some  of  its  incidents  caused 
us.  The  small  British  army  marched  at  will  through 
Virginia  and  Maryland,  burned  Washington,  and 
finally  retreated  from  before  Baltimore  and  re-em- 
barked to  take  part  in  the  expedition  against  New 
Orleans.  Twice,  at  Bladensburg  and  North  Point, 
it  came  in  contact  with  superior  numbers  of  militia 
in  fairly  good  position.  In  each  case  the  result  was 
the  same.  After  some  preliminary  skirmishing, 
manoeuvring,  and  volley  firing,  the  British  charged 
with  the  bayonet.  The  rawest  regiments  among  the 
American  militia  then  broke  at  once;  the  others 
kept  pretty  steady,  pouring  in  quite  a  destructive 


12  Preface  to  Third  Edition 

fire,  until  the  regulars  had  come  up  close  to  them, 
when  they  also  fled.  The  British  regulars  were  too 
heavily  loaded  to  pursue,  and,  owing  to  their  mode 
of  attack,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  their  oppo- 
nents ran  away,  the  loss  of  the  latter  was  in  each  case 
very  slight.  At  North  Point,  however,  the  militia, 
being  more  experienced,  behaved  better  than  at 
Bladensburg.  In  neither  case  were  the  British  put 
to  any  trouble  to  win  their  victory. 

The  above  is  a  brief  sketch  of  the  campaigns  of 
the  war.  fit"  is  not  cheerful  reading  for  an  American, 
nor  yet  of  interest  to  a  military  student ;  and  its  les- 
sons have  been  taught  so  often  by  similar  occur- 
rences in  other  lands  under  like  circumstances,  and 
moreover,  teach  such  self-evident  truths,  that  they 
scarcely  need  to  be  brought  to  the  notice  of  a  his- 
torian. But  the  crowning  event  of  the  war  was  the 
Battle  of  New  Orleans;  remarkable  in  its  military 
aspect,  and  a  source  of  pride  to  every  American.  It 
is  well  worth  a  more  careful  study,  and  to  it  I  have 
devoted  the  last  chapter  of  this  book,  f 

NEW  YORK  CITY,  1883. 


CONTENTS 


PA  R  T    ONE 
CHAPTER    I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Causes  of  the  War  of  1812 — Conflicting  views  of  America 
and  Britain  as  regards  neutral  rights — Those  of  the 
former  power  right — Impossibility  of  avoiding  hostili- 
ties— Declaration  of  war — General  features  of  the  con- 
test— Racial  identity  of  the  contestants — The  treaty  of 
peace  nominally  leaves  the  situation  unchanged — But 
practically  settles  the  dispute  in  our  favor  in  respect  to 
maritime  rights — The  British  navy  and  its  reputation 
prior  to  1812 — Comparison  with  other  European  navies 
— British  and  American  authorities  consulted,  in  the 
present  work 27 

CHAPTER   II 

Overwhelming  naval  supremacy  of  England  when  Ameri- 
ca declared  war  against  her — Race  identity  of  the  com- 
batants— The  American  navy  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war — Officers  well  trained — Causes  tending  to  make  our 
seamen  especially  efficient — Close  similarity  between 
the  British  and  American  sailors — Our  ships  manned 
chiefly  by  native  Americans,  many  of  whom  had  for- 
merly been  impressed  into  the  British  navy — Quotas  of 
seamen  contributed  by  the  different  States — Navy  yard^ 
—Lists  of  officers  and  men— List  of  vessels— Tonnage — 

(23) 


24  Contents 

Different  ways  of  estimating  it  in  Britain  and  America 
— Ratings — American  ships  properly  rated — Arma- 
ments of  the  frigates  and  corvettes — Three  styles  of 
guns  used — Difference  between  long  guns  and  carron- 
ades — Short  weight  of  American  shot — Comparison  of 
British  frigates  rating  38,  and  American  frigates  rating 
44  guns — Compared  with  a  74 50 


CHAPTER  III 
1812 

ON      THE      OCEAN 

Commodore  Rodgers'  cruise  and  unsuccessful  chase  of 
the  Belvidera — Cruise  of  the  Essex — Captain  Hull's 
cruise,  and  escape  from  the  squadron  of  Commodore 
Broke — Constitution  captures  Guerriere —  Wasp  cap- 
tures Frolic — Second  unsuccessful  cruise  of  Commo- 
dore Rodgers — United  States  captures  Macedonian — 
Constitution  captures  Java — Essex  starts  on  a  cruise 
— Summary 105 

CHAPTER   IV 
1812 

ON     THE     LAKES 

PRELIMINARY — The  combatants  starting  nearly  on  an 
equality — Difficulties  of  creating  a  naval  force — Diffi- 
culty of  comparing  the  force  of  the  rival  squadrons — 
Meagreness  of  the  published  accounts — Unreliability  of 
James — ONTARIO — Extraordinary  nature  of  the  Ameri- 
can squadron — Canadian  squadron  forming  only  a  kind 


Contents  25 

of  water  militia — Sackett's  Harbor  feebly  attacked  by 
Commodore  Earle— Commodore  Chauncy  bombards 
York — ERIE — Lieutenant  Elliott  captures  the  Detroit 
and  Caledonia — Unsuccessful  expedition  of  Lieutenant 
Angus 178 

CHAPTER  V 
1813 

ON    THE    OCEAN 

Blockade  of  the  American  coast — The  Essex  in  the  South 
Pacific — The  Hornet  captures  the  Peacock — American 
privateers  cut-out  by  British  boats — Unsuccessful  cruise 
of  Commodore  Rodgers — The  Chesapeake  is  captured 
by  the  Shannon — Futile  gunboat  actions — Defence  of 
Craney  Island — Cutting-out  expeditions — The  Argus 
is  captured  by  the  Pelican — The  Enterprise  captures 
the  Boxer — Summary 201 


CHAPTER  VI 
1813 

ON    THE    LAKES 

ONTARIO — Comparison  of  the  rival  squadrons — Chauncy 
takes  York  and  Fort  George — Yeo  is  repulsed  at  Sack- 
ett's Harbor,  but  keeps  command  of  the  lake — Chauncy 
sails — Yeo's  partial  victory  off  Niagara — Indecisive  ac- 
tion off  the  Genesee — Chauncy 's  partial  victory  off  Bur- 
lington, which  gives  him  the  command  of  the  lake — 
ERIE — Perry's  success  in  creating  a  fleet— His  victory 
— CHAMPLAIN — Loss  of  the  Growler  and  Eagle — Sum- 
mary   267 

VOL.  IX.— 2 


NAVAL     WAR     OF     1812 

CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Causes  of  the  War  of  1812 — Conflicting  views  of  America 
and  Britain  as  regards  neutral  rights — Those  of  the 
former  power  right — Impossibility  of  avoiding  hostili- 
ties— Declaration  of  war — General  features  of  the  con- 
test— Racial  identity  of  the  contestants — The  treaty  of 
peace  nominally  leaves  the  situation  unchanged — But 
practically  settles  the  dispute  in  our  favor  in  respect  to 
maritime  rights — The  British  navy  and  its  reputation 
prior  to  1812 — Comparison  with  other  European  navies 
— British  and  American  authorities  consulted  in  the 
present  work 

HPHE  view  professed  by  Great  Britain  in  1812 
1  respecting  the  rights  of  belligerents  and  neu- 
trals was  diametrically  opposite  to  that  held  by  the 
United  States.  "Between  England  and  the  United 
States  of  America,"  writes  a  British  author,  "a 
spirit  of  animosity,  caused  chiefly  by  the  impress- 
ment of  British  seamen,  or  of  seamen  asserted  to 
be  such,  from  on  board  of  American  merchant  ves- 
sels, had  unhappily  subsisted  for  a  long  time"  prior 
to  the  war.  "It  is,  we  believe,"  he  continues,  "an 
acknowledged  maxim  of  public  law,  as  well  that  no 
nation  but  the  one  he  belongs  to  can  release  a  sub- 
ject from  his  natural  allegiance,  as  that,  provided 
the  jurisdiction  of  another  independent  state  be  not 
infringed,  every  nation  has  a  right  to  enforce  the 
services  of  her  subjects  wherever  they  may  be  found. 

(27) 


28  Naval  War  of  1812 

Nor  has  any  neutral  nation  such  a  jurisdiction  over 
her  merchant  vessels  upon  the  high  seas  as  to  ex- 
clude a  belligerent  nation  from  the  right  of  search- 
ing them  for  contraband  of  war  or  for  the  property 
or  persons  of  her  enemies.  And  if,  in  the  exercise 
of  that  right,  the  belligerent  should  discover  on 
board  of  the  neutral  vessel  a  subject  who  has  with- 
drawn himself  from  his  lawful  allegiance,  the  neu- 
tral can  have  no  fair  ground  for  refusing  to  deliver 
him  up;  more  especially  if  that  subject  is  proved  to 
be  a  deserter  from  the  sea  or  land  service  of  the 
former."  * 

Great  Britain's  doctrine  was  "once  a  subject  al- 
ways a  subject."  On  the  other  hand,  the  United 
States  maintained  that  any  foreigner,  after  five 
years'  residence  within  her  territory,  and  after  hav- 
ing complied  with  certain  forms,  became  one  of  her 
citizens  as  completely  as  if  he  was  native  born. 
Great  Britain  contended  that  her  warships  possessed 
the  right  of  searching  all  neutral  vessels  for  the 
property  and  persons  of  her  foes.  The  United 
States,  resisting  this  claim,  asserted  that  "free  bot- 
toms made  free  goods,"  and  that  consequently  her 
ships  when  on  the  high  seas  should  not  be  molested 
on  any  pretext  whatever.  Finally,  Great  Britain's 
system  of  impressment,2  by  which  men  could  be 
forcibly  seized  and  made  to  serve  in  her  navy,  no 

1  "The  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,"  by  William  James, 
Vol.  IV,  p.  324.  (New  edition  by  Captain  Chamier,  R.  N., 
London,  1837.) 

*  The  best  idea  of  which  can  be  gained  by  reading  Marry- 
at's  novels. 


Introductory  29 


matter  at  what  cost  to  themselves,  was  repugnant  to 
every  American  idea. 

Such  wide  differences  in  the  views  of  the  two 
nations  produced  endless  difficulties.  To  escape  the 
press-gang,  or  for  other  reasons,  many  British  sea- 
men took  service  under  the  American  flag;  and  if 
they  were  demanded  back,  it  is  not  likely  that  they 
or  their  American  shipmates  had  much  hesitation  in 
swearing  either  that  they  were  not  British  at  all, 
or  else  that  they  had  been  naturalized  as  Americans. 
Equally  probable  is  it  that  the  American  blockade- 
runners  were  guilty  of  a  great  deal  of  fraud  and 
more  or  less  thinly  veiled  perjury.  But  the  wrongs 
done  by  the  Americans  were  insignificant  compared 
with  those  they  received.  Any  innocent  merchant 
vessel  was  liable  to  seizure  at  any  moment;  and 
when  overhauled  by  a  British  cruiser  short  of  men 
was  sure  to  be  stripped  of  most  of  her  crew.  The 
British  officers  were  themselves  the  judges  as  to 
whether  a  seaman  should  be  pronounced  a  native 
of  America  or  of  Britain,  and  there  was  no  appeal 
from  their  judgment.  If  a  captain  lacked  his  full 
complement  there  was  little  doubt  as  to  the  view 
he  would  take  of  any  man's  nationality.  The  wrongs 
inflicted  on  our  seafaring  countrymen  by  their  im- 
pressment into  foreign  ships  formed  the  main  cause 
of  the  war. 

There  were  still  other  grievances  which  are  thus 
presented  by  the  British  Admiral  Cochrane.3  "Our 

3  "Autobiography  of  a  Seaman,"  by  Thomas,  tenth  Earl  of 
Dundonald,  Admiral  of  the  Red,  Rear-Admiral  of  the  Fleet, 
London,  1860,  vol.  I,  p.  24. 


30  Naval  War  of  1812 

treatment  of  its  (America's)  citizens  was  scarcely 
in  accordance  with  the  national  privileges  to  which 
the  young  Republic  had  become  entitled.  There 
were  no  doubt  many  individuals  among  the  Ameri- 
can people  who,  caring  little  for  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment, considered  it  more  profitable  to  break  than 
to  keep  the  laws  of  nations  by  aiding  and  supporting 
our  enemy  (France),  and  it  was  against  such  that 
the  efforts  of  the  squadron  had  chiefly  been  directed ; 
but  the  way  the  object  was  carried  out  was  scarcely 
less  an  infraction  of  those  national  laws  which  we 
were  professedly  enforcing.  The  practice  of  taking 
English  (and  American)  seamen  out  of  American 
ships  without  regard  to  the  safety  of  navigating 
them  when  thus  deprived  of  their  hands  has  been 
already  mentioned.  To  this  may  be  added  the  de- 
tention of  vessels  against  which  nothing  contrary  to 
international  neutrality  could  be  established,  where- 
by their  cargoes  became  damaged,  the  compelling 
them,  on  suspicion  only,  to  proceed  to  ports  other 
than  those  to  which  they  were  destined;  and  gener- 
ally treating  them  as  though  they  were  engaged  in 
contraband  trade.  .  .  .  American  ships  were  not 
permitted  to  quit  English  ports  without  giving  se- 
curity for  the  discharge  of  their  cargoes  in  some 
other  British  or  neutral  port."  On  the  same  subject 
James4  writes :  "When,  by  the  maritime  supremacy 
of  England,  France  could  no  longer  trade  for  her- 
self, America  proffered  her  services,  as  a  neutral,  to 
trade  for  her;  and  American  merchants  and  their 

4  L.  c.,  IV,  325. 


Introductory  31 

agents,  in  the  gains  that  flowed  in,  soon  found  a 
compensation  for  all  the  perjury  and  fraud  necessary 
to  cheat  the  former  out  of  her  belligerent  rights. 
The  high  commercial  importance  of  the  United 
States,  thus  obtained,  coupled  with  a  similarity  of 
language  and,  to  a  superficial  observer,  a  resem- 
blance in  person  between  the  natives  of  America 
and  Great  Britain,  has  caused  the  former  to  be  the 
chief,  if  not  the  only,  sufferers  by  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  search.  Chiefly  indebted  for  their  growth 
and  prosperity  to  emigration  from  Europe,  the 
United  States  hold  out  every  allurement  to  foreign- 
ers, particularly  to  British  seamen,  whom,  by  a 
process  peculiarly  their  own,  they  can  naturalize  as 
quickly  as  a  dollar  can  exchange  masters  and  a  blank 
form,  ready  signed  and  sworn  to,  can  be  filled  up.5 
It  is  the  knowledge  of  this  fact  that  makes  British 
naval  officers  when  searching  for  deserters  from 
their  service  so  harsh  in  their  scrutiny,  and  so  scep- 
tical of  American  oaths  and  asseverations." 

The  last  sentence  of  the  foregoing  from  James  is 
a  euphemistic  way  of  saying  that  whenever  a  Brit- 
ish commander  short  of  men  came  across  an  Ameri- 
can vessel  he  impressed  all  of  her  crew  that  he 
wanted,  whether  they  were  citizens  of  the  United 
States  or  not.     It  must  be  remembered,  however,    y 
that  the  only  reason  why  Great  Britain  did  us  more 
injury  than  any  other  power  was  because  she  was 
better  able  to  do  so.    None  of  her  acts  were  more  y 
offensive  than  Najrolepn'_s_Milan ,_  decree,  by  which 

6  This  is  an  exaggeration. 


32  Naval  War  of  1812 

it  was  declared  that  any  neutral  vessel  which  per- 
mitted itself  to  be  searched  by  a  British  cruiser 
should  be  considered  as  British,  and  as  the  lawful 
prize  of  any  French  vessel.  French  frigates  and 
privateers  were  very  apt  to  snap  up  any  American 
vessel  they  came  across,  and  were  only  withheld  at 
all  by  the  memory  of  the  sharp  dressing  they  had 
received  in  the  West  Indies  during  the  quasi-war  of 
1799-1800.  What  we  undoubtedly  ought  to  have 
done  was  to  have  adopted  the  measure  actually  pro- 
posed in  Congress,  and  declared  war  on  both  France 
and  England.  As  it  was,  we  chose  as  a  foe  the  one 
that  had  done,  and  could  still  do,  us  the  greatest 
injury. 

The  principles  for  which  the  United  States  con- 
tended in  1812  are  now  universally  accepted,  and 
those  so  tenaciously  maintained  by  Great  Britain 
find  no  advocates  in  the  civilized  world.  That  Eng- 
land herself  was  afterward  completely  reconciled 
to  our  views  was  amply  shown  by  her  intense  indig- 
nation when  Commodore  Wilkes,  in  the  exercise  of 
the  right  of  search  for  the  persons  of  the  foes  of 
his  country,  stopped  the  neutral  British  ship  Trent; 
while  the  applause  with  which  the  act  was  greeted 
in  America  proves  pretty  clearly  another  fact,  that 
we  had  warred  for  the  right,  not  because  it  was  the 
right,  but  because  it  agreed  with  our  self-interest  to 
do  so.  We  were  contending  for  "Free  Trade  and 
Sailors'  Rights" ;  meaning  by  the  former  expression, 
freedom  to  trade  wherever  we  chose  without  hin- 
drance save  from  the  power  with  whom  we  were 


Introductory  33 

trading ;  and  by  the  latter,  that  a  man  who  happened 
to  be  on  the  sea  should  have  the  same  protection 
accorded  to  a  man  who  remained  on  land.  Nomi- 
nally, neither  of  these  questions  was  settled  by,  or 
even  alluded  to,  in  the  treaty  of  peace;  but  the  im- 
mense increase  in  reputation  that  the  navy  acquired 
during  the  war  practically  decided  both  points  in  our 
favor.  Our  sailors  had  gained  too  great  a  name  for 
one  to  molest  them  with  impunity  again. 

Holding  views  on  these  maritime  subjects  so  radi- 
cally different  from  each  other,  the  two  nations  could 
not  but  be  continually  dealing  with  causes  of  quar- 
rel. Not  only  did  British  cruisers  molest  our  mer- 
chantmen, but  at  length  one  of  them,  the  5O-gun 
ship  Leopard,  attacked  an  American  frigate,  the 
Chesapeake,  when  the  latter  was  so  lumbered  up  that  V 
she  could  not  return  a  shot,  killed  or  disabled  some 
twenty  of  her  men,  and  took  away  four  others,  one 
Briton  and  three  Americans,  who  were  claimed  as 
deserters.  For  this  act  an  apology  was  offered,  but 
it  failed  to  restore  harmony  between  the  two  nations. 
Soon  afterward  another  action  was  fought.  The 
American  frigate  President,  Commodore  Rodgers, 
attacked  the  British  sloop  Little  Belt,  Captain  Bing- 
ham,  and  exchanged  one  or  two  broadsides  with  her, 
— the  frigate  escaping  scot-free  while  the  sloop  was 
nearly  knocked  to  pieces.  Mutual  recriminations 
followed,  each  side  insisting  that  the  other  was  the 
assailant. 

When  Great  Britain  issued  her  Orders  in  Council  V 
forbidding  our  trading  with  France,  we  retaliated 


34  Naval  War  of  1812 

•^  by  passing  an  embargo  act,  which  prevented  us  from 
trading  at  all.  There  could  be  but  one  result  to 
such  a  succession  of  incidents,  and  that  was  war. 
Accordingly,  in  June,  1812,  war  was  declared;  and 
as  a  contest  for  the  rights  of  seamen,  it  was  largely 
waged  on  the  ocean.  We  also  had  not  a  little  fight- 
ing to  do  on  land,  in  which,  as  a  rule,  we  came  out 
second-best.  Few  or  no  preparations  for  the  war 
had  been  made,  and  the  result  was  such  as  might 
have  been  anticipated.  After  dragging  on  through 
three  dreary  and  uneventful  years  it  came  to  an  end 
in  1815,  by  a  peace  which  left  matters  in  almost  pre- 
cisely the  state  in  which  the  war  had  found  them. 
On  land  and  water  the  contest  took  the  form  of  a 
succession  of  petty  actions,  in  which  the  glory  ac- 
quired by  the  victor  seldom  eclipsed  the  disgrace  in- 

v  curred  by  the  vanquished.  Neither  side  succeeded 
in  doing  what  it  intended.  Americans  declared  that 
Canada  must  and  should  be  conquered,  but  the  con- 
quering came  quite  as  near  being  the  other  way. 
British  writers  insisted  that  the  American  navy 
should  be  swept  from  the  seas;  and  during  the 
sweeping  process  it  increased  fourfold. 

When  the  United  States  declared  war,  Great  Brit- 
ain was  straining  every  nerve  and  muscle  in  a  death 
struggle  with  the  most  formidable  military  despot- 
ism of  modern  times,  and  was  obliged  to  entrust  the 
defence  of  her  Canadian  colonies  to  a  mere  handful 
of  regulars,  aided  by  the  local  fencibles.  But  Con- 
gress had  provided  even  fewer  trained  soldiers,  and 
relied  on  the  militia.  The  latter  chiefly  exercised 


Introductory  35 

their  fighting  abilities  upon  one  another  in  dueling, 
and,  as  a  rule,  were  afflicted  with  conscientious  scru- 
ples whenever  it  was  necessary  to  cross  the  frontier 
and  attack  the  enemy.  Accordingly,  the  campaign 
opened  with  the  bloodless  surrender  of  an  American 
general  to  a  much  inferior  British  force,  and  the  war 
continued  much  as  it  had  begun;  we  suffered  dis- 
grace after  disgrace,  while  the  losses  we  inflicted, 
in  turn,  on  Great  Britain  were  so  slight  as  hardly 
to  attract  her  attention.  At  last,  having  crushed  her 
greater  foe,  she  turned  to  crush  the  lesser,  and,  in 
her  turn,  suffered  ignominious  defeat^  By  this  time 
events  had  gradually  developed  a  small  number  of 
soldiers  on  our  northern  frontier,  who,  commanded 
by  Scott  and  Brown,  were  able  to  contend  on  equal  fv 
terms  with  the  veteran  troops  to  whom  they  were 
opposed,  though  these  formed  part  of  what  was  then 
undoubtedly  the  most  formidable  fighting  infantry 
any  European  nation  possessed.  The  battles  at  this 
period  of  the  struggle  were  remarkable  for  the  skill 
and  stubborn  courage  with  which  they  were  waged, 
as  well  as  for  the  heavy  loss  involved ;  but  the  num- 
ber of  combatants  was  so  small  that  in  Europe  they 
would  have  been  regarded  as  mere  outpost  skir- 
mishes, and  they  wholly  failed  to  attract  any  atten- 
tion abroad  in  that  period  of  colossal  armies. 

When  Great  Britain  seriously  turned  her  attention 
to  her  transatlantic  foe,  and  assembled  in  Canada 
an  army  of  14,000  men  at  the  head  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  Congressional  forethought  enabled  it  to  be 
opposed  by  soldiers  who,  it  is  true,  were  as  well  dis- 


36  Naval  War  of  1812 

ciplined,  as  hardy,  and  as  well  commanded  as  any  in 
the  world,  but  who  were  only  a  few  hundred  strong, 
backed  by  more  or  less  incompetent  militia.  Only 
Macdonough's  skill  and  Sir  George  Prevost's  inca- 
pacity saved  us  from  a  serious  disaster ;  the  sea-fight 
reflected  high  honor  on  our  seamen,  but  the  retreat 
of  the  British  land-forces  was  due  to  the  commander 
and  not  to  their  antagonists.  Meanwhile  a  large 
British  fleet  in  the  Chesapeake  had  not  achieved 
much  glory  by  the  destruction  of  local  oyster-boats 
and  the  burning  of  a  few  farmers'  houses,  so  an 
army  was  landed  to  strike  a  decisive  blow.  At  Bla- 
densburg8  the  five  thousand  British  regulars,  utterly 
worn  out  by  heat  and  fatigue,  by  their  mere  ap- 
pearance, frightened  into  a  panic  double  their  num- 
ber of  American  militia  well  posted.  But  the  only 
success  attained  was  burning  the  public  buildings  of 
Washington,  and  that  result  was  of  dubious  value. 
Baltimore  was  attacked  next,  and  the  attack  repulsed, 
after  the  forts  and  ships  had  shelled  one  another 
with  the  slight  results  that  usually  attend  that  spec- 
tacular and  harmless  species  of  warfare. 

The  close  of  the  contest  was  marked  by  the  ex- 
traordinary battle  of  New  Orleans.  It  was  a  per- 
fectly useless  shedding  of  blood,  since  peace  had 
already  been  declared.  There  is  hardly  another  con- 
test of  modern  times  where  the  defeated  side  suf- 
fered such  frightful  carnage,  while  the  victors  came 
off  almost  scathless.  It  is  quite  in  accordance  with 

8  See  the  "Capture  of  Washington,"  by  Edward  D.  Ingra- 
ham  (Philadelphia,  1849). 


Introductory  37 

the  rest  of  the  war  that  the  militia,  hitherto  worse 
than  useless,  should  on  this  occasion  win  against 
great  odds  in  point  of  numbers ;  and,  moreover,  that 
their  splendid  victory  should  have  been  of  little  con- 
sequence in  its  effects  upon  the  result.  On  the  whole, 
the  contest  by  land,  where  we  certainly  ought  to 
have  been  successful,  reflected  greater  credit  on  our 
antagonists  than  upon  us,  in  spite  of  the  services  of 
Scott,  Brown,  and  Jackson.  Our  small  force  of 
regulars  and  volunteers  did  excellently;  as  for  the 
militia,  New  Orleans  proved  that  they  could  fight 
superbly;  and  the  other  battles  that  they  generally 
would  not  fight  at  all. 

At  sea,  as  will  appear,  the  circumstances  were 
widely  different.  Here  we  possessed  a  small  but 
highly  effective  force,  the  ships  well  built,  manned 
by  thoroughly  trained  men,  and  commanded  by  able 
and  experienced  officers.  The  deeds  of  our  navy 
form  a  part  of  history  over  which  any  American  can 
be  pardoned  for  lingering. 

Such  was  the  origin,  issue,  and  general  character 
of  the  war.  It  may  now  be  well  to  proceed  to  a 
comparison  of  the  authorities  on  the  subject.  Allu- 
sion has  already  been  made  to  them  in  the  preface, 
but  a  fuller  reference  seems  to  be  necessary  in  this 
connection. 

At  the  close  of  the  contest,  the  large  majority  of 
historians  who  wrote  of  it  were  so  bitterly  ran- 
corous that  their  statements  must  be  received  with 
caution.  For  the  main  facts  I  have  relied  wherever 


38  Naval  War  of  1812 

it  was  practicable  upon  the  official  letters  of  the 
commanding  officers,  taking  each  as  authority  for 
his  own  force  and  loss.7  For  all  the  British  victories 
we  have  British  official  letters,  which  tally  almost 
exactly,  as  regards  matters  of  fact  and  not  of  opin- 
ion, with  the  corresponding  American  accounts.  For 
the  first  year  the  British  also  published  official  ac- 
counts of  their  defeats,  which,  in  the  cases  of  the 
Guerriere,  Macedonian,  and  Frolic,  I  have  followed 
as  closely  as  the  accounts  of  the  American  victors. 
The  last  British  official  letter  published  announcing 
a  defeat  was  that  in  the  case  of  the  Java,  and  it  is 
the  only  letter  that  I  have  not  strictly  accepted.  The 
fact  that  no  more  were  published  thereafter  is  of 
itself  unfortunate;  and  from  the  various  contradic- 
tions it  contains  it  would  appear  to  have  been  tam- 
pered with.  The  surgeon's  report  accompanying  it 
is  certainly  false.  Subsequent  to  1812  no  letter  of 
a  defeated  British  commander  was  published,8  and  I 
have  to  depend  upon  the  various  British  historians, 
especially  James,  of  whom  more  anon. 

The  American  and  British  historians  from  whom 
we  are  thus  at  times  forced  to  draw  our  material 

1  As  where  Broke  states  his  own  force  at  330,  his  antago- 
nist's at  440,  and  the  American  court  of  inquiry  makes  the 
numbers  396  and  379,  I  have  taken  them  as  being  330  and  379 
respectively.  This  is  the  only  just  method ;  I  take  it  for 
granted  that  each  commander  meant  to  tell  the  truth,  and 
of  course  knew  his  own  force,  while  he  might  very  naturally 
and  in  perfect  good  faith  exaggerate  his  antagonist's. 

8  Except  about  the  battles  on  the  Lakes,  where  I  have  ac- 
cordingly given  the  same  credit  to  the  accounts  both  of  the 
British  and  of  the  Americans. 


Introductory  39 

regard  the  war  from  very  different  standpoints,  and 
their  accounts  generally  differ.  Each  writer  natur- 
ally so  colored  the  affair  as  to  have  it  appear  favor- 
able to  his  own  side.  Sometimes  this  was  done  inten- 
tionally and  sometimes  not.  Not  infrequently  errors 
are  made  against  the  historian's  own  side;  as  when 
the  British  author,  Brenton,  says  that  the  British 
brig  Peacock  mounted  32*5  instead  of  24*5,  while 
Lossing  in  his  "Field  Book  of  the  War  of  1812" 
makes  the  same  mistake  about  the  armament  of  the 
American  brig  Argus.  Errors  of  this  description 
are,  of  course,  as  carefully  to  be  guarded  against  as 
any  others.  Mere  hearsay  reports,  such  as  "it  has 
been  said,"  "a  prisoner  on  board  the  opposing  fleet 
has  observed,"  "an  American  (or  British)  news- 
paper of  such  and  such  a  date  has  remarked,"  are  of 
course  to  be  rejected.  There  is  a  curious  parallelism 
in  the  errors  on  both  sides.  For  example,  the  Amer- 
ican, Mr.  Low,  writing  in  1813,  tells  how  the  Con- 
stitution, 44,  captured  the  Guerriere  of  49  guns, 
while  the  British  Lieutenant  Low,  writing  in  1880, 
tells  how  the  Pelican,  18,  captured  the  Argus  of  20 
guns.  Each  records  the  truth  but  not  the  whole 
truth,  for  although  rating  44  and  18  the  victors  car- 
ried respectively  54  and  21  guns,  of  heavier  metal 
than  those  of  their  antagonists.  Such  errors  are 
generally  intentional.  Similarly,  most  American 
writers  mention  the  actions  in  which  the  privateers 
were  victorious,  but  do  not  mention  those  in  which 
they  were  defeated ;  while  the  British,  in  turn,  record 
every  successful  "cutting-out"  expedition,  but  ig- 


40  Naval  War  of  1812 

nore  entirely  those  which  terminated  unfavorably. 
Other  errors  arise  from  honest  ignorance.  Thus, 
James  in  speaking  of  the  repulse  of  the  Endymion's 
boats  by  the  Neufchatel  gives  the  latter  a  crew  of 
1 20  men;  she  had  more  than  this  number  originally, 
but  only  40  were  in  her  at  the  time  of  the  attack. 
So  also  when  the  captain  of  the  Pelican  writes  that 
the  officers  of  the  Argus  report  her  loss  at  40,  when 
they  really  reported  it  at  24 ;  or  when  Captain  Dacres 
thought  the  Constitution  had  lost  about  20  men  in- 
stead of  14.  The  American  gunboat  captains  in 
recounting  their  engagements  with  the  British  frig- 
ates invariably  greatly  overestimated  the  loss  of  the 
latter.  So  that  on  both  sides  there  were  some  inten- 
tional misstatements  or  garblings,  and  a  much  more 
numerous  class  of  simple  blunders,  arising  largely 
from  an  incapacity  for  seeing  more  than  one  side 
of  the  question. 

Among  the  early  British  writers  upon  this  war, 
the  ablest  was  James.  He  devoted  one  work,  his 
"Naval  Occurrences,"  entirely  to  it ;  and  it  occupies 
the  largest  part  of  the  sixth  volume  of  his  more  ex- 
tensive "History  of  the  British  Navy."  9  Two  other 
British  writers,  Lieutenant  Marshall10  and  Captain 
Brenton,11  wrote  histories  of  the  same  events,  about 
the  same  time;  but  neither  of  these  naval  officers 
produced  half  as  valuable  a  work  as  did  the  civilian 

•  A  new  edition,  London,  1826. 

10  "R0yai  Naval  Biography,"  by  John  Marshall  (London, 
1823-1835). 

"  "Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,"  by  Edward  Pelham 
Brenton  (new  edition,  London,  1837). 


Introductory  41 

James.  Marshall  wrote  a  dozen  volumes,  each  filled 
with  several  scores  of  dreary  panegyrics,  or  memoirs 
of  as  many  different  officers.  There  is  no  attempt  at 
order,  hardly  anything  about  the  ships,  guns,  or 
composition  of  the  crews ;  and  not  even  the  pretence 
of  giving  both  sides,  the  object  being  to  make  every 
Englishman  appear  in  his  best  light.  The  work  is 
analogous  to  the  numerous  lives  of  Decatur,  Bain- 
bridge,  Porter,  etc.,  that  appeared  in  the  United 
States  about  the  same  time,  and  is  quite  as  un- 
trustworthy. Brenton  made  a  far  better  and  very 
interesting  book,  written  on  a  good  and  well-con- 
nected plan,  and  apparently  with  a  sincere  desire  to 
tell  the  truth.  He  accepts  the  British  official  ac- 
counts as  needing  nothing  whatever  to  supplement 
them,  precisely  as  Cooper  accepts  the  American  offi- 
cials'. A  more  serious  fault  is  his  inability  to  be  ac- 
curate. That  this  inaccuracy  is  not  intentional  is 
proved  by  the  fact  that  it  tells  as  often  against  his 
own  side  as  against  his  opponents.  He  says,  for 
example,  that  the  guns  of  Perry's  and  Barclay's 
squadrons  "were  about  equal  in  number  and  weight," 
that  the  Peacock  (British)  was  armed  with  32*5  in- 
stead of  24's,  and  underestimates  the  force  of  the 
second  Wasp.  But  the  blunders  are  quite  as  bad 
when  distributed  as  when  confined  to  one  side;  in 
addition,  Brenton's  disregard  of  all  details  makes 
him  of  but  little  use. 

James,  as  already  said,  is  by  far  the  most  valuable 
authority  on  the  war,  as  regards  purely  British  af- 
fairs. He  enters  minutely  into  details,  and  has  evi- 


42  Naval  War  of  1812 

dently  laboriously  hunted  up  his  authorities.  He  has 
examined  the  ships'  logs,  the  Admiralty  reports,  va- 
rious treaties,  all  the  "Gazette"  reports,  gives  very 
well-chosen  extracts,  has  arranged  his  work  in  chron- 
ological order,  discriminates  between  the  officers  that 
deserve  praise  and  those  that  deserve  blame,  and  in 
fact  writes  a  work  which  ought  to  be  consulted  by 
every  student  of  naval  affairs.  But  he  is  unfortu- 
nately afflicted  with  a  hatred  toward  the  Americans 
that  amounts  to  a  monomania.  He  wishes  to  make 
out  as  strong  a  case  as  possible  against  them.  The 
animus  of  his  work  may  be  gathered  from  the  not 
over  complimentary  account  of  the  education  of  the 
youthful  seafaring  American,  which  can  be  found  in 
Vol.  VI,  p.  113,  of  his  "History."  On  page  153  he 
asserts  that  he  is  an  "impartial  Historian" ;  and  about 
three  lines  before  mentions  that  "it  may  suit  the 
Americans  to  invent  any  falsehood,  no  matter  how 
barefaced,  to  foist  a  valiant  character  on  them- 
selves." On  page  419  he  says  that  Captain  Porter 
is  to  be  believed,  "so  far  as  is  borne  out  by  proof 
(the  only  safe  way  where  an  American  is  con- 
cerned),"— which  somewhat  sweeping  denunciation 
of  the  veracity  of  all  of  Captain  Porter's  compatriots 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  James  was  not,  perhaps, 
in  that  dispassionate  frame  of  mind  best  suited  for 
writing  history.  That  he  should  be  biased  against 
individual  captains  can  be  understood,  but  when  he 
makes  rabid  onslaughts  upon  the  American  people 
as  a  whole,  he  renders  it  difficult  for  an  American, 
at  any  rate,  to  put  implicit  credence  in  him.  His 


Introductory  43 

statements  are  all  the  harder  to  confute  when  they 
are  erroneous,  because  they  are  intentionally  so. 
It  is  not,  as  with  Brenton  and  Marshall,  because  he 
really  thinks  a  British  captain  can  not  be  beaten,  ex- 
cept by  some  kind  of  distorted  special  Providence, 
for  no  man  says  worse  things  than  he  does  about 
certain  officers  and  crews.  A  writer  of  James'  un- 
doubted ability  must  have  known  perfectly  well  that 
his  statements  were  untrue  in  many  instances,  as 
where  he  garbles  Hilyar's  account  of  Porter's  loss, 
or  misstates  the  comparative  force  of  the  fleets  on 
Lake  Champlain. 

When  he  says  (p.  194)  that  Captain  Bainbridge 
wished  to  run  away  from  the  Java,  and  would  have 
done  so  if  he  had  not  been  withheld  by  the  advice 
of  his  first  lieutenant,  who  was  a  renegade  English- 
man,12 it  is  not  of  much  consequence  whether  his 
making  the  statement  was  due  to  excessive  credulity 
or  petty  meanness,  for,  in  either  case,  whether  the 
defect  was  in  his  mind  or  his  morals,  it  is  enough 
to  greatly  impair  the  value  of  his  other  "facts." 
Again,  when  James  (p.  165)  states  that  Decatur 
ran  away  from  the  Macedonian  until,  by  some  mar- 
velous optical  delusion,  he  mistook  her  for  a  32,  he 
merely  detracts  a  good  deal  from  the  worth  of  his 
own  account.  When  the  Americans  adopt  boarding 
helmets,  he  considers  it  as  proving  conclusively  that 
they  are  suffering  from  an  acute  attack  of  cowardice. 
On  p.  122  fie  says  that  "had  the  President,  when  she 

11  Who,  by  the  way,  was  Mr.  Parker,  born  in  Virginia,  and 
never  in  England  in  his  life. 


44  Naval  War  of  1812 

fell  in  with  the  Belvidera,  been  cruising  alone  .  .  . 
Commodore  Rodgers  would  have  magnified  the  Brit- 
ish frigate  into  a  line-of-battle  ship,  and  have  done 
his  utmost  to  avoid  her,"  which  gives  an  excellent 
idea  of  the  weight  to  be  attached  to  the  various 
other  anecdotes  he  relates  of  the  much  abused  Com- 
modore Rodgers. 

But  it  must  always  be  remembered  that  untrust- 
worthy as  James  is  in  anything  referring  purely  to 
the  Americans,  he  is  no  worse  than  his  compeers  of 
both  nationalities.  The  misstatements  of  Niles  in 
his  "Weekly  Register"  about  the  British  are  quite 
as  flagrant,  and  his  information  about  his  own  side 
even  more  valuable.13  Every  little  American  author 
crowed  over  Perry's  "Nelsonic  victory  over  a  greatly 
superior  force."  The  Constitution  was  declared  to 
have  been  at  a  disadvantage  when  she  fought  the 
Guerri&re,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  But  these  writers 
have  all  faded  into  oblivion,  and  their  writings  are 
not  even  referred  to,  much  less  believed.  James,  on 
the  contrary,  has  passed  through  edition  after  edi- 
tion, is  considered  as  unquestionable  authority  in 

13  In  Niles,  by  the  way,  can  be  found  excellent  examples  of 
the  traditional  American  "spread-eagle"  style.  In  one  place 
I  remember  his  describing  "The  Immortal  Rodgers,"  balked 
of  his  natural  prey,  the  British,  as  "soaring  about  like  the 
bold  bald  eagle  of  his  native  land,"  seeking  whom  he  might 
devour.  The  accounts  he  gives  of  British  line-of-battle  ships 
fleeing  from  American  44*5  quite  match  James'  anecdotes  of 
the  latter's  avoidance  of  British  38*8  and  36*8  for  fear  they 
might  mount  twenty-four-pounders.  The  two  works  taken 
together  give  a  very  good  idea  of  the  war ;  separately,  either 
is  utterly  unreliable,  especially  in  matters  of  opinion. 


Introductory  45 

his  own  country  and  largely  throughout  Europe, 
and  has  furnished  the  basis  for  every  subsequent  ac- 
count by  British  authors.  From  Alison  to  Lieuten- 
ant Low,  almost  every  English  work,  whether  of  a 
popular  character  or  not,  is,  in  so  far  as  it  touches 
on  the  war,  simply  a  "rehash"  of  the  works  written 
by  James.  The  consequence  is  that  the  British  and 
American  accounts  have  astonishingly  little  resem- 
blance. One  ascribes  the  capture  of  the  British  frig- 
ates simply  to  the  fact  that  their  opponents  were  "cut 
down  line-of-battle  ships";  the  other  gives  all  the 
glory  to  the  "undaunted  heroism,"  etc.,  of  the  Yan- 
kee sailors. 

One  not  very  creditable  trait  of  the,  early  Ameri- 
can naval  historians  gave  their  rivals  a  great  advan- 
tage. The  object  of  the  former  was  to  make  out 
that  the  Constitution,  for  example,  won  her  victo- 
ries against  an  equal  foe,  and  an  exact  statement  of 
the  forces  showed  the  contrary;  so  they  always 
avoided  figures,  and  thus  left  the  ground  clear  for 
James'  careful  misstatements.  Even  when  they 
criticised  him  they  never  went  into  details,  confin- 
ing themselves  to  some  remark  about  "hurling"  his 
figures  in  his  face  with  "loathing."  Even  Cooper, 
interesting  though  his  work  is,  has  gone  far  less  into 
figures  than  he  should,  and  seems  to  have  paid  little 
if  any  attention  to  the  British  official  statements, 
which  of  course  should  be  received  as  of  equal 
weight  with  the  American.  His  comments  on  the 
actions  are  generally  very  fair,  the  book  never  being 
disfigured  by  bitterness  toward  the  British ;  but  he  is 


46  Naval  War  of  1812 

certainly  wrong,  for  example,  in  ascribing  the  loss 
of  the  Chesapeake  solely  to  accident,  that  of  the 
Argus  solely  to  her  inferiority  in  force,  and  so  on. 
His  disposition  to  praise  all  the  American  com- 
manders may  be  generous,  but  is  nevertheless  un- 
just. If  Decatur's  surrender  of  the  President  is  at 
least  impliedly  praised,  then  Porter's  defence  of  the 
Essex  can  hardly  receive  its  just  award.  There  is 
no  weight  in  the  commendation  bestowed  upon  Hull, 
if  commendation,  the  same  in  kind  though  less  in 
degree,  is  bestowed  upon  Rodgers.  It  is  a  great  pity 
that  Cooper  did  not  write  a  criticism  on  James,  for 
no  one  could  have  done  it  more  thoroughly.  But 
he  never  mentions  him,  except  once  in  speaking  of 
Barclay's  fleet.  In  all  probability  this  silence  arose 
from  sheer  contempt,  and  the  certainty  that  most  of 
James'  remarks  were  false;  but  the  effect  was  that 
very  many  foreigners  believe  him  to  have  shirked 
the  subject  He  rarely  gives  any  data  by  which  the 
statements  of  James  can  be  disproved,  and  it  is  for 
this  reason  that  I  have  been  obliged  to  criticise  the 
latter's  work  very  fully.  Many  of  James'  remarks, 
however,  defy  criticism  from  their  random  nature, 
as  when  he  states  that  American  midshipmen  were 
chiefly  masters  and  mates  of  merchantmen,  and  does 
not  give  a  single  proof  to  support  the  assertion.  It 
would  be  nearly  as  true  to  assert  that  the  British 
midshipmen  were  for  the  most  part  ex-members  of 
the  prize-ring,  and  as  much  labor  would  be  needed 
to  disprove  it.  In  other  instances  it  is  quite  enough 
to  let  his  words  speak  for  themselves,  as  where  he 


Introductory  47 

says  (p.  155)  that  of  the  American  sailors  one-third 
in  number  and  one-half  in  point  of  effectiveness  were 
in  reality  British.  That  is,  of  the  450  men  the  Con- 
stitution had  when  she  fought  the  Java  150  were 
British,  and  the  remaining  300  could  have  been  as 
effectively  replaced  by  150  more  British.  So  a  very 
little  logic  works  out  a  result  that  James  certainly 
did  not  intend  to  arrive  at ;  namely,  that  300  British 
led  by  American  officers  could  beat,  with  ease  and 
comparative  impunity,  400  British  led  by  their  own 
officers.  He  also  forgets  that  the  whole  consists  of 
the  sum  of  the  parts.  He  accounts  for  the  victories 
of  the  Americans  by  stating  (p.  280)  that  they  were 
lucky  enough  to  meet  with  frigates  and  brigs  who 
had  unskilful  gunners  or  worthless  crews;  he  also 
carefully  shows  that  the  Macedonian  was  incompe- 
tently handled,  the  Peacock  commanded  by  a  mere 
martinet,  the  Avon's  crew  unpracticed  at  the  guns, 
the  Epervier's  mutinous  and  cowardly,  the  Pen- 
guin's weak  and  unskilful,  the  Java's  exceedingly 
poor,  and  more  to  the  same  effect.  Now  the  Amer- 
icans took  in  single  fight  three  frigates  and  seven 
sloops,  and  when  as  many  as  ten  vessels  are  met 
it  is  exceedingly  probable  that  they  represent  the  fair 
average;  so  that  James'  strictures,  so  far  as  true, 
simply  show  that  the  average  British  ship  was  very 
apt  to  possess,  comparatively  speaking,  an  incompe- 
tent captain  or  unskilful  crew.  These  disadvantages 
were  not  felt  when  opposed  to  navies  in  which  they 
existed  to  an  even  greater  extent,  but  became  very 
apparent  when  brought  into  contact  with  a  power 


48  Naval  War  of  1812 

whose  few  officers  knew  how  to  play  their  own  parts 
very  nearly  to  perfection,  and,  something  equally  im- 
portant, knew  how  to  make  first-rate  crews  out  of 
what  was  already  good  raw  material.  Finally,  a 
large  proportion  of  James'  abuse  of  the  Americans 
sufficiently  refutes  itself,  and  perhaps  Cooper's 
method  of  contemptuously  disregarding  him  was  the 
best;  but  no  harm  can  follow  from  devoting  a  little 
space  to  commenting  upon  him. 

Much  the  best  American  work  is  Lieutenant 
George  E.  Emmons'  statistical  "History  of  the 
United  States  Navy."  Unfortunately  it  is  merely 
a  mass  of  excellently  arranged  and  classified  statis- 
tics, and  while  of  invaluable  importance  to  the  stu- 
dent, is  not  interesting  to  the  average  reader.  Al- 
most all  the  statements  I  have  made  of  the  force, 
tonnage,  and  armament  of  the  American  vessels, 
though  I  have  whenever  practicable  taken  them 
from  the  Naval  Records,  etc.,  yet  could  be  just  as 
well  quoted  from  Emmons.  Copies  of  most  of  the 
American  official  letters  which  I  have  quoted  can  be 
found  in  Niles'  "Register,"  volumes  I  to  10,  and  all 
of  the  British  ones  in  the  "London  Naval  Chronicle" 
for  the  same  years.  It  is  to  these  two  authorities 
that  I  am  most  indebted,  and  nearly  as  much  so  to 
the  "American  State  Papers,"  Vol.  XIV.  Next  in 
order  come  Emmons,  Cooper,  and  the  invaluable,  al- 
beit somewhat  scurrilous,  James;  and  a  great  many 
others  whose  names  I  have  quoted  in  their  proper 
places.  In  commenting  upon  the  actions  I  have, 
whenever  possible,  drawn  from  some  standard  work, 


Introductory  49 

such  as  Jurien  de  la  Graviere's  "Guerres  Maritimes," 
Lord  Howard  Douglas'  "Naval  Gunnery,"  or,  bet- 
ter still,  from  the  lives  and  memoirs  of  Admirals 
Farragut,  Codrington,  Broke,  or  Durham.  The  titles 
of  the  various  works  will  be  found  given  in  full  as 
they  are  referred  to.14  In  a  few  cases,  where  ex- 
treme accuracy  was  necessary,  or  where,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  President's  capture,  it  was  desirable  that 
there  should  be  no  room  for  dispute  as^to  the  facts, 
I  have  given  the  authority  for  each  sentence;  but  in 
general  this  would  be  too  cumbersome,  and  so  I  have 
confined  myself  to  referring,  at  or  near  the  begin- 
ning of  the  account  of  each  action,  to  the  authorities 
from  whom  I  have  taken  it.  For  the  less  important 
facts  on  which  every  one  is  agreed  I  have  often 
given  no  references. 

M  To  get  an  idea  of  the  American  seamen  of  that  time 
Cooper's  novels,  "Miles  Wallingford, "  "Home  as  Found," 
and  the  "Pilot,"  are  far  better  than  any  history;  in  the 
"Two  Admirals"  the  description  of  the  fleet  manoeuvring  is 
unrivaled.  His  view  of  Jack's  life  is  rather  rose-colored 
however.  "Tom  Cringle's  Log"  ought  to  be  read  for  the  in- 
formation it  gives;  Marryat's  novels  will  show  some  of  the 
darker  aspects  of  sailor  life. 


VOL.  IX.— 3 


CHAPTER  II 

Overwhelming  naval  supremacy  of  England  when  Ameri- 
ca declared  war  against  her — Race  identity  of  the  com- 
batants— The  American  navy  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war — Officers  well  trained — Causes  tending  to  make  our 
seamen  especially  efficient — Close  similarity  between 
the  British  and  American  sailors — Our  ships  manned 
chiefly  by  native  Americans,  many  of  whom  had  for- 
merly been  impressed  into  the  British  navy — Quotas  of 
seamen  contributed  by  the  different  States — Navy  yards 
— Lists  of  officers  and  men — List  of  vessels — Tonnage — 
Different  ways  of  estimating  it  in  Britain  and  America 
— Ratings — American  ships  properly  rated — Arma- 
ments of  the  frigates  and  corvettes — Three  styles  of 
guns  used — Difference  between  long  guns  and  carron- 
ades — Short  weight  of  American  shot — Comparison  of 
British  frigates  rating  38,  and  American  frigates  rating 
44  guns — Compared  with  a  74 

DURING  the  early  years  of  this  century  Eng- 
land's naval  power  stood  at  a  height  never 
reached  before  or  since  by  that  of  any  other  nation. 
On  every  sea  her  navies  rode,  not  only  triumphant, 
but  with  none  to  dispute  their  sway.  The  island  folk 
had  long  claimed  the  mastery  of  the  ocean,  and  they 
had  certainly  succeeded  in  making  their  claim  com- 
pletely good  during  the  time  of  bloody  warfare  that 
followed  the  breaking  out  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion. Since  the  year  1 792  each  European  nation,  in 
turn,  had  learned  to  feel  bitter  dread  of  the  weight 
of  England's  hand.  In  the  Baltic,  Sir  Samuel  Hood 
(so) 


Naval  War  of  1812  51 

had  taught  the  Russians  that  they  must  needs  keep 
in  port  when  the  English  cruisers  were  in  the  offing. 
The  descendants  of  the  Vikings  had  seen  their  whole 
navy  destroyed  at  Copenhagen.  No  Dutch  fleet  ever 
put  out  after  the  day  when,  off  Camperdown,  Lord 
Duncan  took  possession  of  Van  Winter's  shattered 
ships.  But  a  few  years  before  1812,  the  greatest 
sea-fighter  of  all  time  had  died  in  Trafalgar  Bay, 
and  in  dying  had  crumbled  to  pieces  the  navies  of 
France  and  of  Spain. 

From  that  day  England's  task  was  but  to  keep 
in  port  such  of  her  foes'  vessels  as  she  had  not. de- 
stroyed. France  alone  still  possessed  fleets  that 
could  be  rendered  formidable,  and  so,  from  the 
Scheldt  to  Toulon,  her  harbors  were  watched  and 
her  coasts  harried  by  the  blockading  squadrons  of 
the  English.  Elsewhere  the  latter  had  no  fear  of 
their  power  being  seriously  assailed;  but  their  vast 
commerce  and  numerous  colonies  needed  ceaseless 
protection.  Accordingly  in  every  sea  their  cruisers 
could  be  found,  of  all  sizes,  from  the  stately  ship-of- 
the-line,  with  her  tiers  of  heavy  cannon  and  her 
many  hundreds  of  men,  down  to  the  little  cutter 
carrying  but  a  score  of  souls  and  a  couple  of  light 
guns.  All  these  cruisers,  but  especially  those  of  the 
lesser  rates,  were  continually  brought  into  contact 
with  such  of  the  hostile  vessels  as  had  run  through 
the  blockade,  or  were  too  small  to  be  affected  by  it. 
French  and  Italian  frigates  were  often  fought  and 
captured  when  they  were  skirting  their  own  coasts, 
or  had  started  off  on  a  plundering  cruise  through  the 


52  Naval  War  of  1812 

Atlantic,  or  to  the  Indian  Ocean;  and  though  the 
Danes  had  lost  their  larger  ships  they  kept  up  a  spir- 
ited warfare  with  brigs  and  gunboats.  So  the  En- 
glish marine  was  in  constant  exercise,  attended  with 
almost  invariable  success. 

Such  was  Great  Britain's  naval  power  when  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  declared  war  upon 
her.  While  she  could  number  her  thousand  sail, 
the  American  navy  included  but  half  a  dozen  frig- 
ates, and  six  or  eight  sloops  and  brigs;  and  it  is 
small  matter  for  surprise  that  the  British  officers 
should  have  regarded  their  new  foe  with  contemptu- 
ous indifference.  Hitherto  the  American  seamen 
had  never  been  heard  of  except  in  connection  with 
two  or  three  engagements  with  French  frigates,  and 
some  obscure  skirmishes  against  the  Moors  of  Trip- 
oli; none  of  which  could  possibly  attract  attention 
in  the  years  that  saw  Aboukir,  Copenhagen,  and 
Trafalgar.  And  yet  these  same  petty  wars  were  the 
school  which  raised  our  marines  to  the  highest 
standard  of  excellence.  A  continuous  course  of  vic- 
tory, won  mainly  by  seamanship,  had  made  the  En- 
glish sailor  overweeningly  self-confident,  and  caused 
him  to  pay  but  little  regard  to  manoeuvring  or  even 
to  gunnery.  Meanwhile  the  American  learned,  by 
receiving  hard  knocks,  how  to  give  them,  and  be- 
longed to  a  service  too  young  to  feel  an  over-confi- 
dence in  itself.  One  side  had  let  its  training  relax, 
while  the  other  had  carried  it  to  the  highest  possible 
point.  Hence  our  ships  proved,  on  the  whole,  vic- 
torious in  the  apparently  unequal  struggle,  and  the 


Naval  War  of  1812  53 

men  who  had  conquered  the  best  seamen  of  Europe 
were  now  in  turn  obliged  to  succumb.  Compared 
with  the  great  naval  battles  of  the  preceding  few 
years,  our  bloodiest  conflicts  were  mere  skirmishes, 
but  they  were  skirmishes  between  the  hitherto  ac- 
knowledged kings  of  the  ocean,  and  new  men  who 
yet  proved  to  be  more  than  their  equals.  For  over 
a  hundred  years,  or  since  the  time  when  they  had 
contended  on  equal  terms  with  the  great  Dutch 
admirals,  the  British  had  shown  a  decided  supe- 
riority to  their  various  foes,  and  during  the  latter 
quarter  of  the  time  this  superiority,  as  already  said, 
was  very  marked  indeed ;  in  consequence,  the  victo- 
ries of  the  new  enemy  attracted  an  amount  of  atten- 
tion altogether  disproportionate  to  their  material 
effects.  And  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  our  little  navy, 
in  which  the  art  of  handling  and  fighting  the  old 
broadside,  sailing  frigate  in  single  conflict  was 
brought  to  the  highest  point  of  perfection  ever 
reached,  that  this  same  navy  should  have  contained 
the  first  representative  of  the  modern  war  steamer, 
and  also  the  torpedo — the  two  terrible  engines  which 
were  to  drive  from  the  ocean  the  very  white-winged 
craft  that  had  first  won  honor  for  the  starry  flag. 
The  tactical  skill  of  Hull  or  Decatur  is  now  of  mere- 
ly archaic  interest,  and  has  but  little  more  bearing 
on  the  manreuvring  of  a  modern  fleet  than  have  the 
tactics  of  the  Athenian  galleys.  But  the  war  still 
conveys  some  most  practical  lessons  as  to  the  value 
of  efficient  ships  and,  above  all,  of  efficient  men  in 
them.  Had  we  only  possessed  the  miserable  gun- 


54  Naval  War  of  1812 

boats,  our  men  could  have  done  nothing;  had  we 
not  possessed  good  men,  the  heavy  frigates  would 
have  availed  us  little.  Poor  ships  and  impotent 
artillery  had  lost  the  Dutch  almost  their  entire 
navy;  fine  ships  and  heavy  cannon  had  not  saved 
the  French  and  Spanish  from  the  like  fate.  We 
owed  our  success  to  putting  sailors  even  better 
than  the  Dutch  on  ships  even  finer  than  those  built 
by  the  two  Latin  seaboard  powers. 

The  first  point  to  be  remembered  in  order  to 
write  a  fair  account  of  this  war  is  that  the  difference 
in  fighting  skill,  which  certainly  existed  between  the 
two  parties,  was  due  mainly  to  training,  and  not  to 
the  nature  of  the  men.  It  seems  certain  that  the 
American  had  in  the  beginning  somewhat  the  ad- 
vantage, because  his  surroundings,  partly  physical 
and  partly  social  and  political,  had  forced  him  into 
habits  of  greater  self-reliance.  Therefore,  on  the 
average,  he  offered  rather  the  best  material  to  start 
with ;  but  the  difference  was  very  slight,  and  totally 
disappeared  under  good  training.  The  combatants 
were  men  of  the  same  race,  differing  but  little  from 
one  another.  On  the  New  England  coast  the  En- 
glish blood  was  as  pure  as  in  any  part  of  Britain; 
in  New  York  and  New  Jersey  it  was  mixed  with 
that  of  the  Dutch  settlers — and  the  Dutch  are  by 
race  nearer  to  the  true  old  English  of  Alfred  and 
Harold  than  are,  for  example,  the  thoroughly  Angli- 
cized Welsh  of  Cornwall.  Otherwise,  the  infusion 
of  new  blood  into  the  English  race  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic  has  been  chiefly  from  three  sources — Ger- 


Naval  War  of  1812  55 

man,  Irish,  and  Norse;  and  these  three  sources  rep- 
resent the  elemental  parts  of  the  composite  English 
stock  in  about  the  same  proportions  in  which  they 
were  originally  combined — mainly  Teutonic,  largely 
Celtic,  and  with  a  Scandinavian  admixture.  The 
descendant  of  the  German  becomes  as  much  an  An- 
glo-American as  the  descendant  of  the  Strathclyde 
Celt  has  already  become  an  Anglo-Briton.  Looking 
through  names  of  the  combatants  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  find  any  of  one  navy  that  could  not  be  matched 
in  the  other — Hull  or  Lawrence,  Allen,  Perry,  or 
Stewart.  And  among  all  the  English  names  on  both 
sides  will  be  found  many  Scotch,  Irish,  or  Welsh — 
Macdonough,  O'Brien,  or  Jones.  Still  stranger  ones 
appear:  the  Huguenot  Tattnall  is  one  among  the 
American  defenders  of  the  Constellation,  and  an- 
other Huguenot  Tattnall  is  among  the  British  as- 
sailants at  Lake  Borgne.  It  must  always  be  kept 
in  mind  that  the  Americans  and  the  British  are  two 
substantially  similar  branches  of  the  great  English 
race,  which  both  before  and  after  their  separation 
have  assimilated,  and  made  Englishmen  of  many 
other  peoples.1  The  lessons  taught  by  the  war  can 
hardly  be  learned  unless  this  identity  is  kept  in 
mind.2 

1  The  inhabitants  of  Great  Britain  are  best  designated  as 
"British" — English  being  either  too  narrow  or  too  broad  a 
term,  in  one  case  meaning  the  inhabitants  of  but  a  part  of 
Britain,  and  in  the  other  the  whole  Anglo-Saxon  people. 

*  It  was  practically  a  civil  war,  and  was  waged  with  much 
harshness  and  bitterness  on  both  sides.  I  have  already  spoken 
of  the  numerous  grievances  of  the  Americans;  the  British, 
in  turn,  looked  upon  our  blockade-runners  which  entered 


56  Naval  War  of  1812 

To  understand  aright  the  efficiency  of  our  navy, 
it  is  necessary  to  take  a  brief  look  at  the  character 
and  antecedents  of  the  officers  and  men  who  served 
in  it. 

When  war  broke  out  the  United  States  Navy  was 
but  a  few  years  old,  yet  it  already  had  a  far  from 
dishonorable  history.  The  captains  and  lieutenants 
of  1812  had  been  taught  their  duties  in  a  very  prac- 
tical school,  and  the  flag  under  which  they  fought 
was  endeared  to  them  already  by  not  a  few  glorious 
traditions — though  these,  perhaps,  like  others  of 
their  kind,  had  lost  none  of  their  glory  in  the  telling. 
A  few  of  the  older  men  had  served  in  the  war  of 
the  Revolution,  and  all  still  kept  fresh  in  mind  the 
doughty  deeds  of  the  old-time  privateering  war 
craft  Men  still  talked  of  Biddle's  daring  cruises 
and  Barney's  stubborn  fights,  or  told  of  Scotch  Paul 
and  the  grim  work  they  had  who  followed  his  for- 
tunes. Besides  these  memories  of  an  older  genera- 
tion, most  of  the  officers  had  themselves  taken  part, 
when  younger  in  years  and  rank,  in  deeds  not  a  whit 
less  glorious.  Almost  every  man  had  had  a  share  in 
some  gallant  feat,  to  which  he,  in  part  at  least,  owed 

the  French  ports  exactly  as  we  regarded,  at  a  later  date,  the 
British  steamers  that  ran  into  Wilmington  and  Charleston. 
It  is  curious  to  see  how  illogical  writers  are.  The  careers  of 
the  Argus  and  Alabama,  for  example,  were  strikingly  similar 
in  many  ways,  yet  the  same  writer  who  speaks  of  one  as  a 
"heroic  little  brig,"  will  call  the  other  a  "black  pirate."  Of 
course  there  can  be  no  possible  comparison  as  to  the  causes 
for  which  the  two  vessels  were  fighting;  but  the  cruises 
themselves  were  very  much  alike,  both  in  character  and 
history. 


Naval  War  of  1812  57 

his  present  position.  The  captain  had  perhaps  been 
a  midshipman  under  Truxton  when  he  took  the  Ven- 
geance, and  had  been  sent  aboard  the  captured 
French  frigate  with  the  prize-master;  the  lieutenant 
had  borne  a  part  in  the  various  attacks  on  Tripoli, 
and  had  led  his  men  in  the  desperate  hand-to-hand 
fights  in  which  the  Yankee  cutlass  proved  an  over- 
match for  the  Turkish  and  Moorish  cimeters.  Nearly 
every  senior  officer  had  extricated  himself  by  his 
own  prowess  or  skill  from  the  dangers  of  battle  or 
storm;  he  owed  his  rank  to  the  fact  that  he  had 
proved  worthy  of  it.  Thrown  upon  his  own  re- 
sources, he  had  learned  self-reliance ;  he  was  a  first- 
rate  practical  seaman,  and  prided  himself  on  the 
way  his  vessel  was  handled.  Having  reached  his 
rank  by  hard  work,  and  knowing  what  real  fighting 
meant,  he  was  careful  to  see  that  his  men  were 
trained  in  the  essentials  of  discipline,  and  that  they 
knew  how  to  handle  the  guns  in  battle  as  well  as  pol- 
ish them  in  peace.  Beyond  almost  any  of  his  coun- 
trymen, he  worshiped  the  "Gridiron  Flag,"  and, 
having  been  brought  up  in  the  Navy,  regarded  its 
honor  as  his  own.  It  was,  perhaps,  the  Navy  alone 
that  thought  itself  a  match,  ship  against  ship,  for 
Great  Britain.  The  remainder  of  the  nation  pinned 
its  faith  to  the  army,  or  rather  to  that  weakest  of 
weak  reeds,  the  militia.  The  officers  of  the  Navy, 
with  their  strong  esprit  de  corps,  their  jealousy  of 
their  own  name  and  record,  and  the  knowledge,  by 
actual  experience,  that  the  British  ships  sailed  no 
faster  and  were  no  better  handled  than  their  own, 


5«  Naval  War  of  1812 

had  no  desire  to  shirk  a  conflict  with  any  foe,  and 
having  tried  their  bravery  in  actual  service,  they 
made  it  doubly  formidable  by  cool,  wary  skill.  Even 
the  younger  men,  who  had  never  been  in  action,  had 
been  so  well  trained  by  the  tried  veterans  over  them 
that  the  lack  of  experience  was  not  sensibly  felt. 

The  sailors  comprising  the  crews  of  our  ships 
were  well  worthy  of  their  leaders.  There  was  no  bet- 
ter seaman  in  the  world  than  the  American  Jack ;  he 
had  been  bred  to  his  work  from  infancy,  and  had 
been  off  in  a  fishing  dory  almost  as  soon  as  he  could 
walk.  When  he  grew  older,  he  shipped  on  a  mer- 
chantman or  whaler,  and  in  those  warlike  times, 
when  our  large  merchant-marine  was  compelled  to 
rely  pretty  much  on  itself  for  protection,  each  craft 
had  to  be  well  handled ;  all  who  were  not  were  soon 
weeded  out  by  a  process  of  natural  selection,  of 
which  the  agents  were  French  picaroons,  Spanish 
buccaneers,  and  Malay  pirates.  ,  It  was  a  rough 
school,  but  it  taught  Jack  to  be  both  skilful  and  self- 
reliant  ;  and  he  was  all  the  better  fitted  to  become  a 
man-of-war's  man,  because  he  knew  more  about  fire- 
arms than  most  of  his  kind  in  foreign  lands.  At 
home  he  had  used  his  ponderous  ducking  gun  with 
good  effect  on  the  flocks  of  canvasbacks  in  the  reedy 
flats  of  the  Chesapeake,  or  among  the  sea-coots  in 
the  rough  water  off  the  New  England  cliffs;  and 
when  he  went  on  a  sailing  voyage  the  chances  were 
even  that  there  would  be  some  use  for  the  long  guns 
before  he  returned,  for  the  American  merchant 
sailor  could  trust  to  no  armed  escort. 


Naval  War  of  1812  59 

The  wonderful  effectiveness  of  our  seamen  at  the 
date  of  which  I  am  writing  as  well  as  long  subse- 
quently to  it  was  largely  due  to  the  curious  condi- 
tion of  things  in  Europe.  For  thirty  years  all  the 
European  nations  had  been  in  a  state  of  continuous 
and  very  complicated  warfare,  during  the  course  of 
which  each  nation  in  turn  fought  almost  every  other, 
England  being  usually  at  loggerheads  with  all.  One 
effect  of  this  was  to  force  an  enormous  proportion 
of  the  carrying  trade  of  the  world  into  American 
bottoms.  The  old  Massachusetts  town  of  Salem 
was  then  one  of  the  main  depots  of  the  East  India 
trade;  the  Baltimore  clippers  carried  goods  into  the 
French  and  German  ports  with  small  regard  to  the 
blockade;  New  Bedford  and  Sag  Harbor  fitted  out 
whalers  for  the  Arctic  seas  as  well  as  for  the  South 
Pacific ;  the  rich  merchants  of  Philadelphia  and  New 
York  sent  their  ships  to  all  parts  of  the  world; 
and  every  small  port  had  some  craft  in  the  coasting 
trade.  On  the  New  England  seaboard  but  few  of 
the  boys  would  reach  manhood  without  having  made 
at  least  one  voyage  to  the  Newfoundland  Banks 
after  codfish;  and  in  the  whaling  towns  of  Long 
Island  it  used  to  be  an  old  saying  that  no  man  could 
marry  till  he  struck  his  whale.  The  wealthy  mer- 
chants of  the  large  cities  would  often  send  their 
sons  on  a  voyage  or  two  before  they  let  them  enter 
their  counting-houses.  Thus  it  came  about  that  a 
large  portion  of  our  population  was  engaged  in  sea- 
faring pursuits  of  a  nature  strongly  tending  to  de- 
velop a  resolute  and  hardy  character  in  the  men 


60  Naval  War  of  1812 

that  followed  them.  The  British  merchantmen 
sailed  in  huge  convoys,  guarded  by  men-of-war, 
while,  as  said  before,  our  vessels  went  alone,  and 
relied  for  protection  on  themselves.  If  a  fishing 
smack  went  to  the  Banks  it  knew  that  it  ran  a  chance 
of  falling  in  with  some  not  overscrupulous  Nova 
Scotian  privateer.  The  barks  that  sailed  from  Sa- 
lem to  the  Spice  Islands  kept  their  men  well  trained 
both  at  great  guns  and  musketry,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
beat  off  either  Malay  proas,  or  Chinese  junks.  The 
New  York  ships,  loaded  for  the  West  Indies,  were 
prepared  to  do  battle  with  the  picaroons  that 
swarmed  in  the  Spanish  Main;  while  the  fast  craft 
from  Baltimore  could  fight  as  well  as  they  could 
run.  Wherever  an  American  seaman  went,  he  not 
only  had  to  contend  with  all  the  legitimate  perils  of 
the  sea,  but  he  had  also  to  regard  almost  every 
stranger  as  a  foe.  Whether  this  foe  called  him- 
self pirate  or  privateer  mattered  but  little.  French, 
Spaniards,  Algerines,  Malays,  from  all  alike  our 
commerce  suffered,  and  against  all  our  merchants 
were  forced  to  defend  themselves.  The  effect  of 
such  a  state  of  things,  which  made  commerce  so 
remunerative  that  the  bolder  spirits  could  hardly 
keep  out  of  it,  and  so  hazardous  that  only  the  most 
skilful  and  daring  could  succeed  in  it,  was  to  raise 
up  as  fine  a  set  of  seamen  as  ever  manned  a  navy. 
The  stern  school  in  which  the  American  was  brought 
up  forced  him  into  habits  of  independent  thought 
and  action  which  it  was  impossible  that  the  more 
protected  Briton  could  possess.  He  worked  more 


Naval  War  of  1812  61 

intelligently  and  less  from  routine,  and  while  per- 
fectly obedient  and  amenable  to  discipline,  was  yet 
able  to  judge  for  himself  in  an  emergency.  He 
was  more  easily  managed  than  most  of  his  kind — 
being  shrewd,  quiet,  and,  in  fact,  comparatively 
speaking,  rather  moral  than  otherwise;  if  he  was  a 
New  Englander,  when  he  retired  from  a  sea  life  he 
was  not  unapt  to  end  his  days  as  a  deacon.  Alto- 
gether there  could  not  have  been  better  material  for 
a  fighting  crew  than  cool,  gritty  American  Jack. 
Moreover,  there  was  a  good  nucleus  of  veterans  to 
begin  with,  who  were  well  fitted  to  fill  the  more 
responsible  positions,  such  as  captains  of  guns,  etc. 
These  were  men  who  had  cruised  in  the  little  Enter- 
prise after  French  privateers,  who  had  been  in  the 
Constellation  in  her  two  victorious  fights,  or  who, 
perhaps,  had  followed  Decatur  when  with  only 
eighty  men  he  cut  out  the  Philadelphia,  manned  by 
fivefold  his  force  and  surrounded  by  hostile  bat- 
teries and  war  vessels, — one  of  the  boldest  expe- 
ditions of  the  kind  on  record. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  furthermore,  in  this  connection, 
that  by  a  singular  turn  of  fortune,  Great  Britain, 
whose  system  of  impressing  American  sailors  had 
been  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  war,  herself  be- 
came, in  consequence  of  that  very  system,  in  some 
sort  a  nursery  for  the  seamen  of  the  young  Repub- 
lican navy.  The  American  sailor  feared  nothing 
more  than  being  impressed  on  a  British  ship — dread- 
ing beyond  measure  the  hard  life  and  cruel  discipline 
aboard  of  her;  but  once  there,  he  usually  did  well 


62  Naval  War  of  1812 

enough,  and  in  course  of  time  often  rose  to  be  of 
some  little  consequence.  For  years  before  1812, 
the  number  of  these  impressed  sailors  was  in  reality 
greater  than  the  entire  number  serving  in  the  Ameri- 
can navy,  from  which  it  will  readily  be  seen  that 
they  formed  a  good  stock  to  draw  upon.  Very 
much  to  their  credit,  they  never  lost  their  devotion 
to  the  home  of  their  birth,  more  than  two  thousand 
of  them  being  imprisoned  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  because  they  refused  to  serve  against  their 
country.  When  Commodore  Decatur  captured  the 
Macedonian,  that  officer,  as  we  learn  from  Mar- 
shall's "Naval  Biography"  (II,  1019),  stated  that 
most  of  the  seamen  of  his  own  frigate,  the  United 
States,  had  served  in  British  war  vessels,  and  that 
some  had  been  with  Lord  Nelson  in  the  Victory, 
and  had  even  been  bargemen  to  the  great  Admiral, 
— a  pretty  sure  proof  that  the  American  sailors  did 
not  show  at  a  disadvantage  when  compared  with 
others.8 

8  With  perfect  gravity,  James  and  his  followers  assume 
Decatur's  statement  to  be  equivalent  to  saying  that  he  had 
chiefly  British  "seamen  on  board ;  whereas  even  as  quoted  by 
Marshall,  Decatur  merely  said  that  "his  seamen  had  served 
on  board  a  British  man-of-war,"  and  that  some  "had  served 
under  Lord  Nelson."  Like  the  Constitution,  the  United 
States  had  rid  herself  of  most  of  the  British  subjects  on 
board,  before  sailing.  Decatur's  remark  simply  referred  to 
the  number  of  his  American  seamen  who  had  been  impressed 
on  board  British  ships.  Whenever  James  says  that  an 
American  ship  had  a  large  proportion  of  British  sailors 
aboard,  the  explanation  is  that  a  large  number  of  the  crew 
were  Americans  who  had  been  impressed  on  British  ships. 
It  would  be  no  more  absurd  to  claim  Trafalgar  as  an  Ameri- 


Naval  War  of  1812  63 

Good  seaman  as  the  impressed  American  proved 
to  be,  yet  he  seldom  missed  an  opportunity  to  escape 
from  the  British  service,  by  desertion  or  otherwise. 
In  the  first  place,  the  life  was  very  hard,  and,  in 
the  second,  the  American  seaman  was  very  patriotic. 
He  had  an  honest  and  deep  affection  for  his  own 
flag,  while,  on  the  contrary,  he  felt  a  curiously 
strong  hatred  for  England,  as  distinguished  from 
Englishmen.  This  hatred  was  partly  an  abstract 
feeling,  cherished  through  a  vague  traditional  re- 
spect for  Bunker  Hill,  and  partly  something  very 
real  and  vivid,  owing  to  the  injuries  he,  and  others 
like  him,  had  received.  Whether  he  lived  in  Mary- 
land or  Massachusetts,  he  certainly  knew  men  whose 
ships  had  been  seized  by  British  cruisers,  their 
goods  confiscated,  and  the  vessels  condemned.  Some 
of  his  friends  had  fallen  victims  to  the  odious  right 
of  search,  and  had  never  been  heard  of  afterward. 
He  had  suffered  many  an  injury  to  friend,  fortune, 
or  person,  and  some  day  he  hoped  to  repay  them 
all;  and  when  the  war  did  come,  he  fought  all  the 
better  because  he  knew  it  was  his  own  quarrel.  But, 
as  I  have  said,  this  hatred  was  against  England, 
not  against  Englishmen.  Then,  as  now,  sailors 
were  scattered  about  over  the  world  without  any 
great  regard  for  nationality;  and  the  resulting  in- 
termingling of  natives  and  foreigners  in  every  mer- 
cantile marine  was  especially  great  in  those  of 

can  victory  because  there  was  a  certain  number  of  Americans 
in  Nelson's  fleet,  than  it  is  to  assert  that  the  Americans  were 
victorious  in  1812,  because  there  were  a  few  renegade  British 
on  board  their  ships. 


64  Naval  War  of  1812 

Britain  and  America,  whose  people  spoke  the  same 
tongue  and  wore  the  same  aspect.  When  chance 
drifted  the  American  into  Liverpool  or  London, 
he  was  ready  enough  to  ship  in  an  Indiaman  or 
whaler,  caring  little  for  the  fact  that  he  served  under 
the  British  flag ;  and  the  Briton,  in  turn,  who  found 
himself  in  New  York  or  Philadelphia,  willingly 
sailed  in  one  of  the  clipper-built  barks,  whether  it 
floated  the  Stars  and  Stripes  or  not.  When  Cap- 
tain Porter  wrought  such  havoc  among  the  British 
whalers  in  the  South  Seas,  he  found  that  no  incon- 
siderable portion  of  their  crews  consisted  of  Ameri- 
cans, some  of  whom  enlisted  on  board  his  own  ves- 
sel ;  and  among  the  crews  of  the  American  whalers 
were  many  British.  In  fact,  though  the  skipper 
of  each  ship  might  brag  loudly  of  his  nationality, 
yet  in  practical  life  he  knew  well  enough  that  there 
was  very  little  to  choose  between  a  Yankee  and  a 
Briton.4  Both  were  bold  and  hardy,  cool  and  in- 

4  What  choice  there  was,  was  in  favor  of  the  American. 
In  point  of  courage  there  was  no  difference  whatever.  The 
Essex  and  the  Lawrence,  as  well  as  the  Frolic  and  the  Rein- 
deer, were  defended  with  the  same  stubborn,  desperate,  cool 
bravery  that  marks  the  English  race  on  both  sides  of  the  At- 
lantic. But  the  American  was  a  free  citizen,  any  one's  equal, 
a  voter  with  a  personal  interest  in  his  country's  welfare,  and, 
above  all,  without  having  perpetually  before  his  eyes  the  de- 
grading fear  of  the  press-gang.  In  consequence,  he  was 
more  tractable  than  the  Englishman,  more  self-reliant,  and 
possessed  greater  judgment.  In  the  fight  between  the  Wasp 
and  the  Frolic,  the  latter's  crew  had  apparently  been  well 
trained  at  the  guns,  for  they  aimed  well ;  but  they  fired  at 
the  wrong  time,  and  never  corrected  the  error;  while  their 
antagonists,  delivering  their  broadsides  far  more  slowly,  by 


Naval  War  of  1812  65 

telligent,  quick  with  their  hands,  and  showing  at 
their  best  in  an  emergency.  They  looked  alike  and 
spoke  alike;  when  they  t'ook  the  trouble  to  think, 
they  thought  alike ;  and  when  they  got  drunk,  which 
was  not  an  unfrequent  occurrence,  they  quarreled 
alike. 

Mingled  with  them  were  a  few  seamen  of  other 
nationalities.  The  Irishman,  if  he  came  from  the 
old  Dano-Irish  towns  of  Waterford,  Dublin,  and 
Wexford,  or  from  the  Ulster  coast,  was  very  much 
like  the  two  chief  combatants;  the  Celto-Turanian 
kern  of  the  west  did  not  often  appear  on  shipboard. 
The  French,  Danes,  and  Dutch  were  hemmed  in  at 
home;  they  had  enough  to  do  on  their  own  sea- 
board, and  could  not  send  men  into  foreign  fleets. 
A  few  Norse,  however,  did  come  in,  and  excellent 
sailors  and  fighters  they  made.  With  the  Portu- 
guese and  Italians,  of  whom  some  were  to  be  found 
serving  under  the  Union  Jack  and  others  under  the 
Stars  and  Stripes,  it  was  different;  although  there 
were  many  excellent  exceptions  they  did  not,  as  a 
rule,  make  the  best  kind  of  seamen.  They  were 
treacherous,  fond  of  the  knife,  less  ready  with  their 
hands,  and  likely  to  lose  either  their  wits  or  their 
courage  when  in  a  tight  place. 

intelligently  waiting  until  the  proper  moment,  worked  fright- 
ful havoc.  But  though  there  was  a  certain  slight  difference 
between  the  seamen  of  the  two  nations,  it  must  never  be  for- 
gotten that  it  was  very  much  less  than  that  between  the  vari- 
ous individuals  of  the  same  nation ;  and  when  the  British  had 
been  trained  for  a  few  years  by  such  commanders  as  Broke 
and  Manners,  it  was  impossible  to  surpass  them,  and  it  needed 
our  best  men  to  equal  them. 


66  Naval  War  of  1812 

In  the  American  navy,  unlike  the  British,  there 
was  no  impressment ;  the  sailor  was  a  volunteer,  and 
he  shipped  in  whatever  craft  his  fancy  selected. 
Throughout  the  war  there  were  no  "picked  crews" 
on  the  American  side,5  excepting  on  the  last  two 
cruises  of  the  Constitution.  In  fact  (as  seen  by  the 
letter  of  Captains  Stewart  and  Bainbridge  to  Secre- 
tary Hamilton),  there  was  often  much  difficulty  in 
getting  enough  men.6  Many  sailors  preferred  to 
serve  in  the  innumerable  privateers,  and  the  two 

5  James'  statements  to  the  contrary  being  in  every  case  ut- 
terly without  foundation.     He  Is  also  wrong  In  his  assertion 
that  the  American  ships  had  no  boys;    they  had  nearly  as 
many  in  proportion  as  the  British.     The  Constitution  had 
31,  the  Adams  15,  etc.     So,  when  he  states  that  our  midship- 
men were  generally  masters  and  mates  of  merchantmen;  they 
were  generally  from  eleven  to  seventeen  years  old  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war,  and,  besides,  had  rarely  or  never  been  in 
the  merchant  marine. 

6  Reading  through  the  volumes  of  official  letters  about  this 
war,  which  are  preserved  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  one  of  the  most  noticeable  things  is  the  continual  com- 
plaints about  the  difficulty  of  getting  men.     The  Adams  at 
one  time  had  a  crew  of  but  nineteen  men — "fourteen  of  whom 
are  marines,"  adds  the  aggrieved  commander.    A  log-book  of 
one  of  the  gun-boats  records  the  fact  that  after  much  difficulty 
two  men  were  enlisted — from  the  jail,  with  a  parenthetical 
memorandum  to  the  effect  that  they  were  both  very  drunk. 
British  ships  were  much  more  easily  manned,  as  they  could 
always  have  recourse  to  impressment. 

The  Constitution  on  starting  out  on  her  last  cruises  had  an 
extraordinary  number  of  able  seamen  aboard,  viz.,  218,  with 
but  92  ordinary  seamen,  12  boys,  and  44  marines,  making, 
with  the  officers,  a  total  of  440  men.  (See  letter  of  Captain 
Bainbridge,  Oct.  16,  1814;  it  is  letter  No.  51,  in  the  fortieth 
volume  of  "Captains'  Letters,"  in  the  clerk's  office  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.) 


Naval  War  of  1812  67 

above-mentioned  officers,  in  urging  the  necessity  of 
building  line-of-battle  ships,  state  that  it  was  hard 
work  to  recruit  men  for  vessels  of  an  inferior  grade, 
so  long  as  the  enemy  had  ships  of  the  line. 

One  of  the  standard  statements  made  by  the 
British  historians  about  this  war  is  that  our  ships 
were  mainly  or  largely  manned  by  British  sailors. 
This,  if  true,  would  not  interfere  with  the  lessons 
which  it  teaches ;  and,  besides  that,  it  is  not  true. 

In  this,  as  in  everything  else,  all  the  modern 
writers  have  merely  followed  James  or  Brenton, 
and  I  shall  accordingly  confine  myself  to  examin- 
ing their  assertions.  The  former  begins  (Vol.  IV, 
p.  470)  by  diffidently  stating  that  there  is  a  "simi- 
larity" of  language  between  the  inhabitants  of  the 
two  countries — an  interesting  philological  discovery 
that  but  few  will  attempt  to  controvert.  In  Vol. 
VI,  p.  154,  he  mentions  that  a  number  of  blanks 
occur  in  the  American  Navy  List  in  the  column 
"Where  Born" ;  and  in  proof  of  the  fact  that  these 
blanks  are  there  because  the  men  were  not  Ameri- 
cans, he  says  that  their  names  "are  all  English  and 
Irish."7  They  certainly  are ;  and  so  are  all  the  other 

7  For  example,  James  writes:  "Out  of  the  32  captains  one 
only,  Thomas  Tingey,  has  England  marked  as  his  birth- 
place. .  .  .  Three  blanks  occur,  and  we  consider  it  rather 
creditable  to  Captains  John  Shaw,  Daniel  S.  Patterson,  and 
John  Ord  Creighton  that  they  were  ashamed  to  tell  where 
they  were  born."  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  out  the  lat- 
ter's  birth-place,  but  Captain  Shaw  was  born  in  New  York, 
and  I  have  seen  Captain  Patterson  incidentally  alluded  to  as 
"born  and  bred  in  America."  Generally,  whenever  I  have 
been  able  to  fill  up  the  vacancies  in  the  column  "Where 
Born,"  I  have  found  that  it  was  in  America.  From  these 


68  Naval  War  of  1812 

names  in  the  list.  It  could  not  well  be  otherwise, 
as  the  United  States  navy  was  not  officered  by 
Indians.  In  looking  over  this  same  Navy  List  (of 
1816)  it  will  be  seen  that  but  a  little  over  five  per 
cent  of  the  officers  were  born  abroad — a  smaller 
proportion  by  far  than  would  exist  in  the  popula- 
tion of  the  country  at  large — and  most  of  these  had 
come  to  America  when  under  ten  years  of  age.  On 
p.  155  James  adds  that  the  British  sailors  com- 
posed "one  third  in  number  and  one  half  in  point 
of  effectiveness"  of  the  American  crews.  Brenton 
in  his  "Naval  History"  writes :  "It  was  said,  and  I 
have  no  reason  to  doubt  the  fact,  that  there  were 
200  British  seamen  aboard  the  Constitution."8 
These  statements  are  mere  assertions  unsupported  by 
proof  and  of  such  a  loose  character  as  to  be  diffi- 
cult to  refute.  As  our  navy  was  small,  it  may  be 
best  to  take  each  ship  in  turn.  The  only  ones  of 
which  the  British  could  write  authoritatively  were, 
of  course,  those  which  they  captured.  The  first  one 
taken  was  the  Wasp.  James  says  many  British 
were  discovered  among  her  crew,  instancing  es- 
pecially one  sailor  named  Jack  Lang;  now  Jack 
Lang  was  born  in  the  town  of  Brunswick,  New 
Jersey,  but  had  been  impressed  and  forced  to  serve 
in  the  British  Navy.  The  same  was  doubtless  true 
of  the  rest  of  the  "many  British"  seamen  of  her 
crew;  at  any  rate,  as  the  only  instance  James  men- 
facts  it  would  appear  that  James  was  somewhat  hasty  in  con- 
cluding that  the  omission  of  the  birth-place  proved  the  owner 
of  the  name  to  be  a  native  of  Great  Britain. 
8  New  edition,  London,  1837,  Vol.  II,  p.  456. 


Naval  War  of  1812  69 

tions  (Jack  Lang)  was  an  American,  he  can  hardly 
be  trusted  for  those  whom  he  does  not  name. 

Of  the  95  men  composing  the  crew  of  the  Nau- 
tilus when  she  was  captured,  "6  were  detained  and 
sent  to  England  to  await  examination  as  being  sus- 
pected of  being  British  subjects."9  Of  the  other 
small  brigs,  the  Viper,  Vixen,  Rattlesnake,  and 
Syren,  James  does  not  mention  the  composition  of 
the  crews,  and  I  do  not  know  that  any  were  claimed 
as  British.  Of  the  crew  of  the  Argus  "about  10  or 
12  were  believed  to  be  British  subjects;  the  American 
ofBcers  swore  the  crew  contained  none"  (James, 
"Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  278).  From  o  to  10  per 
cent  can  be  allowed.  When  the  Frolic  was  cap- 
tured "her  crew  consisted  of  native  Americans"  (do. 
p.  340).  James  speaks  ("History,"  p.  418)  of  "a 
portion  of  the  British  subjects  on  board  the  Essex," 
but  without  giving  a  word  of  proof  or  stating  his 
grounds  of  belief.  One  man  was  claimed  as  a 
deserter  by  the  British,  but  he  turned  out  to  be  a 
New  Yorker.  There  were  certainly  a  certain  number 
of  British  aboard,  but  the  number  probably  did  not 
exceed  thirty.  Of  the  President's  crew  he  says 

9  Quoted  from  letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers  of  September 
12,  1812  (in  Naval  Archives,  "Captains'  Letters,"  Vol.  XXV, 
No.  43),  inclosing  a  "List  of  American  prisoners  of  war  dis- 
charged out  of  custody  of  Lieutenant  William  Miller,  agent 
at  the  port  of  Halifax,"  in  exchange  for  some  of  the  British 
captured  by  Porter.  This  list,  by  the  way,  shows  the  crew 
of  the  Nautilus  (counting  the  six  men  detained  as  British) 
to  have  been  95  in  number,  instead  of  106,  as  stated  by  James. 
Commodore  Rodgers  adds  that  he  has  detained  12  men  of  the 
Gtterrttre's  crew  as  an  offset  to  the  6  men  belonging  to  the 
Nautilus, 


yo  Naval  War  of  1812 

("Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  448)  :  "In  the  opinion  of 
several  British  officers  there  were  among-  them  many 
British  seamen" ;  but  Commodore  Decatur,  Lieuten- 
ant Gallagher,  and  the  other  officers  swore  that 
there  were  none.  Of  the  crew  of  the  Chesapeake, 
he  says,  "about  32"  were  British  subjects,  or  about 
10  per  cent.  One  or  two  of  these  were  afterward 
shot,  and  some  25,  together  with  a  Portuguese 
boatswain's  mate,  entered  into  the  British  service. 
So  that  of  the  vessels  captured  by  the  British,  the 
Chesapeake  had  the  largest  number  of  British  (about 
10  per  cent  of  her  crew)  on  board,  the  others  rang- 
ing from  that  number  down  to  none  at  all,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  Wasp. 

As  these  eleven  ships  would  probably  represent  a 
fair  average,  this  proportion,  of  from  o  to  10  per 
cent,  should  be  taken  as  the  proper  one.  James, 
however,  is  of  the  opinion  that  those  ships  manned 
by  Americans  were  more  apt  to  be  captured  than 
those  manned  by  the  braver  British;  which  calls 
for  an  examination  of  the  crews  of  the  remaining 
vessels.  Of  the  American  sloop  Peacock,  James 
says  ("Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  348)  that  "several 
of  her  men  were  recognized  as  British  seamen"; 
even  if  this  were  true,  "several"  could  not  probably 
mean  more  than  sixteen,  or  10  per  cent.  Of  the 
second  Wasp  he  says,  "Captain  Blakely  was  a  na- 
tive of  Dublin,  and,  along  with  some  English  and 
Scotch,  did  not,  it  may  be  certain,  neglect  to  have 
in  his  crew  a  great  many  Irish."  Now  Captain 
Blakely  left  Ireland  when  he  was  but  16  months 


Naval  War  of  1812  71 

old,  and  the  rest  of  James's  statement  is  avowedly 
mere  conjecture.  It  was  asserted  positively  in  the 
American  newspapers  that  the  Wasp,  which  sailed 
from  Portsmouth,  was  manned  exclusively  by  New 
Englanders,  except  a  small  draft  of  men  from  a 
Baltimore  privateer,  and  that  there  was  not  a  for- 
eigner in  her  crew.  Of  the  Hornet  James  states 
that  "some  of  her  men  were  natives  of  the  United 
Kingdom" ;  but  he  gives  no  authority,  and  the  men 
he  refers  to  were  in  all  probability  those  spoken  of 
in  the  journal  of  one  of  the  Hornet's  officers,  which 
says  that  "many  of  our  men  [Americans]  had  been 
impressed  in  the  British  service."  As  regards  the 
gunboats,  James  asserts  that  they  were  commanded 
by  "Commodore  Joshua  Barney,  a  native  of  Ire- 
land." This  officer,  however,  was  born  at  Baltimore 
on  July  6,  1759.  As  to  the  Constitution,  Brenton, 
as  already  mentioned,  supposes  the  number  of  Brit- 
ish sailors  in  her  crew  to  have  been  200;  James 
makes  it  less,  or  about  150.  Respecting  this,  the 
only  definite  statements  I  can  find  in  British  works 
are  the  following:  In  the  "Naval  Chronicle,"  Vol. 
XXIX,  p.  452,  an  officer  of  the  Java  states  that  most 
of  the  Constitution's  men  were  British,  many  being 
from  the  Guerriere;  which  should  be  read  in  con- 
nection with  James's  statement  (Vol.  VI,  p.  156) 
that  but  eight  of  the  Guerriere' s  crew  deserted,  and 
but  two  shipped  on  board  the  Constitution.  More- 
over, as  a  matter  of  fact,  these  eight  men  were  all 
impressed  Americans.  In  the  "Naval  Chronicle"  it 
is  also  said  that  the  Chesapeake' s  surgeon  was  an 


72  Naval  War  of  1812 

Irishman,  formerly  of  the  British  Navy;  he  was 
born  in  Baltimore,  and  was  never  in  the  British 
navy  in  his  life.  The  third  lieutenant  "was  sup- 
posed to  be  an  Irishman"  (Brenton,  II,  456).  The 
first  lieutenant  "was  a  native  of  Great  Britain,  we 
have  been  informed"  (James,  VI,  194)  ;  he  was 
Mr.  George  Parker,  born  and  bred  in  Virginia.  The 
remaining  three  citations,  if  true,  prove  nothing. 
"One  man  had  served  under  Mr.  Kent"  of  the  Guer- 
riere  (James,  VI,  p.  153).  "One  had  been  in  the 
Achille"  and  "one  in  the  Eurydice"  (Brenton,  II, 
456).  These  three  men  were  most  probably  Ameri- 
can seamen  who  had  been  impressed  on  British  ships. 
From  Cooper  (in  "Putnam's  Magazine,"  Vol,  I,  p. 
593)  as  well  as  from  several  places  in  the  Consti- 
tution's log,10  we  learned  that  those  of  the  crew  who 
were  British  deserters  were  discharged  from  the 
Constitution  before  she  left  port,  as  they  were  afraid 
to  serve  in  a  war  against  Great  Britain.  That  this  fear 
was  justifiable  may  be  seen  by  reading  James,  Vol. 
IV,  p.  483.  Of  the  four  men  taken  by  the  Leopard 
from  the  Chesapeake,  as  deserters,  one  was  hung 
and  three  scourged.  In  reality  the  crew  of  the  Con- 
stitution probably  did  not  contain  a  dozen  British 
sailors;  in  her  last  cruises  she  was  manned  almost 

10  See  her  log-book  (Vol.  II,  Feb.  i,  1812,  to  Dec.  13,  1813) ; 
especially  on  July  i2th,  when  twelve  men  were  discharged. 
In  some  of  Hull's  letters  he  alludes  to  the  desire  of  the  Brit- 
ish part  of  the  crew  to  serve  on  the  gun-boats  or  in  the  ports ; 
and  then  writes  that  "in  accordance  with  the  instructions 
sent  him  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy"  he  had  allowed  the 
British-born  portion  to  leave  the  ship.  The  log-books  are  in 
the  Bureau  of  Navigation. 


Naval  War  of  1812  73 

exclusively  by  New  Englanders.  The  only  remain- 
ing vessel  is  the  United  States,  respecting  whose 
crew  some' remarkable  statements  have  been  made. 
Marshall  (Vol.  II,  p.  1019)  writes  that  Commodore 
Decatur  "declared  there  was  not  .a  seaman  in  his 
ship  who  had  not  served  from  5  to  12  years  in  a 
British  man-of-war,"  from  which  he  concludes  that 
they  were  British  themselves.  It  may  be  questioned 
whether  Decatur  ever  made  such  an  assertion ;  or  if 
he  did,  it  is  safe  to  asume  again  that  his  men  were 
long-impressed  Americans.11 

11  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  were  on  record  in  the 
American  State  Department  6,257  cases  of  impressed  Ameri- 
can seamen.  These  could  represent  but  a  small  part  of  the 
whole,  which  must  have  amounted  to  20,000  men,  or  more 
than  sufficient  to  man  our  entire  navy  five  times  over.  Ac- 
cording to  the  British  Admiralty  Report  to  the  House  of 
Commons,  February  i,  1815,  2,548  impressed  American  sea- 
men, who  refused  to  serve  against  their  country,  were  im- 
prisoned in  1812.  According  to  Lord  Castlereagh's  speech  in 
the  House,  February  18, 1813,  3,300  men  claiming  to  be  Ameri- 
can subjects  were  serving  in  the  British  navy  in  January, 
1811,  and  he  certainly  did  not  give  anything  like  the  whole 
number.  In  the  American  service  the  term  of  enlistment  ex- 
tended for  two  years,  and  the  frigate  United  States,  referred 
to,  had  not  had  her  crew  for  any  very  great  length  of  time  as 
yet.  If  such  a  crew  were  selected  at  random  from  American 
sailors,  among  them  there  would  be,  owing  to  the  small  num- 
ber serving  in  our  own  navy  and  the  enormous  number  im- 
pressed into  the  British  navy,  probably  but  one  of  the  former 
to  two  of  the  latter.  As  already  mentioned  the  American  al- 
ways left  a  British  man-of-war  as  soon  as  he  could,  by  deser- 
tion or  discharge;  but  he  had  no  unwillingness  to  serve  in 
the  home  navy,  where  the  pay  was  larger  and  the  discipline 
far  more  humane,  not  to  speak  of  motives  of  patriotism. 
Even  if  the  ex-British  man-of-war's-man  kept  out  of  service 
for  some  time,  he  would  be  very  apt  to  enlist  when  a  war 

VOL.  IX.— 4 


74  Naval  War  of  1812 

Of  the  Carolina's  crew  of  70  men,  five  were 
British.  This  fact  was  not  found  out  till  three 
deserted,  when  an  investigation  was  made  and 
the  two  other  British  discharged.  Captain  Henly, 
in  reporting  these  facts,  made  no  concealment  of 
his  surprise  that  there  should  be  any  British  at 
all  in  his  crew.12 

From  these  facts  and  citations  we  may  accord- 
ingly conclude  that  the  proportion  of  British  seamen 
serving  on  American  ships  after  the  war  broke  out, 
varied  between  none,  as  on  the  Wasp  and  Consti- 
tution, to  ten  per  cent,  as  on  the  Chesapeake  and 
Essex.  On  the  average,  nine-tenths  of  each  of  our 
crews  were  American  seamen,  and  about  one-twen- 
tieth British,  the  remainder  being  a  mixture  of  va- 
rious nationalities. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be  said  that  the  British 
frigate  Guerriere  had  ten  Americans  among  her 
crew,  who  were  permitted  to  go  below  during  action, 
and  the  Macedonian  eight,  who  were  not  allowed 
that  privilege,  three  of  them  being  killed.  Three 
of  the  British  sloop  Peacock's  men  were  Americans, 
who  were  forced  to  fight  against  the  Hornet;  one 
of  them  was  killed.  Two  of  the  Epervier's  men 
were  Americans,  who  were  also  forced  to  fight. 
When  the  crew  of  the  Nautilus  was  exchanged,  a 
number  of  other  American  prisoners  were  sent  with 
them;  among  these  were  a  number  of  American 

broke  out,  while  his  country  undertook   largely  to  avenge 
his  own  wrongs. 

lt  See  his  letter  in  "Letters  of  Masters-Commandant," 
1814,  I.  No.  116. 


Naval  War  of  1812 


75 


seamen  who  had  been  serving  in  the  Shannon, 
Acasta,  Africa,  and  various  other  vessels.  So  there 
was  also  a  certain  proportion  of  Americans  among 
the  British  crews,  although  forming  a  smaller  per- 
centage of  them  than  the  British  did  on  board  the 
American  ships.  In  neither  case  was  the  number 
sufficient  to  at  all  affect  the  result. 

The  crews  of  our  ships  being  thus  mainly  native 
Americans,  it  may  be  interesting  to  try  to  find  out 
the  proportions  that  were  furnished  by  the  different 
sections  of  the  country.  There  is  not  much  difficulty 
about  the  officers.  The  captains,  masters  comman- 
dant, lieutenants,  marine  officers,  whose  birthplaces 
are  given  in  the  Navy  List  of  1816, — 240  in  all, — 
came  from  the  various  States  as  follows : 


New  England 


N.  H.,      5 


.  LI      I.I 
Conn.,      6 

N.Y.,     17 

22 


Middle 

Del., 
District  of  Columbia  |  D.  C, 

Md., 
Va., 
N.  C., 

Southern  States  •(  S.  C., 
Ga., 
La., 


>  no 


Total  of  given  birthplaces 


240 


76  Naval  War  of  1812 

Thus,  Maryland  furnished,  both  absolutely  and 
proportionately,  the  greatest  number  of  officers, 
Virginia,  then  the  most  populous  of  all  the  States, 
coming  next;  four-fifths  of  the  remainder  came  from 
the  Northern  States. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  get  at  the  birthplaces  of  the 
sailors.  Something  can  be  inferred  from  the  num- 
ber of  privateers  and  letters  of  marque  fitted  out. 
Here  Baltimore  again  headed  the  list;  following 
closely  came  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  the  New 
England  coast  towns,  with,  alone  among  the  South- 
ern ports,  Charleston,  S.  C.  A  more  accurate  idea 
of  the  quotas  of  sailors  furnished  by  the  different 
sections  can  be  arrived  at  by  comparing  the  total 
amount  of  tonnage  the  country  possessed  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war.  Speaking  roughly,  44  per  cent 
of  it  belonged  to  New  England,  32  per  cent  to  the 
Middle  States,  and  1 1  per  cent  to  Maryland.  This 
makes  it  probable  (but  of  course  not  certain)  that 
three-fourths  of  the  common  sailors  hailed  from  the 
Northern  States,  half  the  remainder  from  Maryland, 
and  the  rest  chiefly  from  Virginia  and  South 
Carolina. 

Having  thus  discussed  somewhat  at  length  the 
character  of  our  officers  and  crews,  it  will  now  be 
necessary  to  present  some  statistical  tables  to  give 
a  more  accurate  idea  of  the  composition  of  the  navy, 
the  tonnage,  complements,  and  armaments  of  the 
ships,  etc. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Government  pos- 


Naval  War  of  1812  77 

sessed  six  navy  yards  (all  but  the  last  established 
in  1801)  as  follows:13 

Minimum  number  of 
Place.  Original  cost.         men  employed. 

1.  Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  $  S'S°°  Io 

2.  Charleston,  Mass.,  39,214  20 

3.  New  York,  40,000  102 

4.  Philadelphia,  37,000  13 

5.  Washington,  4,000  36 
o.  Gosport,  12,000  1 6 

In  1812  the  following  was  the  number  of  officers 
in  the  navy  :14 

12  captains, 

lo  masters  commandant, 
73  lieutenants, 
53  masters, 
310  midshipmen, 
42  marine  officers, 

500 

At  the  opening  of  the  year,  the  number  of  seamen, 
ordinary  seamen,  and  boys  in  service  was  4,010, 
and  enough  more  were  recruited  to  increase  it  to 
5,230,  of  whom  only  2,346  were  destined  for  the 
cruising  war  vessels,  the  remainder  being  detailed 
for  forts,  gun-boats,  navy  yards,  the  lakes,  etc.15 
The  marine  corps  was  already  ample,  consisting  of 
1,523  men.16 

No  regular  navy  lists  were  published  till  1816, 
and  I  have  been  able  to  get  very  little  information 
respecting  the  increase  in  officers  and  men  during 

13  Report  of  Naval  Secretary  Jones,  Nov.  30,  1814. 

14  "List   of   Vessels,"   etc.,    by   Geo.    H.    Preble,    U.S.N. 

(1874)- 
16  Report  of  Secretary  Paul  Hamilton,  Feb.  21,  1812. 

16  Ibid 


78  Naval  War  of  1812 

1813  and  1814;  but  we  have  full  returns  for  1815, 
which  may  be  summarized  as  follows  :17 

30  captains,  25  masters  commandant, 

141  lieutenants,  24  commanders, 

510  midshipmen,  230  sailing-master 

50  surgeons,  12  chaplains, 

50  pursers,  10  coast  pilots, 

45  captain's  clerks,  80  surgeon's  mates, 

530  boatswains,  gunners,  carpenters,  and  salt 

makers, 

268  boatswain's  mates,  gunner's  mates,  etd> 
1,106  quarter  gunners,  etc-, 
5,000  able  seamen, 
6,849  ordinary  seamen  and  boys. 

Making  a  total  of  14,960,  with  2,715  marines.18 

Comparing  this  list  with  the  figures  given  before, 
it  can  be  seen  that  during  the  course  of  the  war 
our  navy  grew  enormously,  increasing  to  between 
three  and  four  times  its  original  size. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1812  the  navy  of 
the  United  States  on  the  ocean  consisted  of  the  fol- 
lowing vessels,  which  either  were,  or  could  have 
been,  made  available  during  the  war:19 

Cost. 


Rate 
tr*     _\      viAine. 
(Ounsj 

Where  Built. 

When 
Built 

Ton- 
nage. 

44  United  States, 

Philadelphia, 

«797 

1576 

44  Constitution, 

Boston, 

»797 

1576 

44  President, 

New  York, 

1800 

1576 

38  Constellation, 

Baltimore, 

'797 

1265 

38  Congress, 

Portsmouth, 

«799 

1268 

38  Chesapeake, 

Norfolk. 

'799 

1244 

32  Essex, 

Salem, 

'799 

860 

28  Adams, 

New  York, 

«799 

560 

18  Hornet, 

Baltimore, 

1805 

480 

.8  Wasp, 

Washington, 

1806 

450 

16  Argus, 

Boston, 

1803 

298 

16  Syrrn, 

Philadelphia, 

,803 

250 

14  Nautilus, 

Baltimore, 

1803 

185 

14   Vijcen, 

Baltimore, 

1803 

185 

12  Enterprise, 
it   Viper, 

Baltimore, 
Purchased. 

'799 
1810 

,65 
148 

302,718 
220,919 

197,246 
220,677 
139.362 
76,6*2 


18,763 
20,872 
16,240 


"  Seybert's" Statistical  Annals,"  p.  676  (Philadelphia,  1818). 

18  Report  of  Secretary  B.  W.  Crowninshield,  April  18,  1816. 

19  Letter  of  Secretary  Benjamin  Stoddart  to  Fifth  Con- 


Naval  War  of  1812  79 

There  also  appeared  on  the  lists  the  New  York, 
36,  Boston,  28,  and  John  Adams,  28.  The  two 
former  were  condemned  hulks;  the  latter  was  en- 
tirely rebuilt  after  the  war.  The  Hornet  was  orig- 
inally a  brig  of  440  tons,  and  18  guns;  having  been 
transformed  into  a  ship,  she  was  pierced  for  20 
guns,  and  in  size  was  of  an  intermediate  grade 
between  the  Wasp  and  the  heavy  sloops,  built  some- 
what later,  of  509  tons.  Her  armament  consisted 
of  32-pound  carronades,  with  the  exception  of  the 
two  bow-guns,  which  were  long  I2's.  The 
whole  broadside  was  in  nominal  weight  just  300 
pounds;  in  actual  weight  about  277  pounds. 
Her  complement  of  men  was  140,  but  during  the 
war  she  generally  left  port  with  I5O.20  The  Wasp 
had  been  a  ship  from  the  beginning,  mounted  the 
number  of  guns  she  rated  (of  the  same  calibres  as 
the  Hornet's}  and  carried  some  ten  men  less.  She 
was  about  the  same  length  as  the  British  i8-gun 
brig-sloop,  but,  being  narrower,  measured  nearly 
30  tons  less.  The  Argus  and  Syren  were  similar 
and  very  fine  brigs,  the  former  being  the  longer. 
Each  carried  two  more  guns  than  she  rated;  and 

gress,  Dec.  24,  1798;  Letters  of  Secretary  Paul  Hamilton, 
Feb.  21,  1812;  "American  State  Papers,"  Vol.  XIX,  p.  149. 
See  also  "The  History  of  the  Navy  of  the  United  States,"  by 
Lieut.  G.  E.  Emmons.  U.  S.  N.  (published  in  Washington, 
MDCCCLIII,  under  the  authority  of  the  Navy  Department. 
20  In  the  Hornet's  log  of  Oct.  25,  1812,  while  in  port,  it  is 
mentioned  that  she  had  158  men;  four  men  who  were  sick 
were  left  behind  before  she  started.  (See,  in  the  Navy 
Archives,  the  Log-book,  Hornet,  Wasp,  and  Argus,  July 
20,  1809,  to  Oct.  6,  1813). 


8o  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  Argus,  in  addition,  had  a  couple  thrust  through 
the  bridle-ports.  The  guns  were  24-pound  carron- 
ades,  with  two  long  12' 's  for  bow-chasers.  The 
proper  complement  of  men  was  100,  but  each  sailed 
usually  with  about  125.  The  four  smaller  craft 
were  originally  schooners,  armed  with  the  same 
number  of  light  long  guns  as  they  rated,  and  carry- 
ing some  70  men  apiece;  but  they  had  been  very 
effectually  ruined  by  being  changed  into  brigs,  with 
crews  increased  to  a  hundred  men.  Each  was  armed 
with  1 8-pound  carronades,  carrying  two  more  than 
she  rated.  The  Enterprise,  in  fact,  mounted  16 
guns,  having  two  long  nines  thrust  through  the 
bridle-ports.  These  little  brigs  were  slow,  not  very 
seaworthy,  and  overcrowded  with  men  and  guns; 
they  all  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands  without  doing 
any  good  whatever,  with  the  single  exception  of 
the  Enterprise,  which  escaped  capture  by  sheer  good 
luck,  and  in  her  only  battle  happened  to  be  pitted 
against  one  of  the  corresponding  and  equally  bad 
class  of  British  gun-brigs.  The  Adams  after  sev- 
eral changes  of  form  finally  became  a  flush-decked 
corvette.  The  Essex  had  originally  mounted 
twenty-six  long  I2's  on  her  main-deck,  and  sixteen 
24-pound  carronades  on  her  spar-deck;  but  official 
Nvisdom  changed  this,  giving  her  46  guns,  twenty- 
four  32-pound  carronades,  and  two  long  I2's  on 
the  main-deck,  and  sixteen  32-pound  carronades 
with  four  long  I2's  on  the  spar-deck.  When  Cap- 
tain Porter  had  command  of  her  he  was  deeply 
sensible  of  the  disadvantages  of  an  armament  which 


Naval  War  of  1812  81 

put  him  at  the  mercy  of  any  ordinary  antagonist 
who  could  choose  his  distance;  accordingly  he  pe- 
titioned several  times,  but  always  without  success, 
to  have  his  long  I2's  returned  to  him. 

The  American  38's  were  about  the  size  of  the 
British  frigates  of  the  same  rate,  and  armed  almost 
exactly  in  the  same  way,  each  having  28  long  i8's 
on  the  main-deck  and  20  32-pound  carronades  on 
the  spar-deck.  The  proper  complement  was  300 
men,  but  each  carried  from  40  to  80  more.21 

Our  three  44-gun  ships  were  the  finest  frigates 
then  afloat  (although  the  British  possessed  some 
as  heavy,  such  as  the  Egyptienne,  44).  They  were 
beautifully  modeled,  with  very  thick  scantling,  ex- 
tremely stout  masts,  and  heavy  cannon.  Each  car- 
ried on  her  main-deck  thirty  long  24*8,  and  on  her 
spar-deck  two  long  bow-chasers,  and  twenty  or 
twenty-two  carronades — 42-pounders  on  the  Presi- 

91  The  Chesapeake,  by  some  curious  mistake,  was  frequently 
rated  as  a  44,  and  this  drew  in  its  train  a  number  of  attend- 
ant errors.  When  she  was  captured,  James  says  that  in  one 
of  her  lockers  was  found  a  letter,  dated  in  February,  1811, 
from  Robert  Smith,  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  Captain  Evans, 
at  Boston,  directing  him  to  open  houses  of  rendezvous  for 
manning  the  Chesapeake,  and  enumerating  her  crew  at  a 
total  of  443.  Naturally  this  gave  British  historians  the  idea 
that  such  was  the  ordinary  complement  of  our  38-gun  frig- 
ates. But  the  ordering  so  large  a  crew  was  merely  a  mis- 
take, as  may  be  seen  by  a  letter  from  Captain  Bainbridge  to 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  which  is  given  in  full  in  the  "Cap- 
tains' Letters,"  Vol.  XXV,  No.  19  (Navy  Archives).  In  it  he 
mentions  the  extraordinary  number  of  men  ordered  for  the 
Chesapeake,  as  it  equals  in  number  the  crews  of  our  44-gun 
frigates,  whereas  the  Chesapeake  is  of  the  class  of  the  Con- 
gress and  Constellation. 


82  Naval  War  of  1812 

dent  and  United  States,  32-pounders  on  the  Consti- 
tution. Each  sailed  with  a  crew  of  about  450  men 
— 50  in  excess  of  the  regular  complement.22 

It  may  be  as  well  to  mention  here  the  only  other 
class  of  vessels  that  we  employed  during  the  war. 
This  was  composed  of  the  ship-sloops  built  in  1813, 
which  got  to  sea  in  1814.  They  were  very  fine 
vessels,  measuring  509  tons  apiece,23  with  very  thick 
scantling  and  stout  masts  and  spars.  Each  carried 
twenty  32-pound  carronades  and  two  long  I2's,  with 
a  crew  nominally  of  160  men,  but  with  usually  a 
few  supernumeraries.24 

98  The  President  when  in  action  with  the  Endymion  had 
450  men  aboard,  as  sworn  by  Decatur ;  the  muster-roll  of  the 
Constitution,  a  few  days  before  her  action  with  the  Guerriere, 
contains  464  names  (including  51  marines);  8  men  were  ab- 
sent in  a  prize,  so  she  had  aboard  in  the  action  456.  Her 
muster-roll  just  before  the  action  with  the  Cyane  and  Levant 
shows  461  names. 

n  The  dimensions  were  117  feet  n  inches  upon  the  gun- 
deck,  97  feet  6  inches  keel  for  tonnage,  measuring  from  one 
foot  before  the  forward  perpendicular  and  along  the  base 
line  to  the  front  of  the  rabbet  of  the  port,  deducting  3  of  the 
moulded  breadth  of  the  beam,  which  is  31  feet  6  inches;  mak- 
ing 50931  tons.  (See  in  Navy  Archives,  "Contracts,"  Vol. 

II,  P-  I37-) 

**  The  Peacock  had  166  men,  as  we  learn  from  her  com- 
mander, Warrington's,  letter  of  June  ist  (Letter  No.  140  in 
"Masters-Commandant's  Letters,"  1814,  Vol.  I).  The  Frolic 
took  aboard  "10  or  12  men  beyond  her  regular  complement." 
(See  letter  of  Joseph  Bainbridge,  No.  51,  in  same  Vol.)  Ac- 
cordingly, when  she  was  captured  by  the  Orpheus,  the  com- 
mander of  the  latter,  Captain  Hugh  Pigot,  reported  the 
number  of  men  aboard  to  be  171.  The  Wasp  left  port  with 
173  men,  with  which  she  fought  her  first  action;  she  had  a 
much  smaller  number  aboard  in  her  second. 


Naval  War  of  1812  83 

The  British  vessels  encountered  were  similar,  but 
generally  inferior,  to  our  own.  The  only  24-pounder 
frigate  we  encountered  was  the  Endymion,  of  about 
a  fifth  less  force  than  the  President.  Their  38-gun 
frigates  were  almost  exactly  like  ours,  but  with 
fewer  men  in  crew  as  a  rule.  They  were  three  times 
matched  against  our  44-gun  frigates,  to  which  they 
were  inferior  about  as  three  is  to  four.  Their  36- 
gun  frigates  were  larger  than  the  Essex,  with  a 
more  numerous  crew,  but  the  same  number  of  guns ; 
carrying  on  the  lower  deck,  however,  long  i8's  in- 
stead of  32-pound  carronades, — a  much  more  effec- 
tive armament.  The  32-gun  frigates  were  smaller, 
with  long  I2's  on  the  main-deck.  The  largest  sloops 
were  also  frigate-built,  carrying  twenty-two  32- 
pound  carronades  on  the  main-deck,  and  twelve 
lighter  guns  on  the  quarter-deck  and  forecastle,  with 
a  crew  of  180.  The  large  flush-decked  ship-sloops 
carried  21  or  23  guns,  with  a  crew  of  140  men. 
But  our  vessels  most  often  came  in  contact  with 
the  British  i8-gun  brig-sloop;  this  was  a  tubby 
craft,  heavier  than  any  of  our  brigs,  being  about 
the  size  of  the  Hornet.  The  crew  consisted  of 
from  no  to  135  men;  ordinarily  each  was  armed 
with  sixteen  32-pound  carronades,  two  long  6's,  and 
a  shifting  12-pound  carronade;  often  with  a  light 
long  gun  as  a  stern-chaser,  making  20  in  all.  The 
Reindeer  and  Peacock  had  only  24-pound  carron- 
ades; the  Epervier  had  but  eighteen  guns,  all  car- 
ronades.25 

85  The  Epervier  was  taken  into  our  service  under  the  same 
name  and  rate.     Both  Preble  and  Emmons  describe  her  as  of 


84  Naval  War  of  1812 

Among  the  stock  accusations  against  our  navy 
of  1812  were,  and  are,  statements  that  our  vessels 
were  rated  at  less  than  their  real  force,  and  in  par- 
ticular that  our  large  frigates  were  "disguised  line- 
of-battle  ships."  As  regards  the  ratings,  most  vessels 
of  that  time  carried  more  guns  than  they  rated ;  the 
disparity  was  less  in  the  French  than  in  either  the 
British  or  American  navies.  Our  38-gun  frigates 
carried  48  guns,  the  exact  number  the  British  38*5 
possessed.  The  worst  case  of  underrating  in  our 
navy  was  the  Essex,  which  rated  32,  and  carried 
46  guns,  so  that  her  real  was  44  per  cent  in  excess 
of  her  nominal  force;  but  this  was  not  as  bad  as 
the  British  sloop  Cyane,  which  was  rated  at  20  or 
22,  and  carried  34  guns,  so  that  she  had  either  55 
or  70  per  cent  greater  real  than  nominal  force.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  war  we  owned  two  i8-gun 
ship-sloops,  one  mounting  18  and  the  other  20  guns; 
the  i8-gun  brig-sloops  they  captured  mounted  each 
19  guns,  so  the  average  was  the  same.  Later  we 
built  sloops  that  rated  18  and  mounted  22  guns, 
but  when  one  was  captured  it  was  also  put  down 
in  the  British  navy  list  as  an  i8-gun  ship-sloop. 
During  all  the  combats  of  the  war  there  were  but 
four  vessels  that  carried  as  few  guns  as  they  rated. 
Two  were  British,  the  Epervier  and  Levant,  and 
two  American,  the  Wasp  and  Adams.  One  navy 

477  tons.      Warrington,    her  captor,   however,   says:    "The 
surveyor  of  the  port  has  just  measured  the  Epervier,  and 
reports  her  467  tons."     (In   the  Navy  Archives,  "Masters- 
Commandant's  Letters,"  1814,  I,  No.   125.) 
For  a  full  discussion  of  tonnage,  see  Appendix  A. 


Naval  War  of  1812  85 

was  certainly  as  deceptive  as  another,  so  far  as  un- 
derrating went. 

The  force  of  the  statement  that  our  large  frigates 
were  disguised  line-of-battle  ships,  of  course  de- 
pends entirely  upon  what  the  words  "frigate"  and 
"line-of-battle  ship"  mean.  When,  on  the  loth  of 
August,  1653,  De  Ruyter  saved  a  great  convoy  by 
beating  off  Sir  George  Ayscough's  fleet  of  38  sail, 
the  largest  of  the  Dutch  admiral's  "33  sail  of  the 
line"  carried  but  30  guns  and  1 50  men,  and  his  own 
flagship  but  28  guns  and  134  men.26  The  Dutch 
book  from  which  this  statement  is  taken  speaks  in^ 
differently  of  frigates  of  18,  40,  and  58  guns. 
Toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  terms 
had  crystallized.  Frigate  then  meant  a  so-called 
single-decked  ship ;  it  in  reality  possessed  two  decks, 
the  main,  or  gun-deck,  and  the  upper  one,  which 
had  no  name  at  all  until  our  sailors  christened  it 
spar-deck.  The  gun-deck  possessed  a  complete  bat- 
tery, and  the  spar-deck  an  interrupted  one,  mounting 
guns  on  the  forecastle  and  quarter-deck.  At  that 
time  all  "two-decked"  or  "three-decked"  (in  reality 
three  and  four-decked)  ships  were  liners.  But  in 
1812  this  had  changed  somewhat;  as  the  various 
nations  built  more  and  more  powerful  vessels,  the 
lower  rates  of  the  different  divisions  were  dropped. 

26  "La  Vie  et  les  Actions  Memorables  du  Sr.  Michel  de 
Ruyter  a  Amsterdam,  Chez  Henry  et  Theodore  Boom, 
MDCLXXXVII."  The  work  is  by  Barthelemy  Pielat,  a  surgeon 
in  de  Ruyter's  fleet,  and  personally  present  during  many  of 
his  battles.  It  is  written  in  French,  but  is  in  tone  more 
strongly  anti-French  than  anti-English. 


86  Naval  War  of  1812 

Thus  the  British  ship  Cyane,  captured  by  the  Con- 
stitution, was  in  reality  a  small  frigate,  with  a  main- 
deck  battery  of  22  guns,  and  12  guns  on  the  spar- 
deck  ;  a  few  years  before  she  would  have  been  called 
a  24-gun  frigate,  but  she  then  ranked  merely  as  a 
22-gun  sloop.  Similarly  the  50  and  64-gun  ships 
that  had  fought  in  the  line  at  the  Doggerbaak, 
Camperdown,  and  even  at  Aboukir,  were  now  no 
longer  deemed  fit  for  that  purpose,  and  the  74  was 
the  lowest  line-of-battle  ship. 

The  Constitution,  President,  and  States  must  then 
be  compared  with  the  existing  European  vessels  that 
were  classed  as  frigates.  The  French  in  1812  had 
no  24-pounder  frigates,  for  the  very  good  reason 
that  they  had  all  fallen  victims  to  the  English  18- 
pounders ;  but  in  July  of  that  year  a  Danish  frigate, 
the  Nayaden,  which  carried  long  24*8,  was  destroyed 
by  the  English  ship  Dictator,  64. 

The  British  frigates  were  of  several  rates.  The 
lowest  rated  32,  carrying  in  all  40  guns,  26  long 
I2's  on  the  main-deck  and  14  24-pound  carronades 
on  the  spar-deck — a  broadside  of  324  pounds.27 
The  36-gun  frigates,  like  the  Phoebe,  carried  46 
guns,  26  long  i8's  on  the  gun-deck  and  32-pound 
carronades  above.  The  38-gun  frigates,  like  the 
Macedonian,  carried  48  or  49  guns,  long  i8's  below 
and  32-pound  carronades  above.  The  32-gun  frig- 
ates, then,  presented  in  broadsides  13  long  I2's  be- 
low and  7  24-pound  carronades  above ;  the  38-gun 

"  In  all  these  vessels  there  were  generally  two  long  6's  or 
9's  substituted  for  the  bow-chase  carronades. 


Naval  War  of  1812  87 

frigates,  14  long  i8's  below  and  10  32-pound  car- 
ronades  above;  so  that  a  44-gun  frigate  would  nat- 
urally present  15  long  24's  below  and  12  42-pound 
carronades  above,  as  the  United  States  did  at  first. 
The  rate  was  perfectly  proper,  for  French,  British, 
and  Danes  already  possessed  24-pounder  frigates; 
and  there  was  really  less  disparity  between  the  force 
and  rate  of  a  44  that  carried  54  guns,  than  there  was 
in  a  38  that  carried  49,  or,  like  the  Shannon,  52. 
Nor  was  this  all.  Two  of  our  three  victories  were 
won  by  the  Constitution,  which  only  carried  32- 
pound  carronades,  and  once  54  and  once  52  guns; 
and  as  two-thirds  of  the  work  was  thus  done  by  this 
vessel,  I  shall  now  compare  her  with  the  largest 
British  frigates.  Her  broadside  force  consisted  of 
15  long  24*3  on  the  main-deck,  and  on  the  spar- 
deck  one  long  24,  and  in  one  case  10,  in  the  other 
1 1  32-pound  carronades — a  broadside  of  704  or  736 
pounds.28  There  was  then  in  the  British  navy  the 
Acasta,  40,  carrying  in  broadside  15  long  i8's  and 
ii  32-pound  carronades;  when  the  spar-deck  bat- 
teries are  equal,  the  addition  of  90  pounds  to  the 
main-deck  broadside  (which  is  all  the  superiority 
of  the  Constitution  over  the  Acasta}  is  certainly  not 
enough  to  make  the  distinction  between  a  frigate 
and  a  disguised  74.  But  not  considering  the  Acasta, 
there  were  in  the  British  navy  three  24-pounder 
frigates,  the  Cornwallis,  Indefatigable,  and  Endy- 
mion.  We  only  came  in  contact  with  the  latter  in 

48  Nominally ;  in  reality  about  7  per  cent  less  on  account  of 
the  short  weight  in  metal. 


88  Naval  War  of  1812 

1815,  when  the  Constitution  had  but  52  guns.  The 
Endymion  then  had  an  armament  of  28  long  24*5,  2 
long  i8's,  and  20  32-pound  carronades,  making  a 
broadside  of  674  pounds,29  or  including  a  shifting 
24-pound  carronade,  of  698  pounds — just  six 
pounds,  or  i  per  cent,  less  than  the  force  of  that 
"disguised  line-of-battle  ship"  the  Constitution! 
As  the  Endymion  only  rated  as  a  40,  and  the  Con- 
stitution as  a  44,  it  was  in  reality  the  former  and  not 
the  latter  which  was  underrated.  I  have  taken  the 
Constitution,  because  the  British  had  more  to  do 
with  her  than  they  did  with  our  other  two  44*5  taken 
together.  The  latter  were  both  of  heavier  metal  than 
the  Constitution,  carrying  42-pound  carronades.  In 
1812  the  United  States  carried  her  full  54  guns, 
throwing  a  broadside  of  846  pounds;  when  cap- 
tured, the  President  carried  53,  having  substituted 
a  24-pound  carronade  for  two  of  her  42*8,  and  her 
broadside  amounted  to  828  pounds,  or  16  per  cent 
nominal,  and,  on  account  of  the  short  weight  of  her 
shot,  9  per  cent  real  excess  over  the  Endymion.  If 
this  difference  made  her  a  line-of-battle  ship,  then 
the  Endymion  was  doubly  a  line-of-battle  ship  com- 
pared to  the  Congress  or  Constellation.  Moreover, 
the  American  commanders  found  their  42-pound 
carronades  too  heavy;  as  I  have  said  the  Constitu- 
tion only  mounted  32*5,  and  the  United  States  land- 
ed 6  of  her  guns.  When,  in  1813,  she  attempted  to 
break  the  blockade,  she  carried  but  48  guns,  throw- 

49  According  to  James  664  pounds ;  he  omits  the  chase  guns 
for  no  reason. 


Naval  War  of  1812  89 

ing  a  broadside  of  720  pounds — just  3  per  cent 
more  than  the  Endymion.30  If  our  frigates  were 
line-of-battle  ships  the  disguise  was  certainly  mar- 
velously  complete,  and  they  had  a  number  of  com- 
panions equally  disguised  in  the  British  ranks. 

The  44's  were  thus  true  frigates,  with  one  com- 
plete battery  of  long  guns  and  one  interrupted  one 
of  carronades.  That  they  were  better  than  any 
other  frigates  was  highly  creditable  to  our  ingenuity 
and  national  skill.  We  can  not,  perhaps,  lay  claim 
to  the  invention  and  first  use  of  the  heavy  frigate, 
for  24-pounder  frigates  were  already  in  the  service 
of  at  least  three  nations,  and  the  French  36-pound 
carronade,  in  use  on  their  spar-decks,  threw  a  heav- 
ier ball  than  our  42-pounder.  But  we  had  enlarged 
and  perfected  the  heavy  frigate,  and  were  the  first 
nation  that  ever  used  it  effectively.  The  French 
Forte  and  the  Danish  Nayaden  shared  th£  fate  of 
ships  carrying  guns  of  lighter  calibre ;  and  the  Brit- 
ish 24-pounders,  like  the  Endymion,  had  never  ac- 
complished anything.  Hitherto  there  had  been  a 
strong  feeling,  especially  in  England,  that  an  18- 
pound  gun  was  as  effective  as  a  24  in  arming  a  frig- 

80  It  was  on  account  of  this  difference  of  3  per  cent  that 
Captain  Hardy  refused  to  allow  the  Endymion  to  meet  the 
States  (James  vi,  p.  470).  This  was  during  the  course  of 
some  challenges  and  counter-challenges  which  ended  in  noth- 
ing, Decatur  in  his  turn  heing  unwilling  to  have  the  Mace- 
donian meet  the  Statira,  unless  the  latter  should  agree  not 
to  take  on  a  picked  crew.  He  was  perfectly  right  in  this ; 
but  he  ought  never  to  have  sent  the  challenge  at  all,  as  two 
ships  but  an  hour  or  two  out  of  port  would  be  at  a  frightful 
disadvantage  in  a  fight. 


90  Naval  War  of  1812 

ate;  we  made  a  complete  revolution  in  this  respect. 
England  had  been  building  only  i8-pounder  ves- 
sels when  she  ought  to  have  been  building  24-pound- 
ers.  It  was  greatly  to  our  credit  that  our  average 
frigate  was  superior  to  the  average  British  frigate; 
exactly  as  it  was  to  our  discredit  that  the  Essex  was 
so  ineffectively  armed.  Captain  Porter  owed  his 
defeat  chiefly  to  his  ineffective  guns,  but  also  to  hav- 
ing lost  his  topmast,  to  the  weather  being  unfavor- 
able, and,  still  more,  to  the  admirable  skill  with 
which  Hilyar  used  his  superior  armament.  The 
Java,  Macedonian,  and  Guerriere  owed  their  defeat 
partly  to  their  lighter  guns,  but  much  more  to  the 
fact  that  their  captains  and  seamen  did  not  display 
either  as  good  seamanship  or  as  good  gunnery  as 
their  foes.  Inferiority  in  armament  was  a  factor 
to  be  taken  into  account  in  all  the  four  cases,  but  it 
was  more  marked  in  that  of  the  Essex  than  in  the 
other  three ;  it  would  have  been  fairer  for  Porter  to 
say  that  he  had  been  captured  by  a  line-of-battle 
ship,  than  for  the  captain  of  the  Java  to  make  that 
assertion.  In  this  last  case  the  forces  of  the  two 
ships  compared  almost  exactly  as  their  rates.  A  44 
was  matched  against  a  38 ;  it  was  not  surprising  that 
she  should  win,  but  it  was  surprising  that  she  should 
win  with  ease  and  impunity.  The  long  24*5  on  the 
Constitution's  gun-deck  no  more  made  her  a  line-of- 
battle  ship  than  the  32-pound  carronades  mounted 
on  an  English  frigate's  quarter-deck  and  forecastle 
made  her  a  line-of-battle  ship  when  opposed  to  a 
Frenchman  with  only  8's  and  6's  on  his  spar-deck. 


Naval  War  of  1812  91 

When,  a  few  years  before,  the  English  Phoebe  had 
captured  the  French  Nereide,  their  broadsides  were 
respectively  407  and  258  pounds,  a  greater  disparity 
than  in  any  of  our  successful  rights;  yet  no  author 
thought  of  claiming  that  the  Phoebe  was  anything 
but  a  frigate.  So  with  the  Clyde,  throwing  425 
pounds,  which  took  the  V estate,  throwing  but  246. 
The  facts  were  that  i8-pounder  frigates  had  cap- 
tured i2-pounders,  exactly  as  our  24-pounders  in 
turn  captured  the  i8-pounders. 

Shortly  before  Great  Britain  declared  war  on  us, 
one  of  her  i8-pounder  frigates,  the  San  Florenzo, 
throwing  476  Ibs.  in  a  broadside,  captured  the  12- 
pounder  French  frigate  Psyche,  whose  .broadside 
was  only  246  Ibs.  The  force  of  the  former  was 
thus  almost  double  that  of  the  latter,  yet  the  battle 
was  long  and  desperate,  the  English  losing  48  and 
the  French  124  men.  This  conflict,  then,  reflected 
as  much  credit  on  the  skill  and  seamanship  of  the 
defeated  as  of  the  victorious  side;  the  difference  in 
loss  could  fairly  be  ascribed  to  the  difference  in 
weight  of  metal.  But  where,  as  in  the  famous  ship- 
duels  of  1812,  the  difference  in  force  is  only  a  fifth, 
instead  of  a  half,  and  yet  the  slaughter,  instead  of 
being  as  five  is  to  two,  is  as  six  to  one,  then  the  vic- 
tory is  certainly  to  be  ascribed  as  much  to  superi- 
ority in  skill  as  to  superiority  in  force.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  should  always  be  remembered  that 
there  was  a  very  decided  superiority  in  force.  It  is 
a  very  discreditable  feature  of  many  of  our  naval 
histories  that  they  utterly  ignore  this  superiority, 


92  Naval  War  of  1812 

seeming  ashamed  to  confess  that  it  existed.  In  real- 
ity it  was  something  to  be  proud  of.  It  was  highly 
to  the  credit  of  the  United  States  that  her  frigates 
were  of  better  make  and  armament  than  any  others  ; 
it  always  speaks  well  for  a  nation's  energy  and  ca- 
pacity that  any  of  her  implements  of  warfare  are  of 
a  superior  kind.  This  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  rea- 
son for  pride. 

It  spoke  well  for  the  Prussians  in  1866  that  they 
opposed  breech-loaders  to  the  muzzle-loaders  of  the 
Austrians ;  but  it  would  be  folly  to  give  all  the  credit 
of  the  victory  to  the  breech-loaders  and  none  to 
Moltke  and  his  lieutenants.  Thus,  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  two  things  contributed  to  our  vic- 
tories. One  was  the  excellent  make  and  armament 
of  our  ships;  the  other  was  the  skilful  seamanship, 
excellent  discipline,  and  superb  gunnery  of  the  men 
who  were  in  them.  British  writers  are  apt  only  to 
speak  of  the  first,  and  Americans  only  of  the  last, 
whereas  both  should  be  taken  into  consideration. 

To  sum  up:  the  American  44-gun  frigate  was  a 
true  frigate,  in  build  and  armament,  properly  rated, 
stronger  than  a  38-gun  frigate  just  about  in  the 
proportion  of  44  to  38,  and  not  exceeding  in 
strength  an  i8-pounder  frigate  as  much  as  the  latter 
exceeded  one  carrying  12-pounders.  They  were  in 
no  way  whatever  line-of-battle  ships ;  but  they  were 
superior  to  any  other  frigates  afloat,  and,  what  is 
still  more  important,  they  were  better  manned  and 
commanded  than  the  average  frigate  of  any  other 
navy.  Lord  Codrington  says  ("Memoirs,"  I,  p. 


Naval  War  of  1812  93 

310)  :  "But  I  well  know  the  system  of  favoritism 
and  borough  corruption  prevails  so  very  much  that 
many  people  are  promoted  and  kept  in  command 
that  should  be  dismissed  the  service,  and  while  such 
is  the  case  the  few  Americans  chosen  for  their  merit 
may  be  expected  to  follow  up  their  successes  except 
where  they  meet  with  our  best  officers  on  even 
terms."  31  The  small  size  of  our  navy  was  probably 
to  a  certain  extent  effective  in  keeping  it  up  to  a  high 
standard;  but  this  is  not  the  only  explanation,  as 
can  be  seen  by  Portugal's  small  and  poor  navy.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  champions  or  pick  of  a  large 
navy  ought  to  be  better  than  the  champions  of  a 
small  one.32 

81  To  show  that  I  am  not  quoting  an  authority  biased  in 
our  favor  I  will  give  Sir  Edward  Codrington's  opinion  of 
our  rural  better  class  (i,  318).  "It  is  curious  to  observe  the 
animosity  which  prevails  here  among  what  is  called  the  bet- 
ter order  of  people,  which  I  think  is  more  a  misnomer  here 
than  in  any  other  country  I  have  ever  been.  Their  whig 
and  tory  are  democrat  and  federalist,  and  it  would  seem  for 
the  sake  of  giving  vent  to  that  bitterness  of  hatred  which 
marks  the  Yankee  character,  every  gentleman  (God  save  the 
term)  who  takes  possession  of  a  property  adopts  the  opposite 
political  creed  to  that  of  his  nearest  neighbor." 

32  In  speaking  of  tonnage  I  wish  I  could  have  got  better 
authority  than  James  for  the  British  side  of  the  question. 
He  is  so  bitter  that  it  involuntarily  gives  one  a  distrust  of 
his  judgment.  Thus,  in  speaking  of  the  Penguin's  capture, 
he,  in  endeavoring  to  show  that  the  Hornefs  loss  was  greater 
than  she  acknowledged,  says,  "several  of  the  dangerously 
wounded  were  thrown  overboard  because  the  surgeon  was 
afraid  to  amputate,  owing  to  his  want  of  experience"  ("Naval 
Occurrences,"  492).  Now  what  could  persuade  a  writer  to 
make  such  a  foolish  accusation?  No  matter  how  utterly  de- 
praved and  brutal  Captain  Diddle  might  be,  he  would  cer- 


94  Naval  War  of  1812 

Again,  the  armaments  of  the  American  as  well 
as  of  the  British  ships  were  composed  of  three  very 
different  styles  of  guns.  The  first,  or  long  gun,  was 

tainly  not  throw  his  wounded  over  alive  because  he  feared 
they  might  die.  Again,  in  vol.  vi,  p.  546,  he  says:  "Captain 
Stewart  had  caused  the  Cyane  to  be  painted  to  resemble  a 
36-gun  frigate.  The  object  of  this  was  to  aggrandize  his 
exploit  in  the  eyes  of  the  gaping  citizens  of  Boston."  No 
matter  how  skilful  an  artist  Captain  Stewart  was,  and  no 
matter  how  great  the  gaping  capacities  of  the  Bostonians, 
the  Cyane  (which,  by  the  way,  went  to  New  York  and  not 
Boston)  could  no  more  be  painted  to  look  like  a  36-gun 
frigate  than  a  schooner  could  be  painted  to  look  like  a  brig. 
Instances  of  rancor  like  these  two  occur  constantly  in  his 
work,  and  make  it  very  difficult  to  separate  what  is  matter 
of  fact  from  what  is  matter  of  opinion.  I  always  rely  on  the 
British  official  accounts  when  they  can  be  reached,  except  in 
the  case  of  the  Java,  which  seem  garbled.  That  such  was 
sometimes  the  case  with  British  officials  is  testified  to  by 
both  James  (vol.  iv,  p.  17)  and  Brenton  (vol.  ii,  p.  454, 
note).  From  the  "Memoir  of  Admiral  Broke"  we  learn  that 
his  public  letter  was  wrong  in  a  number  of  particulars.  See 
also  any  one  of  the  numerous  biographies  of  Lord  Dundon- 
ald,  the  hero  of  the  little  Speedy 's  fight.  It  is  very  unfor- 
tunate that  the  British  stopped  publishing  official  accounts 
of  their  defeats ;  it  could  not  well  help  giving  rise  to  unpleas- 
ant suspicions. 

It  may  be  as  well  to  mention  here,  again,  that  James'  ac- 
cusations do  not  really  detract  from  the  interest  attaching  to 
the  war,  and  its  value  for  purposes  of  study.  If,  as  he  says, 
the  American  commanders  were  cowards,  and  their  crews 
renegades,  it  is  well  worth  while  to  learn  the  lesson  that 
good  training  will  make  such  men  able  to  beat  brave  officers 
with  loyal  crews.  And  why  did  the  British  have  such  bad 
average  crews  as  he  makes  out?  He  says,  for  instance,  that 
the  Java's  was  unusually  bad;  yet  Brenton  says  (vol.  ii,  p. 
461)  it  was  like  "the  generality  of  our  crews."  It  is  worth 
while  explaining  the  reason  that  such  a  crew  was  generally 
better  than  a  French  and  worse  than  an  American  one. 


Naval  War  of  1812  95 

enormously  long  and  thick-barreled  in  comparison 
to  its  bore,  and  in  consequence  very  heavy;  it  pos- 
sessed a  very  long  range,  and  varied  in  calibre  from 
two  to  forty-two  pounds.  The  ordinary  calibres  in 
our  navy  were  6,  9,  12,  18,  and  24.  The  second 
style  was  the  carronade,  a  short,  light  gun  of  large 
bore ;  compared  to  a  long  gun  of  the  same  weight  it 
carried  a  much  heavier  ball  for  a  much  shorter  dis- 
tance. The  chief  calibres  were  9,  12,  18,  24,  32,  42, 
and  68  pounders,  the  first  and  the  last  being  hardly 
in  use  in  our  navy.  The  third  style  was  the  colum- 
biad,  of  an  intermediate  grade  between  the  first  two. 
Thus  it  is  seen  that  a  gun  of  one  style  by  no  means 
corresponds  to  a  gun  of  another  style  of  the  same 
calibre.  As  a  rough  example,  a  long  12,  a  colum- 
biad,  1 8,  and  a  32-pound  carronade  would  be  about 
equivalent  to  one  another.  These  guns  were  mount- 
ed on  two  different  types  of  vessel.  The  first  was 
flush-decked;  that  is,  it  had  a  single  straight  open 
deck  on  which  all  the  guns  were  mounted.  This 
class  included  one  heavy  corvette  (the  Adams), 
the  ship-sloops,  and  the  brig-sloops.  Through 
the  bow-chase  port,  on  each  side,  each  of  these 
mounted  a  long  gun;  the  rest  of  their  guns  were 
carronades,  except  in  the  case  of  the  Adams  f  which 
had  all  long  guns.  Above  these  came  the  frig- 
ates, whose  gun-deck  was  covered  above  by  an- 
other deck;  on  the  fore  and  aft  parts  (forecastle  and 
quarter-deck)  on  this  upper,  open  deck  were  also 
mounted  guns.  The  main-deck  guns  were  all  long, 
except  on  the  Essex,  which  had  carronades ;  on  the 


96  Naval  War  of  1812 

quarter-deck  were  mounted  carronades,  and  on  the 
forecastle  also  carronades,  with  two  long  bow- 
chasers. 

Where  two  ships  of  similar  armament  fought  one 
another,  it  is  easy  to  get  the  comparative  force  by 
simply  comparing  the  weight  in  broadsides,  each 
side  presenting  very  nearly  the  same  proportion  of 
long  guns  to  carronades.  For  such  a  broadside  we 
take  half  the  guns  mounted  in  the  ordinary  way; 
and  all  guns  mounted  on  pivots  or  shifting.  Thus 
Perry's  force  in  guns  was  54  to  Barclay's  63;  yet 
each  presented  34  in  broadside.  Again,  each  of  the 
British  brig-sloops  mounted  19  guns,  presenting  10 
in  broadside.  Besides  these,  some  ships  mounted 
bow-chasers  run  through  the  bridle-ports,  or  stern- 
chasers,  neither  of  which  could  be  used  in  broad- 
sides. Nevertheless,  I  include  them,  both  because  it 
works  in  about  an  equal  number  of  cases  against  each 
navy,  and  because  they  were  sometimes  terribly  ef- 
fective. James  excludes  the  Guerriere's  bow-chaser ; 
in  reality  he  ought  to  have  included  both  it  and  its 
fellow,  as  they  worked  more  damage  than  all  the 
broadside  guns  put  together.  Again,  he  excludes 
the  Endymion's  bow-chasers,  though  in  her  action 
they  proved  invaluable.  Yet  he  includes  those  of 
the  Enterprise  and  Argus,  though  the  former's  were 
probably  not  fired.  So  I  shall  take  the  half  of  the 
fixed,  plus  all  the  movable,  guns  aboard,  in  compar- 
ing broadside  force. 

But  the  chief  difficulty  appears  when  guns  of  one 
style  are  matched  against  those  of  another.  If  a 


Naval  War  of  1812  97 

ship  armed  with  long  I2's  meets  one  armed  with 
32-pound  carronades,  which  is  superior  in  force? 
At  long  range  the  first,  and  at  short  range  the  sec- 
ond ;  and  of  course  each  captain  is  pretty  sure  to  in- 
sist that  "circumstances"  forced  him  to  fight  at  a 
disadvantage.  The  result  would  depend  largely  on 
the  skill  or  luck  of  each  commander  in  choosing  po- 
sition. 

One  thing  is  certain ;  long  guns  are  more  formid- 
able than  carronades  of  the  same  calibre.  There  are 
exemplifications  of  this  rule  on  both  sides ;  of  course, 
American  writers,  as  a  rule,  only  pay  attention  to 
one  set  of  cases  and  British  to  the  others.  The 
Cyane  and  Levant  threw  a  heavier  broadside  than 
the  Constitution  but  were  certainly  less  formidably 
armed;  and  the  Essex  threw  a  heavier  broadside 
than  the  Phoebe,  yet  was  also  less  formidable.  On 
Lake  Ontario  the  American  ship  General  Pike  threw 
less  metal  at  a  broadside  than  either  of  her  two 
chief  antagonists,  but  neither  could  be  called  her 
equal;  while  on  Lake  Champlain  a  parallel  case  is 
afforded  by  the  British  ship  Confiance.  Supposing 
that  two  ships  throw  the  same  broadside  weight  of 
metal,  one  from  long  guns,  the  other  from  carron- 
ades, at  short  range  they  are  equal ;  at  long,  one  has 
it  all  her  own  way.  Her  captain  thus  certainly  has 
a  great  superiority  of  force,  and  if  he  does  not  take 
advantage  of  it  it  is  owing  to  his  adversary's  skill 
or  his  own  mismanagement.  As  a  mere  approxi- 
mation, it  may  be  assumed,  in  comparing  the  broad- 
sides of  two  vessels  or  squadrons,  that  long  guns 

VOL.  IX.- 5 


98  Naval  War  of  1812 

count  for  at  least  twice  as  much  as  carronades  of 
the  same  calibre.  Thus  on  Lake  Champlain  Captain 
Downie  possessed  an  immense  advantage  in  his 
long  guns,  which  Commodore  Macdonough's  ex- 
ceedingly good  arrangements  nullified.  Sometimes 
part  of  the  advantage  may  be  willingly  foregone,  so 
as  to  acquire  some  other.  Had  the  Constitution 
kept  at  long  bowls  with  the  Cyane  and  Levant  she 
could  have  probably  captured  one  without  any  loss 
to  herself,  while  the  other  would  have  escaped ;  she 
preferred  to  run  down  close  so  as  to  ensure  the  cap- 
ture of  both,  knowing  that  even  at  close  quarters 
long  guns  are  somewhat  better  than  short  ones  (not 
to  mention  her  other  advantages  in  thick  scantling, 
speed,  etc.).  The  British  carronades  often  upset  in 
action;  this  was  either  owing  to  their  having  been 
insufficiently  secured,  and  to  this  remaining  undis- 
covered because  the  men  were  not  exercised  at  the 
guns,  or  else  it  was  because  the  unpracticed  sailors 
would  greatly  overcharge  them.  Our  better-trained 
sailors  on  the  ocean  rarely  committed  these  blun- 
ders, but  the  less-skilled  crews  on  the  lakes  did  so 
as  often  as  their  antagonists. 

But  while  the  Americans  thus,  as  a  rule,  had  heav- 
ier and  better-fitted  guns,  they  labored  under  one 
or  two  disadvantages.  Our  foundries  were  gener- 
ally not  as  good  as  those  of  the  British,  and  our 
guns,  in  consequence,  more  likely  to  burst ;  it  was  an 
accident  of  this  nature  which  saved  the  British  Bel- 
videra;  and  the  General  Pike,  under  Commodore 
Chauncy,  and  the  new  American  frigate  Guerriere 


Naval  War  of  1812  99 

suffered  in  the  same  way;  while  often  the  muzzles 
of  the  guns  would  crack.  A  more  universal  disad- 
vantage was  in  the  short  weight  of  our  shot.  When 
Captain  Blakely  sunk  the  Avon  he  officially  reported 
that  her  four  shot  which  came  aboard  weighed  just 
32  pounds  apiece,  a  pound  and  three-quarters  more 
than  his  heaviest;  this  would  make  his  average  shot 
about  2%  pounds  less,  or  rather  over  7  per  cent. 
Exactly  similar  statements  were  made  by  the  officers 
of  the  Constitution  in  her  three  engagements.  Thus 
when  she  fought  the  Java,  she  threw  at  a  broadside, 
as  already  stated,  704  pounds ;  the  Java  mounted  28 
long  i8's,  1 8  32-pound  carronades,  2  long  I2's,  and 
one  shifting  24-pound  carronade,  a  broadside  of  576 
pounds. 

Yet  by  "the  actual  weighing  of  all  the  differ- 
ent shot  on  both  sides  it  was  found  that  the  dif- 
ference in  broadside  force  was  only  about  77 
pounds,  or  the  Constitution's  shot  were  about  7  per 
cent  short  weight.  The  long  24's  of  the  United 
States  each  threw  a  shot  4/4  pounds  heavier  than 
the  long  i8's  of  the  Macedonian;  here  again  the 
difference  was  about  7  per  cent.  The  same  differ- 
ence existed  in  favor  of  the  Penguin  and  Epervier 
compared  with  the  Wasp  and  Hornet.  Mr.  Feni- 
more  Cooper33  weighed  a  great  number  of  shot 
some  time  after  the  war.  The  later  castings,  even, 
weighed  nearly  5  per  cent  less  than  the  British  shot, 
and  some  of  the  older  ones,  about  9  per  cent.  The 
average  is  safe  to  take  at  7  per  cent  less,  and  I  shall 

33  See  "Naval  History,"  i,  p.  380. 


ioo  Naval  War  of  1812 

throughout  make  this  allowance  for  ocean  cruisers. 
The  deficit  was  sometimes  owing  to  windage,  but 
more  often  the  shot  was  of  full  size  but  defective  in 
density. 

The  effect  of  this  can  be  gathered  from  the  fol- 
lowing quotation  from  the  work  of  a  British  artil- 
lerist :  "The  greater  the  density  of  shot  of  like  cali- 
bres, projected  with  equal  velocity  and  elevation, 
the  greater  the  range,  accuracy,  and  penetration."  84 
This  defectiveness  in  density  might  be  a  serious  in- 
jury in  a  contest  at  a  long  distance,  but  would  make 
but  little  difference  at  close  quarters  (although  it 
may  have  been  partly  owing  to  their  short  weight 
that  so  many  of  the  Chesapeake' s  shot  failed  to  pen- 
trade  the  Shannon's  hull).  Thus  in  the  actions  with 
the  Macedonian  and  Java  the  American  frigates 
showed  excellent  practice  when  the  contest  was  car- 
ried on  within  fair  distance,  while  their  first  broad- 
sides at  long  range  went  very  wild ;  but  in  the  case 
of  the  Guerriere,  the  Constitution  reserved  her  fire 
for  close  quarters,  and  was  probably  not  at  all  af- 
fected by  the  short  weight  of  her  shot. 

As  to  the  officers  and  crew  of  a  44-gun  frigate, 
the  following  was  the  regular  complement  estab- 
lished by  law  :85 

84  "Heavy  Ordnance,"  Captain  T.  F.  Simmons,  R.  A.,  Lon- 
don, 1837.  James  supposes  that  the  "Yankee  captains"  have 
in  each  case  hunted  round  till  they  could  get  particularly 
small  American  shot  to  weigh;  and  also  denies  that  short 
weight  is  a  disadvantage.  The  last  proposition  carried  out 
logically  would  lead  to  some  rather  astonishing  results. 

*  See  State  Papers,  vol.  xiv,  159  (Washington,  1834) 


Naval  War  of  1812  101 

1  captain,  purser, 

4  lieutenants,  surgeon, 

2  lieutenants  of  marines,  2  surgeon's  mates, 
2  sailing  masters,  clerk, 

2  master's  mates,  carpenter, 

7  midshipmen,  2  carpenter's  mates 

1  boatswain,  cook, 

2  boatswain's  mates  chaplain, 
yeoman  of  gun-room, 

gunner,  50 

quarter  gunners.  120  able  seamen, 

coxswain,  150  ordinary  seamen, 

sailmaker,  30  boys, 

cooper,  50  marine. 

steward, 

armorer,  400  in  all. 

master  of  arms, 

An  i8-gun  ship  had  32  officers  and  petty  officers, 
30  able  seamen,  46  ordinary  seamen,  12  boys,  and 
20  marines — 140  in  all.  Sometimes  ships  put  to  sea 
without  their  full  complements  (as  in  the  case  of 
the  first  Wasp),  but  more  often  with  supernumer- 
aries aboard.  The  weapons  for  close  quarters  were 
pikes,  cutlasses,  and  a  few  axes;  while  the  marines 
and  some  of  the  topmen  had  muskets,  and  occasion- 
ally rifles. 

In  comparing-  the  forces  of  the  contestants  I  have 
always  given  the  number  of  men  in  crew;  but  this 
in  most  cases  was  unnecessary.  When  there  were 
plenty  of  men  to  handle  the  guns,  trim  the  sails, 
make  repairs,  act  as  marines,  etc.,  any  additional 
number  simply  served  to  increase  the  slaughter  on 
board.  The  Guerriere  undoubtedly  suffered  from 
being  short-handed,  but  neither  the  Macedonian  nor 
Java  would  have  been  benefited  by  the  presence  of 
a  hundred  additional  men.  Barclay  possessed  about 
as  many  men  as  Perry,  but  this  did  not  give  him  an 
equality  of  force.  The  Penguin  and  Frolic  would 


102  Naval  War  of  1812 

have  been  taken  just  as  surely  had  the  Hornet  and 
Wasp  had  a  dozen  men  less  apiece  than  they  did. 
The  principal  case  where  numbers  would  help  would 
be  in  a  hand-to-hand  fight.  Thus  the  Chesapeake 
having  fifty  more  men  than  the  Shannon  ought  to 
have  been  successful;  but  she  was  not,  because  the 
superiority  of  her  crew  in  numbers  was  more  than 
counterbalanced  by  the  superiority  of  the  Shannon's 
crew  in  other  respects.  The  result  of  the  battle  of 
Lake  Champlain,  which  was  fought  at  anchor,  with 
the  fleets  too  far  apart  for  musketry  to  reach,  was 
not  in  the  slightest  degree  affected  by  the  number  of 
men  on  either  side,  as  both  combatants  had  amply 
enough  to  manage  the  guns  and  perform  every  other 
service. 

In  all  these  conflicts  the  courage  of  both  parties 
is  taken  for  granted ;  it  was  not  so  much  a  factor  in 
gaining  the  victory,  as  one  which  if  lacking  was 
fatal  to  all  chances  of  success.  In  the  engagements 
between  regular  cruisers,  not  a  single  one  was 
gained  by  superiority  in  courage.  The  crews  of 
both  the  Argus  and  Epervier  certainly  flinched ;  but 
had  they  fought  never  so  bravely  they  were  too  un- 
skilful to  win.  The  Chesapeake' 's  crew  could  hardly 
be  said  to  lack  courage ;  it  was  more  that  they  were 
inferior  to  their  opponents  in  discipline  as  well  as  in 
skill. 

There  was  but  one  conflict  during  the  war  where 
the  victory  could  be  said  to  be  owing  to  superiority 
in  pluck.  This  was  when  the  Neufchatel  privateer 
beat  off  the  boats  of  the  Endymion.  The  privateers- 


Naval  War  of  1812  103 

men  suffered  a  heavier  proportional  loss  than  their 
assailants,  and  they  gained  the  victory  by  sheer 
ability  to  stand  punishment. 

For  convenience  in  comparing  them  I  give  in 
tabulated  form  the  force  of  the  three  British  38*5 
taken  by  American  44*3  (allowing  for  short  weight 
of  metal  of  latter). 

CONSTITUTION  GUEttRIERE 

30  long  24's,  30  long  i8's, 

2  long  24*3,  2  long  i2*s, 

22  short  32'$,  16  short  32*3, 

i  short  18. 


Broadside,  nominal,  736  Ibs. 


real,  684  Ibs.  Broadside,  556  Ibs. 

UNITED  STATES,  MACEDONIAN 

30  long  24*8,  28  long  i8's, 

2  long  24's,  2  long  ia's, 

22  short  42*8,  2  long  g's, 

16  short  32*8, 

Broadside,  nominal,  846  Ibs.  i  short  18 
real,  786  Ibs. 


Broadside,  547  Ibs. 

CONSTITUTION  JAVA 

30  long  24*5,  28  long  i8's, 

2  long  24's,  2  long  12*8, 

20  short  32*8.  18  short  32*8, 

i  short  24. 


Broadside,  nominal,  704  Ibs. 


real,  654  Ibs.  Broadside,  576  Ibs. 

The  smallest  line-of-battle  ship,  the  74,  with  only 
long  i8's  on  the  second  deck,  was  armed  as  follows: 

28  long   32*8, 
28    "       i8's, 

6  "          I2'S, 

14  short  3z's, 

7  "      i8's, 

or  a  broadside  of  1,032  Ibs.,  736  from  long  guns., 
296  from  carronades;  while  the  Constitution  threw 


104  Naval  War  of  1812 

(in  reality)  684  Ibs.,  356  from  long  guns,  and  328 
from  her  carronades,  and  the  United  States  102  Ibs. 
more  from  her  carronades.  Remembering  the  dif- 
ference between  long  guns  and  carronades,  and  con- 
sidering sixteen  of  the  74's  long  i8's  as  being  re- 
placed by  42-pound  carronades36  (so  as  to  £et  the 
metal  on  the  ships  distributed  in  similar  proportions 
between  the  two  styles  of  cannon),  we  get  as  the 
74's  broadside  592  Ibs.  from  long  guns,  and  632 
from  carronades.  The  United  States  threw  nomin- 
ally 360  and  486,  and  the  Constitution  nominally 
360  and  352;  so  the  74  was  superior  even  to  the 
former  nominally  about  as  three  is  to  two;  while 
the  Constitution,  if  "a  line-of-battle  ship,"  was  dis- 
guised to  such  a  degree  that  she  was  in  reality  of  but 
little  more  than  one  half  the  force  of  one  of  the 
smallest  true  liners  England  possessed! 

**  That  this  change  would  leave  the  force  about  as  it  was, 
can  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  the  Adams  and  John 
Adams,  both  of  which  had  been  armed  with  42-pound  car- 
ronades (which  were  sent  to  Sackett's  Harbor),  had  them 
replaced  by  long  and  medium  i8-pounders,  these  being  con- 
sidered to  be  more  formidable;  so  that  the  substitution  of  42- 
pound  caronnades  would,  if  anything,  reduce  the  force  of 
the  74- 


CHAPTER   III 
1812 

ON   THE  OCEAN 

Commodore  Rodgers'  cruise  and  unsuccessful  chase  of 
the  Belvidera — Cruise  of  the  Essex — Captain  Hull's 
cruise,  and  escape  from  the  squadron  of  Commodore 
Broke — Constitution  captures  Guerriere — Wasp  cap- 
tures Frolic — Second  unsuccessful  cruise  of  Commo- 
dore Rodgers — United  States  captures  Macedonian- 
Constitution  captures  Java — Essex  starts  on  a  cruise 
— Summary 

AT  the  time  of  the  declaration  of  war,  June  18, 
1812,  the  American  navy  was  but  partially 
prepared  for  effective  service.  The  Wasp,  18,  was 
still  at  sea,  on  her  return  voyage  from  France;  the 
Constellation,  38,  was  lying  in  the  Chesapeake  river 
unable  to  receive  a  crew  for  several  months  to  come ; 
the  Chesapeake,  38,  was  lying  in  a  similar  condition 
in  Boston  harbor;  the  Adams,  28,  was  at  Washing- 
ton, being  cut  down  and  lengthened  from  a  frigate 
into  a  corvette.  These  three  cruisers  were  none 
of  them  fit  to  go  to  sea  till  after  the  end  of  the 
year.  The  Essex,  32,  was  in  New  York  harbor, 
but,  having  some  repairs  to  make,  was  not  yet  ready 
to  put  out.  The  Constitution,  44,  was  at  Annapolis, 
without  all  of  her  stores,  and  engaged  in  shipping 
a  new  crew,  the  time  of  the  old  one  being  up.  The 

(105) 


io6  Naval  War  of  1812 

Nautilus,  14,  was  cruising  off  New  Jersey,  and  the 
other  small  brigs  were  also  off  the  coast.  The 
only  vessels  immediately  available  were  those  under 
the  command  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  at  New  York, 
consisting  of  his  own  ship,  the  President,  44,  and 
of  the  United  States,  44,  Commodore  Decatur, 
Congress,  38,  Captain  Smith,  Hornet,  18,  Captain 
Lawrence,  and  Argus,  16,  Lieut.  Sinclair.  It  seems 
marvelous  that  any  nation  should  have  permitted 
its  ships  to  be  so  scattered  and  many  of  them  in 
such  an  unfit  condition,  at  the  beginning  of  hostil- 
ities. The  British  vessels  cruising  off  the  coast  were 
not  at  that  time  very  numerous  or  formidable,  con- 
sisting of  the  Africa,  64,  Acasta,  40,  Shannon,  38, 
Guerriere,  38,  Behidera,  36,  JEolus,  32,  Southamp- 
ton, 32,  and  Minerva,  32,  with  a  number  of  cor- 
vettes and  sloops;  their  force  was,  however,  strong 
enough  to  render  it  impossible  for  Commodore 
Rodgers  to  make  any  attempt  on  the  coast  towns 
of  Canada  or  the  West  Indies.  But  the  homeward 
bound  plate  fleet  had  sailed  from  Jamaica  on  May 
2Oth,  and  was  only  protected  by  the  Thalia,  36, 
Capt.  Vashon,  and  Reindeer,  18,  Capt.  Manners. 
Its  capture  or  destruction  would  have  been  a  serious 
blow,  and  one  which  there  seemed  a  good  chance 
of  striking,  as  the  fleet  would  have  to  pass  along 
the  American  coast,  running  with  the  Gulf  Stream. 
Commodore  Rodgers  had  made  every  preparation, 
in  expectation  of  war  being  declared,  and  an  hour 
after  official  intelligence  of  it,  together  with  his 
instructions,  had  been  received,  his  squadron  put  to 


On  the  Ocean  107 

sea,  on  June  2ist,  and  ran  off  toward  the  southeast1 
to  get  at  the  Jamaica  ships.  Having  learned  from 
an  American  brig  that  she  had  passed  the  plate  fleet 
four  days  before  in  lat.  36°  N.,  long.  67°  W.,  the 
Commodore  made  all  sail  in  that  direction.  At 
6  A.M.  on  June  23d  a  sail  was  made  out  in  the 
N.E.,  which  proved  to  be  the  British  frigate  Bel- 
videra,  36,  Capt.  Richard  Byron.2  The  latter  had 
sighted  some  of  Commodore  Rodgers'  squadron 
some  time  before,  and  stood  toward  them,  till  at 
6.30  she  made  out  the  three  largest  ships  to  be 
frigates.  Having  been  informed  of  the  likelihood 
of  war  by  a  New  York  pilot  boat,  the  Belvidera 
now  stood  away,  going  N.E.  by  E.,  the  wind  being 
fresh  from  the  west.  The  Americans  made  all  sail 
in  chase,  the  President,  a  very  fast  ship  off  the 
wind,  leading,  and  the  Congress  coming  next.  At 
noon  the  President  bore  S.W.,  distant  2  3-4  miles 
from  the  Belvidera.  Nantucket  shoals  bearing  100 
miles  N.  and  48  miles  E.3  The  wind  grew  lighter, 
shifting  more  toward  the  southwest,  while  the  ships 
continued  steadily  in  their  course,  going  N.E.  by  E. 
As  the  President  kept  gaining,  Captain  Byron  cleared 
his  ship  for  action,  and  shifted  to  the  stern  ports 
two  long  eighteen-pounders  on  the  main-deck  and 
two  thirty-two  pound  carronades  on  the  quarter- 
deck. 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  John  Rodgers  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  Sept.  i,  1812. 
1  Brenton,  v,  46. 
3  Log  of  Belvidera,  June  23, 1812. 


io8  Naval  War  of  1812 

At  4.30 4  the  President's  starboard  forecastle 
bow-gun  was  fired  by  Commodore  Rodgers  himself ; 
the  corresponding  main-deck  gun  was  next  dis- 
charged, and  then  Commodore  Rodgers  fired  again. 
These  three  shots  all  struck  the  stern  of  the  Belvi- 
dera,  killing  and  wounding  nine  men, — one  of  them 
went  through  the  rudder  coat,  into  the  after  gun- 
room, the  other  two  into  the  captain's  cabin.  A  few 
more  such  shots  would  have  rendered  the  Belvidera' s 
capture  certain,  but  when  the  President's  main-deck 
gun  was  discharged  for  the  second  time  it  burst, 
blowing  up  the  forecastle  deck  and  killing  and 
wounding  16  men,  among  them  the  Commodore 
himself,  whose  leg  was  broken.  This  saved  the 
British  frigate.  Such  an  explosion  always  causes  a 
half  panic,  every  gun  being  at  once  suspected.  In 
the  midst  of  the  confusion  Captain  Byron's  stern- 
chasers  opened  with  spirit  and  effect,  killing  or 
wounding  six  men  more.  Had  the  President  still 
pushed  steadily  on,  only  using  her  bow-chasers  until 
she  closed  abreast,  which  she  could  probably  have 
done,  the  Belvidera  could  still  have  been  taken ;  but, 
instead,  the  former  now  bore  up  and  fired  her  port 
broadside,  cutting  her  antagonist's  rigging  slightly, 
but  doing  no  other  damage,  while  the  Belvidera 
kept  up  a  brisk  and  galling  fire,  although  the  long 
bolts,  breeching-hooks,  and  breechings  of  the  guns 
now  broke  continually,  wounding  several  of  the  men, 

4  Cooper,  ii,  151.  According  to  James,  vi,  117,  the  Presi- 
dent was  then  600  yards  distant  from  the  Belvidera,  half  a 
point  on  her  weather  or  port  quarter. 


On  the  Ocean  109 

including  Captain  Byron.  The  President  had  lost 
ground  by  yawing,  but  she  soon  regained  it,  and, 
coming  up  closer  than  before,  again  opened  from 
her  bow-chasers  a  well-directed  fire,  which  severely 
wounded  her  opponent's  main-top  mast,  cross- jack 
yard,  and  one  or  two  other  spars  ;5  but  shortly  after- 
ward she  repeated  her  former  tactics  and  again  lost 
ground  by  yawing  to  discharge  another  broadside, 
even  mode  ineffectual  than  the  first.  Once  more  she 
came  up  closer  than  ever,  and  once  more  yawed ; 
the  single  shots  from  her  bow-chasers  doing  consid- 
erable damage,  but  her  raking  broadsides  none.6 
Meanwhile  the  active  crew  of  the  Belvidera  repaired 
everything  as  fast  as  it  was  damaged,  while  under 
the  superintendence  of  Lieutenants  Sykes,  Bruce, 
and  Campbell,  no  less  than  300  shot  were  fired  from 
her  stern  guns.7  Finding  that  if  the  President 
ceased  yawing  she  could  easily  run  alongside,  Cap- 
tain Byron  cut  away  one  bower,  one  stream,  and  two 
sheet  anchors,  the  barge,  yawl,  gig,  and  jolly  boat, 
and  started  14  tons  of  water.  The  effect  of  this  was 
at  once  apparent,  and  she  began  to  gain,  meanwhile 
the  damage  the  sails  of  the  combatants  had  received 
had  enabled  the  Congress  to  close,  and  when  abreast 
of  his  consort  Captain  Smith  opened  with  his  bow- 
chasers,  but  the  shot  fell  short.  The  Belvidera  soon 
altered  her  course  to  east  by  south,  set  her  starboard 

*  James,  vi,  119.  He  says  the  President  was  within  400 
yards. 

6  Lord  Howard  Douglas,  "Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  419  (third 
edition). 

1  James,  vi,  118. 


no  Naval  War  of  1812 

studding-sails,  and  by  midnight  was  out  of  danger; 
and  three  days  afterward  reached  Halifax  harbor. 
Lord  Howard  Douglas'  criticisms  on  this  en- 
counter seem  very  just.  He  says  that  the  President 
opened  very  well  with  her  bow-chasers  (in  fact  the 
Americans  seemed  to  have  aimed  better  and  to  have 
done  more  execution  with  these  guns  than  the  Brit- 
ish with  their  stern-chasers;  but  that  she  lost  so 
much  ground  by  yawing  and  delivering  harmless 
broadsides  as  to  enable  her  antagonist  to  escape. 
Certainly  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  time  thus  lost 
to  no  purpose,  the  Commodore  would  have  run 
alongside  his  opponent,  and  the  fate  of  the  little  36 
would  have  been  sealed.  On  the  other  hand  it  must 
be  remembered  that  it  was  only  the  bursting  of  the 
gun  on  board  the  President,  causing  such  direful 
confusion  and  loss,  and  especially  harmful  in  dis- 
abling her  commander,  that  gave  the  Belvidera  any 
chance  of  escape  at  all.  At  any  rate,  whether  the 
American  frigate  does,  or  does  not,  deserve  blame, 
Captain  Byron  and  his  crew  do  most  emphatically 
deserve  praise  for  the  skill  with  which  their  guns 
were  served  and  repairs  made,  the  coolness  with 
which  measures  to  escape  were  adopted,  and  the 
courage  with  which  they  resisted  so  superior  a  force. 
On  this  occasion  Captain  Byron  showed  himself  as 
good  a  seaman  and  as  brave  a  man  as  he  subsequent- 
ly proved  a  humane  and  generous  enemy  when  en- 
gaged in  the  blockade  of  the  Chesapeake.8 

8  Even  Niles,  unscrupulously  bitter  as  he  is  toward  the 
British,  does  justice  to  the  humanity  of  Captains  Byron  and 


On  the  Ocean  in 

This  was  not  a  very  auspicious  opening  of  hostili- 
ties for  America.  The  loss  of  the  Belvidera  was  not 
the  only  thing  to  be  regretted,  for  the  distance  the 
chase  took  the  pursuers  out  of  their  course  probably 
saved  the  plate  fleet.  When  the  Belvidera  was  first 
made  out,  Commodore  Rodgers  was  in  latitude  39^ 
26'  N.,  and  longitude  71°  10'  W.,  at  noon  the  same 
day  the  Thalia  and  her  convoy  were  in  latitude  39° 
N.,  longitude  62°  W.  Had  they  not  chased  the 
Belvidera  the  Americans  would  probably  have  run 
across  the  plate  fleet. 

The  American  squadron  reached  the  western  edge 
of  the  Newfoundland  Banks  on  June  29th,9  and  on 
July  ist,  a  little  to  the  east  of  the  Banks,  fell  in  with 
large  quantities  of  cocoa-nut  shells,  orange  peels, 
etc.,  which  filled  every  one  with  great  hopes  of  over- 
taking the  quarry.  On  July  9th,  the  Hornet  cap- 
tured a  British  privateer,  in  latitude  45°  30'  N.,  and 
longitude  23°  W.,  and  her  master  reported  that  he 
had  seen  the  Jamaica-men  the  previous  evening ;  but 
nothing  further  was  heard  or  seen  of  them,  and  on 
July  1 3th,  being  within  twenty  hours'  sail  of  the 
English  Channel,  Commodore  Rodgers  reluctantly 
turned  southward,  reaching  Madeira  July  2ist. 
Thence  he  cruised  toward  the  Azores  and  by  the 
Grand  Banks  home,  there  being  considerable  sick- 
ness on  the  ships.  On  August  3ist  he  reached  Bos- 
ton after  a  very  unfortunate  cruise,  in  which  he  had 

Hardy — which  certainly  shone  in  comparison  to  some  of  the 
rather  buccaneering    exploits    of    Cockburn's    followers  in 
Chesapeake  Bay. 
9  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Sept.  ist. 


ii2  Naval  War  of  1812 

made  but  seven  prizes,  all  merchantmen,  and  had 
recaptured  one  American  vessel. 

On  July  3d  the  Essex,  32,  Captain  David  Porter, 
put  out  of  New  York.  As  has  been  already  ex- 
plained she  was  most  inefficiently  armed,  almost  en- 
tirely with  carronades.  This  placed  her  at  the  mercy 
of  any  frigate  with  long  guns  which  could  keep  at 
a  distance  of  a  few  hundred  yards;  but  in  spite  of 
Captain  Porter's  petitions  and  remonstrances  he  was 
not  allowed  to  change  his  armament.  On  the  nth 
of  July  at  2  A.M.,  latitude  33°  N.,  longitude  66°  W., 
the  Essex  fell  in  with  the  Minerva,  32,  Captain 
Richard  Hawkins,  convoying  seven  transports,  each 
containing  about  200  troops,  bound  from  Barbadoes 
to  Quebec.  The  convoy  was  sailing  in  open  order, 
and,  there  being  a  dull  moon,  the  Essex  ran  in  and 
cut  out  transport  No.  299,  with  197  soldiers  aboard. 
Having  taken  out  the  soldiers,  Captain  Porter  stood 
back  to  the  convoy,  expecting  Captain  Hawkins  to 
come  out  and  fight  him;  but  this  the  latter  would 
not  do,  keeping  the  convoy  in  close  order  around 
him.  The  transports  were  all  armed  and  still  con- 
tained in  the  aggregate  1,200  soldiers.  As  the  Es- 
sex could  only  fight  at  close  quarters  these  heavy 
odds  rendered  it  hopeless  for  her  to  try  to  cut  out 
the  Minerva.  Her  carronades  would  have  to  be 
used  at  short  range  to  be  effective,  and  it  would  of 
course  have  been  folly  to  run  in  right  among  the 
convoy,  and  expose  herself  to  the  certainty  of  being 
boarded  by  five  times  as  many  men  as  she  pos- 
sessed. The  Minerva  had  three  less  guns  a  side, 


On  the  Ocean  113 

and  on  her  spar-deck  carried  24-pound  carronades 
instead  of  32's,  and,  moreover,  had  fifty  men  less 
than  the  Essex,  which  had  about  270  men  this 
cruise ;  on  the  other  hand,  her  main-deck  was  armed 
with  long  I2's,  so  that  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  she 
did  right  or  not  in  refusing  to  fight.  She  was  of  the 
same  force  as  the  Southampton,  whose  captain,  Sir 
James  Lucas  Yeo,  subsequently  challenged  Porter, 
but  never  appointed  a  meeting-place.  In  the  event 
of  a  meeting,  the  advantage,  in  ships  of  such  radical- 
ly different  armaments,  would  have  been  with  that 
captain  who  succeeded  in  outmanoeuvring  the  other 
and  in  making  the  fight  come  off  at  the  distance  best 
suited  to  himself.  At  long  range  either  the  Minerva 
or  Southampton  would  possess  an  immense  superi- 
ority; but  if  Porter  could  have  contrived  to  run  up 
within  a  couple  of  hundred  yards,  or  still  better,  to 
board,  his  superiority  in  weight  of  metal  and  num- 
ber of  men  would  have  enabled  him  to  carry  either 
of  them.  Porter's  crew  was  better  trained  for 
boarding  than  almost  any  other  American  com- 
mander's ;  and  probably  none  of  the  British  frigates 
on  the  American  station,  except  the  Shannon  and 
Tenedos,  would  have  stood  a  chance  with  the  Essex 
in  a  hand-to-hand  struggle.  Among  her  youngest 
midshipmen  was  one,  by  name  David  Glasgow 
Farragut,  then  but  thirteen  years  old,  who  after- 
ward became  the  first  and  greatest  admiral  of  the 
United  States.  His  own  words  on  this  point  will 
be  read  with  interest.  "Every  day,"  he  says,10  "the 

10  "Life  of  Farragut"  (embodying  his  journal  and  letters), 
p.  31.    By  his  son,  Loyall  Farragut,  New  York,  1879. 


ii4  Naval  War  of  1812 

crew  were  exercised  at  the  great  guns,  small  arms, 
arid  single  stick.  And  I  may  here  mention  the  fact 
that  I  have  never  been  on  a  ship  where  the  crew  of 
the  old  Essex  was  represented  but  that  I  found  them 
to  be  the  best  swordsmen  on  board.  They  had  been 
so  thoroughly  trained  as  boarders  that  every  man 
was  prepared  for  such  an  emergency,  with  his  cut- 
lass as  sharp  as  a  razor,  a  dirk  made  by  the  ship's 
armorer  out  of  a  file,  and  a  pistol."  n 

On  August  I3th  a  sail  was  made  out  to  wind- 
ward, which  proved  to  be  the  British  ship-sloop 
Alert,  1 6,  Captain  T.  L.  O.  Laugharne,  carrying  20 
eighteen-pound  carronades  and  100  men.12  As  soon 

11  James  says:  "Had  Captain  Porter  really  endeavored  to 
bring  the  Minerva  to  action  we  do  not  see  what  could  have 
prevented  the  Essex,  with  her  superiority  of  sailing,  from 
coming  alongside  of  her.  But  no  such  thought,  we  are  sure, 
entered  into  Captain  Porter's  head."  What  "prevented  the 
Essex"  was  the  Minerva's  not  venturing  out  of  the  convoy. 
Farragut,  in  his  journal,  writes:  "The  captured  British  offi- 
cers were  very  anxious  for  us  to  have  a  fight  with  the 
Minerva,  as  they  considered  her  a  good  match  for  the 
Essex,  and  Captain  Porter  replied  that  he  should  gratify 
them  with  pleasure  if  His  Majesty's  commander  was  of  their 
taste.  So  we  stood  toward  the  convoy,  and  when  within  gun- 
shot hove  to  and  awaited  the  Minerva,  but  she  tacked  and 
stood  in  among  the  convoy,  to  the  utter  amazement  of  our 
prisoners,  who  denounced  the  commander  as  a  base  coward, 
and  expressed  their  determination  to  report  him  to  the  Ad- 
miralty." An  incident  of  reported  "flinching"  like  this  is 
not  worth  mentioning ;  I  allude  to  it  only  to  show  the  value 
of  James'  sneers. 

14  James  (History,  vi,  p.  128)  says  "86  men."  In  the 
Naval  Archives  at  Washington  in  the  "Captains'  Letters" 
for  1812  (vol.  ii,  No.  182)  can  be  found  inclosed  in  Porter's 
letter  the  parole  of  the  officers  and  crew  of  the  Alert  signed 


On  the  Ocean  115 

as  the  Essex  discovered  the  Alert  she  put  out  drags 
astern,  and  led  the  enemy  to  believe  she  was  trying 
to  escape  by  sending  a  few  men  aloft  to  shake  out 
the  reefs  and  make  sail.  Concluding  the  frigate  to 
be  a  merchantman,  the  Alert  bore  down  on  her; 
while  the  Americans  went  to  quarters  and  cleared 
for  action,  although  the  tompions  were  left  in  the 
guns,  and  the  ports  kept  closed.13  The  Alert  fired 
a  gun  and  the  Essex  hove  to,  when  the  former 
passed  under  her  stern,  and  when  on  her  lee  quarter 
poured  in  a  broadside  of  grape  and  canister ;  but  the 
sloop  was  so  far  abaft  the  frigate's  beam  that  her 
shot  did  not  enter  the  ports  and  caused  no  damage. 
Thereupon  Porter  put  up  his  helm  and  opened  as 
soon  as  his  guns  would  bear,  tompions  and  all. 
The  Alert  now  discovered  her  error  and  made  off, 
but  too  late,  for  in  eight  minutes  the  Essex  was 
alongside,  and  the  Alert  fired  a  musket  and  struck, 
three  men  being  wounded  and  several  feet  of  water 
in  the  hold.  She  was  disarmed  and  sent  as  a  cartel 
into  St.  Johns.  It  has  been  the  fashion  among 
American  writers  to  speak  of  her  as  if  she  were 
"unworthily"  given  up,  but  such  an  accusation  is 
entirely  groundless.  The  Essex  was  four  times  her 
force,  and  all  that  could  possibly  be  expected  of  her 
was  to  do  as  she  did — exchange  broadsides  and 
strike,  having  suffered  some  loss  and  damage.  The 

by  Captain  Laugharne;  it  contains  either  100  or  101  names 
of  the  crew  of  the  Alert,  besides  those  of  a  number  of  other 
prisoners  sent  back  in  the  same  cartel. 
13  "Life  of  Farragut,"  p.  16. 


n6  Naval  War  of  1812 

Essex  returned  to  New  York  on  September  7th, 
having  made  10  prizes,  containing  423  men.14 

The  Belvidera,  as  has  been  stated,  carried  the 
news  of  the  war  to  Halifax.  On  July  5th  Vice- 
Admiral  Sawyer  despatched  a  squadron  to  cruise 
against  the  United  States,  commanded  by  Philip 
Vere  Broke,  of  the  Shannon,  38,  having  under  him 
the  Belvidera,  36,  Captain  Richard  Byron,  Africa, 
64,  Captain  John  Bastard,  and  JEolus,  32,  Captain 
Lord  James  Townsend.  On  the  Qth,  while  off  Nan- 
tucket,  they  were  joined  by  the  Guerriere,  38,  Cap- 
tain James  Richard  Dacres.  On  the  i6th  the  squad- 
ron fell  in  with  and  captured  the  United  States  brig 
Nautilus,  14,  Lieutenant  Crane,  which,  like  all  the 
little  brigs,  was  overloaded  with  guns  and  men.  She 
threw  her  lee  guns  overboard  and  made  use  of  every 
expedient  to  escape,  but  to  no  purpose.  At  3  P.M. 
of  the  following  day,  when  the  British  ships  were 
abreast  of  Barnegat,  about  four  leagues  off  shore, 
a  strange  sail  was  seen  and  immediately  chased,  in 
the  south  by  east,  or  windward  quarter,  standing  to 
the  northeast.  This  was  the  United  States  frigate 

14  Before  entering  New  York  the  Essex  fell  in  with  a  Brit- 
ish force  which,  in  both  Porter's  and  Farragut's  works,  is 
said  to  have  been  composed  of  the  Ac  as  t  a  and  Shannon, 
each  of  fifty  guns,  and  Ringdove,  of  twenty.  James  says  it 
was  the  Shannon,  accompanied  by  a  merchant  vessel.  It  is 
not  a  point  of  much  importance,  as  nothing  came  of  the 
meeting,  and  the  Shannon  alone,  with  her  immensely  su- 
perior armament,  ought  to  have  been  a  match  twice  over  for 
the  Essex;  although,  if  James  is  right,  as  seems  probable,  it 
gives  rather  a  comical  turn  to  Porter's  account  of  his  "extra- 
ordinary escape." 


On  the  Ocean  117 

Constitution,  44,  Captain  Isaac  Hull.15  When  the 
war  broke  out  he  was  in  the  Chesapeake  River  get- 
ting a  new  crew  aboard.  Having  shipped  over  450 
men  (counting  officers),  he  put  out  of  harbor  on 
the  1 2th  of  July.  His  crew  was  entirely  new,  drafts 
of  men  coming  on  board  up  to  the  last  moment.16 
On  the  1 7th,  at  2  P.M.,  Hull  discovered  four  sail, 
in  the  northern  board,  heading  to  the  westward. 
At  3,  the  wind  being  very  light,  the  Constitution 
made  sail  and  tacked,  in  18^  fathoms.  At  4,  in 
the  N.E.,  a  fifth  sail  appeared,  which  afterward 
proved  to  be  the  Guerriere.  The  first  four  ships 
bore  N.N.W.,  and  were  all  on  the  starboard  tack; 
while  by  6  o'clock  the  fifth  bore  E.N.E.  At  6.15 
the  wind  shifted  and  blew  lightly  from  the  south, 
bringing  the  American  ship  to  windward.  She  then 
wore  round  with  her  head  to  the  eastward,  set  her 
light  studding-sails  and  stay-sails,  and  at  7.30  beat 
to  action,  intending  to  speak  the  nearest  vessel,  the 
Guerriere.  The  two  frigates  neared  one  another 
gradually  and  at  10  the  Constitution  began  making 
signals,  which  she  continued  for  over  an  hour.  At 

15  For  the  ensuing  chase  I  have  relied  mainly  on  Cooper; 
see  also  "Memoir  of  Admiral  Broke,"  p.  240;  James,  vi,  133; 
and  Marshall's  "Naval  Biography"  (London,  1825),  ii,  625. 

16  In  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  ("Captains'  Let- 
ters," 1812,  ii,  No.  85),  Hull,  after  speaking  of  the  way  his 
men  were  arriving,  says:  "The  crew  are  as  yet  unacquainted 
with  a  ship  of  war,  as  many  have  but  lately  joined  and  have 
never  been  on  an  armed  ship  before.  .  .  .     We  are  doing  all 
that  we  can  to  make  them  acquainted  with  their  duty,  and 
in  a  few  days  we  shall  have  nothing  to  fear  from  any  single 
decked  ship." 


n8  Naval  War  of  1812 

3.30  A.M.  on  the  1 8th  the  Guerriere,  going  gradual- 
ly toward  the  Constitution  on  the  port  tack,  and  but 
one  half  mile  distant,  discovered  on  her  lee  beam  the 
Belvidera  and  the  other  British  vessels,  and  sig- 
nalled to  them.  They  did  not  answer  the  signals, 
thinking  she  must  know  who  they  were — a  circum- 
stance which  afterward  gave  rise  to  sharp  recrim- 
inations among  the  captains — and  Dacres,  conclud- 
ing them  to  be  Commodore  Rodgers'  squadron, 
tacked,  and  then  wore  round  and  stood  away  from 
the  Constitution  for  some  time  before  discovering 
his  mistake. 

At  5  A.M.  Hull  had  just  enough  steerage  way  on 
to  keep  his  head  to  the  east,  on  the  starboard  tack; 
on  his  lee  quarter,  bearing  N.E.  by  N.,  were  the 
Belvidera  and  Guerriere  and  astern  the  Shannon, 
JEolus,  and  Africa.  At  5.30  it  fell  entirely  calm, 
and  Hull  put  out  his  boats  to  tow  the  ship,  always 
going  southward.  At  the  same  time  he  whipped 
up  a  24  from  the  main-deck,  and  got  the  forecastle- 
chaser  aft,  cutting  away  the  taffrail  to  give  the  two 
guns  more  freedom  to  work  in  and  also  running 
out,  through  the  cabin  windows,  two  of  the  long 
main-deck  24's.  The  British  boats  were  towing 
also.  At  6  A.M.  a  light  breeze  sprang  up,  and  the 
Constitution  set  studding-sails  and  stay-sails;  the 
Shannon  opened  at  her  with  her  bow  guns,  but 
ceased  when  she  found  she  could  not  reach  her.  At 
6.30,  the  wind  having  died  away,  the  Shannon  be- 
gan to  gain,  almost  all  the  boats  of  the  squadron 
towing  her.  Having  sounded  in  26  fathoms,  Lieu- 


On  the  Ocean  119 

tenant  Charles  Morris  suggested  to  Hull  to  try  kedg- 
ing.  All  the  spare  rope  was  bent  on  to  the  cables, 
paid  out  into  the  cutters,  and  a  kedge  run  out  half 
a  mile  ahead  and  let  go;  then  the  crew  clapped  on 
and  walked  away  with  the  ship,  overrunning  and 
tripping  the  kedge  as  she  came  up  with  the  end  of 
the  line.  Meanwhile,  fresh  lines  and  another  kedge 
were  carried  ahead,  and  the  frigate  glided  away 
from  her  pursuers.  At  7.30  A.M.  a  little  breeze 
sprang  up,  when  the  Constitution  set  her  ensign  and 
fired  a  shot  at  the  Shannon.  It  soon  fell  calm  again 
and  the  Shannon  neared.  At  9.10  a  light  air  from 
the  southward  struck  the  ship,  bringing  her  to  wind- 
ward. As  the  breeze  was  seen  coming,  her  sails 
were  trimmed,  and  as  soon  as  she  obeyed  her  helm 
she  was  brought  close  up  on  the  port  tack.  The 
boats  dropped  alongside ;  those  that  belonged  to  the 
davits  were  run  up,  while  the  others  were  just  lifted 
clear  of  the  water,  by  purchases  on  the  spare  spars, 
stowed  outboard,  where  they  could  be  used  again  at 
a  minute's  notice.  Meanwhile,  on  her  lee  beam  the 
Guerriere  opened  fire;  but  her  shot  fell  short,  and 
the  Americans  paid  not  the  slightest  heed  to  it. 
Soon  it  again  fell  calm,  when  Hull  had  2,000  gal- 
lons of  water  started,  and  again  put  out  his  boats 
to  tow.  The  Shannon,  with  some  of  the  other 
boats  of  the  squadron  helping  her,  gained  on  the 
Constitution,  but  by  severe  exertion  was  again  left 
behind.  Shortly  afterward,  a  slight  wind  springing 
up,  the  Belvidera  gained  on  the  other  British  ships, 
and  when  it  fell  calm  she  was  nearer  to  the  Con- 


i2o  Naval  War  of  1812 

stitution  than  any  of  her  consorts,  their  boats  being 
put  on  to  her.17  At  10.30,  observing  the  benefit 
that  the  Constitution  had  derived  from  warping, 
Captain  Byron  did  the  same,  bending  all  his  hawsers 
to  one  another,  and  working  two  kedge  anchors  at 
the  same  time  by  paying  the  warp  out  through  one 
hawse-hole  as  it  was  run  in  through  the  other  op- 
posite. Having  men  from  the  other  frigates  aboard, 
and  a  lighter  ship  to  work,  Captain  Byron,  at  2 
P.M.,  was  near  enough  to  exchange  bow  and  stern- 
chasers  with  the  Constitution,  out  of  range  however. 
Hull  expected  to  be  overtaken,  and  made  every  ar- 
rangement to  try  in  such  case  to  disable  the  first 
frigate  before  her  consorts  could  close.  But  neither 
the  Belvidera  nor  the  Shannon  dared  to  tow  very 
near  for  fear  of  having  their  boats  sunk  by  the 
American's  stern-chasers. 

The  Constitution's  crew  showed  the  most  excel- 
lent spirit.  Officers  and  men  relieved  each  other 
regularly,  the  former  snatching  their  rest  any  where 
on  deck,  the  latter  sleeping  at  the  guns.  Gradually 
the  Constitution  drew  ahead,  but  the  situation  con- 
tinued most  critical'.  All  through  the  afternoon  the 
British  frigates  kept  towing  and  kedging,  being 
barely  out  of  gunshot.  At  3  P.M.  a  light  breeze 
sprung  up,  and  blew  fitfully  at  intervals ;  every  puff 

"  Cooper  speaks  as  if  this  was  the  Shannon  ;  but  from 
Marshall's  "Naval  Biography"  we  learn  that  it  was  the  Bel- 
videra. At  other  times  he  confuses  the  Belvidera  with  the 
Guerriere.  Captain  Hull,  of  course,  could  not  accurately 
distinguish  the  names  of  his  pursuers.  My  account  is  drawn 
from  a  careful  comparison  of  Marshall,  Cooper,  and  James. 


On  the  Ocean  121 

was  watched  closely  and  taken  advantage  of  to  the 
utmost.  At  7  in  the  evening  the  wind  almost  died 
out,  and  for  four  more  weary  hours  the  worn-out 
sailors  towed  and  kedged.  At  10 .45  a  little  breeze 
struck  the  frigate,  when  the  boats  dropped  along- 
side and  were  hoisted  up,  excepting  the  first  cutter. 
Throughout  the  night  the  wind  continued  very 
light,  the  Belvidera  forging  ahead  till  she  was  off 
the  Constitution's  lee  beam;  and  at  4  A.M.  on  the 
morning  of  the  iQth,  she  tacked  to  the  eastward,  the 
breeze  being  light  from  the  south  by  east.  At  4 .20 
the  Constitution  tacked  also;  and  at  5  .15  the  &Lolus, 
which  had  drawn  ahead,  passed  on  the  contrary  tack. 
Soon  afterward  the  wind  freshened  so  that  Captain 
Hull  took  in  his  cutter.  The  Africa  was  now  so  far 
to  leeward  as  to  be  almost  out  of  the  race ;  while  the 
five  frigates  were  all  running  on  the  starboard  tack 
with  every  stitch  of  canvas  set.  At  9  A.M.  an  Amer- 
ican merchantman  hove  in  sight  and  bore  down  tow- 
ard the  squadron.  The  Belvidera,  by  way  of  de- 
coy, hoisted  American  colors,  when  the  Constitution 
hoisted  the  British  flag,  and  the  merchant  vessel 
hauled  off.  The  breeze  continued  light  till  noon, 
when  Hull  found  he  had  dropped  the  British  frigates 
well  behind;  the  nearest  was  the  Belvidera,  exactly 
in  his  wake,  bearing  W.N.W.  2^  miles  distant. 
The  Shannon  was  on  his  lee,  bearing  N.  by  W.  J4 
W.  distant  3^  miles.  The  other  two  frigates  were 
five  miles  off  on  the  lee  quarter.  Soon  afterward 
the  breeze  freshened,  and  "Old  Ironsides"  drew 
slowly  ahead  from  her  foes,  her  sails  being  watched 

VOL.  IX.— 6 


122  Naval  War  of  1812 

and  tended  with  the  most  consummate  skill.  At  4 
P.M.  the  breeze  again  lightened,  but  even  the  Belvi- 
dera  was  now  four  miles  astern  and  to  leeward.  At 
6.45  there  were  indications  of  a  heavy  rain  squall, 
which  once  more  permitted  Hull  to  show  that  in  sea- 
manship he  excelled  even  the  able  captains  against 
whom  he  was  pitted.  The  crew  were  stationed  and 
everything  kept  fast  till  the  last  minute,  when  all 
was  clewed  up  just  before  the  squall  struck  the  ship. 
The  light  canvas  was  furled,  a  second  reef  taken  in 
the  mizzen  topsail,  and  the  ship  almost  instantly 
brought  under  short  sail.  The  British  vessels  see- 
ing this  began  to  let  go  and  haul  down  without 
waiting  for  the  wind,  and  were  steering  on  different 
tacks  when  the  first  gust  struck  them.  But  Hull  as 
soon  as  he  got  the  weight  of  the  wind  sheeted  home, 
hoisted  his  fore  and  maintop  gallant  sails,  and  went 
off  on  an  easy  bowline  at  the  rate  of  1 1  knots.  At 
7.40  sight  was  again  obtained  of  the  enemy,  the 
squall  having  passed  to  leeward ;  the  Belvidera,  the 
nearest  vessel,  had  altered  her  bearings  two  points 
to  leeward,  and  was  a  long  way  astern.  Next  came 
the  Shannon;  the  Guerri&re  and  JEolus  were  hull 
down,  and  the  Africa  barely  visible.  The  wind  now 
kept  light,  shifting  occasionally  in  a  very  baffling 
manner,  but  the  Constitution  gained  steadily,  wet- 
ting her  sails  from  the  sky-sails  to  the  courses.  At 
6  A.M.  on  the  morning  of  the  2Oth  the  pursuers  were 
almost  out  of  sight;  and  at  8.15  A.M.  they  aban- 
doned the  chase.  Hull  at  once  stopped  to  investi- 
gate the  character  of  two  strange  vessels,  but  found 


On  the  Ocean  123 

them  to  be  only  Americans;  then,  at  midday,  he 
stood  toward  the  east,  and  went  into  Boston  on  July 
26th. 

In  this  chase  Captain  Isaac  Hull  was  matched 
against  five  British  captains,  two  of  whom,  Broke 
and  Byron,  were  fully  equal  to  any  in  their  navy; 
and  while  the  latter  showed  great  perseverance,  good 
seamanship,  and  ready  imitation,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  palm  in  every  way  belongs  to  the  cool 
old  Yankee.  Every  daring  expedient  known  to  the 
most  perfect  seamanship  was  tried,  and  tried  with 
success;  and  no  victorious  fight  could  reflect  more 
credit  on  the  part  of  the  conqueror  than  this  three 
days'  chase  did  on  Hull.  Later,  on  two  occasions, 
the  Constitution  proved  herself  far  superior  in  gun- 
nery to  the  average  British  frigate;  this  time  her 
officers  and  men  showed  that  they  could  handle  the 
sails  as  well  as  they  could  the  guns.  Hull  out- 
manoeuvred Broke  and  Byron  as  cleverly  as  a  month 
later  he  out-fought  Dacres.  His  successful  escape 
and  victorious  fight  were  both  performed  in  a  way 
that  place  him  above  any  single  ship  captain  of  the 
war. 

On  August  2d  the  Constitution  made  sail  from 
Boston18  and  stood  to  the  eastward,  in  hopes  of  fall- 
ing in  with  some  of  the  British  cruisers.  She  was 
unsuccessful,  however,  and  met  nothing.  Then  she 
ran  down  to  the  Bay  of  Fundy,  steered  along  the 
coast  of  Nova  Scotia,  and  thence  toward  Newfound- 
land, and  finally  took  her  station  off  Cape  Race  in 

18  Letter  of  Capt.  Isaac  Hull,  Aug.  28,  1812. 


124  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  where  she  took  and  burned 
two  brigs  of  little  value.  On  the  I5th  she  recap- 
tured an  American  brig  from  the  British  ship-sloop 
Avenger,  though  the  latter  escaped;  Capt.  Hull 
manned  his  prize  and  sent  her  in.  He  then  sailed 
southward,  and  on  the  night  of  the  i8th  spoke  a 
Salem  privateer  which  gave  him  news  of  a  British 
frigate  to  the  south  ;  thither  he  stood,  and  at  2  P.M. 
on  the  igth,  in  lat.  41°  30'  N.  and  55°  W.,  made 
out  a  large  sail  bearing  E.S.E.  and  to  leeward,19 
which  proved  to  be  his  old  acquaintance,  the  frigate 
Guerriere,  Captain  Dacres.  It  was  a  cloudy  day 
and  the  wind  was  blowing  fresh  from  the  north- 
west. The  Guerriere  was  standing  by  the  wind  on 
the  starboard  tack,  under  easy  canvas;20  she  hauled 
up  her  courses,  took  in  her  topgallant  sails,  and  at 
4.30  backed  her  maintopsail.  Hull  then  very  de- 
liberately began  to  shorten  sail,  taking  in  topgallant 
sails,  staysails,  and  flying-  jib,  sending  down  the 
royal  yards  and  putting  another  reef  in  the  top- 
sails. Soon  the  Englishman  hoisted  three  ensigns, 
when  the  American  also  set  his  colors,  one  at  each 
masthead,  and  one  at  the  mizzen  peak. 

The  Constitution  now  ran  down  with  the  wind 
nearly  aft.  The  Guerriere  was  on  the  starboard 
tack,  and  at  five  o'clock  opened  with  her  weather- 
guns,21  the  shot  falling  short,  then  wore  round  and 
fired  her  port  broadside,  of  which  two  shots  struck 


'»  Do.,  Aug. 

*°  Letter  of  Capt.  James  R.  Dacres,  Sept.  7,  1812. 

fl  Log  of  Guerrtire. 


On  the  Ocean  125 

her  opponent,  the  rest  passing  over  and  through  her 
rigging.22  As  the  British  frigate  again  wore  to 
open  with  her  starboard  battery,  the  Constitution 
yawed  a  little  and  fired  two  or  three  of  her  port 
bow  guns.  Three  or  four  times  the  Guerridre  re- 
peated this  manoeuvre,  wearing  and  firing  alternate 
broadsides,  but  with  little  or  no  effect,  while  the 
Constitution  yawed  as  often  to  avoid  being  raked, 
and  occasionally  fired  one  of  her  bow  guns.  This 
continued  nearly  an  hour,  as  the  vessels  were  very 
far  apart  when  the  action  began,  hardly  any  loss 
or  damage  being  inflicted  by  either  party.  At  6 .00 
the  Guerriere  bore  up  and  ran  off  under  her  topsails 
and  jib,  with  the  wind  almost  astern,  a  little  on  her 
port  quarter ;  when  the  Constitution  set  her  maintop 
gallant  sail  and  foresail,  and  at  6.05  closed  within 
half  pistol-shot  distance  on  her  adversary's  port 
beam.23  Immediately  a  furious  cannonade  opened, 
each  ship  firing  as  the  guns  bore.  By  the  time  the 
ships  were  fairly  abreast,  at  6.20,  the  Constitution 
shot  away  the  Guerriere's  mizzenmast,  which  fell 
over  the  starboard  quarter,  knocking  a  large  hole  in 

99  See  in  the  Naval  Archives  (Bureau  of  Navigation)  the 
Constitution's  Log-Book  (vol.  ii,  from  Feb.  i,  1812,  to  Dec. 
13,  1813).  The  point  is  of  some  little  importance  because 
Hull,  in  his  letter,  speaks  as  if  both  the  first  broadsides  fell 
short,  whereas  the  log  distinctly  says  that  the  second  went 
over  the  ship,  except  two  shot,  which  came  home.  The  hy- 
pothesis of  the  Guerrttre  having  damaged  powder  was 
founded  purely  on  this  supposed  falling  short  of  the  first 
two  broadsides. 

93  "Autobiography  of  Commodore  Morris"  (Annapolis, 
1880),  p.  164. 


126  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  counter,  and  bringing  the  ship  round  against  her 
helm.  Hitherto  she  had  suffered  very  greatly  and 
the  Constitution  hardly  at  all.  The  latter,  finding 
that  she  was  ranging  ahead,  put  her  helm  a-port  and 
then  luffed  short  round  her  enemy's  bows,24  deliv- 
ering a  heavy  raking  fire  with  the  starboard  guns 
and  shooting  away  the  Guerri&re's  mainyard.  Then 
she  wore  and  again  passed  her  adversary's  bows, 
raking  with  her  port  guns.  The  mizzenmast  of  the 
Guerrtire,  dragging  in  the  water,  had  by  this  time 
pulled  her  bow  round  till  the  wind  came  on  her  star- 
board quarter;  and  so  near  were  the  two  ships  that 
the  Englishman's  bowsprit  passed  diagonally  over 
the  Constitution's  quarterdeck,  and  as  the  latter 
ship  fell  off  it  got  foul  of  her  mizzen-rigging,  and 
the  vessels  then  lay  with  the  Guerrtire's  starboard- 
bow  against  the  Constitution's  port,  or  lee  quarter- 
gallery.25  The  Englishman's  bow  guns  played  havoc 
with  Captain  Hull's  cabin,  setting  fire  to  it ;  but  the 
flames  were  soon  extinguished  by  Lieutenant  Hoff- 
mann. On  both  sides  the  boarders  were  called 
away;  the  British  ran  forward,  but  Captain  Dacres 
relinquished  the  idea  of  attacking26  when  he  saw 
the  crowds  of  men  on  the  American's  decks.  Mean- 
while, on  the  Constitution,  the  boarders  and  marines 
gathered  aft,  but  such  a  heavy  sea  was  running  that 
they  could  not  get  on  the  Guerri&re.  Both  sides 
suffered  heavily  from  the  closeness  of  the  musketry 

94  Log  of  Constitution. 

K  Cooper,  in  "Putnam's  Magazine,"  i,  475. 

M  Address  of  Captain  Dacres  to  the  court-martial  at  Halifax. 


On  the  Ocean  127 

fire;  indeed,  almost  the  entire  loss  on  the  Constitu- 
tion occurred  at  this  juncture.  As  Lieutenant  Bush, 
of  the  marines,  sprang  upon  the  taffrail  to  leap  on 
the  enemy's  decks,  a  British  marine  shot  him  dead ; 
Mr.  Morris,  the  first  lieutenant,  and  Mr.  Alwyn, 
the  master,  had  also  both  leaped  on  the  taffrail,  and 
both  were  at  the  same  moment  wounded  by  the  mus- 
ketry fire.  On  the  Guerriere  the  loss  was  far  heav- 
ier, almost  all  the  men  on  the  forecastle  being  picked 
off.  Captain  Dacres  himself  was  shot  in  the  back 
and  severely  wounded  by  one  of  the  American  miz- 
zen  topmen,  while  he  was  standing  on  the  starboard 
forecastle  hammocks  cheering  on  his  crew  ;27  two  of 
the  lieutenants  and  the  master  were  also  shot  down. 
The  ships  gradually  worked  round  till  the  wind  was 
again  on  the  port  quarter,  when  they  separated,  and 
the  Guerriere' s  foremast  and  mainmast  at  once  went 
by  the  board,  and  fell  over  on  the  starboard  side, 
leaving  her  a  defenceless  hulk,  rolling  her  main- 
deck  guns  into  the  water.28  At  6.30  the  Constitu- 
tion hauled  aboard  her  tacks,  ran  off  a  little  dis- 
tance to  the  eastward,  and  lay  to.  Her  braces  and 
standing  and  running  rigging  were  much  cut  up  and 
some  of  the  spars  wounded,  but  a  few  minutes  suf- 
ficed to  repair  damages,  when  Captain  Hull  stood 
under  his  adversary's  lee,  and  the  latter  at  once 
struck,  at  7 .00  P.M.,29  just  two  hours  after  she  had 
fired  the  first  shot.  On  the  part  of  the  Constitution, 
however,  the  actual  fighting,  exclusive  of  six  or 

17  James,  vi,  144.  *8  Brenton,  v,  51. 

"  Log  of  the  Constitution. 


128  Naval  War  of  1812 

eight  guns  fired  during  the  first  hour,  while  closing, 
occupied  less  than  30  minutes. 

The  tonnage  and  metal  of  the  combatants  have 
already  been  referred  to.  The  Constitution  had,  as 
already  said,  about  456  men  aboard,  while  of  the 
Guerriere's  crew,  267  prisoners  were  received  aboard 
the  Constitution;  deducting  10  who  were  Americans 
and  would  not  fight,  and  adding  the  1 5  killed  out- 
right, we  get  272 ;  28  men  were  absent  in  prizes. 

COMPARATIVE  FORCE 

Com  para- 
Broad-  Compara-    live  loss 
Tons       Guns       side         Men        Loss       live  Force   Inflicted 
Constitution       1576            27            684            456             14  i.oo  i.oo 
Gutrriert           1338            25            556           272            79                 .70  .18 

The  loss  of  the  Constitution  included  Lieutenant 
William  S.  Bush,  of  the  marines,  and  six  seamen 
killed,  and  her  first  lieutenant,  Charles  Morris,  mas- 
ter John  C.  Alwyn,  four  seamen,  and  one  marine, 
wounded.  Total,  seven  killed  and  seven  wounded. 
Almost  all  this  loss  occurred  when  the  ships  came 
foul,  and  was  due  to  the  Guerriere's  musketry  and 
the  two  guns  in  her  bridle-ports. 

The  Guerriere  lost  23  killed  and  mortally 
wounded,  including  her  second  lieutenant,  Henry 
Ready,  and  56  wounded  severely  and  slightly,  in- 
cluding Captain  Dacres  himself,  the  first  lieutenant, 
Bartholomew  Kent,  master  Robert  Scott,  two  mas- 
ter's mates,  and  one  midshipman. 

The  third  lieutenant  of  the  Constitution,  Mr. 
George  Campbell  Read,  was  sent  on  board  the  prize, 
and  the  Constitution  remained  by  her  during  the 


On  the  Ocean 


129 


This  diagram  is  taken  from  Commodore  Morris'  autobiography  and 
the  log  of  the  Gtterriere;  the  official  accounts  apparently  consider 
"larboard"  and  "starboard"  as  interchangeable  terms. 


Naval  War  of  1812 


night  ;  but  at  daylight  it  was  found  that  she  was  in 
danger  of  sinking.  Captain  Hull  at  once  began  re- 
moving the  prisoners,  and  at  three  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  set  the  Guerriere  on  fire,  and  in  a  quarter 
of  an  hour  she  blew  up.  He  then  set  sail  for  Bos- 
ton, where  he  arrived  on  August  3Oth.  "Captain 
Hull  and  his  officers,"  writes  Captain  Dacres  in  his 
official  letter,  "have  treated  us  like  brave  and  gener- 
ous enemies;  the  greatest  care  has  been  taken  that 
we  should  not  lose  the  smallest  trifle." 

The  British  laid  very  great  stress  on  the  rotten 
and  decayed  condition  of  the  Guerriere;  mentioning 
in  particular  that  the  mainmast  fell  solely  because 
of  the  weight  of  the  falling  foremast.  But  it  must 
be  remembered  that  until  the  action  occurred  she 
was  considered  a  very  fine  ship.  Thus,  in  Brighton's 
"Memoir  of  Admiral  Broke,"  it  is  declared  that 
Dacres  freely  expressed  the  opinion  that  she  could 
take  a  ship  in  half  the  time  the  Shannon  could. 
The  fall  of  the  mainmast  occurred  when  the  fight 
was  practically  over;  it  had  no  influence  whatever 
on  the  conflict.  It  was  also  asserted  that  her  powder 
was  bad,  but  on  no  authority  ;  her  first  broadside  fell 
short,  but  so,  under  similar  circumstances,  did  the 
first  broadside  of  the  United  States.  None  of  these 
causes  accounts  for  the  fact  that  her  shot  did  not  hit. 
Her  opponent  was  of  such  superior  force  —  nearly  in 
the  proportion  of  3  to  2  —  that  success  would  have 
been  very  difficult  in  any  event,  and  no  one  can 
doubt  the  gallantry  and  pluck  with  which  the  Brit- 
ish ship  was  fought;  but  the  execution  was  very 


On  the  Ocean  131 

greatly  disproportioned  to  the  force.  The  gunnery 
of  the  Guerridre  was  very  poor,  and  that  of  the 
Constitution  excellent;  during  the  few  minutes  the 
ships  were  yardarm  and  yardarm,  the  latter  was  not 
hulled  once,  while  no  less  than  30  shot  took  effect 
on  the  former's  engaged  side,30  five  sheets  of  copper 
beneath  the  bends.  The  Guerriere,  moreover,  was 
out-manoeuvred ;  "in  wearing  several  times  and  ex- 
changing broadsides  in  such  rapid  and  continual 
changes  of  position,  her  fire  was  much  more  harm- 
less than  it  would  have  been  if  she  had  kept  more 
steady." 31  The  Constitution  was  handled  fault- 
lessly ;  Captain  Hull  displayed  the  coolness  and  skill 
of  a  veteran  in  the  way  in  which  he  managed,  first 
to  avoid  being  raked,  and  then  to  improve  the  ad- 
vantage which  the  precision  and  rapidity  of  his  fire 
had  gained.  "After  making  every  allowance  claimed 
by  the  enemy,  the  character  of  this  victory  is  not 
essentially  altered.  Its  peculiarities  were  a  fine  dis- 
play of  seamanship  in  the  approach,  extraordinary 
efficiency  in  the  attack,  and  great  readiness  in  re- 
pairing damages ;  all  of  which  denote  cool  and  capa- 
ble officers,  with  an  expert  and  trained  crew;  in  a 
word,  a  disciplined  man-of-war."32  The  disparity 
of  force,  10  to  7,  is  not  enough  to  account  for  the 
disparity  of  execution,  10  to  2.  Of  course,  some- 
thing must  be  allowed  for  the  decayed  state  of  the 
Englishman's  masts,  although  I  really  do  not  think 

10  Captain  Dacres*  address  to  the  court-martial. 
81  Lord  Howard  Douglas'  "Treatise  on  Naval  Gunnery" 
(London,  1851),  p.  454. 
32  Cooper,  ii,  173. 


132  Naval  War  of  1812 

it  had  any  influence  on  the  battle,  for  he  was  beaten 
when  the  mainmast  fell ;  and  it  must  be  remembered, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  the  American  crew  was  ab- 
solutely new,  while  the  Guerriere  was  manned  by 
old  hands.  So  that,  while  admitting  and  admiring 
the  gallantry,  and,  on  the  whole,  the  seamanship,  of 
Captain  Dacres  and  his  crew,  and  acknowledging 
that  he  fought  at  a  great  disadvantage,  especially  in 
being  short-handed,  yet  all  must  acknowledge  that 
the  combat  showed  a  marked  superiority,  particu- 
larly in  gunnery,  on  the  part  of  the  Americans.  Had 
the  ships  not  come  foul,  Captain  Hull  would  prob- 
ably not  have  lost  more  than  three  or  four  men;  as 
it  was,  he  suffered  but  slightly.  That  the  Guerriere 
was  not  so  weak  as  she  was  represented  to  be  can 
be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  she  mounted  two 
more  maindeck  guns  than  the  rest  of  her  class ;  thus 
carrying  on  her  maindeck  30  long  i8-pounders  in 
battery  to  oppose  to  the  30  long  24/5,  or  rather  (al- 
lowing for  the  short  weight  of  shot)  long  22's,  of 
the  Constitution.  Characteristically  enough,  James, 
though  he  carefully  reckons  in  the  long  bow-chasers 
in  the  bridle-ports  of  the  Argus  and  Enterprise,  yet 
refuses  to  count  the  two  long  eighteens  mounted 
through  the  bridle-ports  on  the  Guerriere's  main- 
deck.  Now,  as  it  turned  out,  these  two  bow  guns 
were  used  very  effectively,  when  the  ships  got  foul, 
and  caused  more  damage  and  loss  than  all  of  the 
other  maindeck  guns  put  together. 

Captain  Dacres,  very  much  to  his  credit,  allowed 
the  ten  Americans  on  board  to  go  below,  so  as  not 


On  the  Ocean  133 

to  fight  against  their  flag;  and  in  his  address  to  the 
court-martial  mentions,  among  the  reasons  for  his 
defeat,  "that  he  was  very  much  weakened  by  per- 
mitting the  Americans  on  board  to  quit  their  quar- 
ters." Coupling  this  with  the  assertion  made  by 
James  and  most  other  British  writers  that  the  Con- 
stitution was  largely  manned  by  Englishmen,  we 
reach  the  somewhat  remarkable  conclusion,  that  the 
British  ship  was  defeated  because  the  Americans  on 
board  would  not  fight  against  their  country,  and 

that  the  American  was  victorious  because  the  Brit- 

P 

ish  on  board  would.  However,  as  I  have  shown, 
in  reality  there  were  probably  not  a  score  of  British 
on  board  the  Constitution. 

In  this,  as  well  as  the  two  succeeding  frigate  ac- 
tions, every  one  must  admit  that  there  was  a  great 
superiority  in  force  on  the  side  of  the  victors,  and 
British  historians  have  insisted  that  this  superiority 
was  so  great  as  to  preclude  any  hopes  of  a  success- 
ful resistance.  That  this  was  not  true,  and  that  the 
disparity  between  the  combatants  was  not  as  great 
as  had  been  the  case  in  a  number  of  encounters  in 
which  English  frigates  had  taken  French  ones,  can 
be  best  shown  by  a  few  accounts  taken  from  the 
French  historian  Troude,  who  would  certainly  not 
exaggerate  the  difference.  Thus  on  March  i,  1799, 
the  English  38-gun  i8-pounder  frigate  Sybil,  cap- 
tured the  French  44-gun  24-pounder  frigate  Forte, 
after  an  action  of  two  hours  and  ten  minutes.33  In 

33  "Batailles  Navales  de  la  France."  O.  Troude  (Paris, 
1868),  iv,  171. 


134  Naval  War  of  1812 

actual  weight  the  shot  thrown  by  one  of  the  main- 
deck  guns  of  the  defeated  Forte  was  over  six  pounds 
heavier  than  the  shot  thrown  by  one  of  the  main- 
deck  guns  of  the  victorious  Constitution  or  United 
States.3* 

There  are  later  examples  than  this.  But  a  very 
few  years  before  the  declaration  of  war  by  the 
United  States,  and  in  the  same  struggle  that  was 
then  still  raging,  there  had  been  at  least  two  victo- 
ries gained  by  English  frigates  over  French  foes 
as  superior  to  themselves  as  the  American  44/3  were 
to  the  British  ships  they  captured.  On  Aug.  10, 1805, 
the  Phoenix,  36,  captured  the  Didon,  40,  after  3^ 
hours'  fighting,  the  comparative  broadside  force 
being  :35 

PHCENIX  DIDON 

13X18  14X18 

zx  9  ax  8 

6X32  7X36 


21  guns,  444  Ibs.  23  guns,  522  Ibs. 

(nominal;  about 
ooo,  real) 

On  March  8,  1808,  the  San  Florenzo,  36,  captured 
the  Piedmontaise,  40,  the  force  being  exactly  what 
it  was  in  the  case  of  the  Phoenix  and  Didon." 
Comparing  the  real,  not  the  nominal,  weight  of 
metal,  we  find  that  the  Didon  and  Piedmontaise 
were  proportionately  of  greater  force  compared  to 
the  Phoenix  and  San  Florenso,  than  the  Constitu- 
tion was  compared  to  the  Guerriere  or  Java.  The 

M  See  Appendix  B,  for  actual  weight  of  French  shot. 

tt  Ibid,  iii,  425. 

**  "Batailles  Na vales  de  la  France,"  iii,  199. 


On  the  Ocean  135 

French  i8's  threw  each  a  shot  weighing  but  about 
two  pounds  less  than  that  thrown  by  an  American 
24  of  1812,  while  their  36-pound  carronades  each 
threw  a  shot  over  10  pounds  heavier  than  that 
thrown  by  one  of  the  Constitution's  spar-deck  32*5. 

That  a  24-pounder  cannot  always  whip  an  18- 
pounder  frigate  is  shown  by  the  action  of  the  Brit- 
ish frigate  Eurotas  with  the  French  frigate  Chlor- 
inde,  on  Feb.  25,  i8i4.37  The  first  with  a  crew 
of  329  men  threw  625  pounds  of  shot  at  a  broadside, 
the  latter  carrying  344  men  and  throwing  463 
pounds;  yet  the  result  was  indecisive.  The  French 
lost  90  and  the  British  60  men.  The  action  showed 
that  heavy  metal  was  not  of  much  use  unless  used 
well. 

To  appreciate  rightly  the  exultation  Hull's  victory 
caused  in  the  United  States,  and  the  intense  an- 
noyance it  created  in  England,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  during  the  past  twenty  years  the  Island 
Power  had  been  at  war  with  almost  every  State 
in  Europe,  at  one  time  or  another,  and  in  the  course 
of  about  two  hundred  single  conflicts  between  ships 
of  approximately  equal  force  (that  is,  where  the 
difference  was  less  than  one-half),  waged  against 
French,  Spanish,  Italian,  Turkish,  Algerine,  Rus- 
sian, Danish,  and  Dutch  antagonists,  her  ships  had 
been  beaten  and  captured  in  but  five  instances. 
Then  war  broke  out  with  America,  and  in  eight 
months  five  single-ship  actions  occurred,  in  every 
one  of  which  the  British  vessel  was  captured. 

OT  James,  vi,  391. 


136  Naval  War  of  1812 

Even  had  the  victories  been  due  solely  to  superior 
force  this  would  have  been  no  mean  triumph  for 
the  United  States. 

On  October  13,  1812,  the  American  i8-gun  ship 
sloop  Wasp,  Captain  Jacob  Jones,  with  137  men 
aboard,  sailed  from  the  Delaware  and  ran  off  south- 
east to  get  into  the  track  of  the  West  India  vessels ; 
on  the  1 6th  a  heavy  gale  began  to  blow,  causing 
the  loss  of  the  jib-boom  and  two  men  who  were  on 
it.  The  next  day  the  weather  moderated  somewhat, 
and  at  11.30  P.M.,  in  latitude  37°  N.,  longitude 
65°  W.,  several  sail  were  descried.38  These  were 
part  of  a  convoy  of  14  merchantmen  which  had 
quitted  the  bay  of  Honduras  on  September  I2th, 
bound  for  England,39  under  the  convoy  of  the  Brit- 
ish i8-gun  brig-sloop  Frolic,  of  19  guns  and  no 
men,  Captain  Thomas  Whinyates.  They  had  been 
dispersed  by  the  gale  of  the  i6th,  during  which 
the  Frolic's  main-yard  was  carried  away  and  both 
her  top-sails  torn  to  pieces;40  next  day  she  spent  in 
repairing  damages,  and  by  dark  six  of  the  missing 
ships  had  joined  her.  The  day  broke  almost  cloud- 
less on  the  1 8th  (Sunday),  showing  the  convoy, 
ahead  and  to  leeward  of  the  American  ship,  still 
some  distance  off,  as  Captain  Jones  had  not  thought 
it  prudent  to  close  during  the  night,  while  he  was 
ignorant  of  the  force  of  his  antagonists.  The  Wasp 
now  sent  down  her  top-gallant  yards,  close  reefed 

18  Capt.  Jones'  official  letter,  Nov.  24,  1812. 

89  James"  History,  vi,  158. 

40  Capt.  Whinyates'  official  letter,  Oct.  18,  1812. 


On  the  Ocean  137 

her  top-sails,  and  bore  down  under  short  fighting 
canvas;  while  the  Frolic  removed  her  main-yard 
from  the  casks,  lashed  it  on  deck,  and  then  hauled 
to  the  wind  under  her  boom  main-sail  and  close- 
reefed  foretopsail,  hoisting  Spanish  colors  to  decoy 
the  stranger  under  her  guns,  and  permit  the  convoy 
to  escape.  At  1 1.32  the  action  began — the  two  ships 
running  parallel  on  the  starboard  tack,  not  60  yards 
apart,  the  Wasp  firing  her  port,  and  the  Frolic  her 
starboard  guns.  The  latter  fired  very  rapidly,  de- 
livering three  broadsides  to  the  Wasp's  two,41  both 
crews  cheering  loudly  as  the  ships  wallowed  through 
the  water.  There  was  a  very  heavy  sea  running, 
which  caused  the  vessels  to  pitch  and  roll  heavily. 
The  Americans  fired  as  the  engaged  side  of  their 
ship  was  going  down,  aiming  at  their  opponent's 
hull;42  while  the  British  delivered  their  broadsides 
while  on  the  crests  of  the  seas,  the  shot  going  high. 
The  water  dashed  in  clouds  of  spray  over  both 
crews,  and  the  vessels  rolled  so  that  the  muzzles 
of  the  guns  went  under.43  But  in  spite  of  the  rough 
weather,  the  firing  was  not  only  spirited  but  well 
directed.  At  11.36  the  Wasp's  maintop-mast  was 
shot  away  and  fell,  with  its  yard,  across  the  port 
fore  and  foretop-sail  braces,  rendering  the  head 
yards  unmanageable;  at  11.46  the  gaff  and  miz- 
zentop-gallant  mast  came  down,  and  by  11.52  every 
brace  and  most  of  the  rigging  was  shot  away.44  It 
would  now  have  been  very  difficult  to  brace  any 

41  Cooper,  182.  4S  Niles'  Register,  iii,  p.  324. 

43  Do.  «  Capt.  Jones'  letter. 


138  Naval  War  of  1812 

of  the  yards.  But  meanwhile  the  Frolic  suffered 
dreadfully  in  her  hull  and  lower  masts,  and  had 
her  gaff  and  head  braces  shot  away.45  The  slaugh- 
ter among  her  crew  was  very  great,  but  the  survi- 
vors kept  at  their  work  with  the  dogged  courage 
of  their  race.  At  first  the  two  vessels  ran  side  by 
side,  but  the  American  gradually  forged  ahead, 
throwing  in  her  fire  from  a  position  in  which  she 
herself  received  little  injury;  by  degrees  the  ves- 
sels got  so  close  that  the  Americans  struck  the 
Frolic's  side  with  their  rammers  in  loading,46  and 
the  British  brig  was  raked  with  dreadful  effect. 
The  Frolic  then  fell  aboard  her  antagonist,  her  jib- 
boom  coming  in  between  the  main  and  mizzen-rig- 
ging  of  the  W asp  and  passing  over  the  heads  of 
Captain  Jones  and  Lieutenant  Biddle,  who  were 
standing  near  the  capstan.  This  forced  the  Wasp 
up  in  the  wind,  and  she  again  raked  her  antagonist, 
Captain  Jones  trying  to  restrain  his  men  from  board- 
ing till  he  could  put  in  another  broadside.  But  they 
could  no  longer  be  held  back,  and  Jack  Lang,  a 
New  Jersey  seaman,  leaped  on  the  Frolic's  bowsprit. 
Lieutenant  Biddle  then  mounted  on  the  hammock 
cloth  to  board,  but  his  feet  got  entangled  in  the 
rigging,  and  one  of  the  midshipmen  seizing  his 
coat-tails  to  help  himself  up,  the  lieutenant  tumbled 
back  on  the  deck.  At  the  next  swell  he  succeeded 
in  getting  on  the  bowsprit,  on  which  there  were 
already  two  seamen  whom  he  passed  on  the  fore- 
castle. But  there  was  no  one  to  oppose  him;  not 

46  Capt.  Whinyates'  letter.  «•  Capt.  Jones'  letter. 


On  the  Ocean 


twenty  Englishmen  were  left  unhurt.47  The  man 
at  the  wheel  was  still  at  his  post,  grim  and  undaunt- 
ed, and  two  or  three  more  were  on  deck,  including 
Captain  Whinyates  and  Lieutenant  Wintle,  both  so 
severely  wounded  that  they  could  not  stand  without 
support.48  There  could  be  no  more  resistance,  and 
Lieutenant  Biddle  lowered  the  flag  at  12.15 — Just 
43  minutes  after  the  beginning  of  the  fight.49  A 
minute  or  two  afterward  both  the  Frolic's  masts 


DIAGRAM 50 


WASP 


atou* 


47  Capt.  Whinyates'  letter.  48  James,  vi,  161. 

49  Capt.  Jones'  letter. 

50  It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  the  accounts  of  the  manoeuvres 
in  this  action.     James  says  "larboard"  where  Cooper  says 
"starboard";  one  says  the  Wasp  wore,  the  other  says  that 
she  could  not  do  so,  etc. 


140  Naval  War  of  1812 

went  by  the  board — the  foremast  about  fifteen  feet 
above  the  deck,  the  other  short  off.  Of  her  crew, 
as  already  said,  not  twenty  men  had  escaped  unhurt. 
Every  officer  was  wounded;  two  of  them,  the  first 
lieutenant,  Charles  McKay,  and  master,  John 
Stephens,  soon  died.  Her  total  loss  was  thus  over 
90  ;51  about  30  of  whom  were  killed  outright  or 
died  later.  The  Wasp  suffered  very  severely  in  her 
rigging  and  aloft  generally,  but  only  two  or  three 
shots  struck  her  hull ;  five  of  her  men  were  killed — 
two  in  her  mizzen-top  and  one  in  her  maintop-mast 
rigging — and  five  wounded,  chiefly  while  aloft. 

The  two  vessels  were  practically  of  equal  force. 
The  loss  of  the  Frolic's  main-yard  had  merely  con- 
verted her  into  a  brigantine,  and,  as  the  roughness 
of  the  sea  made  it  necessary  to  fight  under  very 
short  canvas,  her  inferiority  in  men  was  fully  com- 
pensated for  by  her  superiority  in  metal.  She  had 
been  desperately  defended;  no  men  could  have 
fought  more  bravely  than  Captain  Whinyates  and 
his  crew.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans  had 
done  their  work  with  a  coolness  and  skill  that  could 
not  be  surpassed;  the  contest  had  been  mainly  one 
of  gunnery,  and  had  been  decided  by  the  greatly 
superior  judgment  and  accuracy  with  which  they 
fired.  Both  officers  and  crew  had  behaved  well; 
Captain  Jones  particularly  mentions  Lieutenant 
Claxton,  who,  though  too  ill  to  be  of  any  service, 

11  Capt.  Whinyates'  official  letter  thus  states  it,  and  is,  of 
course,  to  be  taken  as  authority ;  the  Bermuda  account  makes 
it  69,  and  James  only  62. 


On  the  Ocean  141 

persisted  in  remaining  on  deck  throughout  the  en- 
gagement. 

The  W asp  was  armed  with  2  long  I2's  and  16 
32-pound  carronades ;  the  Frolic  with  2  long  6's,  16 
32-pound  carronades,  and  i  shifting  1 2-pound  car- 
ronade. 

COMPARATIVE  FORCE 

Tons     No.  Guns    Weight  Metal     Crews  Loss 

Wasp     450             9                   250                135  to 

Frolic    467            10                  274               no  90 

Vice-Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere  comments  on 
this  action  as  follows  :52 

"The  American  fire  showed  itself  to  be  as  accu- 
rate as  it  was  rapid.  On  occasions  when  the  rough- 
ness of  the  sea  would  seem  to  render  all  aim  exces- 
sively uncertain,  the  effects  of  their  artillery  were 
not  less  murderous  than  under  more  advantageous 
conditions.  The  corvette  Wasp  fought  the  brig 
Frolic  in  an  enormous  sea,  under  very  short  canvas, 
and  yet,  forty  minutes  after  the  beginning  of  the  ac- 
tion, when  the  two  vessels  came  together,  the  Amer- 
icans who  leaped  aboard  the  brig  found  on  the  deck, 
covered  with  dead  and  dying,  but  one  brave  man, 
who  had  not  left  the  wheel,  and  three  officers,  all 
wounded,  who  threw  down  their  swords  at  the  feet 
of  the  victors."  Admiral  de  la  Graviere's  criticisms 
are  especially  valuable,  because  they  are  those  of  an 
expert,  who  only  refers  to  the  War  of  1812  in  order 
to  apply  to  the  French  navy  the  lessons  which  it 
teaches,  and  who  is  perfectly  unprejudiced.  He 

M  "Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  287  (Septieme  Edition,  Paris, 

1881). 


Naval  War  of  1812 


cares  for  the  lesson  taught,  not  the  teacher,  and  is 
quite  as  willing  to  learn  from  the  defeat  of  the 
Chesapeake  as  from  the  victories  of  the  Constitution 
—  while  most  American  critics  only  pay  heed  to  the 
latter. 

The  characteristics  of  the  action  are  the  practical 
equality  of  the  contestants  in  point  of  force  and  the 
enormous  disparity  in  the  damage  each  suffered  ;  nu- 
merically, the  Wasp  was  superior  by  5  per  cent, 
and  inflicted  a  ninefold  greater  loss. 

Captain  Jones  was  not  destined  to  bring  his  prize 
into  port,  for  a  few  hours  afterward  the  Poictiers, 
a  British  74,  Captain  John  Poer  Beresford,  hove  in 
sight.  Now  appeared  the  value  of  the  Frolic's  des- 
perate defence  ;  if  she  could  not  prevent  herself  from 
being  captured,  she  had  at  least  ensured  her  own 
recapture,  and  also  the  capture  of  the  foe.  When 
the  Wasp  shook  out  her  sails  they  were  found  to 
be  cut  into  ribbons  aloft,  and  she  could  not  make  off 
with  sufficient  speed.  As  the  Poictiers  passed  the 
Frolic,  rolling  like  a  log  in  the  water,  she  threw  a 
shot  over  her,  and  soon  overtook  the  Wasp.  Both 
vessels  were  carried  into  Bermuda.  Captain  Whin- 
yates  was  again  put  in  command  of  the  Frolic.  Cap- 
tain Jones  and  his  men  were  soon  exchanged;  25,- 
ooo  dollars  prize-money  was  voted  them  by  Con- 
gress, and  the  Captain  and  Lieutenant  Biddle  were 
both  promoted,  the  former  receiving  the  captured 
ship  Macedonian.  Unluckily  the  blockade  was  too 
close  for  him  to  succeed  in  getting  out  during  the 
remainder  of  the  war. 


On  the  Ocean  143 

On  Oct.  8th  Commodore  Rodgers  left  Boston 
on  his  second  cruise,  with  the  President,  United 
States,  Congress,  and  Argus,53  leaving  the  Hornet 
in  port.  Four  days  out,  the  United  States  and  Ar- 
gus separated,  while  the  remaining  two  frigates 
continued  their  cruise  together.  The  Argus54  Cap- 
tain Sinclair,  cruised  to  the  eastward,  making  prizes 
of  6  valuable  merchantmen,  and  returned  to  port  on 
January  3d.  During  the  cruise  she  was  chased  for 
three  days  and  three  nights  (the  latter  being  moon- 
light) by  a  British  squadron,  and  was  obliged  to  cut 
away  her  boats  and  anchors  and  start  some  of  her 
water.  But  she  saved  her  guns,  and  was  so  cleverly 
handled  that  during  the  chase  she  actually  suc- 
ceeded in  taking  and  manning  a  prize,  though  the 
enemy  got  near  enough  to  open  fire  as  the  vessels 
separated.  Before  relating  what  befell  the  United 
States,  we  shall  bring  Commodore  Rodgers'  cruise 
to  an  end. 

On  Oct.  loth  the  Commodore  chased,  but  failed 
to  overtake,  the  British  frigate  Nymphe,  38,  Cap- 
tain Epworth.  On  the  i8th,  off  the  great  Bank  of 
Newfoundland,  he  captured  the  Jamaica  packet 
Swallow,  homeward  bound,  with  200,000  dollars  in 
specie  aboard.  On  the  3ist  at  9  A.M.,  lat.  33°  N., 
long.  32°  W.,  his  two  frigates  fell  in  with  the  Brit- 
ish frigate  Galatea,  36,  Captain  Woodley  Losack, 
convoying  two  South  Sea  ships,  to  windward.  The 
Galatea  ran  down  to  reconnoitre,  and  at  10  A.M., 

18  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Jan.  i,  1813. 
64  Letter  of  Capt.  Arthur  Sinclair,  Jan.  4.  1813. 


144  Naval  War  of  1812 

recognizing  her  foes,  hauled  up  on  the  starboard 
tack  to  escape.  The  American  frigates  made  all 
sail  in  chase,  and  continued  beating  to  windward, 
tacking  several  times,  for  about  three  hours.  Seeing 
that  she  was  being  overhauled,  the  Galatea  now 
edged  away  to  get  on  her  best  point  of  sailing;  at 
the  same  moment  one  of  her  convoy,  the  Argo,  bore 
up  to  cross  the  hawse  of  her  foes,  but  was  inter- 
cepted by  the  Congress,  who  lay  to  to  secure  her. 
Meanwhile  the  President  kept  after  the  Galatea; 
she  set  her  topmast,  topgallant  mast  and  lower  stud- 
ding-sails, and  when  it  was  very  dusk,  the  President 
lost  sight  of  the  chase,  and,  toward  midnight,  hauled 
to  the  wind  to  rejoin  her  consort.  The  two  frigates 
cruised  to  the  east  as  far  as  22°  W.,  and  then  ran 
down  to  17°  N. ;  but  during  the  month  of  Novenv 
ber  they  did  not  see  a  sail.  They  had  but  slightly 
better  luck  on  their  return  toward  home.  Passing 
1 20  miles  north  of  Bermuda,  and  cruising  a  little 
while  toward  the  Virginia  capes,  they  re-entered 
Boston  on  Dec.  3ist,  having  made  9  prizes,  most  of 
them  of  little  value. 

When  four  days  out,  on  Oct.  I2th,  Commodore 
Decatur  had  separated  from  the  rest  of  Rodgers' 
squadron  and  cruised  east;  on  the  25th,  in  lat.  29° 
N.,  and  long.  29°  30',  W.,  while  going  close-hauled 
on  the  port  tack,  with  the  wind  fresh  from  the 
S.  S.  E.,  a  sail  was  descried  on  the  weather  beam, 
about  12  miles  distant.65  This  was  the  British  38- 
gun  frigate  Macedonian,  Captain  John  Surnam  Car- 

M  Official  letter  of  Commodore  Decatur,  Oct.  30,  1812. 


On  the  Ocean  145 

den.  She  was  not,  like  the  Guerriere,  an  old  ship 
captured  from  the  French,  but  newly  built  of  oak, 
and  larger  than  any  American  i8-pounder  frigate; 
she  was  reputed  (very  wrongfully)  to  be  a  "crack 
ship."  According  to  Lieut.  David  Hope,  "the  state 
of  discipline  on  board  was  excellent;  in  no  British 
ship  was  more  attention  paid  to  gunnery.  Before 
this  cruise  the  ship  had  been  engaged  almost  every 
day  with  the  enemy;  and  in  time  of  peace  the  crew 
were  constantly  exercised  at  the  great  guns." 56 
How  they  could  have  practiced  so  much  and  learned 
so  little  is  certainly  marvelous. 

The  Macedonian  set  her  foretopmast  and  top- 
gallant studding-sails  and  bore  away  in  chase,57 
edging  down  with  the  wind  a  little  aft  the  star- 
board beam.  Her  first  lieutenant  wished  to  con- 
tinue on  this  course  and  pass  down  ahead  of  the 
United  States,58  but  Captain  Garden's  over-anxiety 
to  keep  the  weather-gage  lost  him  this  opportunity 
of  closing.59  Accordingly  he  hauled  by  the  wind 
and  passed  way  to  windward  of  the  American.  As 
Commodore  Decatur  got  within  range,  he  eased  off 
and  fired  a  broadside,  most  of  which  fell  short;60 
he  then  kept  his  luff,  and,  the  next  time  he  fired, 
his  long  24*8  told  heavily,  while  he  received  very 
little  injury  himself.61  The  fire  from  his  main-deck 

56  Marshall's  "Naval  Biography,"  vol.  iv,  p.  1018. 
"  Capt.  Carden  to  Mr.  Croker,  Oct.  28,  1812. 
68  James,  vi,  166. 

59  Sentence  of  Court-martial  held  on  the  San  Domingo,  74, 
at  the  Bermudas,  May  27,  1812. 

60  Marshall,  iv,  1080.  "  Cooper,  ii,  178. 

VOL.  IX.— 7 


146  Naval  War  of  1812 

(for  he  did  not  use  his  carronades  at  all  for  the  first 
half-hour)82  was  so  very  rapid  that  it  seemed  as 
if  the  ship  was  on  fire ;  his  broadsides  were  delivered 
with  almost  twice  the  rapidity  of  those  of  the  En- 
glishman.63 The  latter  soon  found  he  could  not  play 
at  long  bowls  with  any  chance  of  success ;  and,  hav- 
ing already  erred  either  from  timidity  or  bad  judg- 
ment, Captain  Garden  decided  to  add  rashness  to  the 
catalogue  of  his  virtues.  Accordingly  he  bore  up, 
and  came  down  end  on  toward  his  adversary,  with 
the  wind  on  his  port  quarter.  The  States  now 
(10.15)  laid  her  maintopsail  aback,  and  made  heavy 
play  with  her  long  guns,  and,  as  her  adversary  came 
nearer,  with  her  carronades  also.  The  British  ship 
would  reply  with  her  starboard  guns,  hauling  up  to 
do  so;  as  she  came  down,  the  American  would  ease 
off,  run  a  little  way  and  again  come  to,  keeping 
up  a  terrific  fire.  As  the  Mecedonian  bore  down  to 
close,  the  chocks  of  all  her  forecastle  guns  (which 
were  mounted  on  the  outside)  were  cut  away  ;64  her 
fire  caused  some  damage  to  the  American's  rig- 
ging, but  hardly  touched  her  hull,  while  she  herself 
suffered  so  heavily  both  alow  and  aloft  that  she 
gradually  dropped  to  leeward,  while  the  American 
forereached  on  her.  Finding  herself  ahead  and  to 
windward,  the  States  tacked  and  ranged  up  under 
her  adversary's  lee,  when  the  latter  struck  her  col- 
ors at  11.15,  just  an  hour  and  a  half  after  the  begin- 
ning of  the  action.65 

69  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur.  **  James,  vi,  169. 

M  Letter  of  Captain  Garden. 
45  Letter  of  Com  modore  Decatur. 


On  the  Ocean 


148  Naval  War  of  1812 

The  United  States  had  suffered  surprisingly  little ; 
what  damage  had  been  done  was  aloft.  Her  miz- 
zen  topgallant  mast  was  cut  away,  some  of  the  spars 
were  wounded,  and  the  rigging  a  good  deal  cut ;  the 
hull  was  only  struck  two  or  three  times.  The  ships 
were  never  close  enough  to  be  within  fair  range  of 
grape  and  musketry,66  and  the  wounds  were  mostly 
inflicted  by  round  shot  and  were  thus  apt  to  be 
fatal.  Hence  the  loss  of  the  Americans  amounted 
to  Lieutenant  John  Messer  Funk  (5th  of  the  ship) 
and  six  seamen  killed  or  mortally  wounded,  and  only 
five  severely  and  slightly  wounded. 

The  Macedonian,  on  the  other  hand,  had  received 
over  a  hundred  shot  in  her  hull,  several  between 
wind  and  water;  her  mizzenmast  had  gone  by  the 
board;  her  fore  and  maintopmasts  had  been  shot 
away  by  the  caps,  and  her  mainyard  in  the  slings; 
almost  all  her  rigging  was  cut  away  (only  the  fore- 
sail being  left) ;  on  the  engaged  side  all  of  her  car- 
ronades  but  two,  and  two  of  her  maindeck  guns, 
were  dismounted.  Of  her  crew  43  were  killed  and 
mortally  wounded,  and  61  (including  her  first  and 
third  lieutenants)  severely  and  slightly  wounded.67 
Among  her  crew  were  eight  Americans  (as  shown 
by  her  muster-roll) ;  these  a'sked  permission  to  go 
below  before  the  battle,  but  it  was  refused  by  Cap- 
tain Garden,  and  three  were  killed  during  the  ac- 
tion. James  says  that  they  were  allowed  to  go  be- 
low, but  this  is  untrue;  for  if  they  had  the  three 

"  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur. 
•'  Letter  of  Captain  Carden. 


On  the  Ocean  149 

would  not  have  been  slain.  The  others  testified  that 
they  had  been  forced  to  fight,  and  they  afterward 
entered  the  American  service — the  only  ones  of  the 
Macedonian's  crew  who  did,  or  who  were  asked  to. 
The  Macedonian  had  her  full  complement  of  301 
men ;  the  States  had,  by  her  muster-roll  of  October 
20th,  428  officers,  petty  officers,  seamen,  and  boys, 
and  50  officers  and  privates  of  marines,  a  total  of 
478  (instead  of  509  as  Marshall  in  his  "Naval  Bi- 
ography" makes  it). 

COMPARATIVE   FORCE 


Broadside 
Size          Guns 

Weight 
Metal          Men           Loss 

United  States        1576            27 
Macedonian          1325            25 

786            478              12 
547            30i             104 

Comparative 
Force 

Comparative  Loss 
Inflicted 

States                         100 

IOO 

Macedonian                66 

ii 

That  is,  the  relative  force  being  about  as  three 
is  to  two,68  the  damage  done  was  as  nine  to  one ! 

*8  I  have  considered  the  United  States  as  mounting  her 
full  allowance  of  54  guns;  but  it  is  impossible  that  she  had 
no  more  than  49.  In  Decatur's  letter  of  challenge  of  Jan.  17, 
1814  (which  challenge,  by  the  way,  was  a  most  blustering 
affair,  reflecting  credit  neither  on  Decatur,  nor  his  opponent, 
Captain  Hope,  nor  on  any  one  else  excepting  Captain  Stack- 
pole  of  H.  M.  S.  Stattra),  she  is  said  to  have  had  that  num- 
ber; her  broadside  would  then  be  15  long  24*5  below,  i  long 
24,  i  12-pound,  and  8  42-pound,  carronades  above.  Her  real 
broadside  weight  of  metal  would  thus  be  about  680  Ibs.,  and 
she  would  be  superior  to  the  Macedonian  in  the  proportion 
of  5  to  4.  But  it  is  possible  that  Decatur  had  landed  some  of 
his  guns  in  1813,  as  James  asserts;  and  though  I  am  not  at  all 
sure  of  this,  I  have  thought  it  best  to  be  on  the  safe  side  in 
describing  his  force. 


150  Naval  War  of  1812 

Of  course,  it  would  have  been  almost  impossible 
for  the  Macedonian  to  conquer  with  one-third  less 
force;  but  the  disparity  was  by  no  means  sufficient 
to  account  for  the  ninefold  greater  loss  suffered,  and 
the  ease  and  impunity  with  which  the  victory  was 
won.  The  British  sailors  fought  with  their  accus- 
tomed courage,  but  their  gunnery  was  exceedingly 
poor;  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  though  the 
ship  was  bravely  fought,  still  the  defence  was  by 
no  means  so  desperate  as  that  made  by  the  Essex 
or  even  the  Chesapeake,  as  witnessed  by  their  re- 
spective losses.  The  Macedonian,  moreover,  was 
surrendered  when  she  had  suffered  less  damage 
than  either  the  Guerriere  or  Java.  The  chief  cause 
of  her  loss  lay  in  the  fact  that  Captain  Garden  was 
a  poor  commander.  The  gunnery  of  the  Java,  Guer- 
riere, and  Macedonian  was  equally  bad;  but  while 
Captain  Lambert  proved  himself  to  be  as  able  as  he 
was  gallant,  and  Captain  Dacres  did  nearly  as  well, 
Captain  Garden,  on  the  other  hand,  was  first  too 
timid,  and  then  too  rash,  and  showed  bad  judgment 
at  all  times.  By  continuing  his  original  course  he 
could  have  closed  at  once ;  but  he  lost  his  chance  by 
over-anxiety  to  keep  the  weather-gage,  and  was  cen- 
sured by  the  court-martial  accordingly.  Then  he 
tried  to  remedy  one  error  by  another,  and  made  a 
foolishly  rash  approach.  A  very  able  and  fair- 
minded  English  writer  says  of  this  action:  "As  a 
display  of  courage  the  character  of  the  service  was 
nobly  upheld,  but  we  would  be  deceiving  ourselves 
were  we  to  admit  that  the  comparative  expertness 


On  the  Ocean  151 

of  the  crews  in  gunnery  was  equally  satisfactory. 
Now,  taking  the  difference  of  effect  as  given  by  Cap- 
tain Garden,  we  must  draw  this  conclusion — that  the 
comparative  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  (104  to  12), 
together  with  the  dreadful  account  he  gives  of  the 
condition  of  his  own  ship,  while  he  admits  that  the 
enemy's  vessel  was  in  comparatively  good  order, 
must  have  arisen  from  inferiority  in  gunnery  as 
well  as  in  force."  69 

On  the  other  hand,  the  American  crew,  even  ac- 
cording to  James,  were  as  fine  a  set  of  men  as  ever 
were  seen  on  shipboard.  Though  not  one-fourth 
were  British  by  birth,  yet  many  of  them  had  served 
on  board  British  ships  of  war,  in  some  cases  volun- 
tarily, but  much  more  often  because  they  were  im- 
pressed. They  had  been  trained  at  the  guns  with 
the  greatest  care  by  Lieutenant  Allen.  And  finally 
Commodore  Decatur  handled  his  ship  with  abso- 
lute faultlessness.  To  sum  up:  a  brave  and  skilful 
crew,  ably  commanded,  was  matched  against  an 
equally  brave  but  unskilful  one,  with  an  incompetent 
leader;  and  this  accounts  for  the  disparity  of  loss 
being  so  much  greater  than  the  disparity  in  force. 

At  the  outset  of  this  battle  the  position  of  the 
parties  was  just  the  reverse  of  that  in  the  case  of  the 
Constitution  and  Guerriere;  the  Englishman  had  the 
advantage  of  the  wind,  but  he  used  it  in  a  very  dif- 
ferent manner  from  that  in  which  Captain  Hull  had 
done.  The  latter  at  once  ran  down  to  close,  but 
manoeuvred  so  cautiously  that  no  damage  could  be 

69  Lord  Howard  Douglas,  "Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  515. 


152  Naval  War  of  1812 

done  him  till  he  was  within  pistol  shot.  Captain 
Garden  did  not  try  to  close  till  after  fatal  indecision, 
and  then  made  the  attempt  so  heedlessly  that  he  was 
cut  to  pieces  before  he  got  to  close  quarters.  Com- 
modore Decatur,  also,  manoeuvred  more  skilfully 
than  Captain  Dacres,  although  the  difference  was 
less  marked  between  these  two.  The  combat  was  a 
plain  cannonade;  the  States  derived  no  advantage 
from  the  superior  number  of  her  men,  for  they  were 
not  needed.  The  marines  in  particular  had  nothing 
whatever  to  do,  while  they  had  been  of  the  greatest 
service  against  the  Guerriere.  The  advantage  was 
simply  in  metal,  as  10  is  to  7.  Lord  Howard  Doug- 
las'  criticisms  on  these  actions  seem  to  me  only 
applicable  in  part.  He  says  (p.  524)  :  "The  Ameri- 
cans would  neither  approach  nor  permit  us  to  join 
in  close  battle  until  they  had  gained  some  extraordi- 
nary advantage  from  the  superior  faculties  of  their 
long  guns  in  distant  cannonade,  and  from  the  in- 
trepid, uncircumspect,  and  often  very  exposed  ap- 
proach of  assailants  who  had  long  been  accustomed 
to  contemn  all  manoeuvring.  Our  vessels  were 
crippled  in  distant  cannonade  from  encountering 
rashly  the  serious  disadvantage  of  making  direct 
attacks;  the  uncircumspect  gallantry  of  our  com- 
manders led  our  ships  unguardedly  into  the  snares 
which  wary  caution  had  spread." 

These  criticisms  are  very  just  as  regards  the 
Macedonian,  and  I  fully  agree  with  them  (possibly 
reserving  the  right  to  doubt  Captain  Garden's  gal- 
lantry, though  readily  admitting  his  uncircumspec- 


On  the  Ocean  153 

tion) .  But  the  case  of  the  Guerriere  differed  widely. 
There  the  American  ship  made  the  attack,  while  the 
British  at  first  avoided  close  combat;  and,  so  far 
from  trying  to  cripple  her  adversary  by  a  distant 
cannonade,  the  Constitution  hardly  fired  a  dozen 
times  until  within  pistol  shot.  This  last  point  is 
worth  mentioning,  because  in  a  work  on  "Heavy 
Ordnance,"  by  Captain  T.  F.  Simmons,  R.A.  (Lon- 
don, 1837),  it  is  stated  that  the  Guerriere  received 
her  injuries  before  the  closing,  mentioning  especially 
the  "thirty  shot  below  the  water-line";  whereas,  by 
the  official  accounts  of  both  commanders,  the  re- 
verse was  the  case.  Captain  Hull,  in  his  letter,  and 
Lieutenant  Morris  (in  his  autobiography)  say  they 
only  fired  a  few  guns  before  closing;  and  Captain 
Dacres,  in  his  letter,  and  Captain  Brenton,  in  his 
"History,"  say  that  not  much  injury  was  received 
by  the  Guerriere  until  about  the  time  the  mizzen- 
mast  fell,  which  was  three  or  four  minutes  after 
close  action  began. 

Lieutenant  Allen  was  put  aboard  the  Macedonian 
as  prize-master;  he  secured  the  fore  and  mainmasts 
and  rigged  a  jury  mizzenmast,  converting  the  vessel 
into  a  bark.  Commodore  Decatur  discontinued  his 
cruise  to  convoy  his  prize  back  to  America;  they 
reached  New  London  Dec.  4th.  Had  it  not  been  for 
the  necessity  of  convoying  the  Macedonian,  the 
States  would  have  continued  her  cruise,  for  the  dam- 
age she  suffered  was  of  the  most  trifling  character. 

Captain  Carden  stated  (in  Marshall's  "Naval 
Biography")  that  the  States  measured  1,670  tons, 


154  Naval  War  of  1812 

was  manned  by  509  men,  suffered  so  from  shot  un- 
der water  that  she  had  to  be  pumped  out  every  watch 
and  that  two  eighteen-pound  shot  passed  in  a  hori- 
zontal line  through  her  mainmast;  all  of  which 
statements  were  highly  creditable  to  the  vividness 
of  his  imagination.  The  States  measured  but  1,576 
tons  (and  by  English  measurement  very  much  less), 
had  478  men  aboard,  had  not  been  touched  by  a 
shot  under  water-line  and  her  lower  masts  were 
unwounded.  James  states  that  most  of  her  crew 
were  British,  which  assertion  I  have  already  dis- 
cussed; and  that  she  had  but  one  boy  aboard,  and 
that  he  was  seventeen  years  old, — in  which  case  29 
others,  some  of  whom  (as  we  learn  from  the  "Life 
of  Decatur")  were  only  twelve,  must  have  grown 
with  truly  startling  rapidity  during  the  hour  and  a 
half  that  the  combat  lasted. 

During  the  twenty  years  preceding  1812,  there 
had  been  almost  incessant  warfare  on  the  ocean, 
and  although  there  had  been  innumerable  single  con- 
flicts between  French  and  English  frigates,  there  had 
been  but  one  case  in  which  the  French  frigate,  sin- 
gle-handed, was  victorious.  This  was  in  the  year 
1805,  when  the  Milan  captured  the  Cleopatra.  Ac- 
cording to  Troude,  the  former  threw  at  a  broadside 
574  pounds  (actual),  the  latter  but  334;  and  the 
former  lost  35  men  out  of  her  crew  of  350;  the  lat- 
ter 58  out  of  200.  Or,  the  forces  being  as  100  to  58, 
the  loss  inflicted  was  as  100  to  60 ;  while  the  States? 
force  compared  to  the  Macedonian's  being  as  100  to 
66,  the  loss  she  inflicted  was  as  100  to  n. 


On  the  Ocean  155 

British  ships,  moreover,  had  often  conquered 
against  odds  as  great;  as,  for  instance,  when  the 
Sea  Horse  captured  the  great  Turkish  frigate  Ba- 
dere-Zaffer;  when  the  Astrea  captured  the  French 
frigate  Gloire,  which  threw  at  a  broadside  286 
pounds  of  shot,  while  she  threw  but  174;  and  when, 
most  glorious  of  all,  Lord  Dundonald,  in  the  gal- 
lant little  Speedy,  actually  captured  the  Spanish 
xebec  Gamo,  of  over  five  times  her  own  force !  Sim- 
ilarly, the  corvette  Comus  captured  the  Danish  frig- 
ate Fredrickscoarn,  the  brig  Onyx  captured  the 
Dutch  sloop  Manly,  the  little  cutter  Thorn  captured 
the  French  Courier-National,  and  the  Pasley  the 
Spanish  Virgin;  while  there  had  been  many  in- 
stances of  drawn  battles  between  English  1 2-pound 
frigates  and  French  or  Spanish  i8-pounders. 

Captain  Hull  having  resigned  the  command  of 
the  Constitution  she  was  given  to  Captain  Bain- 
bridge,  of  the  Constellation,  who  was  also  entrusted 
with  the  command  of  the  Essex:  and  Hornet.  The 
latter  ship  was  in  the  port  of  Boston  with  the  Con- 
stitution, under  the  command  of  Captain  Lawrence. 
The  Essex  was  in  the  Delaware,  and  accordingly 
orders  were  sent  to  Captain  Porter  to  rendezvous  at 
the  island  of  San  Jago;  if  that  failed  several  other 
places  were  appointed,  and  if,  after  a  certain  time, 
he  did  not  fall  in  with  his  commodore  he  was  to  act 
at  his  own  discretion. 

On  October  26th  the  Constitution  and  Hornet 
sailed,  touched  at  the  different  rendezvouses,  and 
on  December  i3th  arrived  off  San  Salvador,  where 


156  Naval  War  of  1812 

Captain  Lawrence  found  the  Bonne  Citoyenne,  18, 
Captain  Pitt  Barnaby  Greene.  The  Bonne  Cito- 
yenne was  armed  with  18  32-pound  carronades  and 
2  long  nines,  and  her  crew  of  150  men  was  exactly 
equal  in  number  to  that  of  the  Hornet;  the  latter's 
short  weight  in  metal  made  her  antagonist  supe- 
rior to  her  in  about  the  same  proportion  that  she 
herself  was  subsequently  superior  to  the  Penguin, 
or,  in  other  words,  the  ships  were  practically  equal. 
Captain  Lawrence  now  challenged  Captain  Greene 
to  single  fight,  giving  the  usual  pledges  that  the 
Constitution  should  not  interfere.  The  challenge 
was  not  accepted  for  a  variety  of  reasons;  among 
others  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  was  carrying  home  half 
a  million  pounds  in  specie  70  Leaving  the  Hornet 

10  Brenton  and  James  both  deny  that  Captain  Greene  was 
blockaded  by  the  Hornet,  and  claim  that  he  feared  the  Con- 
stitution. James  says  (p.  275)  that  the  occurrence  was  one 
which  "the  characteristic  cunning  of  Americans  turned 
greatly  to  their  advantage";  and  adds  that  Lawrence  only 
sent  the  challenge  because  "it  could  not  be  accepted,"  and 
so  he  would  "suffer  no  personal  risk."  He  states  that  the 
reason  it  was  sent,  as  well  as  the  reason  that  it  was  refused, 
was  because  the  Constitution  was  going  to  remain  in  the 
offing  and  capture  the  British  ship  if  she  proved  conqueror. 
It  is  somewhat  surprising  that  even  James  should  have  had 
the  temerity  to  advance  such  arguments.  According  to  his 
own  account  (p.  277)  the  Constitution  left  for  Boston  on  Jan. 
6th,  and  the  Hornet  remained  blockading  the  Bonne'Citoyenne 
till  the  24th,  when  the  Montagu,  74,  arrived.  During  these 
eighteen  days  there  could  have  been  no  possible  chance  of 
the  Constitution  or  any  other  ship  interfering,  and  it  is  ridic- 
ulous to  suppose  that  any  such  fear  kept  Captain  Greene 
from  sailing  out  to  attack  his  foe.  No  doubt  Captain  Greene's 
course  was  perfectly  justifiable,  but  it  is  curious  that  with  all 


On  the  Ocean  157 

to  blockade  her,  Commodore  Bainbridge  ran  off  to 
the  southward,  keeping  the  land  in  view. 

At  9  A.M.,  Dec.  29,  1812,  while  the  Constitution 
was  running  along  the  coast  of  Brazil,  about  thirty 
miles  off  shore  in  latitude  13°  6'  S.,  and  longitude 
31°  W.,  two  strange  sail  were  made,71  inshore  and 
to  windward.  These  were  H.  B.  M.  frigate  Java, 
Captain  Lambert,  forty-eight  days  out  of  Spithead, 
England,  with  the  captured  ship  William  in  com- 
pany. Directing  the  latter  to  make  for  San  Salva- 
dor, the  Java  bore  down  in  chase  of  the  Constitu- 
tion.™ The  wind  was  blowing  light  from  the 
N.N.E.,  and  there  was  very  little  sea  on.  At  10  the 
Java  made  the  private  signals,  English,  Spanish,  and 
Portuguese  in  succession,  none  being  answered; 
meanwhile  the  Constitution  was  standing  up  toward 
the  Java  on  the  starboard  tack;  a  little  after  n 
she  hoisted  her  private  signal,  and  then,  being  satis- 
fied that  the  strange  sail  was  an  enemy,  she  wore 
and  stood  off  toward  the  S.E.,  to  draw  her  antago- 
nist away  from  the  land,73  which  was  plainly  visible. 
The  Java  hauled  up,  and  made  sail  in  a  parallel 
course,  the  Constitution  bearing  about  three  points 

the  assertions  made  by  James  as  to  the  cowardice  of  the  Ameri- 
cans, this  is  the  only  instance  throughout  the  war  in  which  a 
ship  of  either  party  declined  a  contest  with  an  antagonist 
of  equal  force  (the  cases  of  Commodore  Rodgers  and  Sir 
George  Collier  being  evidently  due  simply  to  an  overestimate 
of  the  opposing  ships). 

11  Official  letter  of  Commodore  Bainbridge,  Jan.  3,  1813. 

11  Official  letter  of  Lieutenant  Chads,  Dec.  31,  1812. 

13  Log  of  the  Constitution. 


158  Naval  War  of  1812 

on  her  lee  bow.     The  Java  gained  rapidly,  being 
much  the  swifter. 

At  1.30  the  Constitution  luffed  up,  shortened  her 
canvas  to  topsails,  topgallant  sails,  jib,  and  spanker, 
and  ran  easily  off  on  the  port  tack,  heading  toward 
the  southeast;  she  carried  her  commodore's  pendant 
at  the  main,  national  ensigns  at  the  mizzen-peak 
and  main  topgallant  masthead,  and  a  Jack  at  the 
fore.  The  Java  also  had  taken  in  the  mainsail  and 
royals,  and  came  down  in  a  lasking  course  on  her 
adversary's  weather-quarter,74  hoisting  her  ensign 
at  the  mizzen-peak,  a  union  Jack  at  the  mizzen  top- 
gallant masthead,  and  another  lashed  to  the  main- 
rigging"-  At  2  P.M.,  the  Constittttion  fired  a  shot 
ahead  of  her,  following  it  quickly  by  a  broadside,75 
and  the  two  ships  began  at  long  bowls,  the  English 
firing  the  lee  or  starboard  battery  while  the  Amer- 
icans replied  with  their  port  guns.  The  cannonade 
was  very  spirited  on  both  sides,  the  ships  suffering 
about  equally.  The  first  broadside  of  the  Java  was 
very  destructive,  killing  and  wounding  several  of 
the  Constitution's  crew.  The  Java  kept  edging 
down,  and  the  action  continued,  with  grape  and 
musketry  in  addition;  the  swifter  British  ship  soon 
fore-reached  and  kept  away,  intending  to  wear 
across  her  slower  antagonist's  bow  and  rake  her; 
but  the  latter  wore  in  the  smoke,  and  the  two  com- 
batants ran  off  to  the  westward,  the  Englishman 

14  Lieutenant  Chads'  Address  to  the  Court-martial,  April 
23,  1813. 
11  Commodore  Bainbridge's  letter. 


On  the  Ocean  159 

still  a-weather  and  steering  freer  than  the  Consti- 
tution, which  had  luffed  to  close.76  The  action 
went  on  at  pistol-shot  distance.  In  a  few  minutes, 
however,  the  Java  again  forged  ahead,  out  of  the 
weight  of  her  adversary's  fire,  and  then  kept  off,  as 
before,  to  cross  her  bows;  and,  as  before,  the  Con- 
stitution avoided  this  by  wearing,  both  ships  again 
coming  round  with  their  heads  to  the  east,  the 
American  still  to  leeward.  The  Java  kept  the 
weather-gage  tenaciously,  fore-reaching  a  little,  and 
whenever  the  Constitution  luffed  up  to  close,77  the 
former  tried  to  rake  her.  But  her  gunnery  was  now 
poor,  little  damage  being  done  by  it;  most  of  the 
loss  the  Americans  suffered  was  early  in  the  action. 
By  setting  her  foresail  and  mainsail  the  Constitu- 
tion got  up  close  on  the  enemy's  lee  beam,  her  fire 
being  very  heavy  and  carrying  away  the  end  of  the 
Java's  bowsprit  and  her  jibboom.78  The  Constitu- 
tion forged  ahead  and  repeated  her  former  manoeu- 
vre, wearing  in  the  smoke.  The  Java  at  once  hove 
in  stays,  but  owing  to  the  loss  of  headsail  fell  off 
very  slowly,  and  the  American  frigate  poured  a 
heavy  raking  broadside  into  her  stern,  at  about  two 
cables'  length  distance.  The  Java  replied  with  her 
port  guns  as  she  fell  off.79  Both  vessels  then  bore 
up  and  ran  off  free,  with  the  wind  on  the  port  quar- 
ter, the  Java  being  abreast  and  to  windward  of  her 
antagonist,  both  with  their  heads  a  little  east  of 
south.  The  ships  were  less  than  a  cable's  length 

16  Log  of  the  Constitution,  "  Do. 

78  Lieutenant  Chads'  letter.  M  Lieut.  Chads'  letter. 


160  Naval  War  of  1812 

apart,  and  the  Constitution  inflicted  great  damage 
while  suffering  very  little  herself.  The  British  lost 
many  men  by  the  musketry  of  the  American  topmen, 
and  suffered  still  more  from  the  round  and  grape, 
especially  on  the  forecastle,80  many  marked  instances 
of  valor  being  shown  on  both  sides.  The  Java's 
masts  were  wounded  and  her  rigging  cut  to  pieces, 
and  Captain  Lambert  then  ordered  her  to  be  laid 
aboard  the  enemy,  who  was  on  her  lee  beam.  The 
helm  was  put  a-weather,  and  the  Java  came  down 
for  the  Constitution's  main-chains.  The  boarders 
and  marines  gathered  in  the  gangways  and  on  the 
forecastle,  the  boatswain  having  been  ordered  to 
cheer  them  up  with  his  pipe  that  they  might  make  a 
clean  spring.81  The  Americans,  however,  raked  the 
British  with  terrible  effect,  cutting  off  their  main 
topmast  above  the  cap,  and  their  foremast  near  the 
cat  harpings.82  The  stump  of  the  Java's  bowsprit 
got  caught  in  the  Constitution's  mizzen-rigging,  and 
before  it  got  clear  the  British  suffered  still  more. 
Finally  the  ships  separated,  the  Java's  bowsprit 
passing  over  the  taffrail  of  the  Constitution;  the  lat- 
ter at  once  kept  away  to  avoid  being  raked.  The 
ships  again  got  nearly  abreast,  but  the  Constitution, 
in  her  turn,  fore-reached;  whereupon  Commodore 
Bainbridge  wore,  passed  his  antagonist,  luffed  up 
under  his  quarter,  raked  him  with  the  starboard 

80  Testimony  of   Christopher   Speedy,   in  minutes  of  the 
Court-martial  on  board  H.  M.  S.  Gladiator,  at  Portsmouth, 
April  23,  1813. 

81  Testimony  of  James  Humble,  in  do.,  do. 
M  Log  of  Constitution. 


On  the  Ocean  161 

guns,  then  wore,  and  recommenced  the  action  with 
his  port  broadside  at  about  3.10.  Again  the  ves- 
sels were  abreast,  and  the  action  went  on  as  fu- 
riously as  ever.  The  wreck  of  the  top  hamper  on  the 
Java  lay  over  her  starboard  side,  so  that  every  dis- 
charge of  her  guns  set  her  on  fire,83  and  in  a  few 
minutes  her  able  and  gallant  commander  was  mor- 
tally wounded  by  a  ball  fired  by  one  of  the  American 
maintopmen.84  The  command  then  devolved  on  the 
first  lieutenant,  Chads,  himself  painfully  wounded. 
The  slaughter  had  been  terrible,  yet  the  British 
fought  on  with  stubborn  resolution,  cheering  lustily. 
But  success  was  now  hopeless,  for  nothing  could 
stand  against  the  cool  precision  of  the  Yankee  fire. 
The  stump  of  the  Java's  foremast  was  carried  away 
by  a  double-headed  shot,  the  mizzenmast  fell,  the 
gaff  and  spanker  boom  were  shot  away,  also  the 
main-yard,  and  finally  the  ensign  was  cut  down  by 
a  shot,  and  all  her  guns  absolutely  silenced ;  when  at 
4.05  the  Constitution,  thinking  her  adversary  had 
struck,85  ceased  firing,  hauled  aboard  her  tacks,  and 
passed  across  her  adversary's  bows  to  windward, 
with  her  topsails,  jib,  and  spanker  set.  A  few 
minutes  afterward  the  Java's  mainmast  fell,  leaving 
her  a  sheer  hulk.  The  Constitution  assumed  a 
weatherly  position,  and  spent  an  hour  in  repairing 
damages  and  securing  her  masts ;  then  she  wore  and 
stood  toward  her  enemy,  whose  flag  was  again  fly- 

83  Lieut.  Chads'  Address. 

84  Surgeon  J.  C.  Jones'  Report. 

85  Log  of  the  Constitution  (as  given  in  Bainbridge's  letter). 


1 62  Naval  War  of  1812 

ing,  but  only  for  bravado,  for  as  soon  as  the  Con- 
stitution stood  across  her  forefoot  she  struck.  At 
5.25  she  was  taken  possession  of  by  Lieutenant  Par- 
ker, ist  of  the  Constitution,  in  one  of  the  latter's 
only  two  remaining  boats. 

The  American  ship  had  suffered  comparatively 
little.  But  a  few  round  shot  had  struck  her  hull, 
one  of  which  carried  away  the.  wheel;  one  18- 
pounder  went  through  the  mizzenmast ;  the  foremast, 
maintopmast,  and  a  few  other  spars  were  slightly 
wounded,  and  the  running  rigging  and  shrouds  were 
a  good  deal  cut;  but  in  an  hour  she  was  again  in 
good  fighting  trim.  Her  loss  amounted  to  8  sea- 
men and  i  marine  killed ;  the  5th  lieutenant,  John 
C.  Aylwin,  and  2  seamen,  mortally,  Commodore 
Bainbridge  and  12  seamen,  severely,  and  7  seamen 
and  2  marines,  slightly  wounded;  in  all  12  killed  and 
mortally  wounded,  and  22  wounded  severely  and 
slightly.88 

"The  Java  sustained  unequally  injuries  beyond 
the  Constitution,"  says  the  British  account.87  These 
have  already  been  given  in  detail ;  she  was  a  riddled 
and  entirely  dismasted  hulk.  Her  loss  (for  discus- 
sion of  which  see  further  on)  was  48  killed  (in- 
cluding Captain  Henry  Lambert,  who  died  soon 
after  the  close  of  the  action,  and  five  midshipmen), 
and  1 02  wounded,  among  them  Lieutenant  Henry 
Ducie  Chads,  Lieutenant  of  Marines  David  Davies, 
Commander  John  Marshall,  Lieutenant  James  Saun- 

w  Report  of  Surgeon  Amos  A.  Evans. 
87  "Naval  Chronicle,"  xxix,  452. 


On  the  Lakes  163 

ders,  the  boatswain,  James  Humble,  master,  Batty 
Robinson,  and  four  midshipmen. 

In  this  action  both  ships  displayed  equal  gallantry 
and  seamanship.  "The  Java,"  says  Commodore 
Bainbridge,  "was  exceedingly  well  handled  and 
bravely  fought.  Poor  Captain  Lambert  was  a  dis- 
tinguished and  gallant  officer,  and  a  most  worthy 
man,  whose  death  I  sincerely  regret."  The  manoeu- 
vring on  both  sides  was  excellent;  Captain  Lam- 
bert used  the  advantage  which  his  ship  possessed  in 
her  superior  speed  most  skilfully,  always  endeav- 
oring to  run  across  his  adversary's  bows  and  rake 
him  when  he  had  fore-reached,  and  it  was  only  owing 
to  the  equal  skill  which  his  antagonist  displayed  that 
he  was  foiled,  the  length  of  the  combat  being  due 
to  the  number  of  evolutions.  The  great  superiority 
of  the  Americans  was  in  their  gunnery.  The  fire 
of  the  Java  was  both  less  rapid  and  less  well-directed 
than  that  of  her  antagonist;  the  difference  of  force 
against  her  was  not  heavy,  being  about  as  ten  is  to 
nine,  and  was  by  no  means  enough  to  account  for 
the  almost  fivefold  greater  loss  she  suffered. 

On  next  page  is  a  diagram  of  the  battle.  It 
differs  from  both  of  the  official  accounts,  as  these 
conflict  greatly  both  as  to  time  and  as  regards  some 
of  the  evolutions.  I  generally  take  the  mean  in  cases 
of  difference ;  for  example,  Commodore  Bainbridge's 
report  makes  the  fight  endure  but  i  hour  and  55 
minutes,  Lieutenant  Chads'  2  hours  and  25  minutes ; 
I  have  made  it  2  hours  and  10  minutes,  etc.,  etc. 

The  tonnage  and  weight  of  metal  of  the  comba- 


164 


Naval  War  of  1812 


On  the  Ocean  165 

tants  have  already  been  stated ;  I  will  give  the  com- 
plements shortly.    The  following  is  the 

COMPARATIVE   FORCE  AND   LOSS 

Tons       Weight  Metal  No.  Men  Loss 

Constitution      1576               654               475  34 

Java                    1340               576               426  150 

Relative  Relative  Loss 

Force  Inflicted 

Constitution  100  100 

Java  89  23 

In  hardly  another  action  of  the  war  do  the  ac- 
counts of  the  respective  forces  differ  so  widely; 
the  official  British  letter  makes  their  total  of  men  at 
the  beginning  of  the  action  377,  of  whom  Commo- 
dore Bainbridge  officially  reports  that  he  paroled 
378!  The  British  state  their  loss  in  killed  and  mor- 
tally wounded  at  24;  Commodore  Bainbridge  reports 
that  the  dead  alone  amounted  to  nearly  60!  Usu- 
ally I  have  taken  each  commander's  account  of  his 
own  force  and  loss,  and  I  should  do  so  now  if  it 
were  not  that  the  British  accounts  differ  among 
themselves,  and  whenever  they  relate  to  the  Ameri- 
cans are  flatly  contradicted  by  the  affidavits  of  the 
latter's  officers.  The  British  first  handicap  them- 
selves by  the  statement  that  the  surgeon  of  the  Con- 
stitution was  an  Irishman  and  lately  an  assistant 
surgeon  in  the  British  navy  ("Naval  Chronicle," 
xxix,  452)  ;  which  draws  from  Surgeon  Amos  A. 
Evans  a  solemn  statement  in  the  Boston  "Gazette" 
that  he  was  born  in  Maryland  and  was  never  in  the 
British  navy  in  his  life.  Then  Surgeon  Jones  of 
the  Java,  in  his  official  report,  after  giving  his  own 


1 66  Naval  War  of  1812 

killed  and  mortally  wounded  at  24,  says  that  the 
Americans  lost  in  all  about  60,  and  that  4  of  their 
amputations  perished  under  his  own  eyes;  where- 
upon Surgeon  Evans  makes  the  statement  ("Niles* 
Register,"  vi,  p.  35),  backed  up  by  affidavits  of  his 
brother  officers,  that  in  all  he  had  but  five  amputa- 
tions, of  whom  only  one  died,  and  that  one  a  month 
after  Surgeon  Jones  had  left  the  ship.  To  meet  the 
assertions  of  Lieutenant  Chads  that  he  began  action 
with  but  377  men,  the  Constitution's  officers  pro- 
duced the  Java's  muster-roll,  dated  Nov.  I7th,  or 
five  days  after  she  had  sailed,  which  showed  446 
persons,  of  whom  20  had  been  put  on  board  a  prize. 
The  presence  of  this  large  number  of  supernumer- 
aries on  board  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  Java 
was  carrying  out  Lieutenant-General  Hislop,  the 
newly-appointed  Governor  of  Bombay,  and  his  suite, 
together  with  part  of  the  crews  for  the  Cornwallis, 
74,  and  gun-sloops  Chameleon  and  Icarus;  she  also 
contained  stores  for  those  two  ships. 

Besides  conflicting  with  the  American  reports, 
the  British  statements  contradict  one  another.  The 
official  published  report  gives  but  two  midshipmen 
as  killed;  while  one  of  the  volumes  of  the  "Naval 
Chronicle"  (vol.  xxix,  p.  452)  contains  a  letter  from 
one  of  the  Java's  lieutenants,  in  which  he  states  that 
there  were  five.  Finally,  Commodore  Bainbridge 
found  on  board  the  Constitution,  after  the  prisoners 
had  left,  a  letter  from  Lieutenant  H.  D.  Cornick, 
dated  Jan.  i,  1813,  and  addressed  to  Lieutenant 
Peter  V.  Wood,  22d  Regiment,  -foot,  in  which  he 


On  the  Ocean  167 

states  that  65  of  their  men  were  killed.  James 
("Naval  Occurrences")  gets  around  this  by  stating 
that  it  was  probably  a  forgery;  but  aside  from  the 
improbability  of  Commodore  Bainbridge  being  a 
forger,  this  could  not  be  so,  for  nothing  would  have 
been  easier  than  for  the  British  lieutenant  to  have 
denied  having  written  it,  which  he  never  did.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  would  be  very  likely  that  in  the 
heat  of  the  action,  Commodore  Bainbridge  and  the 
Java's  own  officers  should  overestimate  the  latter's 
loss.88 

Taking  all  these  facts  into  consideration,  we  find 
446  men  on  board  the  Java  by  her  own  muster-list ; 
378  of  these  were  paroled  by  Commodore  Bain- 
bridge at  San  Salvador ;  24  men  were  acknowledged 
by  the  enemy  to  be  killed  or  mortally  wounded ;  20 
were  absent  in  a  prize,  leaving  24  unaccounted  for, 
who  were  undoubtedly  slain. 

The  British  loss  was  48  men  killed  and  mortally 
wounded,  102  wounded  severely  and  slightly.  The 
Java  was  better  handled  and  more  desperately  de- 
fended than  the  Macedonian  or  even  the  Guerriere, 
and  the  odds  against  her  were  much  smaller ;  so  she 
caused  her  opponent  greater  loss,  though  her  gun- 
nery was  no  better  than  theirs. 

88  For  an  account  of  the  shameless  corruption  then  exist- 
ing in  the  Naval  Administration  of  Great  Britain,  see  Lord 
Dundonald's  "Autobiography  of  a  Seaman."  The  letters  of 
the  commanders  were  often  garbled,  as  is  mentioned  by 
Brenton.  Among  numerous  cases  that  he  gives,  may  be 
mentioned  the  cutting  out  of  the  Chevrette,  where  he  dis- 
tinctly says,  "our  loss  was  much  greater  than  was  ever  ac- 
knowledged." (Vol.  i,  p.  505,  edition  of  1837.) 


168  Naval  War  of  1812 

Lieutenant  Parker,  prize-master  of  the  Java,  re- 
moved all  the  prisoners  and  baggage  to  the  Consti- 
tution, and  reported  the  prize  to  be  in  a  very  dis- 
abled state;  owing  partly  to  this,  but  more  to  the 
long  distance  from  home  and  the  great  danger  there 
was  of  recapture,  Commodore  Bainbridge  destroyed 
her  on  the  3ist,  and  then  made  sail  for  San  Salvador. 
"Our  gallant  enemy,"  reports  Lieutenant  Chads, 
"has  treated  us  most  generously";  and  Lieutenant- 
Gcneral  Hislop  presented  the  Commodore  with  a 
very  handsome  sword  as  a  token  of  gratitude  for  the 
kindness  with  which  he  had  treated  the  prisoners. 

Partly  in  consequence  of  his  frigate's  injuries, 
but  especially  because  of  her  decayed  condition, 
Commodore  Bainbridge  sailed  from  San  Salvador 
on  Jan.  6,  1813,  reaching  Boston  Feb.  27th,  after 
his  four  months'  cruise.  At  San  Salvador  he  left 
the  Hornet  still  blockading  the  Bonne  Citoyenne. 

In  order  "to  see  oureslves  as  others  see  us,"  I 
shall  again  quote  from  Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Gra- 
viere,89  as  his  opinions  are  certainly  well  worthy  of 
attention  both  as  to  these  first  three  battles,  and  as 
to  the  lessons  they  teach.  "When  the  American 
Congress  declared  war  on  England  in  1812,"  he 
says,  "it  seemed  as  if  this  unequal  conflict  would 
crush  her  navy  in  the  act  of  being  born ;  instead,  it 
but  fertilized  the  germ.  It  is  only  since  that  epoch 
that  the  United  States  has  taken  rank  among  mari- 
time powers.  Some  combats  of  frigates,  corvettes, 
and  brigs,  insignificant  without  doubt  as  regards 

89  "Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  284  (Paris,  1881). 


On  the  Ocean  169 

material  results,  sufficed  to  break  the  charm  which 
protected  the  standard  of  St.  George,  and  taught 
Europe  what  she  could  have  already  learned  from 
some  of  our  combats,  if  the  louder  noise  of  our  de- 
feats had  not  drowned  the  glory,  that  the  only  in- 
vincibles  on  the  sea  are  good  seamen  and  good  ar- 
tillerists. 

"The  English  covered  the  ocean  with  their  crui- 
sers when  this  unknown  navy,  composed  of  six  frig- 
ates and  a  few  small  craft  hitherto  hardly  numbered, 
dared  to  establish  its  cruisers  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Channel,  in  the  very  centre  of  the  British  power. 
But  already  the  Constitution  had  captured  the  Guer- 
riere  and  Java,  the  United  States  had  made  a  prize 
of  the  Macedonian,  the  Wasp  of  the  Frolic,  and  the 
Hornet  of  the  Peacock.  The  honor  of  the  new 
flag  was  established.  England,  humiliated,  tried  to 
attribute  her  multiplied  reverses  to  the  unusual  size 
of  the  vessels  which  Congress  had  had  constructed 
in  1799,  and  which  did  the  fighting  in  1812.  She 
wished  to  refuse  them  the  name  of  frigates,  and 
called  them,  not  without  some  appearance  of  reason, 
disguised  line-of-battle  ships.  Since  then  all  mari- 
time powers  have  copied  these  gigantic  models,  as 
the  result  of  the  war  of  1812  obliged  England  her- 
self to  change  her  naval  material;  but  if  they  had 
employed,  instead  of  frigates,  cut-down  74*3  (vais- 
seaux  rases),  it  would  still  be  difficult  to  explain 
the  prodigious  success  of  the  Americans.  .  .  . 

"In  an  engagement  which  terminated  in  less  than 
half  an  hour,  the  English  frigate  Guerriere,  com- 

VOL.  IX.— 8 


1 70  Naval  War  of  1812 

pletely  dismasted,  had  fifteen  men  killed,  sixty-three 
wounded,  and  more  than  thirty  shot  below  the  water- 
line.  She  sank  twelve  hours  after  the  combat.  The 
Constitution,  on  the  contrary,  had  but  seven  men 
killed  and  seven  wounded,  and  did  not  lose  a  mast. 
As  soon  as  she  had  replaced  a  few  cut  ropes  and 
changed  a  few  sails,  she  was  in  condition,  even  by 
the  testimony  of  the  British  historian,  to  take  an- 
other Guerriere.  The  United  States  took  an  hour 
and  a  half  to  capture  the  Macedonian,  and  the  same 
difference  made  itself  felt  in  the  damage  suffered  by 
the  two  ships.  The  Macedonian  had  her  mast  shat- 
tered, two  of  her  maindeck  and  all  her  spardeck  guns 
disabled;  more  than  a  hundred  shot  had  penetrated 
the  hull,  and  over  a  third  of  the  crew  had  suffered 
by  the  hostile  fire.  The  American  frigate,  on  the 
contrary,  had  to  regret  but  five  men  killed  and  seven 
wounded;  her  guns  had  been  fired  each  sixty-six 
times  to  the  Macedonian's  thirty-six.  The  combat 
of  the  Constitution  and  the  Java  lasted  two  hours, 
and  was  the  most  bloody  of  these  three  engagements. 
The  Java  only  struck  when  she  had  been  razed  like  a 
sheer  hulk ;  she  had  twenty-two  men  killed  and  one 
hundred  and  two  wounded. 

"This  war  should  be  studied  with  unceasing  dili- 
gence; the  pride  of  two  peoples  to  whom  naval  af- 
fairs are  so  generally  familiar  has  cleared  all  the  de- 
tails and  laid  bare  all  the  episodes,  and  through  the 
sneers  which  the  victors  should  have  spared,  merely 
out  of  care  for  their  own  glory,  at  every  step  can  be 


On  the  Ocean  171 

seen  that  great  truth,  that  there  is  only  success  for 
those  who  know  how  to  prepare  it. 

"It  belongs  to  us  to  judge  impartially  these  ma- 
rine events,  too  much  exalted  perhaps  by  a  national 
vanity  one  is  tempted  to  excuse.  The  Americans 
showed,  in  the  War  of  1812,  a  great  deal  of  skill 
and  resolution.  But  if,  as  they  have  asserted,  the 
chances  had  always  been  perfectly  equal  between 
them  and  their  adversaries,  if  they  had  only  owed 
their  triumphs  to  the  intrepidity  of  Hull,  Decatur, 
and  Bainbridge,  there  would  be  for  us  but  little 
interest  in  recalling  the  struggle.  We  need  not  seek 
lessons  in  courage  outside  of  our  own  history.  On 
the  contrary,  what  is  to  be  well  considered  is  that 
the  ships  of  the  United  States  constantly  fought  with 
the  chances  in  their  favor,  and  it  is  on  this  that  the 
American  Government  should  found  its  true  title 
to  glory.  .  .  .  The  Americans  in  1812  had  secured 
to  themselves  the  advantage  of  a  better  organiza- 
tion [than  the  English]." 

The  fight  between  the  Constitution  and  the  Java 
illustrates  best  the  proposition,  "that  there  is  only 
success  for  those  who  know  how  to  prepare  it." 
Here  the  odds  in  men  and  metal  were  only  about  as 
10  to  9  in  favor  of  the  victors,  and  it  is  safe  to  say 
that  they  might  have  been  reversed  without  vitally 
affecting  the  result.  In  the  fight  Lambert  handled 
his  ship  as  skilfully  as  Bainbridge  did  his;  and  the 
Java's  men  proved  by  their  indomitable  courage  that 
they  were  excellent  material.  The  Java's  crew  was 


Naval  War  of  1812 


new  shipped  for  the  voyage,  and  had  been  at  sea 
but  six  weeks;  in  the  Constitution's  first  fight  her 
crew  had  been  aboard  of  her  but  five  weeks.  So 
the  chances  should  have  been  nearly  equal,  and  the 
difference  in  fighting  capacity  that  was  shown  by 
the  enormous  disparity  in  the  loss,  and  still  more 
in  the  damage  inflicted,  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  officers  of  one  ship  had,  and  the  officers  of  the 
other  had  not,  trained  their  raw  crews.  The  Con- 
stitution's men  were  not  "picked,"  but  simply  aver- 
age American  sailors,  as  the  Java's  were  average 
British  sailors.  The  essential  difference  was  in  the 
training. 

During  the  six  weeks  the  Java  was  at  sea,  her  men 
had  fired  but  six  broadsides,  of  blank  cartridges; 
during  the  first  five  weeks  the  Constitution  cruised, 
her  crew  were  incessantly  practiced  at  firing  with 
blank  cartridges,  and  also  at  a  target.90  The  Java's 
crew  had  only  been  exercised  occasionally,  even  in 
pointing  the  guns,  and  when  the  captain  of  a  gun 
was  killed  the  effectiveness  of  the  piece  was  tem- 
porarily ruined,  and,  moreover,  the  men  did  not 
work  together.  The  Constitution's  crew  were  exer- 
cised till  they  worked  like  machines,  and  yet  with 
enough  individualityto  render  it  impossible  to  cripple 
a  gun  by  killing  one  man.  The  unpracticed  British 
sailors  fired  at  random  ;  the  trained  Americans  took 

90  In  looking  through  the  logs  of  the  Constitution,  Hornet, 
etc.,  we  continually  find  such  entries  as  "beat  to  quarters," 
"exercised  the  men  at  the  great  guns,"  "exercised  with  mus- 
ketry," "exercised  the  boarders,"  "exercised  the  great  guns, 
blank  cartridges,  and  afterward  firing  at  mark." 


On  the  Ocean  173 

aim.  The  British  marines  had  not  been  taught  any- 
thing approximating  to  skirmishing  or  sharpshoot- 
ing;  the  Americans  had.  The  British  sailors  had 
not  even  been  trained  enough  in  the  ordinary  duties 
of  seamen;  while  the  Americans  in  five  weeks  had 
been  rendered  almost  perfect.  The  former  were  at 
a  loss  what  to  do  in  an  emergency  at  all  out  of  their 
own  line  of  work ;  they  were  helpless  when  the  wreck 
fell  over  their  guns,  when  the  Americans  would  have 
cut  it  away  in  a  jiffy.  As  we  learn  from  Commo- 
dore Morris'  "Autobiography/'  each  Yankee  sailor 
could,  at  need,  do  a  little  carpentering  or  sail-mend- 
ing, and  so  was  more  self-reliant.  The  crew  had 
been  trained  to  act  as  if  guided  by  one  mind,  yet 
each  man  retained  his  own  individuality.  The  petty 
officers  were  better  paid  than  in  Great  Britain,  and 
so  were  of  a  better  class  of  men,  thoroughly  self- 
respecting;  the  Americans  soon  got  their  subor- 
dinates in  order,  while  the  British  did  not.  To  sum 
up :  one  ship's  crew  had  been  trained  practically  and 
thoroughly,  while  the  other  crew  was  not  much  bet- 
ter off  than  the  day  it  sailed ;  and,  as  far  as  it  goes, 
this  is  a  good  test  of  the  efficiency  of  the  two 
navies. 

The  U.  S.  brig  Vixen,  12,  Lieutenant  George  U. 
Read,  had  been  cruising  off  the  southern  coast;  on 
Nov.  22d  she  fell  in  with  the  Southampton,  32, 
Captain  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo,  and  was  captured 
after  a  short  but  severe  trial  of  speed.  Both  vessels 
were  wrecked  soon  afterward. 


174  Naval  War  of  1812 

The  Essex,  32,  Captain  David  Porter,  left  the 
Delaware  on  Oct.  28th,  two  days  after  Commodore 
Bainbridge  had  left  Boston.  She  expected  to  make 
a  very  long  cruise  and  so  carried  with  her  an  un- 
usual quantity  of  stores  and  sixty  more  men  than  or- 
dinarily, so  that  her  muster-roll  contained  319  names. 
Being  deep  in  the  water  she  reached  San  Jago  after 
Bainbridge  had  left.  Nothing  was  met  with  until 
after  the  Essex  had  crossed  the  equator  in  long. 
30°  W.  on  Dec.  nth.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  next 
day  a  sail  was  made  out  to  windward,  and  chased. 
At  nine  in  the  evening  it  was  overtaken,  and  struck 
after  receiving  a  volley  of  musketry  which  killed  one 
man.  The  prize  proved  to  be  the  British  packet  Noc- 
ton,  of  10  guns  and  31  men,  with  $55,000  in  specie 
aboard.  The  latter  was  taken  out,  and  the  Nocton 
sent  home  with  Lieutenant  Finch  and  a  prize  crew 
of  17  men,  but  was  recaptured  by  a  British  frigate. 

The  next  appointed  rendezvous  was  the  Island 
of  Fernando  de  Noronha,  where  Captain  Porter 
found  a  letter  from  Commodore  Bainbridge,  inform- 
ing him  that  the  other  vessels  were  off  Cape  Frio. 
Thither  cruised  Porter,  but  his  compatriots  had  left. 
On  the  29th  he  captured  an  English  merchant  ves- 
sel ;  and  he  was  still  cruising  when  the  year  closed. 

The  year  1812,  on  the  ocean,  ended  as  gloriously 
as  it  had  begun.  In  four  victorious  fights  the  dis- 
parity in  loss  had  been  so  great  as  to  sink  the  dis- 
parity of  force  into  insignificance.  Our  successes 
had  been  unaccompanied  by  any  important  reverse. 


On  the  Ocean  175 

Nor  was  it  alone  by  the  victories,  but  by  the  cruises, 
that  the  year  was  noteworthy.  The  Yankee  men- 
of-war  sailed  almost  in  sight  of  the  British  coast 
and  right  in  the  track  of  the  merchant  fleets  and  their 
armed  protectors.  Our  vessels  had  shown  them- 
selves immensely  superior  to  their  foes. 

The  reason  of  these  striking1  and  unexpected  suc- 
cesses was  that  our  navy  in  1812  was  the  exact 
reverse  of  what  our  navy  is  now,  in  1882.  I  am 
not  alluding  to  the  personnel,  which  still  remains  ex- 
cellent; but,  whereas  we  now  have  a  large  number 
of  worthless  vessels,  standing  very  low  down  in 
their  respective  classes,  we  then  possessed  a  few  ves- 
sels, each  unsurpassed  by  any  foreign  ship  of  her 
class.  To  bring  up  our  navy  to  the  condition  in 
which  it  stood  in  1812  it  would  not  be  necessary 
(although  in  reality  both  very  wise  and  in  the  end 
very  economical)  to  spend  any  more  money  than  at 
present ;  only  instead  of  using  it  to  patch  up  a  hun- 
dred antiquated  hulks,  it  should  be  employed  in  build- 
ing half  a  dozen  ships  on  the  most  effective  model. 
If  in  1812  our  ships  had  borne  the  same  relation 
to  the  British  ships  that  they  do  now,  not  all  the 
courage  and  skill  of  our  sailors  would  have  won  us 
a  single  success.  As  it  was,  we  could  only  cope  with 
the  lower  rates,  and  had  no  vessels  to  oppose  to  the 
great  "liners";  but  to-day  there  is  hardly  any  for- 
eign ship,  no  matter  how  low  its  rate,  that  is  not 
superior  to  the  corresponding  American  ones.  It  is 
too  much  to  hope  that  our  political  short-sightedness 
will  ever  enable  us  to  have  a  navy  that  is  first-class 


176  Naval  War  of  1812 

in  point  of  size ;  but  there  certainly  seems  no  reason 
why  what  ships  we  have  should  not  be  of  the  very 
best  quality.  The  effect  of  a  victory  is  twofold, 
moral  and  material.  Had  we  been  as  roughly  han- 
dled on  water  as  we  were  on  land  during-  the  first 
year  of  the  war,  such  a  succession  of  disasters  would 
have  had  a  most  demoralizing  effect  on  the  nation 
at  large.  As  it  was,  our  victorious  sea-fights,  while 
they  did  not  inflict  any  material  damage  upon  the 
colossal  sea-might  of  England,  had  the  most  impor- 
tant results  in  the  feelings  they  produced  at  home 
and  even  abroad.  Of  course  they  were  magnified 
absurdly  by  most  of  our  writers  at  the  time;  but 
they  do  not  need  to  be  magnified,  for  as  they  are  any 
American  can  look  back  upon  them  with  the  keenest 
national  pride.  For  a  hundred  and  thirty  years 
England  had  had  no  equal  on  the  sea ;  and  now  she 
suddenly  found  one  in  the  untried  navy  of  an  al- 
most unknown  power. 

BRITISH   VESSELS  CAPTURED   OR    DESTROYED  IN  1812 

Name  Guns  Tonnage              Remarks 

Guerriere  49  It34° 

Macedonian  49  i  ,325 

Java  49  1,340 

Frolic  19  477    Recaptured 

Alert  20  325 

186  4,807 

19  477    Deducting  Frolic 

167  4,330 

AMERICAN  VESSELS  CAPTURED  OR  DESTROYED 

Name  Guns  Tonnage 

Wasp  18  450 

Nautilus  14  185 

Vixen  14  185 

46  820 


On  the  Ocean 


177 


VESSELS   BUILT   IN   1812 


Name                    Rig             Guns    Tonnage      Where  Built                 Cost 
Nonsuch         Schooner          14          148          Charleston              $15,000 
Carolina         Schooner         14         230         Charleston                8,743 

Louisiana       Ship                  16         341          New  Orleans            15,500 

PRIZES  MADE»i 

Ship 

No.  of  Prizes 

President    

7 

United  States     .... 

2 

Constitution        .... 

9 

Congress     ..... 

2 

Chesapeake         .... 

I 

Essex  

II 

Argus          

6 

Small  craft        .... 

5 

46 

91  These  can  only  be  approximately  given ;  the  records  are 
often  incomplete  or  contradictory,  especially  as  regards  the 
small  craft.  Most  accounts  do  not  give  by  any  means  the  full 
number. 


CHAPTER  IV 
1812 

ON  THE  LAKES 

PRELIMINARY — The  combatants  starting  nearly  on  an 
equality — Difficulties  of  creating  a  naval  force — Diffi- 
culty of  comparing  the  force  of  the  rival  squadrons — 
Meagreness  of  the  published  accounts — Unreliability  of 
James — ONTARIO — Extraordinary  nature  of  the  Ameri- 
can squadron — Canadian  squadron  forming  only  a  kind 
of  water  militia — Sackett's  Harbor  feebly  attacked  by 
Commodore  Earle — Commodore  Chauncy  bombards 
York — ERIE — Lieutenant  Elliott  captures  the  Detroit 
and  Caledonia — Unsuccessful  expedition  of  Lieutenant 
Angus. 

AT  the  time  we  are  treating  of,  the  State  of 
Maine  was  so  sparsely  settled,  and  covered 
with  such  a  dense  growth  of  forest,  that  it  was  prac- 
tically impossible  for  either  of  the  contending  parties 
to  advance  an  army  through  its  territory.  A  con- 
tinuation of  the  same  wooded  and  mountainous  dis- 
trict protected  the  northern  parts  of  Vermont  and 
New  Hampshire,  while  in  New  York  the  Adirondack 
region  was  an  impenetrable  wilderness.  It  thus 
came  about  that  the  northern  boundary  was  formed, 
for  military  purposes,  by  Lake  Huron,  Lake  Erie,  the 
Niagara,  Lake  Ontario,  the  St.  Lawrence,  and,  after 
an  interval,  by  Lake  Champlain.  The  road  into  the 
States  by  the  latter  ran  close  along  shore,  and  with- 
out a  naval  force  the  invader  would  be  wholly  un- 
(178) 


On  the  Lakes  179 

able  to  protect  his  flanks,  and  would  probably  have 
his  communications  cut.  This  lake,  however,  was 
almost  wholly  within  the  United  States,  and  did  not 
become  of  importance  till  toward  the  end  of  the  war. 
Upon  it  were  two  American  gunboats,  regularly 
officered  and  manned,  and  for  such  smooth  water 
sufficiently  effective  vessels. 

What  was  at  that  time  the  western  part  of  the 
northern  frontier  became  the  main  theatre  of  mili- 
tary operations,  and  as  it  presented  largely  a  water 
front,  a  naval  force  was  an  indispensable  adjunct, 
the  command  of  the  lakes  being  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. As  these  lakes  were  fitted  for  the  manoeu- 
vring of  ships  of  the  largest  size,  the  operations  upon 
them  were  of  the  same  nature  as  those  on  the  ocean, 
and  properly  belong  to  naval  and  not  to  military 
history.  But  while  on  the  ocean  America  started 
with  too  few  ships  to  enable  her  really  to  do  any 
serious  harm  to  her  antagonist,  on  the  inland  waters 
the  two  sides  began  very  nearly  on  an  equality. 
The  chief  regular  forces  either  belligerent  possessed 
were  on  Lake  Ontario.  Here  the  United  States  had 
a  man-of-war  brig,  the  Oneida,  of  240  tons,  carrying 
1 6  24-pound  carronades,  manned  by  experienced 
seamen,  and  commanded  by  Lieutenant  M.  T.  Wool- 
sey.  Great  Britain  possessed  the  Royal  George,  22, 
Prince  Regent,  16,  Earl  of  Moira,  14,  Gloucester, 
10,  Seneca,  8,  and  Simco,  8,  all  under  the  command 
of  a  Commodore  Earle;  but  though  this  force  was 
so  much  the  more  powerful  it  was  very  inefficient, 
not  being  considered  as  belonging  to  the  regular 


i8o  Naval  War  of  1812 

navy,  the  sailors  being  undisciplined,  and  the  offi- 
cers totally  without  experience,  never  having  been 
really  trained  in  the  British  service.  From  these 
causes  it  resulted  that  the  struggle  on  the  lakes 
was  to  be  a  work  as  much  of  creating  as  of  using  a 
navy.  On  the  seaboard  success  came  to  those  who 
made  best  use  of  the  ships  that  had  already  been 
built;  on  the  lakes  the  real  contest  lay  in  the  build- 
ing. And  building  an  inland  navy  was  no  easy  task. 
The  country  around  the  lakes,  especially  on  the 
south  side,  was  still  very  sparsely  settled,  and  all  the 
American  naval  supplies  had  to  be  brought  from  the 
seaboard  cities  through  the  valley  of  the  Mohawk. 
There  was  no  canal  or  other  means  of  communica- 
tion, except  very  poor  roads  intermittently  relieved 
by  transportation  on  the  Mohawk  and  on  Oneida 
Lake,  when  they  were  navigable.  Supplies  were 
thus  brought  up  at  an  enormous  cost,  with  tedious 
delays  and  great  difficulty;  and  bad  weather  put  a 
stop  to  all  travel.  Very  little  indeed,  beyond  tim- 
ber, could  be  procured  at  the  stations  on  the  lakes. 
Still  a  few  scattered  villages  and  small  towns  had 
grown  up  on  the  shores,  whose  inhabitants  were 
largely  engaged  in  the  carrying  trade;  the  ves- 
sels used  for  the  purpose  were  generally  small 
sloops  or  schooners,  swift  and  fairly  good  sailers, 
but  very  shallow  and  not  fitted  for  rough  weather. 
The  frontiersmen  themselves,  whether  Canadian  or 
American,  were  bold,  hardy  seamen,  and  when  prop- 
erly trained  and  led  made  excellent  man-of-war's- 
men ;  but  on  the  American  side  they  were  too  few  in 


On  the  Lakes  181 

number  and  too  untrained  to  be  made  use  of,  and 
the  seamen  had  to  come  from  the  coast.  But  the 
Canadian  shores  had  been  settled  longer,  the  inhabi- 
tants were  more  numerous,  and  by  means  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  the  country  was  easy  of  access  to  Great 
Britain ;  so  that  the  seat  of  war,  as  regards  getting 
naval  supplies,  and  even  men,  was  nearer  to  Great 
Britain  than  to  us.  Our  enemies  also  possessed  in 
addition  to  the  squadron  on  Lake  Ontario  another 
on  Lake  Erie,  consisting  of  the  Queen  Charlotte,  17, 
Lady  Prevost,  13,  Hunter,  10,  Caledonia,  2,  Little 
Belt,  2,  and  Chippeway,  2.  These  two  squadrons 
furnished  training  schools  for  some  five  hundred 
Canadian  seamen,  whom  a  short  course  of  disci- 
pline under  experienced  officers  sufficed  to  render 
as  good  men  as  their  British  friends  or  American 
foes.  Very  few  British  seamen  ever  reached  Lake 
Erie  (according  to  James,  not  over  fifty)  ;  but  on 
Lake  Ontario,  and  afterward  on  Lake  Champlain, 
they  formed  the  bulk  of  the  crews,  "picked  seamen, 
sent  out  by  government  expressly  for  service  on  the 
Canada  lakes."  *  As  the  contrary  has  sometimes 
been  asserted  it  may  be  as  well  to  mention  that  Ad- 
miral Codrington  states  that  no  want  of  seamen  con- 
tributed to  the  British  disasters  on  the  lakes,  as  their 
sea-ships  at  Quebec  had  men  drafted  from  them 
for  that  service  till  their  crews  were  utterly  de- 
pleted.2 I  am  bound  to  state  that  while  I  think  that 

1  James  vi,  353. 

!  Memoirs,  i,  322,  referring  especially  to  battle  of  Lake 
Champlain. 


182  Naval  War  of  1812 

on  the  ocean  our  sailors  showed  themselves  superior 
to  their  opponents,  especially  in  gun  practice,  on  the 
lakes  the  men  of  the  rival  fleets  were  as  evenly 
matched,  in  skill  and  courage,  as  could  well  be.  The 
difference,  when  there  was  any,  appeared  in  the 
officers,  and,  above  all,  in  the  builders;  which  was 
the  more  creditable  to  us,  as  in  the  beginning  we 
were  handicapped  by  the  fact  that  the  British  al- 
ready had  a  considerable  number  of  war  vessels, 
while  we  had  but  one. 

The  Falls  of  Niagara  interrupt  navigation  be- 
tween Erie  and  Ontario;  so  there  were  three  inde- 
pendent centres  of  naval  operations  on  the  northern 
frontier.  The  first  was  on  Lake  Champlain,  where 
only  the  Americans  possessed  any  force,  and,  singu- 
larly enough,  this  was  the  only  place  where  the  Brit- 
ish showed  more  enterprise  in  shipbuilding  than  we 
did.  Next  came  Lake  Ontario,  where  both  sides 
made  their  greatest  efforts,  but  where  the  result  was 
indecisive,  though  the  balance  of  success  was  slightly 
inclined  toward  us.  Our  naval  station  was  at  Sack- 
ett's  Harbor;  that  of  our  foes  at  Kingston.  The 
third  field  of  operations  was  Lake  Erie  and  the 
waters  above  it.  Here  both  sides  showed  equal  dar- 
ing and  skill  in  the  fighting,  and  our  advantage  must 
be  ascribed  to  the  energy  and  success  with  which 
we  built  and  equipped  vessels.  Originally  we  had 
no  force  at  all  on  these  waters,  while  several  ves- 
sels were  opposed  to  us.  It  is  a  matter  of  wonder 
that  the  British  and  Canadian  governments  should 
have  been  so  supine  as  to  permit  their  existing  force 


On  the  Lakes  183 

to  go  badly  armed,  and  so  unenterprising-  as  to  build 
but  one  additional  ship,  when  they  could  easily  have 
preserved  their  superiority. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  give  a  full  and  fair  account 
of  the  lake  campaigns.  The  inland  navies  were 
created  especially  for  the  war,  and,  after  it  were  al- 
lowed to  decay,  so  that  the  records  of  the  tonnage, 
armament,  and  crews  are  hard  to  get  at.  Of  course, 
where  everything  had  to  be  created,  the  services 
could  not  have  the  regular  character  of  those  on  the 
ocean.  The  vessels  employed  were  of  widely  differ- 
ent kinds,  and  this  often  renders  it  almost  impos- 
sible to  correctly  estimate  the  relative  force  of  two 
opposing  squadrons.  While  the  Americans  were 
building  their  lake  navy,  they,  as  make-shifts,  made 
use  of  some  ordinary  merchant  schooners,  which 
were  purchased  and  fitted  up  with  one  or  two  long, 
heavy  guns  each.  These  gun-vessels  had  no  quar- 
ters, and  suffered  under  all  the  other  disadvantages 
which  make  a  merchant  vessel  inferior  to  a  regu- 
larly constructed  man-of-war.  The  chief  trouble 
was  that  in  a  heavy  sea  they  had  a  strong  ten- 
dency to  capsize,  and  were  so  unsteady  that  the  guns 
could  not  be  aimed  when  any  wind  was  blowing. 
Now,  if  a  few  of  these  schooners,  mounting  long 
32*5,  encountered  a  couple  of  man-of-war  brigs, 
armed  with  carronades,  which  side  was  strongest? 
In  smooth  water  the  schooners  had  the  advantage, 
and  in  rough  weather  they  were  completely  at  the 
mercy  of  the  brigs ;  so  that  it  would  be  very  hard  to 
get  at  the  true  worth  of  such  a  contest  as  each  side 


184  Naval  War  of  1812 

would  be  tolerably  sure  to  insist  that  the  weather 
was  such  as  to  give  a  great  advantage  to  the  other. 
In  all  the  battles  and  skirmishes  on  Champlain,  Erie, 
and  Huron,  at  least  there  was  no  room  left  for  doubt 
as  to  who  were  the  victors.  But  on  Lake  Ontario 
there  was  never  any  decisive  struggle,  and  when- 
ever an  encounter  occurred,  each  commodore  al- 
ways claimed  that  his  adversary  had  "declined  the 
combat,"  though  "much  superior  in  strength."  It 
is,  of  course,  almost  impossible  to  find  out  which 
really  did  decline  the  combat,  for  the  official  letters 
flatly  contradict  each  other ;  and  it  is  often  almost  as 
difficult  to  discover  where  the  superiority  in  force 
lay,  when  the  fleets  differed  so  widely  in  character 
as  was  the  case  in  1813.  Then  Commodore 
Chauncy's  squadron  consisted  largely  of  schooners; 
their  long,  heavy  guns  made  his  total  foot  up  in 
a  very  imposing  manner,  and  similar  gun-vessels  did 
very  good  work  on  Lake  Erie ;  so  Commodore  Yeo, 
and  more  especially  Commodore  Yeo's  admirers, 
exalted  these  schooners  to  the  skies,  and  conveyed 
the  impression  that  they  were  most  formidable  craft, 
by  means  of  which  Chauncy  ought  to  have  won 
great  victories.  Yet  when  Yeo  captured  two  of 
them  he  refused  to  let  them  even  cruise  with  his 
fleet,  and  they  were  sent  back  to  act  as  coast  gun- 
boats and  transports,  which  certainly  would  not  have 
been  done  had  they  been  fitted  to  render  any  effectual 
assistance.  Again,  one  night  a  squall  came  on 
and  the  two  largest  schooners  went  to  the  bottom, 
which  did  not  tend  to  increase  the  confidence  felt 


On  the  Lakes  185 

in  the  others.  So  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  all 
but  very  smooth  water  the  schooners  could  almost 
be  counted  out  of  the  fight.  Then  the  question 
arises  in  any  given  case,  was  the  water  smooth? 
And  the  testimony  is  as  conflicting  as  ever. 

It  is  not  too  easy  to  reconcile  the  official  letters 
of  the  commanders,  and  it  is  still  harder  to  get 
at  the  truth  from  either  the  American  or  British  his- 
tories. Cooper  is  very  inexact,  and,  moreover,  paints 
everything  couleur  de  rose,  paying  no  attention  to 
the  British  side  of  the  question,  and  distributing  so 
much  praise  to  everybody  that  one  is  at  a  loss  to 
know  where  it  really  belongs.  Still,  he  is  very  use- 
ful, for  he  lived  at  the  time  of  the  events  he  nar- 
rates, and  could  get  much  information  about  them 
at  first  hand,  from  the  actors  themselves.  James  is 
almost  the  only  British  authority  on  the  subject;  but 
he  is  not  nearly  as  reliable  as  when  dealing  with 
the  ocean  contests,  most  of  this  part  of  his  work  be- 
ing taken  up  with  a  succession  of  acrid  soliloquies 
on  the  moral  defects  of  the  American  character. 
The  British  records  for  this  extraordinary  service 
on  the  lakes  were  not  at  all  carefully  kept,  and  so 
James  is  not  hampered  by  the  necessity  of  adhering 
more  or  less  closely  to  official  documents,  but  lets  his 
imagination  run  loose.  On  the  ocean  and  seaboard 
his  account  of  the  British  force  can  generally  be  re- 
lied upon;  but  on  the  lakes  his  authority  is  ques- 
tionable in  everything  relating  either  to  friends  or 
foes.  This  is  the  more  exasperating  because  it  is 
done  wilfully,  when,  if  he  had  chosen,  he  could  have 


1 86  Naval  War  of  1812 

written  an  invaluable  history;  he  must  often  have 
known  the  truth  when,  as  a  matter  of  preference,  he 
chose  either  to  suppress  or  alter  it.  Thus  he  ignores 
all  the  small  "cutting  out"  expeditions  in  which  the 
Americans  were  successful,  and  where  one  would 
like  to  hear  the  British  side.  For  example,  Captain 
Yeo  captured  two  schooners,  the  Julia  and  Growler, 
but  Chauncy  recaptured  both.  We  have  the  Amer- 
ican account  of  this  recapture  in  full,  but  James 
does  not  even  hint  at  it,  and  blandly  puts  down  both 
vessels  in  the  total  "American  loss"  at  the  end  of  his 
smaller  work.  Worse  still,  when  the  Growler  again 
changed  hands,  he  counts  it  in  again,  in  the  total,  as 
if  it  were  an  entirely  different  boat,  although  he  in- 
variably rules  out  of  the  American  list  all  recap- 
tured vessels.  A  more  serious  perversion  of  facts 
are  his  statements  about  comparative  tonnage.  This 
was  at  that  time  measured  arbitrarily,  the  depth  of 
hold  being  estimated  at  half  the  breadth  of  beam; 
and  the  tonnage  of  our  lake  vessels  was  put  down  ex- 
actly as  if  they  were  regular  ocean  cruisers  of  the 
same  dimensions  in  length  and  breadth.  But  on 
these  inland  seas  the  vessels  really  did  not  draw 
more  than  half  as  much  water  as  on  the  ocean,  and 
the  depth  would  of  course  be  much  less.  James, 
in  comparing  the  tonnage,  gives  that  of  the  Ameri- 
cans as  if  they  were  regular  ocean  ships,  but  in  the 
case  of  the  British  vessels,  carefully  allows  for  their 
shallowness,  although  professing  to  treat  the  two 
classes  in  the  same  way;  and  thus  he  makes  out  a 
most  striking  and  purely  imaginary  difference.  The 


On  the  Lakes  187 

best  example  is  furnished  by  his  accounts  of  the  fleets 
on  Lake  Erie.  The  captured  vessels  were  appraised 
by  two  captains  and  the  shipbuilder,  Mr.  Henry 
Eckford,  their  tonnage  being  computed  precisely  as 
the  tonnage  of  the  American  vessels.  The  appraise- 
ment was  recorded  in  the  Navy  Department,  and 
was  first  made  public  by  Cooper,  so  that  it  could  not 
have  been  done  for  effect.  Thus  measured  it  was 
found  that  the  tonnage  was  in  round  numbers  as  fol- 
lows :  Detroit,  490  tons ;  Queen  Charlotte,  400;  Lady 
Prevost,  230;  Hunter,  180;  Little  Bell,  90;  Chippe- 
way,  70.  James  makes  them  measure  respectively 
305,  280,  120,  74,  54,  and  32  tons,  but  carefully 
gives  the  American  ships  the  regular  sea  tonnage. 
So  also  he  habitually  deducts  about  25  per  cent  from 
the  real  number  of  men  on  board  the  British  ships ; 
as  regards  Lake  Erie  he  contradicts  himself  so  much 
that  he  does  not  need  to  be  exposed  from  outside 
sources.  But  the  most  glaring  and  least  excusable 
misstatements  are  made  as  to  the  battle  of  Lake 
Champlain,  where  he  gives  the  American  as  greatly 
exceeding  the  British  force.  He  reaches  this  conclu- 
sion by  the  most  marvelous  serious  of  garblings  and 
misstatements.  First,  he  says  that  the  Connance  and 
the  Saratoga  were  of  nearly  equal  tonnage.  The 
Confiance  being  captured  was  placed  on  our  naval 
lists,  where  for  years  she  ranked  as  a  36-gun  frigate, 
while  the  Saratoga  ranked  among  the  24-gun  cor- 
vettes; and  by  actual  measurement  the  former  was 
half  as  large  again  as  the  latter.  He  gives  the 
Confiance  but  270  men;  one  of  her  officers,  in  a 


i88  Naval  War  of  1812 

letter  published  in  the  "London  Naval  Chronicle,"  3 
gives  her  over  300 ;  more  than  that  number  of  dead 
and  prisoners  were  taken  out  of  her.  He  misstates 
the  calibre  of  her  guns,  and  counts  out  two  of  them 
because  they  were  used  through  the  bow-ports; 
whereas,  from  the  method  in  which  she  made  her 
attack,  these  would  have  been  peculiarly  effec- 
tive. The  guns  are  given  accurately  by  Cooper, 
on  the  authority  of  an  officer,4  who  was  on  board 
the  Constitution  within  15  minutes  after  the  Linnet 
struck,  and  who  was  in  charge  of  her  for  two 
months. 

Then  James  states  that  there  were  but  10  British 
galleys,  while  Sir  George  Prevost's  official  account, 
as  well  as  all  the  American  authorities,  state  the 
number  to  be  12.  He  says  that  the  Finch  grounded 
opposite  an  American  battery  before  the  engagement 
began,  while  in  reality  it  was  an  hour  afterward, 
and  because  she  had  been  disabled  by  the  shot  of  the 
American  fleet.  The  galleys  were  largely  manned 
by  Canadians,  and  James,  anxious  to  put  the  blame 
on  these  rather  than  the  British,  says  that  they 
acted  in  the  most  cowardly  way,  whereas  in  reality 
they  caused  the  Americans  more  trouble  than  Dow- 
nie's  smaller  sailing  vessels  did.  His  account  of  the 
armament  of  these  vessels  differs  widely  from  the 
official  reports.  He  gives  the  Linnet  and  Chubb  a 
smaller  number  of  men  than  the  number  of  prisoners 

•  Vol.  xxxii,  p.  272.    The  letter  also  says  that  hardly  five 
of  her  men  remained  unhurt. 
4  Lieutenant  E.  A.  F.  Lavallette. 


On  the  Lakes  189 

that  were  actually  taken  out  of  them,  not  including 
the  dead.  Even  misstating  Downie's  force  in  guns, 
underestimating  the  number  of  his  men,  and  leav- 
ing out  two  of  his  gunboats,  did  not  content  James ; 
and  to  make  the  figures  show  a  proper  disproportion, 
he  says  (Vol.  VI,  p.  504)  that  he  shall  exclude  the 
Finch  from  the  estimate,  because  she  grounded,  and 
half  of  the  gunboats,  because  he  does  not  think  they 
acted  bravely.  Even  were  these  assertions  true,  it 
would  be  quite  as  logical  for  an  American  writer  to 
put  the  Chesapeake 's  crew  down  as  only  200,  and  say 
he  should  exclude  the  other  men  from  the  estimate 
because  they  flinched;  and  to  exclude  all  the  guns 
that  were  disabled  by  shot,  would  be  no  worse  than 
to  exclude  the  Finch.  James'  manipulation  of  the 
figures  is  a  really  curious  piece  of  audacity.  Nat- 
urally, subsequent  British  historians  have  followed 
him  without  inquiry.  James'  account  of  this  battle, 
alone,  amply  justifies  our  rejecting  his  narrative  en- 
tirely, as  far  as  affairs  on  the  lakes  go,  whenever 
it  conflicts  with  any  other  statement,  British  or 
American.  Even  when  it  does  not  conflict,  it  must 
be  followed  with  extreme  caution,  for  whenever  he 
goes  into  figures  the  only  thing  certain  about  them 
is  that  they  are  wrong.  He  gives  no  details  at  all 
of  most  of  the  general  actions.  Of  these,  however, 
we  already  possess  excellent  accounts,  the  best  being 
those  in  the  "Manual  of  Naval  Tactics,"  by  Com- 
mander J.  H.  Ward,  U.  S.  N.  (1859),  and  in  Los- 
sing's  "Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  and 
Cooper's  "Naval  History."  The  chief  difficulty  oc- 


190  Naval  War  of  1812 

curs  in  connection  with  matters  on  Lake  Ontario,5 
where  I  have  been  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  a 
perfect  patchwork  of  authors  and  even  newspapers, 
for  the  details,  using  Miles'  "Register"  and  James  as 
mutual  correctives.  The  armaments  and  equipments 
being  so  irregular  I  have  not,  as  in  other  cases, 
made  any  allowance  for  the  short  weight  of  the 
American  shot,  as  here  the  British  may  have  suf- 
fered under  a  similar  disadvantage;  and  it  may  be 
as  well  to  keep  in  mind  that  on  these  inland  waters 
the  seamen  of  the  two  navies  seem  to  have  been 
as  evenly  matched  in  courage  and  skill  as  was  pos- 
sible. They  were  of  exactly  the  same  stock,  with 
the  sole  exception  that  among  and  under,  but  en- 
tirely distinct  from,  the  Canadian-English,  fought 
the  descendants  of  the  conquered  Canadian-French ; 
and  even  these  had  been  trained  by  Englishmen, 
were  led  by  English  captains,  fought  on  ships  built 
by  English  gold,  and  with  English  weapons  and 
discipline. 

8  The  accounts  of  the  two  commanders  on  Lake  Ontario 
are  as  difficult  to  reconcile  as  are  those  of  the  contending 
admirals  in  the  battles  which  the  Dutch  waged  against  the 
English  and  French  during  the  years  1672-1675.  In  every 
one  of  De  Ruyter's  last  six  battles  each  side  regularly 
claimed  the  victory,  although  there  can  be  but  little  doubt 
that  on  the  whole  the  strategical,  and  probably  the  tactical, 
advantage  remained  with  De  Ruyter.  Every  historian  ought 
to  feel  a  sense  of  the  most  lively  gratitude  toward  Nelson ;  in 
his  various  encounters  he  never  left  any  possible  room  for 
dispute  as  to  which  side  had  come  out  first  best. 


On  the  Lakes  191 


ON    LAKE    ONTARIO 

There  being,  as  already  explained,  three  inde- 
pendent centres  of  inland  naval  operations,  the 
events  at  each  will  be  considered  separately. 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  Lieutenant  Woolsey, 
with  the  Oneida,  was  stationed  at  Sackett's  Harbor, 
which  was  protected  at  the  entrance  by  a  small  fort 
with  a  battery  composed  of  one  long  32.  The  Ca- 
nadian squadron  of  six  ships,  mounting  nearly  80 
guns,  was  of  course  too  strong  to  be  meddled  with. 
Indeed,  had  the  Royal  George,  22,  the  largest  vessel, 
been  commanded  by  a  regular  British  sea-officer, 
she  would  have  been  perfectly  competent  to  take 
both  the  Oneida  and  Sackett's  Harbor;  but  before 
the  Canadian  commodore,  Earle,  made  up  his  mind 
to  attack,  Lieut.  Woolsey  had  time  to  make  one  or 
two  short  cruises,  doing  some  damage  among  the 
merchant  vessels  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  1 9th  of  July  Earle's  ships  appeared  off 
the  Harbor;  the  Oneida  was  such  a  dull  sailor  that 
it  was  useless  for  her  to  try  to  escape,  so  she  was 
hauled  up  under  a  bank  where  she  raked  the  entrance, 
and  her  off  guns  landed  and  mounted  on  the  shore, 
while  Lieut.  Woolsey  took  charge  of  the  "battery," 
or  long  32,  in  the  fort.  The  latter  was  the  only 
gun  that  was  of  much  use,  for  after  a  desultory  can- 
nonade of  about  an  hour,  Earle  withdrew,  having 
suffered  very  little  damage,  inflicting  none  at  all, 
and  proved  himself  and  his  subordinates  to  be 
grossly  incompetent. 


192  Naval  War  of  1812 

Acting  under  orders,  Lieut.  Woolsey  now  set 
about  procuring  merchant  schooners  to  be  fitted  and 
used  as  gun-vessels  until  more  regular  cruisers 
could  be  built.  A  captured  British  schooner  was 
christened  the  Julia,  armed  with  a  long  32  and  two 
6's,  manned  with  30  men,  under  Lieut.  Henry  Wells, 
and  sent  down  to  Ogdensburg.  "On  her  way 
thither  she  encountered  and  actually  beat  off,  with- 
out losing  a  man,  the  Moira,  of  14,  and  Gloucester, 
of  10  guns."6  Five  other  schooners  were  also  pur- 
chased ;  the  Hamilton,  of  10  guns,  being  the  largest, 
while  the  other  four,  the  Governor  Tompkins, 
Growler,  Conquest,  and  Pert  had  but  n  pieces  be- 
tween them.  Nothing  is  more  difficult  than  to 
exactly  describe  the  armaments  of  the  smaller  lake 
vessels.  The  American  schooners  were  mere  make- 
shifts, and  their  guns  were  frequently  changed;7  as 
soon  as  they  could  be  dispensed  with  they  were  laid 
up,  or  sold,  and  forgotten. 

It  was  even  worse  with  the  British,  who  mani- 
fested the  most  indefatigable  industry  in  intermit- 
tently changing  the  armament,  rig,  and  name  of 
almost  every  vessel,  and,  the  records  being  very 
loosely  kept,  it  is  hard  to  find  what  was  the  force 

'  James,  vi,  350. 

1  They  were  always  having  accidents  happen  to  them  that 
necessitated  some  alteration.  If  a  boat  was  armed  with  a 
long  32,  she  rolled  too  much,  and  they  substituted  a  14;  if 
she  also  had  an  1 8-pound  carronade,  it  upset  down  the  hatch- 
way in  the  middle  of  a  fight,  and  made  way  for  a  long  12, 
which  burst  as  soon  as  it  was  used,  and  was  replaced  by  two 
medium  6's.  So  a  regular  gamut  of  changes  would  be  rung. 


On  the  Lakes  193 

at  any  one  time.  A  vessel  which  in  one  conflict 
was  armed  with  long  i8's,  in  the  next  would  have 
replaced  some  of  them  with  68-pound  carronades; 
or,  beginning  life  as  a  ship,  she  would  do  most  of 
her  work  as  a  schooner,  and  be  captured  as  a  brig, 
changing  her  name  even  oftener  than  anything  else. 
On  the  first  of  September  Commodore  Isaac 
Chauncy  was  appointed  commander  of  the  forces 
on  the  lakes  (except  of  those  on  Lake  Champlain), 
and  he  at  once  bent  his  energies  to  preparing  an 
effective  flotilla.  A  large  party  of  ship-carpenters 
were  immediately  despatched  to  the  Harbor;  and 
they  were  soon  followed  by  about  a  hundred  offi- 
cers and  seamen,  with  guns,  stores,  etc.  The  keel 
of  a  ship  to  mount  24  32-pound  carronades,  and  to 
be  called  the  Madison,  was  laid  down,  and  she  was 
launched  on  the  26th  of  November,  just  when  navi- 
gation had  closed  on  account  of  the  ice.  Late  in  the 
autumn,  four  more  schooners  were  purchased,  and 
named  the  Ontario,  Scourge,  Fair  American,  and 
Asp,  but  these  were  hardly  used  until  the  following 
spring.  The  cruising  force  of  the  Americans  was 
composed  solely  of  the  Oneida  and  the  six  schooners 
first  mentioned.  The  British  squadron  was  of  near- 
ly double  this  strength,  and  had  it  been  officered 
and  trained  as  it  was  during  the  ensuing  summer, 
the  Americans  could  not  have  stirred  out  of  port. 
But  as  it  was,  it  merely  served  as  a  kind  of  water 
militia,  the  very  sailors,  who  subsequently  did  well, 
being  then  almost  useless,  and  unable  to  oppose 
their  well-disciplined  foes,  though  the  latter  were  so 

VOL.  IX.— o 


194  Naval  War  of  1812 

inferior  in  number  and  force.  For  the  reason  that 
it  was  thus  practically  a  contest  of  regulars  against 
militia,  I  shall  not  give  numerical  comparisons  of 
the  skirmishes  in  the  autumn  of  1812,  and  shall 
touch  on  them  but  slightly.  They  teach  the  old  les- 
son that,  whether  by  sea  or  land,  a  small,  well- 
officered,  and  well-trained  force,  can  not,  except 
very  rarely,  be  resisted  by  a  greater  number  of  mere 
militia;  and  that  in  the  end  it  is  true  economy  to 
have  the  regular  force  prepared  beforehand,  with- 
out waiting  until  we  have  been  forced  to  prepare 
it  by  the  disasters  happening  to  the  irregulars.  The 
Canadian  seamen  behaved  badly,  but  no  worse  than 
the  American  land  forces  did  at  the  same  time; 
later,  under  regular  training,  both  nations  retrieved 
their  reputations. 

Commodore  Chauncy  arrived  at  Sackett's  Har- 
bor in  October,  and  appeared  on  the  lake  on  Novem- 
ber 8th,  in  the  Oncida,  Lieutenant  Woolsey,  with  the 
six  schooners  Conquest,  Lieutenant  Elliott;  Ham- 
ilton, Lieutenant  McPherson;  Tompkins,  Lieuten- 
ant Brown;  Pert,  Sailing-master  Arundel;  Julia, 
Sailing-master  Trant ;  Growler,  Sailing-master  Mix. 
The  Canadian  vessels  were  engaged  in  conveying 
supplies  from  the  westward.  Commodore  Chauncy 
discovered  the  Royal  George  off  the  False  Duck 
Islands,  and  chased  her  under  the  batteries  of  Kings- 
ton, on  the  Qth.  Kingston  was  too  well  defended 
to  be  taken  by  such  a  force  as  Chauncy's;  but  the 
latter  decided  to  make  a  reconnaissance,  to  discover 
the  enemy's  means  of  defence  and  see  if  it  was 


On  the  Lakes  195 

possible  to  lay  the  Royal  George  aboard.  At  3  P.M. 
the  attack  was  made.  The  Hamilton  and  Tompkins 
were  absent  chasing,  and  did  not  arrive  until  the 
fighting  had  begun.  The  other  four  gunboats,  Con- 
quest, Julia,  Pert,  and  Growler,  led,  in  the  order 
named,  to  open  the  attack  with  their  heavy  guns, 
and  prepare  the  way  for  the  Oneida,  which  followed. 
At  the  third  discharge  the  Pert's  gun  burst,  putting 
her  nearly  hors  de  combat,  badly  wounding  her 
gallant  commander,  Mr.  Arundel  (who  shortly 
afterward  fell  overboard  and  was  drowned),  and 
slightly  wounding  four  of  her  crew.  The  other 
gunboats  engaged  the  five  batteries  of  the  enemy, 
while  the  Oneida  pushed  on  without  firing  a  shot  till 
at  3.40  she  opened  on  the  Royal  George,  and  after 
20  minutes'  combat  actually  succeeded  in  compelling 
her  opponent,  though  of  double  her  force,  to  cut 
her  cables,  run  in,  and  tie  herself  to  a  wharf,  where 
some  of  her  people  deserted  her ;  here  she  was  under 
the  protection  of  a  large  body  of  troops,  and  the 
Americans  could  not  board  her  in  face  of  the  land 
forces.  It  soon  began  to  grow  dusk,  and  Chauncy's 
squadron  beat  out  through  the  channel  against  a 
fresh  head-wind.  In  this  spirited  attack  the  Ameri- 
can loss  had  been  confined  to  half  a  dozen  men, 
and  had  fallen  almost  exclusively  on  the  Oneida. 
The  next  day  foul  weather  came  on,  and  the  squad- 
ron sailed  for  Sackett's  Harbor.  Some  merchant 
vessels  were  taken,  and  the  Simco,  8,  was  chased, 
but  unsuccessfully. 

The  weather  now  became  cold  and  tempestuous, 


196  Naval  War  of  1812 

but  cruising  continued  till  the  middle  of  November. 
The  Canadian  commanders,  however,  utterly  refused 
to  fight;  the  Royal  George  even  fleeing  from  the 
Oneida,  when  the  latter  was  entirely  alone,  and  leav- 
ing the  American  commodore  in  undisputed  com- 
mand of  the  lake.  Four  of  the  schooners  continued 
blockading  Kingston  till  the  middle  of  November; 
shortly  afterward  navigation  closed.8 

LAKE    ERIE 

ON  Lake  Erie  there  was  no  American  naval  force ; 
but  the  army  had  fitted  out  a  small  brig,  armed 
with  six  6-pounders.  This  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  British  at  the  capture  of  Detroit,  and  was  named 
after  that  city,  so  that  by  the  time  a  force  of  Ameri- 
can officers  and  seamen  arrived  at  the  lake  there 
was  not  a  vessel  on  it  for  them  to  serve  in,  while 
their  foes  had  eight.  But  we  only  have  to  deal  with 
two  of  the  latter  at  present.  The  Detroit,  still 
mounting  six  6-pounders,  and  with  a  crew  of  56 
men,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  of  Marines 
Rolette,  of  the  Royal  Navy,  assisted  by  a  boatswain 
and  gunner,  and  containing  also  30  American  pris- 
oners, and  the  Caledonia,  a  small  brig  mounting  two 
4-pounders  on  pivots,  with  a  crew  of  12  men,  Cana- 
dian-English, under  Mr.  Irvine,  and  having  aboard 
also  10  American  prisoners,  and  a  very  valuable 
cargo  of  furs,  worth  about  $200,000,  moved  down 

8  These  preliminary  events  were  not  very  important,  and 
the  historians  on  both  sides  agree  almost  exactly,  so  that  I 
have  not  considered  it  necessary  to  quote  authorities. 


On  the  Lakes  197 

the  lake,  and  on   Oct.   7th  anchored  under  Fort 
Erie.9 

Commander  Jesse  D.  Elliott  had  been  sent  up  to 
Erie  some  time  before  with  instructions  from  Com- 
modore Chauncy  to  construct  a  naval  force,  partly 
by  building  two  brigs  of  300  tons  each,10  and  partly 
by  purchasing  schooners  to  act  as  gunboats.  No 
sailors  had  yet  arrived;  but  on  the  very  day  on 
which  the  two  brigs  moved  down  and  anchored 
under  Fort  Erie,  Captain  Elliott  received  news  that 
the  first  detachment  of  the  promised  seamen,  51  in 
number,  including  officers,11  was  but  a  few  miles 
distant.  He  at  once  sent  word  to  have  these  men 
hurried  up,  but  when  they  arrivel  they  were  found 
to  have  no  arms,  for  which  application  was  made 
to  the  military  authorities.  The  latter  not  only  gave 
a  sufficiency  of  sabres,  pistols,  and  muskets  to  the 
sailors,  but  also  detailed  enough  soldiers,  under  Cap- 
tain N.  Towson  and  Lieutenant  Isaac  Roach,  to 
make  the  total  number  of  men  that  took  part  in  the 
expedition  124.  This  force  left  Black  Rock  at  one 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  in  two  large  boats, 
one  under  the  command  of  Commander  Elliott,  as- 

9  Letter  of  Captain  Jesse  D.  Elliott  to  Secretary  of  Navy, 
Black  Rock,  Oct.  5,  1812. 

10  That  is,  of  300  tons  actual  capacity ;  measured  as  if  they 
had  been  ordinary  sea  vessels  they  each  tonned  480.     Their 
opponent,    the    ship   Detroit,   similarly   tonned    305,   actual 
measurement,  or  490,  computing  it  in  the  ordinary  manner. 

11  The  number  of  men  in  this  expedition  is  taken  from 
Lossing's  "Field-book   of  the  War  of  1812,"  by  Benson  J. 
Lossing,  New  York,   1869,  p.  385,  note,  where  a  complete 
list  of  the  names  is  given. 


198  Naval  War  of  1812 

sisted  by  Lieutenant  Roach,  the  other  under  Sailing- 
master  George  Watts  and  Captain  Towson.  After 
two  hours'  rowing  they  reached  the  foe,  and  the 
attack  was  made  at  three  o'clock.  Elliott  laid  his 
boat  alongside  the  Detroit  before  he  was  discovered, 
and  captured  her  after  a  very  brief  struggle,  in 
which  he  lost  but  one  man  killed,  and  Midshipman 
J.  C.  Cummings  wounded  with  a  bayonet  in  the  leg. 
The  noise  of  the  scuffle  roused  the  hardy  provincials 
aboard  the  Caledonia,  and  they  were  thus  enabled 
to  make  a  far  more  effectual  resistance  to  Sailing- 
master  Watts  than  the  larger  vessel  had  to  Captain 
Elliott.  As  Watts  pulled  alongside  he  was  greeted 
with  a  volley  of  musketry,  but  at  once  boarded  and 
carried  the  brig,  the  twelve  Canadians  being  cut 
down  or  made  prisoners;  one  American  was  killed 
and  four  badly  wounded.  The  wind  was  too  light 
and  the  current  too  strong  to  enable  the  prizes  to 
beat  out  and  reach  the  lake,  so  the  cables  were  cut 
and  they  ran  down  stream.  The  Caledonia  was 
safely  beached  under  the  protection  of  an  American 
battery  near  Black  Rock.  The  Detroit,  however, 
was  obliged  to  anchor  but  four  hundred  yards  from 
a  British  battery,  which,  together  with  some  flying 
artillery,  opened  on  her.  Getting  all  his  guns  on 
the  port  side,  Elliott  kept  up  a  brisk  cannonade  till 
his  ammunition  gave  out,  when  he  cut  his  cable  and 
soon  grounded  on  Squaw  Island.  Here  the  Detroit 
was  commanded  by  the  guns  of  both  sides,  and 
whichever  party  took  possession  of  her  was  at  once 
driven  out  by  the  other.  The  struggle  ended  in  her 


On  the  Lakes  199 

destruction,  most  of  her  guns  being  taken  over  to 
the  American  side.  This  was  a  very  daring  and 
handsome  exploit,  reflecting  great  credit  on  Com- 
mander Elliott,  and  giving  the  Americans,  in  the 
Caledonia,  the  nucleus  of  their  navy  on  Lake  Erie; 
soon  afterward  Elliott  returned  to  Lake  Ontario, 
a  new  detachment  of  seamen  under  Commander  S. 
Angus  having  arrived. 

On  the  28th  of  November,  the  American  general, 
Smith,  despatched  two  parties  to  make  an  attack 
on  some  of  the  British  batteries.  One  of  these  con- 
sisted of  10  boats,  under  the  command  of  Captain 
King  of  the  I5th  infantry,  with  150  soldiers,  and 
with  him  went  Mr.  Angus  with  82  sailors,  including 
officers.  The  expedition  left  at  one  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  but  was  discovered  and  greeted  with  a 
warm  fire  from  a  field  battery  placed  in  front  of 
some  British  barracks  known  as  the  Red  House.  Six 
of  the  boats  put  back ;  but  the  other  four,  containing 
about  a  hundred  men,  dashed  on.  While  the  soldiers 
were  forming  line  and  firing,  the  seamen  rushed  in 
with  their  pikes  and  axes,  drove  off  the  British, 
captured  their  commander,  Lieut.  King,  of  the  Royal 
Army,  spiked  and  threw  into  the  river  the  guns, 
and  then  took  the  barracks  and  burned  them,  after 
a  desperate  fight.  Great  confusion  now  ensued, 
which  ended  in  Mr.  Angus  and  some  of  the  seamen 
going  off  in  the  boats.  Several  had  been  killed; 
eight,  among  whom  were  Midshipmen  Wragg,  Dud- 
ley, and  Holdup,  all  under  20  years  old,  remained 
with  the  troops  under  Captain  King,  and  having 


200  Naval  War  of  1812 

utterly  routed  the  enemy  found  themselves  deserted 
by  their  friends.  After  staying  on  the  shore  a 
couple  of  hours  some  of  them  found  two  boats  and 
got  over ;  but  Captain  King  and  a  few  soldiers  were 
taken  prisoners.  Thirty  of  the  seamen,  including 
nine  of  the  twelve  officers,  were  killed  or  wounded 
— among  the  former  being  Sailing-masters  Sisson 
and  Watts,  and  among  the  latter  Mr.  Angus,  Sail- 
ing-master Carter,  and  Midshipmen  Wragg,  Hold- 
up, Graham,  Brailesford,  and  Irvine.  Some  twenty 
prisoners  were  secured  and  taken  over  to  the  Ameri- 
can shore;  the  enemy's  loss  was  more  severe  than 
ours,  his  resistance  being  very  stubborn,  and  a  good 
many  cannon  were  destroyed,  but  the  expedition 
certainly  ended  most  disastrously.  The  accounts  of 
it  are  hard  to  reconcile,  but  it  is  difficult  to  believe 
that  Mr.  Angus  acted  correctly. 

Later  in  the  winter  Captain  Oliver  Hazard  Perry 
arrived  to  take  command  of  the  forces  on  Lake 
Erie. 


CHAPTER   V 
1813 

ON  THE  OCEAN 

Blockade  of  the  American  coast — The  Essex  in  the  South 
Pacific — The  Hornet  captures  the  Peacock — American 
privateers  cut-out  by  British  boats — Unsuccessful  cruise 
of  Commodore  Rodgers — The  Chesapeake  is  captured 
by  the  Shannon — Futile  gunboat  actions — Defence  of 
Craney  Island — Cutting-out  expeditions — The  Argus 
is  captured  by  the  Pelican — The  Enterprise  captures 
the  Boxer — Summary 

BY  the  beginning  of  the  year  1813  the  British 
had  been  thoroughly  aroused  by  the  American 
successes,  and  active  measures  were  at  once  taken  to 
counteract  them.  The  force  on  the  American  sta- 
tion was  largely  increased,  and  a  strict  blockade  be- 
gun, to  keep  the  American  frigates  in  port.  The 
British  frigates  now  cruised  for  the  most  part  in 
couples  and  orders  were  issued  by  the  Board  of 
Admiralty  that  an  i8-pounder  frigate  was  not  to 
engage  an  American  24-pounder.  Exaggerated  ac- 
counts of  the  American  44*5  being  circulated,  a  new 
class  of  spar-deck  frigates  was  constructed  to  meet 
them,  rating  50  and  mounting  60  guns;  and  some 
74's  were  cut  down  for  the  same  purpose.1  These 
new  ships  were  all  much  heavier  than  their  intended 
opponents. 

1  James,  vi,  p.  206. 

(201) 


202  Naval  War  of  1812 

As  New  England's  loyalty  to  the  Union  was,  not 
unreasonably,  doubted  abroad,  her  coasts  were  at 
first  troubled  but  little.  A  British  squadron  was 
generally  kept  cruising  off  the  end  of  Long  Island 
Sound,  and  another  off  Sandy  Hook.  Of  course 
America  had  no  means  of  raising  a  blockade,  as 
each  squadron  contained  generally  a  74  or  a  razee, 
vessels  too  heavy  for  any  in  our  navy  to  cope  with. 
Frigates  and  sloops  kept  skirting  the  coasts  of  New 
Jersey,  the  Carolinas,  and  Georgia.  Delaware 
Bay  no  longer  possessed  the  importance  it  had 
during  the  Revolutionary  War,  and  as  the  only  war 
vessels  in  it  were  some  miserable  gunboats,  the 
British  generally  kept  but  a  small  force  on  that  sta- 
tion. Chesapeake  Bay  became  the  principal  scene 
of  their  operations;  it  was  there  their  main  body 
collected,  and  their  greatest  efforts  were  made.  In 
it  a  number  of  line-of-battle  ships,  frigates,  sloops, 
and  cutters  had  been  collected,  and  early  in  the  sea- 
son Admiral  Sir  John  Warren  and  Rear-Admiral 
Cockburn  arrived  to  take  command.  The  latter 
made  numerous  descents  on  the  coast,  and  frequent- 
ly came  into  contact  with  the  local  militia,  who  gen- 
erally fled  after  a  couple  of  volleys.  These  expedi- 
tions did  not  accomplish  much,  beyond  burning  the 
houses  and  driving  off  the  live-stock  of  the  farmers 
along  shore,  and  destroying  a  few  small  towns — one 
of  them,  Hampton,  being  sacked  with  revolting 
brutality.2  The  Government  of  the  United  States 

1  James  (vi,  340)  says:  The  conduct  of  the  British  troops 
on  this  occasion  was  "revolting  to  human  nature"  and  "dis- 
graceful to  the  flag." 


On  the  Ocean  203 

was,  in  fact,  supported  by  the  people  in  its  war 
policy  very  largely  on  account  of  these  excesses, 
which  were  much  exaggerated  by  American  writers. 
It  was  really  a  species  of  civil  war,  and  in  such  a 
contest,  at  the  beginning  of  this  century,  it  was  im- 
possible that  some  outrages  should  not  take  place. 
The  American  frigate  Constellation  had  by  this 
time  got  ready  for  sea,  and,  under  the  command  of 
Captain  Stewart,  she  prepared  to  put  out  early  in 
January.  As  the  number  of  blockaders  rendered  a 
fight  almost  certain  within  a  few  days  of  her  depar- 
ture, her  crew  were  previously  brought  to  the  high- 
est state  of  discipline,  the  men  being  exercised  with 
especial  care  in  handling  the  great  guns  and  in  firing 
at  a  target.3  However,  she  never  got  out ;  for  when 
she  reached  Hampton  Roads  she  fell  in  with  a  Brit- 
ish squadron  of  line-of-battle  ships  and  frigates. 
She  kedged  up  toward  Norfolk,  and  when  the  tide 
rose  ran  in  and  anchored  between  the  forts;  and  a 
few  days  later  dropped  down  to  cover  the  forts 
which  were  being  built  at  Craney  Island.  Here  she 
was  exposed  to  attacks  from  the  great  British  force 
still  lying  in  Hampton  Roads,  and,  fearing  they 
would  attempt  to  carry  her  by  surprise,  Captain 
Stewart  made  every  preparation  for  defence.  She 
was  anchored  in  the  middle  of  the  narrow  channel, 
flanked  by  gunboats,  her  lower  ports  closed,  not  a 
rope  left  hanging  over  the  sides ;  the  boarding  net- 
tings, boiled  in  half-made  pitch  till  they  were  as 

*  Life  of  Commodore  Tatnall,  by  C.  C.  Jonas  (Savannah, 
1878),  p.  15. 


204  Naval  War  of  1812 

hard  as  wire,  were  triced  out-board  toward  the  yard- 
arms,  and  loaded  with  kentledge  to  fall  on  the  at- 
tacking boats  when  the  tricing  lines  were  cut,  while 
the  carronades  were  loaded  to  the  muzzle  with  mus- 
ket balls,  and  depressed  so  as  to  sweep  the  water 
near  the  ship.4  Twice,  a  force  of  British,  estimated 
by  their  foes  to  number  2,000  men,  started  off  at 
night  to  carry  the  Constellation  by  surprise;  but 
on  each  occasion  they  were  discovered  and  closely 
watched  by  her  guard-boats,  and  they  never  ventured 
to  make  the  attack.  However,  she  was  unable  to  get 
to  sea,  and  remained  blockaded  to  the  close  of  the 
war. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  several  frigates  and 
smaller  craft  were  at  sea.  The  Chesapeake,  Cap- 
tain Evans,  had  sailed  from  Boston  on  Dec.  13, 
i8i2.5  She  ran  down  past  Madeira,  the  Canaries, 
and  Cape  de  Verde,  crossed  the  equator,  and  for  six 
weeks  cruised  to  the  south  of  the  line  between  longi- 
tudes 1 6°  to  25°  W.  Thence  she  steered  to  the  west, 
passing  near  Surinam,  over  the  same  spot  on  which 
the  Hornet  had  sunk  the  Peacock  but  a  day  previous. 
Cruising  northward  through  the  West  Indies,  she 
passed  near  the  Bermudas,  where  she  was  chased  by 
a  74  and  a  frigate;  escaping  from  them  she  got  into 
Boston  on  April  Qth,  having  captured  five  merchant- 
men, and  chased  unsuccessfully  for  two  days  a  brig- 
sloop.  The  term  of  two  years  for  which  her  crew 

4  For  an  admirable  account  of  these  preparations,  as  well 
as  of  the  subsequent  events,  see  Cooper,  ii,  242. 

*  Statistical  "History  of  the  U.  S.  Navy,"  by  Lieutenant 
C.  E.  Emmons. 


On  the  Ocean  205 

were  enlisted  now  being  up,  they,  for  the  most  part, 
left,  in  consequence  of  some  trouble  about  the  prize- 
money.  Captain  Evans  being  in  ill  health,  Captain 
James  Lawrence  was  appointed  to  command  her. 
He  reached  Boston  about  the  middle  of  May  6  and 
at  once  set  about  enlisting  a  new  crew,  and  tried, 
with  but  partial  success,  to  arrange  matters  with  the 
old  sailors,  who  were  now  almost  in  open  mutiny. 
When  the  year  1812  had  come  to  an  end,  the 
Essex,  32,  was  in  the  South  Atlantic,  and  Captain 
Porter  shortly  afterward  ran  into  St.  Catherines  to 
water.  Being  at  a  loss  where  to  find  his  consorts, 
he  now  decided  to  adopt  the  exceedingly  bold  meas- 
ure of  doubling  Cape  Horn  and  striking  at  the  Brit- 
ish whalers  in  the  Pacific.  This  was  practically  go- 
ing into  the  enemy's  waters,  the  Portuguese  and 
Spanish  countries  being  entirely  under  the  influ- 
ence of  Britain,  while  there  were  no  stations  where 
Porter  could  revictual  or  repair  in  safety.  How- 
ever, the  Essex  started,  doubled  the  Horn,  and  on 
March  I3th  anchored  in  the  harbor  of  Valparaiso. 
Her  adventurous  cruise  in  the  Pacific  was  the  most 
striking  feature  of  the  war;  but  as  it  has  been  most 
minutely  described  by  Commodore  Porter  himself, 
by  his  son,  Admiral  Porter,  by  Admiral  Farragut, 
and  by  Cooper,  I  shall  barely  touch  upon  it. 

6  He  was  still  on  the  Hornet  at  New  York  on  May  loth,  as 
we  knew  from  a  letter  of  Biddle's,  written  on  that  date  (in 
letters  of  "Masters-Commandant,"  1813,  No.  58),  and  so 
could  hardly  have  been  with  the  Chesapeake  two  weeks  be- 
fore he  put  out ;  and  had  to  get  his  crew  together  and  train 
them  during  that  time. 


206  Naval  War  of  1812 

On  March  2Oth  the  Essex  captured  the  Peruvian 
corsair  Nereyda,  16,  hove  her  guns  and  small  arms 
overboard,  and  sent  her  into  port.  She  made  the 
island  of  San  Gallan,  looked  into  Callao,  and  thence 
went  to  the  Gallipagos,  getting  everything  she 
wanted  from  her  prizes.  Then  she  went  to  Tumbez, 
and  returned  to  the  Gallipagos;  thence  to  the  Mar- 
quesas, and  finally  back  to  Valparaiso  again.  By 
this  year's  campaign  in  the  Pacific,  Captain  Porter 
had  saved  all  our  ships  in  those  waters,  had  not  cost 
the  government  a  dollar,  living  purely  on  the  enemy, 
and  had  taken  from  him  nearly  4,000  tons  of  ship- 
ping and  400  men,  completely  breaking  up  his  whal- 
ing trade  in  the  South  Pacific. 

The  cruise  was  something  sui  generis  in  modern 
warfare,  recalling  to  mind  the  cruises  of  the  early 
English  and  Dutch  navigators.  An  American  ship 
was  at  a  serious  disadvantage  in  having  no  harbor 
of  refuge  away  from  home;  while  on  almost  every 
sea  there  were  British,  French,  and  Spanish  ports 
into  which  vessels  of  those  nations  could  run  for 
safety.  It  was  an  unprecedented  thing  for  a  small 
frigate  to  cruise  a  year  and  a  half  in  an  enemy's  wa- 
ters, and  supply  herself  during  that  time,  purely  from 
captured  vessels,  with  everything — cordage,  sails, 
guns,  anchors,  provisions,  and  medicines,  and  even 
money  to  pay  the  officers  and  men !  Porter's  cruise 
was  the  very  model  of  what  such  an  expedition 
should  be,  harassing  the  enemy  most  effectually  at 
no  cost  whatever.  Had  the  Essex  been  decently 
armed  with  long  guns,  instead  of  carronades,  the 


On  the  Ocean  207 

end  might  have  been  as  successful  as  it  was  glorious. 
The  whalers  were  many  of  them  armed  letters-of- 
marque,  and,  though  of  course  unable  to  oppose  the 
frigate,  several  times  smart  skirmishes  occurred  in 
attacking  them  with  boats,  or  in  captured  ships;  as 
when  Lieutenant  Downs  and  20  men  in  the  prize 
Georgiana  after  a  short  brush  captured  the  Hector, 
with  25  men,  two  of  whom  were  killed  and  six 
wounded;  and  when,  under  similar  circumstances, 
the  prize  Greenwich,  of  25  men,  captured  the  Serin- 
gapatam  of  40.  The  cruise  of  the  Essex,  the  first 
American  man-of-war  ever  in  the  Pacific,  a  year  and 
a  half  out  and  many  thousand  miles  away  from 
home,  was  a  good  proof  of  Porter's  audacity  in 
planning  the  trip  and  his  skill  and  resource  in  carry- 
ing it  out. 

To  return  now  to  the  Hornet.  This  vessel  had 
continued  blockading  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  until 
January  24th,  when  the  Montagu,  74,  arrived  to- 
ward evening  and  chased  her  into  port.  As  the 
darkness  came  on  the  Hornet  wore,  stood  out  to  sea, 
passing  into  the  open  without  molestation  from  the 
74,  and  then  steered  toward  the  northeast,  cruising 
near  the  coast,  and  making  a  few  prizes,  among 
which  was  a  brig,  the  Resolution,  with  $23,000  in 
specie  aboard,  captured  on  February  I4th.  On  the 
24th  of  February,  while  nearing  the  mouth  of  the 
Demerara  River,  Captain  Lawrence  discovered  a 
brig  to  leeward,  and  chased  her  till  he  ran  into  quar- 
ter less  five,  when,  having  no  pilot,  he  hauled  off- 
shore. Just  within  the  bar  a  man-of-war  brig  was 


208  Naval  War  of  1812 

lying  at  anchor ;  and  while  beating  round  Caroband 
Bank,  in  order  to  get  at  her,  Captain  Lawrence  dis- 
covered another  sail  edging  down  on  his  weather- 
quarter.7  The  brig  at  anchor  was  the  Espiegle,  of 
1 8  guns,  32-pound  carronades,  Captain  John  Tay- 
lor;8 and  the  second  brig  seen  was  the  Peacock, 
Captain  William  Peake,9  which,  for  some  unknown 
reason,  had  exchanged  her  32-pound  carronades  for 
24*5.  She  had  sailed  from  the  Espiegle' s  anchorage 
the  same  morning  at  10  o'clock.  At  4.20  P.M.  the 
Peacock  hoisted  her  colors ;  then  the  Hornet  beat  to 
quarters  and  cleared  for  action.  Captain  Lawrence 
kept  close  by  the  wind,  in  order  to  get  the  weather- 
gage;  when  he  was  certain  he  could  weather  the 
enemy,  he  tacked,  at  5.10,  and  the  Hornet  hoisted 
her  colors.  The  ship  and  the  brig  now  stood  for 
each  other,  both  on  the  wind,  the  Hornet  being  on 
the  starboard  and  the  Peacock  on  the  port  tack, 
and  at  5.25  they  exchanged  broadsides,  at  half  pis- 
tol-shot distance,  while  going  in  opposite  directions, 
the  Americans  using  their  lee  and  the  British  their 
weather  battery.  The  guns  were  fired  as  they  bore, 
and  the  Peacock  suffered  severely,  while  her  an- 
tagonist's hull  was  uninjured,  though  she  suffered 
slightly  aloft  and  had  her  pennant  cut  off  by  the 
first  shot  fired.10  One  of  the  men  in  the  mizzen-top 
was  killed  by  a  round  shot,  and  two  more  were 
wounded  in  the  main-top.11  As  soon  as  they  were 

*  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence,  March  29,  1813. 

8  James,  vi,  278.  '  Do.  10  Cooper,  p.  200. 

11  See  entry  in  her  log  for  the  day  (In  "Log-Book  of 


On  the  Ocean  209 

clear,  Captain  Peake  put  his  helm  hard  up  and  wore, 
firing  his  starboard  guns;  but  the  Hornet  had 
watched  him  closely,  bore  up  as  quickly,  and  coming 
down  at  5.35,  ran  him  close  aboard  on  the  star- 
board quarter.  Captain  Peake  fell  at  this  moment, 
together  with  many  of  his  crew,  and,  unable  to  with- 
stand the  Hornet's  heavy  fire,  the  Peacock  surren- 
dered at  5.39,  just  14  minutes  after  the  first  shot; 
and  directly  afterward  hoisted  her  ensign  union 
down  in  the  fore-rigging  as  a  signal  of  distress.  Al- 
most immediately  her  mainmast  went  by  the  board. 
Both  vessels  then  anchored,  and  Lieutenant  J.  T. 
Shubrick,  being  sent  on  board  the  prize,  reported 
her  sinking.  Lieutenant  D.  Connor  was  then  sent 
in  another  boat  to  try  to  save  the  vessel ;  but  though 
they  threw  the  guns  overboard,  plugged  the  shot 
holes,  tried  the  pumps,  and  even  attempted  bailing, 
the  water  gained  so  rapidly  that  the  Hornefs  offi- 
cers devoted  themselves  to  removing  the  wounded 
and  other  prisoners;  and  while  thus  occupied  the 
short  tropical  twilight  left  them.  Immediately  after- 
ward the  prize  settled,  suddenly  and  easily,  in  $l/2 
fathoms  of  water,  carrying  with  her  three  of  the 
Hornet's  people  and  nine  of  her  own,  who  were 
rummaging  below;  meanwhile  four  others  of  her 
crew  had  lowered  her  damaged  stern  boat,  and  in 
the  confusion  got  off  unobserved  and  made  their 
way  to  the  land.  The  foretop  still  remained  above 
water,  and  four  of  the  prisoners  saved  themselves 

Hornet,  Wasp,  and  Argus,  from  July  20,  1809,  to  October 
6,  1813,")  in  the  Bureau  of  Navigation,  at  Washington. 


2io  Naval  War  of  1812 

by  running1  up  the  rigging  into  it.  Lieutenant  Con- 
nor and  Midshipman  Cooper  (who  had  also  come 
on  board)  saved  themselves,  together  with  most  of 
their  people  and  the  remainder  of  the  Peacock's 
crew,  by  jumping  into  the  launch,  which  was  lying 
on  the  booms,  and  paddling  her  toward  the  ship  with 
pieces  of  boards  in  default  of  oars. 

The  Hornet's  complement  at  this  time  was  150, 
of  whom  she  had  8  men  absent  in  a  prize  and  7 
on  the  sick  list,12  leaving  135  fit  for  duty  in  the 
action;13  of  these  one  man  was  killed,  and  two 
wounded,  all  aloft.  Her  rigging  and  sails  were  a 
good  deal  cut,  a  shot  had  gone  through  the  fore- 
mast, and  the  bowsprit  was  slightly  damaged;  the 
only  shot  that  touched  her  hull  merely  glanced 
athwart  her  bows,  indenting  a  plank  beneath  the 
cat-head.  The  Peacock's  crew  had  amounted  to 
134,  but  4  were  absent  in  a  prize,  and  but  I2214  fit 
*or  action;  of  these  she  lost  her  captain,  and  seven 
men  killed  and  mortally  wounded,  and  her  master, 
one  midshipman,  and  28  men  severely  and  slightly 
wounded, — in  all  8  killed  and  30  wounded,  or  about 
13  times  her  antagonist's  loss.  She  suffered  under 
the  disadvantage  of  light  metal,  having  24*3  op- 
posed to  32*5 ;  but  judging  from  her  gunnery  this 
was  not  much  of  a  loss,  as  6-pounders  would  have 
inflicted  nearly  as  great  damage.  She  was  well 
handled  arid  bravely  fought;  but  her  men  showed 

1J  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence. 
11  Letter  of  Lieutenant  D.  Conner,  April  26,  1813. 
14  Letter  of  Lieutenant  F.  W.  Wright  (of  the  Peacock), 
April  17,  1813. 


On  the  Ocean 


211 


a  marvelous  ignorance  of  gunnery.    It  appears  that 
she  had  long  been  known  as  "the  yacht,"  on  ac- 


count of  the  tasteful  arrangement  of  her  deck;  the 
breechings  of  the  carronades  were  lined  with  white 
canvas,  and  nothing  could  exceed  in  brilliancy  the 


212  Naval  War  of  1812 

polish  upon  the  traversing  bars  and  elevating 
screws.15  In  other  words,  Captain  Peake  had  con- 
founded the  mere  incidents  of  good  discipline  with 
the  essentials.16 

The  Hornet's  victory  can  not  be  regarded  in  any 
other  light  than  as  due,  not  to  the  heavier  metal, 
but  to  the  far  more  accurate  firing  of  the  Ameri- 
cans; "had  the  guns  of  the  Peacock  been  of  the 
largest  size  they  could  not  have  changed  the  result, 
as  the  weight  of  shot  that  do  not  hit  is  of  no  great 
moment."  Any  merchant-ship  might  have  been  as 
well  handled  and  bravely  defended  as  she  was;  and 
an  ordinary  letter-of-marque  would  have  made  as 
creditable  a  defence. 

During  the  entire  combat  the  Espiegle  was  not 
more  than  4  miles  distant  and  was  plainly  visible 
from  the  Hornet;  but  for  some  reason  she  did  not 
come  out,  and  her  commander  reported  that  he  knew 
nothing  of  the  action  till  the  next  day.  Captain 
Lawrence  of  course  was  not  aware  of  this,  and  made 
such  exertions  to  bend  on  new  sails,  stow  his  boats, 
and  clear  his  decks  that  by  nine  o'clock  he  was 
again  prepared  for  action,17  and  at  2  P.M.  got  under 
way  for  the  N.W.  Being  now  overcrowded  with 
people  and  short  of  water  he  stood  for  home,  an- 
choring at  Holmes'  Hole  in  Martha's  Vineyard  on 
the  i  Qth  of  March. 

On  their  arrival  at  New  York  the  officers  of  the 

16  James,  vi,  280. 

16  Codrington  ("Memoirs,"  i,  310)  comments  very  forcibly 
on  the  uselessness  of  a  mere  martinet. 
11  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence. 


On  the  Ocean  213 

Peacock  published  a  card  expressing  in  the  warmest 
terms  their  appreciation  of  the  way  they  and  their 
men  had  been  treated.  Say  they:  "We  ceased  to 
consider  ourselves  prisoners;  and  everything  that 
friendship  could  dictate  was  aidopted  by  you  and 
the  officers  of  the  Hornet  to  remedy  the  inconven- 
ience we  would  otherwise  have  experienced  from 
the  unavoidable  loss  of  the  whole  of  our  property 
and  clothes  owing  to  the  sudden  sinking  of  the 
Peacock"16  This  was  signed  by  the  first  and  sec- 
ond lieutenants,  the  master,  surgeon  and  purser. 

Weight 
Tonnage     Guns        Metal          Men  Loss 

Hornet  480  10  279  135  3 

Peacock  477  10  210  122  38 

Relative  Relative  Loss 

Force  Inflicted 

Hornet  i.oo  i.oo 

Peacock  .83  .08 

That  is,  the  forces  standing  nearly  as  13  is  to  n, 
the  relative  execution  was  about  as  13  is  to  i. 

The  day  after  the  capture  Captain  Lawrence  re- 
ported 277  souls  aboard,  including  the  crew  of  the 
English  brig  Resolution  which  he  had  taken,  and 
of  the  American  brig  Hunter,  prize  to  the  Peacock. 
As  James,  very  ingeniously,  tortures  these  figures 
into  meaning  what  they  did  not,  it  may  be  well  to 
show  exactly  what  the  277  included.  Of  the  Hor- 
net's original  crew  of  150,  8  were  absent  in  a  prize, 
i  killed,  and  3  drowned,  leaving  (including  7  sick) 
138;  of  the  Peacock's  original  134,  4  were  absent 

18  Quoted  in  full  in  Niles'  "Register"  and  Lossing's  "Field 
Book." 


Naval  War  of  1812 


in  a  prize,  5  killed,  9  drowned,  and  4  escaped,  leav- 
ing (including  8  sick  and  3  mortally  wounded) 
112;  there  were  also  aboard  16  other  British  pris- 
oners, and  the  Hunter's  crew  of  n  men  —  making 
just  277.19  According  to  Lieutenant  Connor's  let- 
ter, written  in  response  to  one  from  Lieutenant 
Wright,  there  were  in  reality  139  in  the  Peacock's 
crew  when  she  began  action;  but  it  is,  of  course, 
best  to  take  each  commander's  account  of  the  num- 
ber of  men  on  board  his  ship  that  were  fit  for  duty. 
On  January  I7th  the  Viper,  12,  Lieutenant  J.  D. 
Henly,  was  captured  by  the  British  frigate  Narcis- 
sus, 32,  Captain  Lumly. 

On  February  8th,  while  a  British  squadron,  con- 
sisting of  the  four  frigates  Belvidera  (Captain 
Richard  Byron),  Maidstone,  Junon,  and  Statira, 
were  at  anchor  in  Lynnhaven  Bay,  a  schooner  was 
observed  in  the  northeast  standing  down  Chesa- 
peake Bay.20  This  was  the  Lottery,  letter-of- 
marque,  of  six  12-pounder  carronades  and  25  men, 
Captain  John  Southcomb,  bound  from  Baltimore 
to  Bombay.  Nine  boats,  with  200  men,  under 
the  command  of  Lieutenant  Kelly  Nazer,  were 
sent  against  her,  and,  a  calm  coming  on,  over- 

19  The  277  men  were  thus  divided  into:  Hornefs  crew,  138; 
Peacock's  crew,  112;  Resolution's  crew,  16;  Hunter's  crew, 
n.  James  quotes  "270"  men,  which  he  divides  as  follows: 
Hornet,  160;  Peacock,  101;  Hunter,  9  —  leaving  out  the 
Resolution's  crew,  n  of  the  Peacock's,  and  2  of  the 
Hunter's. 

40  James,  vi,  325. 


On  the  Ocean  215 

took  her.  The  schooner  opened  a  well-directed  fire 
of  round  and  grape,  but  the  boats  rushed  forward 
and  boarded  her,  not  carrying  her  till  after  a  most 
obstinate  struggle,  in  which  Captain  Southcomb  and 
19  of  his  men,  together  with  13  of  the  assailants, 
were  killed  or  wounded.  The  best  warship  of  a 
regular  navy  might  be  proud  of  the  discipline  and 
courage  displayed  by  the  captain  and  crew  of  the 
little  Lottery.  Captain  Byron  on  this,  as  well  as 
on  many  another  occasion,  showed  himself  to  be  as 
humane  as  he  was  brave  and  skilful.  Captain 
Southcomb,  mortally  wounded,  was  taken  on  board 
Byron's  frigate,  where  he  was  treated  with  the 
greatest  attention  and  most  delicate  courtesy,  and 
when  he  died  his  body  was  sent  ashore  with  every 
mark  of  the  respect  due  to  so  brave  an  officer. 
Captain  Stewart  (of  the  Constellation)  wrote  Cap- 
tain Byron  a  letter  of  acknowledgment  for  his  great 
courtesy  and  kindness.21 

On  March  i6th  a  British  division  of  five  boats 
and  105  men,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  James 
Polkinghorne,  set  out  to  attack  the  privateer 
schooner  Dolphin  of  12  guns  and  70  men,  and  the 
letters-of-marque,  Racer,  Arab,  and  Lynx,  each  of 
six  guns  and  30  men.  Lieutenant  Polkinghorne, 
after  pulling  15  miles,  found  the  four  schooners 
all  prepared  to  receive  him,  but  in  spite  of  his  great 
inferiority  in  force  he  dashed  gallantly  at  them. 

81  The  correspondence  between  the  two  captains  is  given 
in  full  in  Niles*  "Register,"  which  also  contains  fragmen- 
tary notes  on  the  action,  principally  as  to  the  loss  incurred. 


ai 6  Naval  War  of  1812 

The  Arab  and  Lynx  surrendered  at  once ;  the  Racer 
was  carried  after  a  sharp  struggle  in  which  Lieuten- 
ant Polkinghorne  was  wounded,  and  her  guns  turned 
on  the  Dolphin.  Most  of  the  latter's  crew  jumped 
overboard;  a  few  rallied  round  their  captain,  but 
they  were  at  once  scattered  as  the  British  seamen 
came  aboard.  The  assailants  had  13,  and  the  pri- 
vateersmen  16  men  killed  and  wounded  in  the  fight 
It  was  certainly  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  daring 
cutting-out  expeditions  that  took  place  during  the 
war,  and  the  victors  well  deserved  their  success. 
The  privateersmen  (according  to  the  statement  of 
the  Dolphin's  master,  in  "Niks'  Register,")  were 
panic-struck,  and  acted  in  anything  but  a  brave 
manner.  All  irregular  fighting-men  do  their  work 
by  fits  and  starts.  No  regular  cruisers  could  be- 
have better  than  did  the  privateers  Lottery,  Chas- 
seur, and  General  Armstrong;  none  would  behave 
as  badly  as  the  Dolphin,  Lynx,  and  Arab.  The 
same  thing  appears  on  shore.  Jackson's  irregulars 
at  New  Orleans  did  as  well,  or  almost  as  well,  as 
Scott's  troops  at  Lundy's  Lane;  but  Scott's  troops 
would  never  have  suffered  from  such  a  panic  as 
overcame  the  militia  at  Bladensburg. 

On  April  Qth  the  schooner  Norwich,  of  14  guns 
and  6 1  men,  Sailing-master  James  Monk,  captured 
the  British  privateer  Caledonia,  of  10  guns  and  41 
men,  after  a  short  action  in  which  the  privateer  lost 
7  men. 

On  April  3oth  Commodore  Rodgers,  in  the 
President,  44,  accompanied  by  Captain  Smith  in 


On  the  Ocean  217 

the  Congress,  38,  sailed  on  his  third  cruise.22  On 
May  2d  he  fell  in  with  and  chased  the  British  sloop 
Curlew,  1 8,  Captain  Michael  Head,  but  the  latter 
escaped  by  knocking  away  the  wedges  of  her  masts 
and  using  other  means  to  increase  her  rate  of  sail- 
ing. On  the  8th,  in  latitude  39°  3C/  N.,  long.  60° 
W.,  the  Congress  parted  company,  and  sailed  off 
toward  the  southeast,  making  four  prizes,  of  no 
great  value,  in  the  North  Atlantic;23  when  about 
in  long.  35°  W.  she  steered  south,  passing  to  the 
south  of  the  line.  But  she  never  saw  a  man-of- 
war,  and  during  the  latter  part  of  her  cruise  not 
a  sail  of  any  kind,  and  after  cruising  nearly  eight 
months  returned  to  Portsmouth  Harbor  on  Decem- 
ber 1 4th,  having  captured  but  four  merchantmen. 
Being  unfit  to  cruise  longer,  owing  to  her  decayed 
condition,  she  was  disarmed  and  laid  up;  nor  was 
she  sent  to  sea  again  during  the  war.24 

Meanwhile  Rodgers  cruised  along  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  Grand  Bank  until  he  reached  latitude 
48°,  without  meeting  anything,  then  stood  to  the 
southeast,  and  cruised  off  the  Azores  till  June  6th. 

52  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Sept:  30,  1813. 

93  Letter  of  Captain  Smith,  Dec.  15,  1813. 

84  James  states  that  she  was  "blockaded"  in  port  by  the 
Tenedos  during  part  of  1814,  but  was  too  much  awed  by 
the  fate  of  the  Chesapeake  to  come  out  during  the  "long 
blockade"  of  Captain  Parker.  Considering  the  fact  that  she 
was  too  decayed  to  put  to  sea,  had  no  guns  aboard,  no  crew, 
and  was,  in  fact,  laid  up,  the  feat  of  the  Tenedos  was  not 
very  wonderful;  a  row-boat  could  have  "blockaded"  her 
quite  as  well.  It  is  worth  noticing,  as  an  instance  of  the 

way  James  alters  a  fact  by  suppressing  half  of  it. 

VOL.  IX.— 10 


2i8  Naval  War  of  1812 

Then  he  crowded  sail  to  the  northeast  after  a 
Jamaica  fleet  of  which  he  had  received  news,  but 
which  he  failed  to  overtake,  and  on  June  I3th,  in 
lat.  46°,  long.  28°,  he  gave  up  the  chase  and  shaped 
his  course  toward  the  North  Sea,  still  without  any 
good  luck  befalling  him.  On  June  27th  he  put  into 
North  Bergen  in  the  Shetlands  for  water,  and  thence 
passed  the  Orkneys  and  stretched  toward  the  North 
Cape,  hoping  to  intercept  the  Archangel  fleet.  On 
July  i  Qth,  when  off  the  North  Cape,  in  lat.  71° 
52'  N.,  long.  20°  1 8'  E.,  he  fell  in  with  two  sails 
of  the  enemy,  who  made  chase;  after  four  days' 
pursuit  the  commodore  ran  his  opponents  out  of 
sight.  According  to  his  letter  the  two  sail  were 
a  line-of-battle  ship  and  a  frigate;  according  to 
James  they  were  the  12-pounder  frigate  Alexandria, 
Captain  Carthcart,  and  Spitfire,  16,  Captain  Ellis. 
James  quotes  from  the  logs  of  the  two  British  ships, 
and  it  would  seem  that  he  is  correct,  as  it  would  not 
be  possible  for  him  to  falsify  the  logs  so  utterly.  In 
case  he  is  true,  it  was  certainly  carrying  caution  to 
an  excessive  degree  for  the  commodore  to  retreat 
before  getting  some  idea  of  what  his  antagonists 
really  were.  His  mistaking  them  for  so  much 
heavier  ships  was  a  precisely  similar  error  to  that 
made  by  Sir  George  Collier  and  Lord  Stuart  at  a 
later  date  about  the  Cyane  and  Levant.  James 
wishes  to  prove  that  each  party  perceived  the  force 
of  the  other,  and  draws  a  contrast  (p.  312)  between 
the  "gallantry  of  one  party  and  pusillanimity  of 
the  other."  This  is  nonsense,  and,  as  in  similar 


On  the  Ocean  219 

cases,  James  overreaches  himself  by  proving  too 
much.  If  he  had  made  an  i8-pounder  frigate  like 
the  Congress  flee  from  another  i8-pounder,  his 
narrative  would  be  within  the  bounds  of  possibility 
and  would  need  serious  examination.  But  the  lit- 
tle 12-pounder  Alexandria,  and  the  ship-sloop  with 
her  1 8-pound  carronades,  would  not  have  stood  the 
ghost  of  a  chance  in  the  contest.  Any  man  who 
would  have  been  afraid  of  them  would  also  have 
been  afraid  of  the  'Little  Belt,  the  sloop  Rodgers  cap- 
tured before  the  war.  As  for  Captains  Cathcart 
and  Ellis,  had  they  known  the  force  of  the  President, 
and  chased  her  with  a  view  of  attacking  her,  their 
conduct  would  have  only  been  explicable  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  afflicted  with  emotional 
insanity. 

The  President  now  steered  southward  and  got 
into  the  mouth  of  the  Irish  Channel;  on  August  2d 
she  shifted  her  berth  and  almost  circled  Ireland; 
then  steered  across  to  Newfoundland,  and  worked 
south  along  the  coast.  On  September  23d,  a  little 
south  of  Nantucket,  she  decoyed  under  her  guns  and 
captured  the  British  schooner  Highflyer,  6,  Lieut. 
William  Hutchinson,  and  45  men;  and  went  into 
Newport  on  the  27th  of  the  same  month,  having 
made  some  12  prizes. 

On  May  24th  Commodore  Decatur  in  the  United 
States,  which  had  sent  ashore  six  carronades,  and 
now  mounted  but  48  guns,  accompanied  by  Captain 
Jones  in  the  Macedonian,  38,  and  Captain  Biddle  in 
the  Wasp,  20,  left  New  York,  passing  through  Hell 


220  Naval  War  of  1812 

Gate,  as  there  was  a  large  blockading  force  off  the 
Hook.  Opposite  Hunter's  Point  the  main-mast  of 
the  States  was  struck  by  lightning,  which  cut  off 
the  broad  pendant,  shot  down  the  hatchway  into 
the  doctor's  cabin,  put  out  his  candle,  ripped  up  the 
bed,  and  entering  between  the  skin  and  ceiling  of 
the  ship  tore  off  two  or  three  sheets  of  copper  near 
the  water-line,  and  disappeared  without  leaving  a 
trace!  The  Macedonian,  which  was  close  behind, 
hove  all  aback,  in  expectation  of  seeing  the  States 
blown  up. 

At  the  end  of  the  Sound,  Commodore  Decatur 
anchored  to  watch  for  a  chance  of  getting  out.  Early 
on  June  ist  he  started;  but  in  a  couple  of  hours  met 
the  British  Captain  R.  D.  Oliver's  squadron,  con- 
sisting of  a  74,  a  razee,  and  a  frigate.  These  chased 
him  back,  and  all  his  three  ships  ran  into  New  Lon- 
don. Here,  in  the  mud  of  the  Thames  River,  the  two 
frigates  remained  blockaded  till  the  close  of  the  war ; 
but  the  little  sloop  slipped  out  later,  to  the  enemy's 
cost. 

We  left  the  Chesapeake,  38,  being  fitted  out  at 
Boston  by  Captain  James  Lawrence,  late  of  the 
Hornet,  Most  of  her  crew,  as  already  stated,  their 
time  being  up,  left,  dissatisfied  with  the  ship's  ill  luck, 
and  angry  at  not  having  received  their  due  share  of 
prize-money.  It  was  very  hard  to  get  sailors,  most 
of  the  men  preferring  to  ship  in  some  of  the  numer- 
ous privateers  where  the  discipline  was  less  strict 
and  the  chance  of  prize-money  much  greater.  In 
consequence  of  this  an  unusually  large  number  of 


On  the  Ocean  221 

foreigners  had  to  be  taken,  including  about  forty 
British  and  a  number  of  Portuguese.  The  latter 
were  peculiarly  troublesome;  one  of  their  number, 
a  boatswain's  mate,  finally  almost  brought  about  a 
mutiny  among  the  crew,  which  was  only  pacified  by 
giving  the  men  prize-checks.  A  few  of  the  Constitu- 
tion's old  crew  came  aboard,  and  these,  together 
with  some  of  the  men  who  had  been  on  the  Chesa- 
peake during  her  former  voyage,  made  an  excellent 
nucleus.  Such  men  needed  very  little  training  at 
either  guns  or  sails;  but  the  new  hands  were  un- 
practiced,  and  came  on  board  so  late  that  the  last 
draft  that  arrived  still  had  their  hammocks  and 
bags  lying  in  the  boats  stowed  over  the  booms 
when  the  ship  was  captured.  The  officers  were 
largely  new  to  the  ship,  though  the  first  lieutenant, 
Mr.  A.  Ludlow,  had  been  the  third  in  her  former 
cruise;  the  third  and  fourth  lieutenants  were  not 
regularly  commissioned  as  such,  but  were  only  mid- 
shipmen acting  for  the  first  time  in  higher  positions. 
Captain  Lawrence  himself  was  of  course  new  to  all, 
both  officers  and  crew.25  In  other  words,  the  Chesa- 
peake possessed  good  material,  but  in  an  exceeding- 
ly unseasoned  state. 

*5  On  the  day  on  which  he  sailed  to  attack  the  Shannon, 
Lawrence  writes  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  as  follows: 
"Lieutenant  Paige  is  so  ill  as  to  be  unable  to  go  to  sea  with 
the  ship.  At  the  urgent  request  of  Acting-Lieutenant  Pierce 
I  have  granted  him,  also,  permission  to  go  on  shore;  one  in- 
ducement for  my  granting  his  request  was  his  being  at  vari- 
ance with  every  officer  in  his  mess."  "Captains'  Letters," 
vol.  29,  No.  i,  in  the  Naval  Archives  at  Washington.  Neither 
officers  nor  men  had  shaken  together. 


222  Naval  War  of  1812 

Meanwhile  the  British  frigate  Shannon,  38, 
Captain  Philip  Bowes  Vere  Broke,  was  cruising  off 
the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  To  give  some  idea  of 
the  reason  why  she  proved  herself  so  much  more 
formidable  than  her  British  sister  frigate  it  may  be 
well  to  quote,  slightly  condensing,  from  James: 

"There  was  another  point  in  which  the  generality 
of  British  crews,  as  compared  with  any  one  Ameri- 
can crew,  were  miserably  deficient;  that  is,  skill  in 
the  art  of  gunnery.  While  the  American  seamen 
were  constantly  firing  at  marks,  the  British  seamen, 
except  in  particular  cases,  scarcely  did  so  once  in  a 
year;  and  some  ships  could  be  named  on  board  which 
not  a  shot  had  been  fired  in  this  way  for  upward  of 
three  years.  Nor  was  the  fault  wholly  the  cap- 
tain's. The  instructions  under  which  he  was  bound 
to  act  forbade  him  to  use,  during  the  first  six  months 
after  the  ship  had  received  her  armament,  more 
shots  per  month  than  amounted  to  a  third  in  number 
of  the  upper-deck  guns ;  and,  after  these  six  months, 
only  half  the  quantity.  Many  captains  never  put  a 
shot  in  the  guns  till  an  enemy  appeared;  they  em- 
ployed the  leisure  time  of  the  men  in  handling  the 
sails  and  in  decorating  the  ship."  Captain  Broke 
was  not  one  of  this  kind.  "From  the  day  on  which 
he  had  joined  her,  the  I4th  of  September,  1806, 
the  Shannon  began  to  feel  the  effect  of  her  captain's 
proficiency  as  a  gunner  and  zeal  for  the  service. 
The  laying  of  the  ship's  ordnance  so  that  it  may  be 
correctly  fired  in  a  horizontal  direction  is  justly 
deemed  a  most  important  operation,  as  upon  it  de- 


On  the  Ocean  223 

pends  in  a  great  measure  the  true  aim  and  destruct- 
ive effect  of  the  shot ;  this  was  attended  to  by  Captain 
Broke  in  person.  By  draughts  from  other  ships, 
and  the  usual  means  to  which  a  British  man-of- 
war  is  obliged  to  resort,  the  Shannon  got  together  a 
crew;  and  in  the  course  of  a  year  or  two,  by  the 
paternal  care  and  excellent  regulations  of  Captain 
Broke,  the  ship's  company  became  as  pleasant  to 
command  as  it  was  dangerous  to  meet."  The 
Shannon's  guns  were  all  carefully  sighted,  and, 
moreover,  "every  day,  for  about  an  hour  and  a  half 
in  the  forenoon,  when  not  prevented  by  chase  or  the 
state  of  the  weather,  the  men  were  exercised  at 
training  the  guns,  and  for  the  same  time  in  the  after- 
noon in  the  use  of  the  broadsword,  pike,  musket, 
etc.  Twice  a  week  the  crew  fired  at  targets,  both 
with  great  guns  and  musketry;  and  Captain  Broke, 
as  an  additional  stimulus  beyond  the  emulation  ex- 
cited, gave  a  pound  of  tobacco  to  every  man  that 
put  a  shot  through  the  bull's  eye."  He  would  fre- 
quently have  a  cask  thrown  overboard  and  suddenly 
order  some  one  gun  to  be  manned  to  sink  the  cask. 
In  short,  the  Shannon  was  very  greatly  superior, 
thanks  to  her  careful  training,  to  the  average  Brit- 
ish frigate  of  her  rate,  while  the  Chesapeake,  owing 
to  her  having  a  raw  and  inexperienced  crew,  was 
decidedly  inferior  to  the  average  American  frigate 
of  the  same  strength. 

In    force    the    two    frigates    compared    pretty 
equally,26  the  American  being  the  superior  in  just 

*6  Taking  each  commander's  account  for  his  own  force. 


224  Naval  War  of  1812 

about  the  same  proportion  that  the  Wasp  was  to 
the  Frolic,  or,  at  a  later  date,  the  Hornet  to  the  Pen- 
guin. The  Chesapeake  carried  50  guns  (26  in 
broadside),  28  long  i8's  on  the  gun-deck,  and  on 
the  spar-deck  two  long  I2's,  one  long  18,  eighteen 
32-pound  carronades,  and  one  1 2-pound  carronade 
(which  was  not  used  in  the  fight,  however).  Her 
broadside,  allowing  for  the  short  weight  of  metal, 
was  542  Ibs. ;  her  complement,  379  men.  The  Shan- 
non carried  52  guns  (26  in  broadside),  28  long  i8's 
on  the  gun-deck,  and  on  the  spar-deck  four  long  g's, 
one  long  6,  16  32-pound  carronades,  and  three  12- 
pound  carronades  (two  of  which  were  not  used  in 
the  fight).  Her  broadside  was  550  Ibs.;  her  crew 
consisted  of  330  men,  30  of  whom  were  raw  hands. 
Early  on  the  morning  of  June  ist,  Captain  Broke 
sent  in  to  Captain  Lawrence,  by  an  American  pris- 
oner, a  letter  of  challenge,  which  for  courteousness, 
manliness,  and  candor  is  the  very  model  of  what 
such  an  epistle  should  be.  Before  it  reached  Boston, 
however,  Captain  Lawrence  had  weighed  anchor, 
to  attack  the  Shannon,  which  frigate  was  in  full 
sight  in  the  offing.  It  has  been  often  said  that  he 
engaged  against  his  judgment,  but  this  may  be 
doubted.  His  experience  with  the  Bonne  Citoy- 
enne,  Espiegle  and  Peacock  had  not  tended  to  give 
him  a  very  high  idea  of  the  navy  to  which  he  was  op- 
posed, and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  was  confident 
of  capturing  the  Shannon.27  It  was  most  unfortu- 

41  In  his  letter  written  just  before  sailing  (already  quoted 
on  p.  221)  he  says:  "An  English  frigate  is  now  in  sight  from 


On  the  Ocean  225 

nate  that  he  did  not  receive  Broke's  letter,  as  the 
latter  in  it  expressed  himself  willing  to  meet  Law- 
rence in  any  latitude  and  longitude  he  might  appoint ; 
and  there  would  thus  have  been  some  chance  of  the 
American  crew  having  time  enough  to  get  into  shape. 
At  midday  of  June  I,  1812,  the  Chesapeake 
weighed  anchor,  stood  out  of  Boston  Harbor,  and 
at  i  P.M.  rounded  the  Light-house.  The  Shannon 
stood  off  under  easy  sail,  and  at  3.40  hauled  up  and 
reefed  top-sails.  At  4  P.M.  she  again  bore  away 
with  her  foresail  brailed  up,  and  her  main  top-sail 
braced  flat  and  shivering,  that  the  Chesapeake  might 
overtake  her.  An  hour  later,  Boston  Light-house 
bearing  west  distant  about  six  leagues,  she  again 
hauled  up,  with  her  head  to  the  southeast,  and  lay 
to  under  top-sail,  top-gallant  sails,  jib,  and  spanker. 
Meanwhile,  as  the  breeze  freshened  the  Chesapeake 
took  in  her  studding-sails,  top-gallant  sails,  and  roy- 
als, got  her  royal  yards  on  deck,  and  came  down  very 
fast  under  top-sails  and  jib.  At  5.30,  to  keep  under 
command  and  be  able  to  wear  if  necessary,  the 
Shannon  filled  her  main  top-sail  and  kept  a  close 
luff,  and  then  again  let  the  sail  shiver.  At  5.25 
the  Chesapeake  hauled  up  her  foresail,  and  with 

our  deck.  ...  I  am  in  hopes  to  give  a  good  account  of  her 
before  night."  My  account  of  the  action  is  mainly  taken 
from  James'  "Naval  History"  and  Brighton's  "Memoir  of 
Admiral  Broke"  (according  to  which  the  official  letter  of 
Captain  Broke  was  tampered  with) ;  see  also  the  letter  of 
Lieut.  George  Budd,  June  15,  1813;  the  report  of  the  Court 
of  Inquiry,  Commodore  Bainbridge  presiding,  and  the  court- 
martial  held  on  board  frigate  United  States  April  15,  1814, 
Commodore  Decatur  presiding. 


226  Naval  War  of  1812 

three  ensigns  flying,  steered  straight  for  the  Shan- 
non's starboard  quarter.  Broke  was  afraid  that 
Lawrence  would  pass  under  the  Shannon's  stern, 
rake  her,  and  engage  her  on  the  quarter;  but  either 
overlooking  or  waiving  this  advantage,  the  Ameri- 
can captain  luffed  up  within  50  yards  upon  the 
Shannon's  starboard  quarter,  and  squared  his  main- 
yard.  On  board  the  Shannon  the  captain  of  the 
1 4th  gun,  William  Mindham,  had  been  ordered  not 
to  fire  till  it  bore  into  the  second  main-deck  port 
forward;  at  5.50  it  was  fired,  and  then  the  other 
guns  in  quick  succession  from  aft  forward,  the 
Chesapeake  replying  with  her  whole  broadside.  At 
5.53  Lawrence,  finding  he  was  forging  ahead,  hauled 
up  a  little.  The  Chesapeake 's  broadsides  were  do- 
ing great  damage,  but  she  herself  was  suffering  even 
more  than  her  foe;  the  men  in  the  Shannon's  tops 
could  hardly  see  the  deck  of  the  American  frigate 
through  the  clouds  of  splinters,  hammocks,  and  other 
wreck  that  was  flying  across  it.  Man  after  man  was 
killed  at  the  wheel ;  the  fourth  lieutenant,  the  master, 
and  the  boatswain  were  slain;  and  at  5.56,  having 
had  her  jib  sheet  and  foretop-sail  tie  shot  away,  and 
her  spanker  brails  loosened  so  that  the  sail  blew  out, 
the  Chesapeake  came  up  into  the  wind  somewhat,  so 
as  to  expose  her  quarter  to  her  antagonist's  broad- 
side, which  beat  in  her  stern-ports  and  swept  the  men 
from  the  after  guns.  One  of  the  arm  chests  on  the 
quarter-deck  was  blown  up  by  a  hand-grenade 
thrown  from  the  Shannon?*  The  Chesapeake  was 

*8  This  explosion  may  have'  had  more  effect  than  is  com- 
monly supposed  in  the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake.     Commo- 


On  the  Ocean  227 

now  seen  to  have  stern-way  on  and  to  be  paying 
slowly  off ;  so  the  Shannon  put  her  helm  a-starboard 
and  shivered  her  mizzen  top-sail,  so  as  to  keep  off 
the  wind  and  delay  the  boarding.  But  at  that  mo- 
ment her  jib  stay  was  shot  away,  and,  her  headsails 
becoming  becalmed,  she  went  off  very  slowly.  In 
consequence,  at  6  P.M.  the  two  frigates  fell  aboard, 
the  Chesapeake's  quarter  pressing  upon  the  Shan- 
non's side  just  forward  the  starboard  main-chains, 
and  the  frigates  were  kept  in  this  position  by  the 
fluke  of  the  Shannon's  anchor  catching  in  the  Chesa- 
peake's quarter  port. 

The  Shannon's  crew  had  suffered  severely,  but 
not  the  least  panic  or  disorder  existed  among  them. 
Broke  ran  forward,  and  seeing  his  foes  flinching 
from  the  quarter-deck  guns,  he  ordered  the  ships 
to  be  lashed  together,  the  great  guns  to  cease  firing, 
and  the  boarders  to  be  called.  The  boatswain,  who 
had  fought  in  Rodney's  action,  set  about  fastening 

dore  Bainbridge,  writing  from  Charlestown,  Mass.,  on  June 
2,  1813  (see  "Captains'  Letters,"  vol.  xxix,  No.  10),  says: 
"Mr.  Knox,  the  pilot  on  board,  left  the  Chesapeake  at  5 
P.M.  ...  At  6  P.M.,  Mr.  Knox  informs  me,  the  fire  opened, 
and  at  12  minutes  past  six  both  ships  were  laying  alongside 
one  another  as  if  in  the  act  of  boarding ;  at  that  moment  an 
explosion  took  place  on  board  the  Chesapeake,  which  spread 
a  fire  on  her  upper  deck  from  the  foremast  to  the  mizzen- 
mast,  as  high  as  her  tops,  and  enveloped  both  ships  in  smoke 
for  several  minutes.  After  it  cleared  away  they  were  seen 
separate,  with  the  British  flag  hoisted  on  board  the  Chesa- 
peake over  the  American."  James  denies  that  the  explosion 
was  caused  by  a  hand-grenade,  though  he  says  there  were 
some  of  these  aboard  the  Shannon.  It  is  a  point  of  no 
interest. 


228  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  vessels  together,  which  the  grim  veteran  suc- 
ceeded in  doing,  though  his  right  arm  was  literally 
hacked  off  by  a  blow  from  a  cutlass.  All  was  con- 
fusion and  dismay  on  board  the  Chesapeake.  Lieu- 
tenant Ludlow  had  been  mortally  wounded  and  car- 
ried below;  Lawrence  himself,  while  standing  on 
the  quarter-deck,  fatally  conspicuous  by  his  full- 
dress  uniform  and  commanding  stature,  was  shot 
down,  as  the  vessels  closed,  by  Lieutenant  Law  of 
the  British  marines.  He  fell  dying,  and  was  car- 
ried below,  exclaiming:  "Don't  give  up  the  ship" 
— a  phrase  that  has  since  become  proverbial  among 
his  countrymen.  The  third  lieutenant,  Mr.  W.  S. 
Cox,  came  on  deck,  but  utterly  demoralized  by  the 
aspect  of  affairs,  he  basely  ran  below  without  stay- 
ing to  rally  the  men^  and  was  court-martialed  after- 
ward for  so  doing.  At  6.02  Captain  Broke  stepped 
from  the  Shannon's  gangway  rail  on  to  the  muzzle 
of  the  Chesapeake 's  aftermost  carronade,  and  thence 
over  the  bulwark  on  to  her  quarter-deck,  followed 
by  about  20  men.  As  they  came  aboard,  the  Chesa- 
peake's  foreign  mercenaries  and  the  raw  natives 
of  the  crew  deserted  their  quarters;  the  Portuguese 
boatswain's  mate  removed  the  gratings  of  the  berth- 
deck,  and  he  ran  below,  followed  by  many  of  the 
crew,  among  them  one  of  the  midshipmen  named 
Deforest.  On  the  quarter-deck  almost  the  only  man 
that  made  any  resistance  was  the  chaplain,  Mr. 
Livermore,  who  advanced,  firing  his  pistol  at  Broke, 
and  in  return  nearly  had  his  arm  hewed  off  by  a 
stroke  from  the  latter's  broad  Toledo  blade.  On 


On  the  Ocean  229 

the  upper  deck  the  only  men  who  behaved  well  were 
the  marines,  but  of  their  original  number  of  44  men, 
14,  including  Lieutenant  James  Broom  and  Cor- 
poral Dixon,  were  dead,  and  20,  including  Sergeants 
Twin  and  Harris,  wounded,  so  that  there  were  left 
but  one  corporal  and  nine  men,  several  of  whom 
had  been  knocked  down  and  bruised,  though  re- 
ported unwounded.  There  was  thus  hardly  any 
resistance,  Captain  Broke  stopping  his  men  for  a 
moment  till  they  were  joined  by  the  rest  of  the 
boarders  under  Lieutenants  Watt  and  Falkiner. 
The  Chesapeake's  mizzen-topmen  began  firing  at 
the  boarders,  mortally  wounding  a  midshipman, 
Mr.  Samwell,  and  killing  Lieutenant  Watt;  but  one 
of  the  Shannon's  long  nines  was  pointed  at  the 
top  and  cleared  it  out,  being  assisted  by  the  Eng- 
lish main-topmen,  under  Midshipman  Coshnahan. 
At  the  same  time  the  men  in  the  Chesapeake' s  main- 
top were  driven  out  of  it  by  the  fire  of  the  Shannon's 
fore-topmen,  under  Midshipman  Smith.  Lieutenant 
George  Budd,  who  was  on  the  main-deck,  now  for 
the  first  time  learned  that  the  English  had  boarded, 
as  the  upper-deck  men  came  crowding  down,  and  at 
once  called  on  his  people  to  follow  him;  but  the 
foreigners  and  novices  held  back,  and  only  a  few 
of  the  veterans  followed  him  up.  As  soon  as  he 
reached  the  spar-deck,  Budd,  followed  by  only  a 
dozen  men,  attacked  the  British  as  they  came  along 
the  gangways,  repulsing  them  for  a  moment,  and 
killing  the  British  purser,  Aldham,  and  captain's 
clerk,  Dunn ;  but  the  handful  of  Americans  were  at 


230  Naval  War  of  1812 

once  cut  down  or  dispersed,  Lieutenant  Budd  being 
wounded  and  knocked  down  the  main  hatchway. 
"The  enemy,"  writes  Captain  Broke,  "fought  des- 
perately, but  in  disorder."  Lieutenant  Ludlow,  al- 
ready mortally  wounded,  struggled  up  on  deck,  fol- 
lowed by  two  or  three  men,  but  was  at  once  disabled 
by  a  sabre  cut.  On  the  forecastle  a  few  seamen 
and  marines  turned  to  bay.  Captain  Broke  was 
still  leading  his  men  with  the  same  brilliant  per- 
sonal courage  he  had  all  along  shown.  Attacking 
the  first  American,  who  was  armed  with  a  pike,  he 
parried  a  blow  from  it,  and  cut  down  the  man;  at- 
tacking another  he  was  himself  cut  down,  and  only 
saved  by  the  seaman  Mindham,  already  mentioned, 
who  slew  his  assailant.  One  of  the  American  ma- 
rines, using  his  clubbed  musket,  killed  an  English- 
man, and  so  stubborn  was  the  resistance  of  the  little 
group  that  for  a  moment  the  assailants  gave  back, 
having  lost  several  killed  and  wounded;  but  im- 
mediately afterward  they  closed  in  and  slew  their 
foes  to  the  last  man.  The  British  fired  a  volley  or 
two  down  the  hatchway,  in  response  to  a  couple  of 
shots  fired  up;  all  resistance  was  at  an  end,  and  at 
6.05,  just  fifteen  minutes  after  the  first  gun  had 
been  fired,  and  not  five  after  Captain  Broke  had 
come  aboard,  the  colors  of  the  Chesapeake  were 
struck.  Of  her  crew  of  379  men,  61  were  killed 
or  mortally  wounded,  including  her  captain,  her 
first  and  fourth  lieutenants,  the  lieutenant  of  ma- 
rines, the  master  (White),  boatswain  (Adams), 
and  three  midshipmen,  and  85  severely  and  slightly 


On  the  Ocean  231 

wounded,  including  both  her  other  lieutenants,  five 
midshipmen,  and  the  chaplain,  total,  148;  the  loss 
falling  almost  entirely  upon  the  American  portion 
of  the  crew. 

Of  the  Shannon's  men,  33  were  killed  outright 
or  died  of  their  wounds,  including  her  first  lieuten- 
ant, purser,  captain's  clerk,  and  one  midshipman, 
and  50  wounded,  including  the  captain  himself  and 
the  boatswain;  total,  83. 

The  Chesapeake  was  taken  into  Halifax,  where 
Captain  Lawrence  and  Lieutenant  Ludlow  were 
both  buried  with  military  honors.  Captain  Broke 
was  made  a  baronet,  very  deservedly,  and  Lieuten- 
ants Wallis  and  Falkiner  were  both  made  com- 
manders. 

The  British  writers  accuse  some  of  the  American 
crew  of  treachery;  the  Americans  in  turn,  accuse 
the  British  of  revolting  brutality.  Of  course  in 
such  a  fight  things  are  not  managed  with  urbane 
courtesy,  and,  moreover,  writers  are  prejudiced. 
Those  who  would  like  to  hear  one  side  are  referred 
to  James;  if  they  wish  to  hear  the  other,  to  the 
various  letters  from  officers  published  in  "Niles' 
Register,"  especially  Vol.  V,  p.  142. 

Neither  ship  had  lost  a  spar,  but  all  the  lower 
masts,  especially  the  two  mizzen-masts,  were  badly 
wounded.  The  Americans  at  that  period  were 
fond  of  using  bar  shot,  which  were  of  very  ques- 
tionable benefit,  being  useless  against  a  ship's  hull, 
though  said  to  be  sometimes  of  great  help  in  un- 
rigging an  antagonist  from  whom  one  was  desirous 


232  Naval  War  of  1812 

of  escaping,  as  in  the  case  of  the  President  and 
Endymion. 

It  is  thus  seen  that  the  Shannon  received  from 
shot  alone  only  about  half  the  damage  the  Chesa- 
peake did;  the  latter  was  thoroughly  beaten  at  the 
guns,  in  spite  of  what  some  American  authors  say 
to  the  contrary.  And  her  victory  was  not  in  the 


*«       ««       «„ 


"tMxtjjtAja"  moot  *v 

14  UMJINOM  "  mrUCK  »» 

•9  eighteen-pound  shot, 
35   thirty-two-pound  shot, 
a   nine-pound  thot, 
306  gr»pt. 

361  <M. 

ll  eighteen-pound  shot. 

13    UiTrty-two-pouad  ibol, 
U  bar  s!iot,- 

II1J   £T»p«. 

158   shot. 

slightest  degree  to  be  attributed  to,  though  it  may 
have  been  slightly  hastened  by,  accident.  Training 
and  discipline  won  the  victory,  as  often  before;  only 
in  this  instance  the  training  and  discipline  were 
against  us. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  Chesapeake 
battered  the  Shannon's  hull  far  more  than  either  the 
Java,  Guerriere,  or  Macedonian  did  the  hulls  of 
their  opponents,  and  that  she  suffered  less  in  re- 


On  the  Ocean  233 

turn  (not  in  loss  but  in  damage)  than  they  did. 
The  Chesapeake  was  a  better  fighter  than  either  the 
Java,  Guerriere,  or  Macedonian,  and  could  have 
captured  any  one  of  them.  The  Shannon  of  course 
did  less  damage  than  any  of  the  American  44/8, 
probably  just  about  in  the  proportion  of  the  differ- 
ence in  force. 

Almost  all  American  writers  have  treated  the 
capture  of  the  Chesapeake  as  if  it  was  due  simply 
to  a  succession  of  unfortunate  accidents;  for  ex- 
ample, Cooper,  with  his  usual  cheerful  optimism, 
says  that  the  incidents  of  the  battle,  excepting  its 
short  duration,  are  "altogether  the  results  of  the 
chances  of  war,"  and  that  it  was  mainly  decided  by 
"fortuitous  events  as  unconnected  with  any  particu- 
lar merit  on  the  one  side  as  they  are  with  any 
particular  demerit  on  the  other."29  Most  naval 
men  consider  it  a  species  of  treason  to  regard  the 
defeat  as  due  to  anything  but  extraordinary  ill 
fortune.  And  yet  no  disinterested  reader  can  help 
acknowledging  that  the  true  reason  of  the  defeat 
was  the  very  simple  one  that  the  Shannon  fought 
better  than  the  Chesapeake.  It  has  often  been  said 
that  up  to  the  moment  when  the  ships  came  to- 
gether the  loss  and  damage  suffered  by  each  were 

59  The  worth  of  such  an  explanation  is  very  aptly  gauged 
in  General  Alexander  S.  Webb's  "The  Peninsula;  McClel- 
lan's  Campaign  of  1862"  (New  York,  1881),  p.  35,  where  he 
speaks  of ' '  those  unforeseen  or  uncontrollable  agencies  which 
are  vaguely  described  as  the  'fortune  of  war,'  but  which  usu- 
ally prove  to  be  the  superior  ability  or  resources  of  the  an- 
tagonist." 


234  Naval  War  of  1812 

about  the  same.  This  is  not  true,  and  even  if  it 
was,  would  not  affect  the  question.  The  heavy  loss 
on  board  the  Shannon  did  not  confuse  or  terrify 
the  thoroughly  trained  men  with  their  implicit  re- 
liance on  their  leaders;  and  the  experienced  officers 
were  ready  to  defend  any  point  that  was  menaced. 
An  equal  or  greater  amount  of  loss  aboard  the 
Chesapeake  disheartened  and  confused  the  raw 
crew,  who  simply  had  not  had  the  time  or  chance 
to  become  well  disciplined.  Many  of  the  old  hands, 
of  course,  kept  their  wits  and  their  pluck,  but  the 
novices  and  the  disaffected  did  not.  Similarly  with 
the  officers;  some,  as  the  Court  of  Inquiry  found, 
had  not  kept  to  their  posts,  and  all  being  new  to 
each  other  and  the  ship,  could  not  show  to  their 
best.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Chesapeake  was 
beaten  at  the  guns  before  she  was  boarded.  Had 
the  ships  not  come  together,  the  fight  would  have 
been  longer,  the  loss  greater,  and  more  nearly  equal ; 
but  the  result  would  have  been  the  same.  Cooper 
says  that  the  enemy  entered  with  great  caution,  and 
so  slowly  that  twenty  resolute  men  could  have  re- 
pulsed him.  It  was  no  proof  of  caution  for  Cap- 
tain Broke  and  his  few  followers  to  leap  on  board, 
unsupported,  and  then  they  only  waited  for  the 
main  body  to  come  up;  and  no  twenty  men  could 
have  repulsed  such  boarders  as  followed  Broke. 
The  fight  was  another  lesson,  with  the  parties  re- 
versed, to  the  effect  that  want  of  training  and  disci- 
pline is  a  bad  handicap.  Had  the  Chesapeake's 
crew  been  in  service  as  many  months  as  the  Shan- 


On  the  Ocean  235 

non's  had  been  years,  such  a  captain  as  Lawrence 
would  have  had  his  men  perfectly  in  hand;  they 
would  not  have  been  cowed  by  their  losses,  nor 
some  of  the  officers  too  demoralized  to  act  properly, 
and  the  material  advantages  which  the  Chesapeake 
possessed,  although  not  very  great,  would  probably 
have  been  enough  to  give  her  a  good  chance  of 
victory.  It  is  well  worth  noticing  that  the  only 
thoroughly  disciplined  set  of  men  aboard  (all  ac- 
cording to  James  himself,  by  the  way,  native  Ameri- 
cans), namely,  the  marines,  did  excellently,  as 
shown  by  the  fact  that  three-fourths  of  their  num- 
ber were  among  the  killed  and  wounded.  The 
foreigners  aboard  the  Chesapeake  did  not  do  as 
well  as  the  Americans,  but  it  is  nonsense  to  ascribe 
the  defeat  in  any  way  to  them ;  it  was  only  rendered 
rather  more  disastrous  by  their  actions.  Most  of 
the  English  authors  give  very  fair  accounts  of  the 
battle,  except  that  they  hardly  allude  to  the  peculiar 
disadvantages  under  which  the  Chesapeake  suf- 
fered when  she  entered  into  it.  Thus,  James 
thinks  the  Java  was  unprepared  because  she  had 
only  been  to  sea  six  weeks;  but  does  not  lay  any 
weight  on  the  fact  that  the  Chesapeake  had  been 
out  only  as  many  hours. 

Altogether  the  best  criticism  on  the  fight  is  that 
written  by  M.  de  la  Graviere.30  "It  is  impossible 
to  avoid  seeing  in  the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake 
a  new  proof  of  the  enormous  power  of  a  good  or- 
ganization, when  it  has  received  the  consecration 

*°  "Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  272. 


236  Naval  War  of  1812 

of  a  few  years'  actual  service  on  the  sea.  On  this 
occasion,  in  effect,  two  captains  equally  renowned, 
the  honor  of  two  navies,  were  opposed  to  each 
other  on  two  ships  of  the  same  tonnage  and  num- 
ber of  guns.  Never  had  the  chances  seemed  better 
balanced,  but  Sir  Philip  Broke  had  commanded  the 
Shannon  for  nearly  seven  years,  while  Captain 
Lawrence  had  only  commanded  the  Chesapeake  for 
a  few  days.  The  first  of  these  frigates  had  cruised 
for  eighteen  months  on  the  coast  of  America;  the 
second  was  leaving  port.  One  had  a  crew  long 
accustomed  to  the  habits  of  strict  obedience;  the 
other  was  manned  by  men  who  had  just  been  en- 
gaged in  mutiny.  The  Americans  were  wrong  to 
accuse  fortune  on  this  occasion.  Fortune  was  not 
fickle,  she  was  merely  logical.  The  Shannon  cap- 
tured the  Chesapeake  on  the  first  of  June,  1813, 
but  on  the  I4th  of  September,  1806,  the  day  when 
he  took  command  of  his  frigate,  Captain  Broke  had 
begun  to  prepare  the  glorious  termination  to  this 
bloody  affair." 

Hard  as  it  is  to  breathe  a  word  against  such  a 
man  as  Lawrence,  a  very  Bayard  of  the  seas,  who 
was  admired  as  much  for  his  dauntless  bravery  as 
he  was  loved  for  his  gentleness  and  uprightness,  it 
must  be  confessed  that  he  acted  rashly.  And  after 
he  had  sailed,  it  was,  as  Lord  Howard  Douglas 
has  pointed  out,  a  tactical  error,  however  chivalric, 
to  neglect  the  chance  of  luffing  across  the  Shannon's 
stern  to  rake  her;  exactly  as  it  was  a  tactical  error 
of  his  equally  chivalrous  antagonist  to  have  let  him 


On  the  Ocean  237 

have  such  an  opportunity.  Hull  would  not  have 
committed  either  error,  and  would,  for  the  matter 
of  that,  have  been  an  overmatch  for  either  com- 
mander. But  it  must  always  be  remembered  that 
Lawrence's  encounters  with  the  English  had  not 
been  such  as  to  give  him  a  high  opinion  of  them. 
The  only  foe  he  had  fought  had  been  inferior  in 
strength,  it  is  true,  but  had  hardly  made  any  effec- 
tive resistance.  Another  sloop,  of  equal,  if  not 
superior  force,  had  tamely  submitted  to  blockade 
for  several  days,  and  had  absolutely  refused  to  fight. 
And  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Chesapeake, 
unprepared  though  she  was,  would  have  been  an 
overmatch  for  the  Guerriere,  Macedonian,  or  Java. 
Altogether  it  is  hard  to  blame  Lawrence  for  going 
out,  and  in  every  other  respect  his  actions  never 
have  been,  nor  will  be,  mentioned,  by  either  friend 
or  foe,  without  the  warmest  respect.  But  that  is 
no  reason  for  insisting  that  he  was  ruined  purely 
by  an  adverse  fate.  We  will  do  far  better  to  recol- 
lect that  as  much  can  be  learned  from  reverses  as 
from  victories.  Instead  of  flattering  ourselves  by 
saying  the  defeat  was  due  to  chance,  let  us  try  to 
find  out  what  the  real  cause  was,  and  then  take 
care  that  it  does  not  have  an  opportunity  to  act 
again.  A  little  less  rashness  would  have  saved 
Lawrence's  life  and  his  frigate,  while  a  little  more 
audacity  on  one  occasion  would  have  made  Com- 
modore Chauncy  famous  for  ever.  And  whether 
a  lesson  is  to  be  learned  or  not,  a  historian  should 
remember  that  his  profession  is  not  that  of  a 


238  Naval  War  of  1812 

panegyrist.  The  facts  of  the  case  unquestionably 
are  that  Captain  Broke,  in  fair  fight,  within  sight 
of  the  enemy's  harbor,  proved  conqueror  over  a 
nominally  equal  and  in  reality  slightly  superior 
force;  and  that  this  is  the  only  single-ship  action  of 
the  war  in  which  the  victor  was  weaker  in  force 
than  his  opponent.  So  much  can  be  gathered  by 
reading  only  the  American  accounts.  Moreover 
accident  had  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  gain- 
ing of  the  victory.  The  explanation  is  perfectly 
easy;  Lawrence  and  Broke  were  probably  exactly 
equal  in  almost  everything  that  goes  to  make  up 
a  first-class  commander,  but  one  had  trained  his 
crew  for  seven  years,  and  the  other  was  new  to 
the  ship,  to  the  officers,  and  to  the  men,  and  the 
last  to  each  other.  The  Chesapeake 's  crew  must 
have  been  of  fine  material,  or  they  would  not  have 
fought  so  well  as  they  did. 

So  much  for  the  American  accounts.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake  was,  and 
is,  held  by  many  British  historians  to  "conclusively 
prove"  a  good  many  different  things;  such  as,  that 
if  the  odds  were  anything  like  equal,  a  British  frig- 
ate could  always  whip  an  American,  that  in  a  hand- 
to-hand  conflict  such  would  invariably  be  the  case, 
etc. ;  and  as  this  was  the  only  single-ship  action  of 
the  war  in  which  the  victor  was  the  inferior  in  force, 
most  British  writers  insist  that  it  reflected  more 
honor  on  them  than  all  the  frigate  actions  of  1812 
put  together  did  on  the  Americans. 

These  assertions  can  be  best  appreciated  by  ref- 


On  the  Ocean  239 

erence  to  a  victory  won  by  the  French  in  the  year 
of  the  Battle  of  the  Nile.  On  the  i4th  of  Decem- 
ber, 1798,  after  two  hours'  conflict,  the  French  24- 
gun  corvette  Bayonnaise  captured,  by  boarding,  the 
English  32-gun  frigate  Ambuscade.  According  to 
James  the  Ambuscade  threw  at  a  broadside  262 
pounds  of  shot,  and  was  manned  by  190  men, 
while  the  Bayonnaise  threw  150  pounds,  and  had 
on  board  supernumeraries  and  passenger  soldiers 
enough  to  make  in  all  250  men.  According  to 
the  French  historian  Rouvier31  the  broadside  force 
was  246  pounds  against  80  pounds;  according  to 
Troude32  it  was  270  pounds  against  112.  M.  Leon 
Guerin,  in  his  voluminous  but  exceedingly  preju- 
diced and  one-sided  work,33  makes  the  difference 
even  greater.  At  any  rate  the  English  vessel  was 
vastly  the  superior  in  force,  and  was  captured  by 
boarding,  after  a  long  and  bloody  conflict  in  which 
she  lost  46,  and  her  antagonist  over  50,  men.  Dur- 
ing all  the  wars  waged  with  the  Republic  and  the 
Empire,  no  English  vessel  captured  a  French  one 
as  much  superior  to  itself  as  the  Ambuscade  was 
to  the  Bayonnaise,  precisely  as  in  the  war  of  1812 
no  American  vessel  captured  a  British  opponent  as 
much  superior  to  itself  as  the  Chesapeake  was  to 
the  Shannon.  Yet  no  sensible  man  can  help  acknowl- 

31  "Histoire  des  Marins  Frangais  sous  la  Republique,"  par 
Charles  Rouvier,  Lieutenant  de  Vaisseau,  Paris,  1868. 

32  "Ba tallies  Navales." 

33  "Histoire  Maritime  de  France"  (par  Leon  Gu6rin,  His- 
torien  titulaire  de  la  Marine,  Membre  de  la  Legion  d'  Hon- 
neur),  vi,  142  (Paris,  1852). 


240  Naval  War  of  1812 

edging,  in  spite  of  these  and  a  few  other  isolated 
instances,  that  at  that  time  the  French  were  inferior 
to  the  English,  and  the  latter  to  the  Americans. 

It  is  amusing  to  compare  the  French  histories 
of  the  English  with  the  English  histories  of  the 
Americans,  and  to  notice  the  similarity  of  the  argu- 
ments they  use  to  detract  from  their  opponents' 
fame.  Of  course  I  do  not  allude  to  such  writers 
as  Lord  Howard  Douglas  or  Admiral  de  la  Gra- 
viere,  but  to  men  like  William  James  and  Leon 
Guerin,  or  even  O.  Troude.  James  is  always  re- 
counting how  American  ships  ran  away  from  British 
ones,  and  Guerin  tells  as  many  anecdotes  of  British 
ships  that  fled  from  French  foes.  James  reproaches 
the  Americans  for  adopting  a  "Parthian"  mode  of 
warfare,  instead  of  "bringing  to  in  a  bold  and  be- 
coming manner."  Precisely  the  same  reproaches 
are  used  by  the  French  writers,  who  assert  that  the 
English  would  not  fight  "fairly,"  but  acquired  an 
advantage  by  manoeuvring.  James  lays  great  stress 
on  the  American  long  guns;  so  does  Lieutenant 
Rouvier  on  the  British  carronades.  James  always 
tells  how  the  Americans  avoided  the  British  ships, 
when  the  crews  of  the  latter  demanded  to  be  led 
aboard;  Troude  says  the  British  always  kept  at 
long  shot,  while  the  French  sailors  "demanderent  a 
grands  cris,  1'abordage."  James  says  the  Ameri- 
cans "hesitated  to  grapple"  with  their  foes  "unless 
they  possessed  a  twofold  superiority;"  Guerin  that 
the  English  "never  dared  attack"  except  when  they 
possessed  "une  superiorite  enorme."  The  British 


On  the  Ocean  241 

sneer  at  the  "mighty  dollar";  the  French  at  the 
"eternal  guinea."  The  former  consider  Decatur's 
name  as  "sunk"  to  the  level  of  Porter's  or  Bain- 
bridge's;  the  latter  assert  that  the  "presumptuous 
Nelson"  was  inferior  to  any  of  the  French  admirals 
of  the  time  preceding  the  Republic.  Says  James: 
"The  Americans  only  fight  welf  when  they  have 
the  superiority  of  force  on  their  side;"  and  Lieu- 
tenant Rouvier:  "Never  have  the  English  van- 
quished us  with  an  undoubted  inferiority  of  force." 

On  June  12,  1813,  the  small  cutter  Surveyor,  of 
six  12-pound  carronades,  was  lying  in  York  River, 
in  the  Chesapeake,  under  the  command  of  Mr.  Wil- 
liam S.  Travis;  her  crew  consisted  of  but  15  men.34 
At  nightfall  she  was  attacked  by  the  boats  of  the 
Narcissus  frigate,  containing  about  50  men,  under 
the  command  of  Lieutenant  John  Creerie.35  None 
of  the  carronades  could  be  used;  but  Mr.  Travis 
made  every  preparation  that  he  could  for  defence. 
The  Americans  waited  till  the  British  were  within 
pistol  shot  before  they  opened  their  fire;  the  latter 
dashed  gallantly  on,  however,  and  at  once  carried 
the  cutter.  But  though  brief,  the  struggle  was 
bloody;  5  of  the  Americans  were  wounded,  and  of 
the  British  3  were  killed  and  7  wounded.  Lieu- 
tenant Creerie  considered  his  opponents  to  have 
shown  so  much  bravery  that  he  returned  Mr.  Travis 


34  Letter  of  W.  S.  Travis,  June  16,  1813. 

35  James,  vi,  334. 


VOL.  IX.— ii 


Naval  War  of  1812 


his  sword,  with  a  letter  as  complimentary  to  him 
as  it  was  creditable  to  the  writer.36 

As  has  been  already  mentioned,  the  Americans 
possessed  a  large  force  of  gunboats  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war.  Some  of  these  were  fairly  sea- 
worthy vessels,  of  90  tons  burden,  sloop  or  schooner- 
rigged,  and  armed  with  one  or  two  long,  heavy 
guns,  and  sometimes  with  several  light  carronades 
to  repel  boarders.37  Gunboats  of  this  kind,  to- 
gether with  the  few  small  cutters  owned  by  the 
government,  were  serviceable  enough.  They  were 
employed  all  along  the  shores  of  Georgia  and  the 
Carolinas,  and  in  Long  Island  Sound,  in  protecting 
the  coasting  trade  by  convoying  parties  of  small  ves- 

36  The  letter,  dated  June  isth,  is  as  follows:  "Your  gallant 
and  desperate  attempt  to  defend  your  vessel  against  more 
than  double  your  number,  on  the  night  of  the  i2th  instant, 
excited  such  admiration  on  the  part  of  your  opponents  as  I 
have  seldom  witnessed,  and  induced  me  to  return  :you  the 
sword  you  had  so  nobly  used,  in  testimony  of  mine.  Our 
poor  fellows  have  suffered  severely,  occasioned  chiefly,  if  not 
solely,  by  the  precautions  you  had  taken  to  prevent  surprise. 
In  short,  I  am  at  a  loss  which  to  admire  most,  the  previous 
arrangement  aboard  the  Surveyor,  or  the  determined  man- 
ner in  which  her  deck  was  disputed  inch  by  inch.  I  am, 
sir,"  etc. 

81  According  to  a  letter  from  Captain  Hugh  G.  Campbell 
(in  the  Naval  Archives,  "Captains'  Letters,"  1812,  vol.  ii, 
Nos.  21  and  192),  the  crews  were  distributed  as  follows:  ten 
men  and  a  boy  to  a  long  32,  seven  men  and  a  boy  to  a  long 
9,  and  five  men  and  a  boy  to  a  carronade,  exclusive  of  petty 
officers.  Captain  Campbell  complains  of  the  scarcity  of  men, 
and  rather  naively  remarks  that  he  is  glad  the  marines  have 
been  withdrawn  from  the  gunboats,  as  this  may  make  the 
commanders  of  the  latter  keep  a  brighter  lookout  than 
formerly. 


On  the  Ocean  243 

sels  from  one  port  to  another,  and  preventing  them 
from  being  molested  by  the  boats  of  any  of  the 
British  frigates.  They  also  acted  as  checks  upon  the 
latter  in  their  descents  upon  the  towns  and  planta- 
tions, occasionally  capturing  their  boats  and  tend- 
ers, and  forcing  them  to  be  very  cautious  in  their 
operations.  They  were  very  useful  in  keeping  pri- 
vateers off  the  coast,  and  capturing  them  when  they 
came  too  far  in.  The  exploits  of  those  on  the  south- 
ern coast  will  be  mentioned  as  they  occurred.  Those 
in  Long  Island  Sound  never  came  into  collision 
with  the  foe,  except  for  a  couple  of  slight  skirmishes 
at  very  long  range;  but  in  convoying  little  fleets 
of  coasters,  and  keeping  at  bay  the  man-of-war 
boats  sent  to  molest  them,  they  were  invaluable; 
and  they  also  kept  the  Sound  clear  of  hostile 
privateers. 

Many  of  the  gunboats  were  much  smaller  than 
those  just  mentioned,  trusting  mainly  to  their  sweeps 
for  motive  power,  and  each  relying  for  offence  on 
one  long  pivot  gun,  a  12  or  i8-pounder.  In  the 
Chesapeake  there  was  quite  a  large  number  of  these 
small  galleys,  with  a  few  of  the  larger  kind,  and 
here  it  was  thought  that  by  acting  together  in  flotil- 
las the  gunboats  might  in  fine  weather  do  consider- 
able damage  to  the  enemy's  fleet  by  destroying 
detached  vessels,  instead  of  confining  themselves  to 
the  more  humble  tasks  in  which  their  brethren  else- 
where were  fairly  successful.  At  this  period  Den- 
mark, having  lost  all  her  large  ships  of  war,  was 
'confining  herself  purely  to  gun-brigs.  These  were 


244  Naval  War  of  1812 

stout  little  craft,  with  heavy  guns,  which,  acting 
together,  and  being  handled  with  spirit  and  skill, 
had  on  several  occasions  in  calm  weather  captured 
small  British  sloops,  and  had  twice  so  injured  frig- 
ates as  to  make  their  return  to  Great  Britain  neces- 
sary; while  they  themselves  had  frequently  been  the 
object  of  successful  cutting-out  expeditions.  Con- 
gress hoped  that  our  gunboats  would  do  as  well  as 
the  Danish ;  but  for  a  variety  of  reasons  they  failed 
utterly  in  every  serious  attack  that  they  made  on 
a  man-of-war,  and  were  worse  than  useless  for  all 
but  the  various  subordinate  employments  above 
mentioned.  The  main  reason  for  this  failure  was 
in  the  gunboats  themselves.  They  were  utterly  use- 
less except  in  perfectly  calm  weather,  for  in  any 
wind  the  heavy  guns  caused  them  to  careen  over  so 
as  to  make  it  difficult  to  keep  them  right  side  up, 
and  impossible  to  fire.  Even  in  smooth  water  they 
could  not  be  fought  at  anchor,  requiring  to  be  kept 
in  position  by  means  of  sweeps ;  and  they  were  very 
unstable,  the  recoil  of  the  guns  causing  them  to 
roll  so  as  to  make  it  difficult  to  aim  with  any  ac- 
curacy after  the  first  discharge,  while  a  single  shot 
hitting  one  put  it  hors  de  combat.  This  last  event 
rarely  happened,  however,  for  they  were  not  often 
handled  with  any  approach  to  temerity,  and,  on  the 
contrary,  usually  made  their  attacks  at  a  range 
that  rendered  it  as  impossible  to  inflict  as  to  receive 
harm.  It  does  not  seem  as  if  they  were  very  well 
managed;  but  they  were  such  ill-conditioned  craft 
that  the  best  officers  might  be  pardoned  for  feeling 


On  the  Ocean  245 

uncomfortable  in  them.  Their  operations  through- 
out the  war  offer  a  painfully  ludicrous  commentary 
on  Jefferson's  remarkable  project  of  having  our 
navy  composed  exclusively  of  such  craft. 

The  first  aggressive  attempt  made  with  the  gun- 
boats was  characteristically  futile.  On  June  2Oth 
15  of-  them,  under  Captain  Tarbell,  attacked  the 
Junon,  38,  Captain  Sanders,  then  lying  becalmed 
in  Hampton  Roads,  with  the  Barossa,  36,  and  Lau- 
restinus,  24,  near  her.  The  gunboats,  while  still  at 
very  long  range,  anchored,  and  promptly  drifted 
round  so  that  they  couldn't  shoot.  Then  they  got 
under  way,  and  began  gradually  to  draw  nearer  to 
the  Junon.  Her  defence  was  very  feeble;  after 
some  hasty  and  ill-directed  volleys  she  endeavored 
to  beat  out  of  the  way.  But  meanwhile,  a  slight 
breeze  having  sprung  up,  the  Barossa,  Captain  Sher- 
riff,  approached  near  enough  to  take  a  hand  in 
the  affair,  and  at  once  made  it  evident  that  she  was 
a  more  dangerous  foe  than  the  Junon,  though  a 
lighter  ship.  As  soon  as  they  felt  the  effects  of  the 
breeze  the  gunboats  became  almost  useless,  and, 
the  Barossa 's  fire  being  animated  and  well  aimed, 
they  withdrew.  They  had  suffered  nothing  from 
the  Junon,  but  during  the  short  period  she  was  en- 
gaged, the  Barossa  had  crippled  one  boat  and 
slightly  damaged  another;  one  man  was  killed  and 
two  wounded.  The  Barossa  escaped  unscathed  and 
the  Junon  was  but  slightly  injured.  Of  the  com- 
batants, the  Barossa  was  the  only  one  that  came 
off  with  credit,  the  Junon  behaving,  if  anything, 


246  Naval  War  of  1812 

rather  worse  than  the  gunboats.  There  was  no 
longer  any  doubt  as  to  the  amount  of  reliance  to 
be  placed  on  the  latter.88 

On  June  20,  1813,  a  British  force  of  three  74*3, 
one  64,  four  frigates,  two  sloops,  and  three  trans- 
ports was  anchored  off  Craney  Island.  On  the 
northwest  side  of  this  island  was  a  battery  of  18- 
pounders,  to  take  charge  of  which  Captain  Cassin, 
commanding  the  naval  forces  at  Norfolk,  sent 
ashore  one  hundred  sailors  of  the  Constellation, 
under  the  command  of  Lieutenants  Neale,  Shu- 
brick,  and  Saunders,  and  fifty  marines  under  Lieu- 
tenant Breckenridge.89  On  the  morning  of  the 
22d  they  were  attacked  by  a  division  of  15  boats, 
containing  700  men,40  seamen,  marines,  chasseurs, 
and  soldiers  of  the  iO2d  regiment,  the  whole  under 
the  command  of  Captain  Pechell,  of  the  San  Do- 
mingo, 74.  Captain  Hanchett  led  the  attack  in  the 

w  Though  the  flotilla  men  did  nothing  in  the  boats,  they 
acted  with  the  most  stubborn  bravery  at  the  battle  of  Bla- 
densburg.  The  British  Lieutenant  Gleig,  himself  a  spectator, 
thus  writes  of  their  deeds  on  that  occasion  ("Campaign  at 
Washington,"  p.  119):  "Of  the  sailors,  however,  it  would 
be  injustice  not  to  speak  in  the  terms  which  their  conduct 
merits.  They  were  employed  as  gunners,  and  not  only  did 
they  serve  their  guns  with  a  quickness  and  precision  which 
astonished  their  assailants,  but  they  stood  till  some  of  them 
were  actually  bayoneted  with  fuses  in  their  hands;  nor  was 
it  till  their  leader  was  wounded  and  taken,  and  they  saw 
themselves  deserted  on  all  sides  by  the  soldiers,  that  they 
quitted  the  field."  Certainly  such  men  could  not  be  accused 
of  lack  of  courage.  Something  else  is  needed  to  account  for 
the  failure  of  the  gunboat  system. 

*  Letter  of  Captain  John  Cassin,  June  23,  1813. 

*•  James,  vi,  337. 


On  the  Ocean  247 

Diadem's  launch.  The  battery's  guns  were  not  fired 
till  the  British  were  close  in,  when  they  opened 
with  destructive  effect.  While  still  some  seventy 
yards  from  the  guns  the  Diadem's  launch  grounded, 
and  the  attack  was  checked.  Three  of  the  boats 
were  now  sunk  by  shot,  but  the  water  was  so  shal- 
low that  they  remained  above  water;  and  while  the 
fighting  was  still  at  its  height,  some  of  the  Con- 
stellation's crew,  headed  by  Midshipman  Tatnall, 
waded  out  and  took  possession  of  them.41  A  few 
of  their  crew  threw  away  their  arms  and  came 
ashore  with  their  captors;  others  escaped  to  the 
remaining  boats,  and  immediately  afterward  the 
flotilla  made  off  in  disorder,  having  lost  91  men. 
The  three  captured  barges  were  large,  strong  boats, 
one  called  the  Centipede  being  fifty  feet  long,  and 
more  formidable  than  many  of  the  American  gun- 
vessels.  The  Constellation's  men  deserve  great 
credit  for  their  defence,  but  the  British  certainly 
did  not  attack  with  their  usual  obstinacy.  When 
the  foremost  boats  were  sunk,  the  water  was  so 
shallow  and  the  bottom  so  good  that  the  Americans 
on  shore,  as  just  stated,  at  once  waded  out  to 
them;  and  if  in  the  heat  of  the  fight  Tatnall  and 
his  seamen  could  get  out  to  the  boats,  the  700 
British  ought  to  have  been  able  to  get  in  to  the 
battery,  whose  150  defenders  would  then  have 
stood  no  chance.42 

41  "Life  of  Commodore  Josiah  Tatnall,"  by  Charles  C. 
Jones,  Jr.  (Savannah,  1878),  p.  17. 

48  James  comments  on  this  repulse  as  "a  defeat  as  discred- 
itable to  those  that  caused  it  as  honorable  to  those  that  suf- 


248  Naval  War  of  1812 

On  July  14,  1813,  the  two  small  vessels  Scorpion 
and  Asp,  the  latter  commanded  by  Mr.  Sigourney, 
got  under  way  from  out  of  the  Yeocomico  Creek,43 
and  at  10  A.M.,  discovered  in  chase  the  British  brig- 
sloops  Contest,  Captain  James  Rattray,  and  Mo- 
hawk, Captain  Henry  D.  Byng.44  The  Scorpion 
beat  up  the  Chesapeake,  but  the  dull-sailing  Asp 
had  to  re-enter  the  creek;  the  two  brigs  anchored 
off  the  bar  and  hoisted  out  their  boats,  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant  Rodger  C.  Curry;  where- 
upon the  Asp  cut  her  cable  and  ran  up  the  creek 
some  distance.  Here  she  was  attacked  by  three 
boats,  which  Mr.  Sigourney  and  his  crew  of  twenty 
men,  with  two  light  guns,  beat  off;  but  they  were 
joined  by  two  others,  and  the  five  carried  the  Asp, 
giving  no  quarter.  Mr.  Sigourney  and  10  of  his 
men  were  killed  or  wounded,  while  the  British  also 
suffered  heavily,  having  4  killed  and  7  (including 

fered  in  it."  "Unlike  most  other  nations,  the  Americans  in 
particular,  the  British,  when  engaged  in  expeditions  of  this 
nature,  always  rest  their  hopes  of  success  upon  valor  rather 
than  on  numbers."  These  comments  read  particularly  well 
when  it  is  remembered  that  the  assailants  outnumbered  the 
assailed  in  the  proportion  of  5  to  i.  It  is  monotonous  work 
to  have  to  supplement  a  history  by  a  running  commentary 
on  James"  mistakes  and  inventions;  but  it  is  worth  while  to 
prove  once  for  all  the  utter  unreliability  of  the  author  who 
is  accepted  in  Great  Britain  as  the  great  authority  about  the 
war.  Still,  James  is  no  worse  than  his  compeers.  In  the 
American  Coggeshall's  "History  of  Privateers,"  the  mis- 
statements  are  as  gross  and  the  sneers  in  as  poor  taste — the 
British,  instead  of  the  Americans,  being  the  objects. 

41  Letter  of  Midshipman  McClintock,  July  15,  1813. 

44  James,  vi,  343. 


On  the  Ocean  249 

Lieutenant  Curry)  wounded.  The  surviving  Ameri- 
cans reached  the  shore,  rallied  under  Midshipman 
H.  McClintock  (second  in  command),  and  when 
the  British  retired  after  setting  the  Asp  on  fire,  at 
once  boarded  her,  put  out  the  flames,  and  got  her 
in  fighting  order;  but  they  were  not  again  mo- 
lested. 

On  July  29th,  while  the  Junon,  38,  Captain 
Sanders,  and  Martin,  18,  Captain  Senhouse,  were 
in  Delaware  Bay,  the  latter  grounded  on  the  out- 
side of  Crow's  Shoal;  the  frigate  anchored  within 
supporting  distance,  and  while  in  this  position  the 
two  ships  were  attacked  by  the  American  flotilla  in 
those  waters,  consisting  of  eight  gunboats,  carry- 
ing each  25  men  and  one  long  32,  and  two  heavier 
block-sloops,45  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Samuel 
Angus.  The  flotilla  kept  at  such  a  distance  that  an 
hour's  cannonading  did  no  damage  whatever  to 
anybody;  and  during  that  time  gunboat  No.  121, 
Sailing-master  Shead,  drifted  a  mile  and  a  half 
away  from  her  consorts.  Seeing  this  the  British 
made  a  dash  at  her  in  7  boats,  containing  140  men, 
led  by  Lieutenant  Philip  Westphal.  Mr.  Shead 
anchored  and  made  an  obstinate  defence,  but  at 
the  first  discharge  the  gun's  pintle  gave  way,  and 
the  next  time  it  was  fired  the  gun-carriage  was  al- 
most torn  to  pieces.  He  kept  up  a  spirited  fire  of 
small  arms,  in  reply  to  the  boat-carronades  and 
musketry  of  the  assailants;  but  the  latter  advanced 
steadily  and  carried  the  gunboat  by  boarding,  7 

45  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Angus,  July  30,  1813. 


250  Naval  War  of  1812 

of  her  people  being  wounded,  while  7  of  the  British 
were  killed  and  13  wounded.46  The  defence  of 
No.  121  was  very  creditable,  but  otherwise  the  honor 
of  the  day  was  certainly  with  the  British;  whether 
because  the  gunboats  were  themselves  so  worthless 
or  because  they  were  not  handled  boldly  enough, 
they  did  no  damage,  even  to  the  grounded  sloop, 
that  would  seem  to  have  been  at  their  mercy.47 

On  June  i8th  the  American  brig-sloop  Argus, 
commanded  by  Lieutenant  William  Henry  Allen, 
late  first  of  the  United  States,  sailed  from  New 
York  for  France,  with  Mr.  Crawford,  minister  for 
that  country,  aboard,  and  reached  L'Orient  on  July 
nth,  having  made  one  prize  on  the  way.  On  July 
1 4th  she  again  sailed,  and  cruised  in  the  chops 
of  the  Channel,  capturing  and  burning  ship  after 
ship,  and  creating  the  greatest  consternation  among 
the  London  merchants;  she  then  cruised  along 
Cornwall  and  got  into  St.  George's  Channel,  where 
the  work  of  destruction  went  on.  The  labor  was 
very  severe  and  harassing,  the  men  being  able  to 
get  very  little  rest.48  On  the  night  of  August  I3th, 

a  Letter  of  Mr.  Shead,  Aug.  5,  1813. 

4T  The  explanation  possibly  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  gun- 
boats had  worthless  powder.  In  the  Naval  Archives  there  is 
a  letter  from  Mr.  Angus  ("Masters-Commandant's  Letters," 
1813,  No.  3;  see  also  No.  91),  in  which  he  says  that  the  frig- 
ate's shot  passed  over  them,  while  theirs  could  not  even 
reach  the  sloop.  He  also  incloses  a  copy  of  a  paper,  signed 
by  the  other  gunboat  officers,  which  runs:  "We,  the  officers 
of  the  vessels  comprising  the  Delaware  flotilla,  protest  against 
the  powder  as  being  unfit  for  service." 

*  Court  of  Inquiry  into  loss  of  Argus,  1815. 


On  the  Ocean  251 

a  brig  laden  with  wine  from  Oporto  was  captured 
and  burnt,  and  unluckily  many  of  the  crew  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  at  some  of  the  cargo.  At  5  A.M. 
on  the  1 4th  a  large  brig-of-war  was  discovered 
standing  down  under  a  cloud  of  canvas.49  This 
was  the  British  brig-sloop  Pelican,  Captain  John 
Fordyce  Maples,  which,  from  information  received 
at  Cork  three  days  previous,  had  been  cruising 
especially  after  the  Argus,  and  had  at  last  found 
her;  St.  David's  Head  bore  east  five  leagues  (lat. 
52°  15°  N.  and  5°  50'  W.). 

The  small,  fine-lined  American  cruiser,  with  her 
lofty  masts  and  long  spars,  could  easily  have  es- 
caped from  her  heavier  antagonist;  but  Captain 
Allen  had  no  such  intention,  and,  finding  he  could 
not  get  the  weather-gage,  he  shortened  sail  and  ran 
easily  along  on  the  starboard  tack,  while  the  Pelican 
came  down  on  him  with  the  wind  (which  was  from 
the  south)  nearly  aft.  At  6  A.M.  the  Argus  wore 
and  fired  her  port  guns  within  grape  distance,  the 
Pelican  responded  with  her  starboard  battery,  and 
the  action  began  with  great  spirit  on  both  sides.50 
At  6.04  a  round  shot  carried  off  Captain  Allen's 
leg,  inflicting  a  mortal  wound,  but  he  stayed  on 
deck  till  he  fainted  from  loss  of  blood.  Soon  the 
British  fire  carried  away  the  main-braces,  main- 
spring-stay, gaff,  and  try-sail  mast  of  the  Argus; 
the  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Watson,  was  wounded  in 

49  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Watson,  March  2,  1815. 
60  Letter  of  Captain  Maples  to  Admiral  Thornborough, 
Aug.  14,  1813. 


252  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  head  by  a  grape-shot  and  carried  below;  the 
second  lieutenant,  Mr.  U.  H.  Allen  (no  relation 
of  the  captain),  continued  to  fight  the  ship  with 
great  skill.  The  Pelican's  fire  continued  very 
heavy,  the  Argus  losing  her  spritsail-yard  and  most 
of  the  standing  rigging  on  the  port  side  of  the 
foremast.  At  6.14  Captain  Maples  bore  up  to  pass 
astern  of  his  antagonist,  but  Lieutenant  Allen  luffed 
into  the  wind  and  threw  the  main-topsail  aback, 
getting  into  a  beautiful  raking  position;51  had  the 
men  at  the  guns  done  their  duty  as  well  as  those 
on  the  quarter-deck  did  theirs,  the  issue  of  the  fight 
would  have  been  very  different;  but,  as  it  was,  in 
spite  of  her  favorable  position,  the  raking  broad- 
side of  the  Argus  did  little  damage.  Two  or  three 
minutes  afterward  the  Argus  lost  the  use  of  her 
after-sails  through  having  her  preventer-main- 
braces  and  top-sail  tie  shot  away,  and  fell  off  be- 
fore the  wind,  when  the  Pelican  at  6.18  passed 
her  stern,  raking  her  heavily,  and  then  ranged  up 
on  her  starboard  quarter.  In  a  few  minutes  the 
wheel-ropes  and  running-rigging  of  every  descrip- 
tion were  shot  away,  and  the  Argus  became  ut- 
terly unmanageable.  The  Pelican  continued  raking 
her  with  perfect  impunity,  and  at  6.35  passed  her 
broadside  and  took  a  position  on  her  starboard 
bow,  when  at  6.45  the  brigs  fell  together,  and  the 
British  "were  in  the  act  of  boarding  when  the  Argus 
struck  her  colors," 52  at  6.45  A.M.  The  Pelican 

"  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Watson. 
"  Letter  of  Captain  Maples. 


On  the  Ocean  253 

carried,  besides  her  regular  armament,  two  long 
6's  as  stern-chasers,  and  her  broadside  weight  of 
metal  was  thus  :53 


i  x    6 
1x6 

I    X    12 

8  x  32 


or  280  Ibs.  against  the  Argus' : 


I    X    12 

9  x  24 


or,  subtracting  as  usual  7  per  cent  for  light 
weight  of  metal,  210  Ibs..  The  Pelican's  crew  con- 
sisted of  but  1 1 6  men,  according  to  the  British  ac- 
count, though  the  American  reports  make  it  much 
larger.  The  Argus  had  started  from  New  York 
with  137  men,  but  having  manned  and  sent  in  sev- 
eral prizes,  her  crew  amounted,  as  near  as  can  be 
ascertained,  to  104.  Mr.  Low  in  his  "Naval  His- 
tory," published  just  after  the  event,  makes  it  but 
99.  James  makes  it  121;  as  he  placed  the  crew  of 
the  Enterprise  at  125,  when  it  was  really  102;  that 
of  the  Hornet  at  162,  instead  of  135;  of  the  Pea- 
cock at  185,  instead  of  166;  of  the  Nautilus  at  106 
instead  of  95,  etc.,  it  is  safe  to  presume  that  he  has 
over-estimated  it  by  at  least  20,  which  brings  the 
number  pretty  near  to  the  American  accounts. 
The  Pelican  lost  but  two  men  killed  and  five  wound- 
ed. Captain  Maples  had  a  narrow  escape,  a  spent 
grape-shot  striking  him  in  the  chest  with  some 
force,  and  then  falling  on  the  deck.  One  shot 
had  passed  through  the  boatswain's  and  one  through 

53  James,  vi,  320. 


254  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  carpenter's  cabin;  her  sides  were  filled  with 
grape-shot,  and  her  rigging  and  sails  much  in- 
jured; her  foremast,  main-topmast,  and  royal  masts 
were  slightly  wounded,  and  two  of  her  carronades 
dismounted. 

The  injuries  of  the  Argus  have  already  been  de- 
tailed ;  her  hull  and  lower  masts  were  also  tolerably 
well  cut  up.  Of  her  crew,  Captain  Allen,  two  mid- 
shipmen, the  carpenter,  and  six  seamen  were  killed 
or  mortally  wounded;  her  first  lieutenant  and  13 
seamen  severely  and  slightly  wounded;  total,  10 
killed  and  14  wounded. 

In  reckoning  the  comparative  force,  I  include  the 
Englishman's  six-pound  stern-chaser,  which  could 
not  be  fired  in  broadside  with  the  rest  of  the  guns, 
because  I  include  the  Argus'  1 2-pound  bow-chaser, 
which  also  could  not  be  fired  in  broadside,  as  it  was 
crowded  into  the  bridle-port.  James  of  course, 
carefully  includes  the  latter,  though  leaving  out  the 
former. 

COMPARISON 

Weight 
Toot.       No.  Gun*.      Metal.       Men.      Lost. 

Argus  298  IO  2  to  104         24 

Ptlua*         467  u  280          116         7 

Comparatitr*  Comparative  Loss 

Force.  Inflicted 

Argus  £2  .29 

Pelican  UQQ  I.QO 


On  the  Ocean  255 

Of  all  the  single-ship  actions  fought  in  the  war 
this  is  the  least  creditable  to  the  Americans.  The 
odds  in  force,  it  is  true,  were  against  the  Argus, 
about  in  the  proportion  of  10  to  8,  but  this  is  neither 
enough  to  account  for  the  loss  inflicted,  being  as  10 
to  3,  nor  for  her  surrendering  when  she  had  been 
so  little  ill  used.  It  was  not  even  as  if  her  antago- 
nist had  been  an  unusually  fine  vessel  of  her  class. 
The  Pelican  did  not  do  so  well  as  either  the  Frolic 
previously,  or  the  Reindeer  afterward,  though  per- 
haps rather  better  than  the  Avon,  Penguin,  or  Pea- 
cock. With  a  comparatively  unmanageable  antag- 
onist, in  smooth  water,  she  ought  to  have  sunk  her 
in  three  quarters  of  an  hour.  But  the  Pelican's  not 
having  done  particularly  well  merely  makes  the  con- 
duct of  the  Americans  look  worse;  it  is  just  the 
reverse  of  the  Chesapeake 's  case,  where,  paying  the 
highest  credit  to  the  British,  we  still  thought  the 
fight  no  discredit  to  us.  Here  we  can  indulge  no 
such  reflection.  The  officers  did  well^  but  the  crew 
did  not.  Cooper  says:  "The  enemy  was  so  much 
heavier  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  Argus 
would  have  captured  her  antagonist  under  any  ordi- 
nary circumstances."  This  I  doubt;  such  a  crew 
as  the  Wasp's  or  Hornet's  probably  would  have 
been  successful.  The  trouble  with  the  guns  of  the 
Argus  was  not  so  much  that  they  were  too  small,  as 
that  they  did  not  hit ;  and  this  seems  all  the  more  in- 
comprehensible when  it  is  remembered  that  Captain 
Allen  is  the  very  man  to  whom  Commodore  Decatur, 
in  his  official  letter,  attributed  the  skilful  gun-prac- 


256  Naval  War  of  1812 

tice  of  the  crew  of  the  frigate  United  States.  Cooper 
says  that  the  powder  was  bad ;  and  it  has  also  been 
said  that  the  men  of  the  Argus  were  over-fatigued 
and  were  drunk,  in  which  case  they  ought  not  to 
have  been  brought  into  action.  Besides  unskilful- 
ness,  there  is  another  very  serious  count  against  the 
crew.  Had  the  Pelican  been  some  distance  from 
the  Argus,  and  in  a  position  where  she  could  pour 
in  her  fire  with  perfect  impunity  to  herself,  when  the 
surrender  took  place,  it  would  have  been  more  justi- 
fiable. But,  on  the  contrary,  the  vessels  were 
touching,  and  the  British  boarded  just  as  the  colors 
were  hauled  down ;  it  was  certainly  very  disgraceful 
that  the  Americans  did  not  rally  to  repel  them,  for 
they  had  still  four  fifths  of  their  number  absolutely 
untouched.  They  certainly  ought  to  have  suc- 
ceeded, for  boarding  is  a  difficult  and  dangerous  ex- 
periment ;  and  if  they  had  repulsed  their  antagonists 
they  might  in  turn  have  carried  the  Pelican.  So  that, 
in  summing  up  the  merits  of  this  action,  it  is  fair 
to  say  that  both  sides  showed  skilful  seamanship  and 
unskilful  gunnery;  that  the  British  fought  bravely 
and  that  the  Americans  did  not. 

It  is  somewhat  interesting  to  compare  this  fight, 
where  a  weaker  American  sloop  was  taken  by  a 
stronger  British  one,  with  two  or  three  others,  where 
both  the  comparative  force  and  the  result  were  re- 
versed. Comparing  it,  therefore,  with  the  actions 
between  the  Hornet  and  Peacock  (British),  the 
Wasp  and  Avon,  and  the  Peacock  (American)  and 
Epervier,  we  get  four  actions,  in  one  of  which,  the 


On  the  Ocean  257 

first-named,  the  British  were  victorious,  and  in  the 
other  three  the  Americans. 

Comparative  Comparative         Per  cent. 

Force.  Loss  Inflicted.  Loss. 

Pelican  (British)            i.oo  2.00  «6 

Argus  (American)           .82  .29  .23 

Hornet  (American)        i.oo  I,oo  .02 

Peacock  (British)              .83  .07  .81 

Wasp  (American)          i.oo  i.oo  .02 

Avon  (British)                 .80  .07  .33 

peacock  (American)      i.oo  i.oo  ,01 

(British)          .81  .08  .20 


It  is  thus  seen  that  in  these  sloop  actions  the 
superiority  of  the  force  on  the  side  of  the  victor  was 
each  time  about  the  same.  The  Argus  made  a  much 
more  effectual  resistance  than  did  either  the  Peacock, 
Avon,  or  Epervier,  while  the  Pelican  did  her  work  in 
poorer  form  than  either  of  the  victorious  American 
sloops  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  resistance  of  the 
Argus  did  not  by  any  means  show  as  much  bravery 
as  was  shown  in  the  defence  of  the  Peacock  or  Avon, 
although  rather  more  than  in  the  case  of  the 
Epervier. 

This  is  the  only  action  of  the  war  where  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  find  out  the  cause  of  the  inferi- 
ority of  the  beaten  crew.  In  almost  all  other  cases 
we  find  that  one  crew  had  been  carefully  drilled,  and 
so  proved  superior  to  a  less-trained  antagonist;  but 
it  is  incredible  that  the  man,  to  whose  exertions 
when  first  lieutenant  of  the  States  Commodore  De- 
catur  ascribes  the  skilfulness  of  that  ship's  men, 
should  have  neglected  to  train  his  own  crew;  and 
this  had  the  reputation  of  being  composed  of  a  fine 


258  Naval  War  of  1812 

set  of  men.  Bad  powder  would  not  account  for  the 
surrender  of  the  Argus  when  so  little  damaged.  It 
really  seems  as  if  the  men  must  have  been  drunk  or 
over-fatigued,  as  has  been  so  often  asserted.  Of 
course  drunkenness  would  account  for  the  defeat,  al- 
though not  in  the  least  altering  its  humiliating 
character. 

"Et  tu  quoque"  is  not  much  of  an  argument ;  still 
it  may  be  as  well  to  call  to  mind  here  two  engage- 
ments in  which  British  sloops  suffered  much  more 
discreditable  defeats  than  the  Argus  did.  The  fig- 
ures are  taken  from  James ;  as  given  by  the  French 
historians  they  make  even  a  worse  showing  for  the 
British. 

A  short  time  before  our  war  the  British  brig 
Carnation,  18,  had  been  captured,  by  boarding,  by 
the  French  brig  Palinure,  16,  and  the  British  brig 
Alacrity,  18,  had  been  captured,  also  by  boarding, 
by  the  corvette  Abeille,  20. 

The  following  was  the  comparative  force,  etc., 
of  the  combatants: 

Weight  Metal      No.  Crew  Loss 

Carnation  262  217  40 

Palinure  174  100  20 

Alacrity  262  100  18 

Abeille  260  130  19 

In  spite  of  the  pride  the  British  take  in  their  hand- 
to-hand  prowess  both  of  these  ships  were  captured 
by  boarding.  TheCarnation  was  captured  by  a  much 
smaller  force,  instead  of  by  a  much  larger  one,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  Argus;  and  if  the  Argus  gave  up 
before  she  had  suffered  greatly,  the  Alacrity  sur- 


On  the  Ocean  259 

rendered  when  she  had  suffered  still  less.  French 
historians  asserted  that  the  capture  of  the  two  brigs 
proved  that  "French  valor  could  conquer  British 
courage";  and  a  similar  opinion  was  very  com- 
placently expressed  by  British  historians  after  the 
defeat  of  the  Argus.  All  that  the  three  combats 
really  "proved"  was,  that  in  eight  encounters  be- 
tween British  and  American  sloops  the  Americans 
were  defeated  once;  and  in  a  far  greater  number 
of  encounters  between  French  and  British  sloops  the 
British  were  defeated  twice.  No  one  pretends  that 
either  navy  was  invincible;  the  question  is,  which 
side  averaged  best? 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  we  possessed  several 
small  brigs;  these  had  originally  been  fast,  handy 
little  schooners,  each  armed  with  12  long  sixes,  and 
with  a  crew  of  60  men.  As  such  they  were  effective 
enough;  but  when  afterward  changed  into  brigs, 
each  armed  with  a  couple  of  extra  guns,  and  given 
40  additional  men,  they  became  too  slow  to  run, 
without  becoming  strong  enough  to  fight.  They 
carried  far  too  many  guns  and  men  for  their  size, 
and  not  enough  to  give  them  a  chance  with  any 
respectable  opponent;  and  they  were  almost  all 
ignominiously  captured.  The  single  exception  was 
the  brig  Enterprise.  She  managed  to  escape  capture, 
owing  chiefly  to  good  luck,  and  once  fought  a  vic- 
torious engagement,  thanks  to  the  fact  that  the 
British  possessed  a  class  of  vessels  even  worse  than 
our  own.  She  was  kept  near  the  land  and  finally 
took  up  her  station  off  the  eastern  coast,  where  she 


260  Naval  War  of  1812 

did  good  service  in  chasing  away  or  capturing  the 
various  Nova  Scotian  or  New  Brunswick  privateers, 
which  were  smaller  and  less  formidable  vessels  than 
the  privateers  of  the  United  States,  and  not  calcu- 
lated for  fighting. 

By  crowding  guns  into  her  bridle-ports,  and  over- 
manning herself,  the  Enterprise,  now  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant  William  Burrows,  mounted  14 
eighteen-pound  carronades  and  2  long  Q'S,  with  102 
men.  On  September  5th,  while  standing  along  shore 
near  Penguin  Point,  a  few  miles  to  the  eastward  of 
Portland,  Me.,  she  discovered,  at  anchor  inside,  a 
man-of-war  brig54  which  proved  to  be  H.M.S. 
Boxer,  Captain  Samuel  Blyth,  of  12  carronades, 
eighteen-pounders  and  two  long  sixes,  with  but  66 
men  aboard,  12  of  her  crew  being  absent.55  The 
Boxer  at  once  hoisted  three  British  ensigns  and 
bore  up  for  the  Enterprise,  then  standing  in  on  the 
starboard  tack;  but  when  the  two  brigs  were  still 
4  miles  apart  it  fell  calm.  At  midday  a  breeze 
sprang  up  from  the  southwest,  giving  the  American 
the  weather-gage,  but  the  latter  manoeuvred  for 
some  time  to  windward  to  try  the  comparative  rates 
of  sailing  of  the  vessels.  At  3  P.M.  Lieutenant  Bur- 
rows hoisted  three  ensigns,  shortened  sail  and  edged 
away  toward  the  enemy,  who  came  gallantly  on. 

M  Letter  from  Lieutenant  Edward  R.  McCall  to  Commo- 
dore Hull,  September  5,  1813. 

**  James,  "Naval  Occurrences,"  264.  The  American  ac- 
counts give  the  Boxer  104  men,  on  very  insufficient  grounds. 
Similarly,  James  gives  the  Enterprise  123  men.  Each  side 
will  be  considered  authority  for  its  own  force  and  loss. 


On  the  Ocean  261 

Captain  Blyth  had  nailed  his  colors  to  the  mast, 
telling  his  men  they  should  never  be  struck  while 
he  had  life  in  his  body.56  Both  crews  cheered 
loudly  as  they  neared  each  other,  and  at  3.15,  the 
two  brigs  being  on  the  starboard  tack  not  half  pistol- 
shot  apart,  they  opened  fire,  the  American  using  the 
port,  and  the  English  the  starboard,  battery.  Both 
broadsides  were  very  destructive,  each  of  the  com- 
manders falling  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  action. 
Captain  Blyth  was  struck  by  an  eighteen-pound  shot 
while  he  was  standing  on  the  quarter-deck ;  it  passed 
completely  through  his  body,  shattering  his  left  arm 
and  killing  him  on  the  spot.  The  command,  there- 
upon, devolved  on  Lieutenant  David  McCreery.  At 
almost  the  same  time  his  equally  gallant  antagonist 
fell.  Lieutenant  Burrows,  while  encouraging  his 
men,  laid  hold  of  a  gun-tackle  fall  to  help  the  crew 
of  a  carronade  run  out  the  gun ;  in  doing  so  he  raised 
one  leg  against  the  bulwark,  when  a  canister  shot 
struck  his  thigh,  glancing  into  his  body  and  inflict- 
ing a  fearful  wound.57  In  spite  of  the  pain  he  re- 
fused to  be  carried  below,  and  lay  on  the  deck,  crying 
out  that  the  colors  must  never  be  struck.  Lieu- 
tenant Edward  McCall  now  took  command.  At  3.30 
the  Enterprise  ranged  ahead,  rounded  to  on  the  star- 
board tack,  and  raked  the  Boxer  with  the  starboard 
guns.  At  3.35  the  Boxer  lost  her  main-topmast 
and  top  sail  yard,  but  her  crew  still  kept  up  the  fight 
bravely  with  the  exception  of  four  men  who  deserted 

se  «< Naval  Chronicle,"  xxxii,  p.  462. 
"  Cooper,  "Naval  History,"  ii,  p.  259. 


262  Naval  War  of  1812 

their  quarters  and  were  afterward  court-martialed 
for  cowardice.58  The  Enterprise  now  set  her  fore- 
sail and  took  position  on  the  enemy's  starboard  bow, 
delivering  raking  fires;  and  at  3.45  the  latter  sur- 
rendered, when  entirely  unmanageable  and  defence- 
less. Lieutenant  Burrows  would  not  go  below  until 
he  had  received  the  sword  of  his  adversary,  when 
he  exclaimed,  "I  am  satisfied,  I  die  contented." 

Both  brigs  had  suffered  severely,  especially  the 
Boxer,  which  had  been  hulled  repeatedly,  had  three 
eighteen-pound  shot  through  her  foremast,  her  top- 


gallant forecastle  almost  cut  away,  and  several  of 
her  guns  dismounted.  Three  men  were  killed  and 
seventeen  wounded,  four  mortally.  The  Enterprise 
had  been  hulled  by  one  round  and  many  grape ;  one 
1 8-pound  ball  had  gone  through  her  foremast,  and 
another  through  her  main-mast,  and  she  was  much 
cut  up  aloft.  Two  of  her  men  were  killed  and  ten 
wounded,  two  of  them  (her  commander  and  Mid- 
shipman Kervin  Waters)  mortally.  The  British 
court-martial  attributed  the  defeat  of  the  Boxer 
"to  a  superiority  in  the  enemy's  force,  principally 
in  the  number  of  men,  as  well  as  to  a  greater  degree 

M  Minutes  of  court-martial  held  aboard  H.M.S.  Surprise, 
January  8,  1814. 


On  the  Ocean  263 

of  skill  in  the  direction  of  her  fire,  and  to  the  de- 
structive effects  of  the  first  broadside."'  But  the 
main  element  was  the  superiority  in  force,  the 
difference  in  loss  being  very  nearly  proportional  to 
it;  both  sides  fought  with  equal  bravery  and  equal 
skill.  This  fact  was  appreciated  by  the  victors,  for 
at  a  naval  dinner  given  in  New  York  shortly  after- 
ward, one  of  the  toasts  offered  was :  "The  crew  of  the 
Boxer;  enemies  by  law,  but  by  gallantry  brothers." 
The  two  commanders  were  both  buried  at  Portland, 
with  all  the  honors  of  war.  The  conduct  of  Lieu- 
tenant Burrows  needs  no  comment.  He  was  an 
officer  greatly  beloved  and  respected  in  the  service. 
Captain  Blyth,  on  the  other  side,  had  not  only  shown 
himself  on  many  occasions  to  be  a  man  of  distin- 
guished personal  courage,  but  was  equally  noted 
for  his  gentleness  and  humanity.  He  had  been  one 
of  Captain  Lawrence's  pall-bearers,  and  but  a  month 
previous  to  his  death  had  received  a  public  note  of 
thanks  from  an  American  colonel  for  an  act  of 
great  kindness  and  courtesy.59 

The  Enter  prise, under  Lieut.-Com.  Renshaw,  now 
cruised  off  the  southern  coast,  where  she  made  sev- 
eral captures.  One  of  them  was  a  heavy  British 
privateer,  the  Mars,  of  14  long  nines  and  75  men, 
which  struck  after  receiving  a  broadside  that  killed 
and  wounded  4  of  her  crew.  The  Enterprise  was 
chased  by  frigates  on  several  occasions;  being  once 
forced  to  throw  overboard  all  her  guns  but  two,  and 
escaping  only  by  a  shift  in  the  wind.  Afterward, 

59  "Naval  Chronicle,"  xxxii,  466. 


264  Naval  War  of  1812 

as  she  was  unfit  to  cruise,  she  was  made  a  guardship 
at  Charlestown ;  for  the  same  reason  the  Boxer  was 
not  purchased  into  the  service. 

On  October  4th  some  volunteers  from  the  New- 
port flotilla  captured,  by  boarding,  the  British  priva- 
teer Dart,60  after  a  short  struggle,  in  which  two  of 
the  assailants  were  wounded  and  several  of  the 
privateersmen,  including  the  first  officer,  were  killed. 

On  December  4th,  Commodore  Rodgers,  still  in 
command  of  the  President,  sailed  again  from  Provi- 
dence, Rhode  Island.  On  the  25th,  in  lat.  19°  N. 
and  long.  35°  W.,  the  President,  during  the  night, 
fell  in  with  two  frigates,  and  came  so  close  that  the 
headmost  fired  at  her,  when  she  made  off.  These 
were  thought  to  be  British,  but  were  in  reality  the 
two  French  4ogun  frigates  Nymphe  and  Meduse, 
one  month  out  of  Brest.  After  this  little  encounter 
Rodgers  headed  toward  the  Barbadoes,  and  cruised 
to  windward  of  them. 

On  the  whole  the  ocean  warfare  of  1813  was  de- 
cidedly in  favor  of  the  British,  except  during  the 
first  few  months.  The  Hornet's  fight  with  the 
Peacock  was  an  action  similar  to  those  that  took 
place  in  1812,  and  the  cruise  of  Porter  was  unique 
in  our  annals,  both  for  the  audacity  with  which  it 
was  planned,  and  the  success  with  which  it  was 
executed.  Even  later  in  the  year  the  Argus  and  the 
President  made  bold  cruises  in  sight  of  the  British 
coasts,  the  former  working  great  havoc  among  the 
merchantmen.  But  by  that  time  the  tide  had 

*°  Letter  of  Mr.  Joseph  Nicholson,  Oct.  5,  1813. 


On  the  Ocean  265 

turned  strongly  in  favor  of  our  enemies.  From  the 
beginning  of  summer  the  blockade  was  kept  up  so 
strictly  that  it  was  with  difficulty  any  of  our  vessels 
broke  through  it;  they  were  either  chased  back  or 
captured.  In  the  three  actions  that  occurred,  the 
British  showed  themselves  markedly  superior  in  two, 
and  in  the  third  the  combatants  fought  equally  well, 
the  result  being  fairly  decided  by  the  fuller  crew 
and  slightly  heavier  metal  of  the  Enterprise.  The 
gunboats,  to  which  many  had  looked  for  harbor  de- 
fence, proved  nearly  useless,  and  were  beaten  off 
with  ease  whenever  they  made  an  attack. 

The  lessons  taught  by  all  this  were  the  usual  ones. 
Lawrence's  victory  in  the  Hornet  showed  the  superi- 
ority of  a  properly  trained  crew  to  one  that  had  not 
been  properly  trained;  and  his  defeat  in  the  Chesa- 
peake pointed  exactly  the  same  way,  demonstrating 
in  addition  the  folly  of  taking  a  raw  levy  out  of  port, 
and,  before  they  have  had  the  slightest  chance  of 
getting  seasoned,  pitting  them  against  skilled  veter- 
ans. The  victory  of  the  Enterprise  showed  the  wis- 
dom of  having  the  odds  in  men  and  metal  in  our 
favor,  when  our  antagonist  was  otherwise  our  equal ; 
it  proved,  what  hardly  needed  proving,  that,  when- 
ever possible,  a  ship  should  be  so  constructed  as  to 
be  superior  in  force  to  the  foes  it  would  be  likely  to 
meet.  As  far  as  the  capture  of  the  Argus  showed 
anything,  it  was  the  advantage  of  heavy  metal  and 
the  absolute  need  that  a  crew  should  fight  with  pluck. 
The  failure  of  the  gunboats  ought  to  have  taught  the 
lesson  (though  it  did  not)  that  too  great  economy  in 

VOL.  IX.— is 


a66  Naval  War  of  1812 

providing  the  means  of  defence  may  prove  very  ex- 
pensive in  the  end,  and  that  good  officers  and  men 
are  powerless  when  embarked  in  worthless  vessels. 
A  similar  point  was  emphasized  by  the  strictness  of 
the  blockade,  and  the  great  inconvenience  it  caused ; 
namely,  that  we  ought  to  have  had  ships  powerful 
enough  to  break  it. 

We  had  certainly  lost  ground  during  this  year; 
fortunately  we  regained  it  during  the  next  two. 

BRITISH   VESSELS  SUNK  OR  TAKEN 

Name  Guns  Tonnage 

Peacock  20  477 

Boxer  14  181 

Highflyer  6  96 


Name. 

Chtsaptake  50 

Argus  20 

Vtjxr  10 

1o 
VESSELS  BUILT  OR  PURCHASED 

NUM.             Rig.  Cons.  Tonnage.    Where  Built.       Cort. 

Rattlesnake  Brig  14  278     Medford,  Pa.  $18,000 

Alligator      SchY  4  So 

Asp             Sloop  3  56                             2,600 

PRIZES  MADE. 
Name  of  Ship.  No.  of  Prise*. 

Pr  indent  13 

Congress  4 

Chesapeake  O 

Essex  14 

Hornet  3 

Argus  21 

Small  craft  18 

79 


CHAPTER  VI 
1813 

ON    THE    LAKES 

ONTARIO — Comparison  of  the  rival  squadrons — Chauncy 
takes  York  and  Fort  George — Yeo  is  repulsed  at  Sack- 
ett's  Harbor,  but  keeps  command  of  the  lake — Chauncy 
sails — Yeo's  partial  victory  off  Niagara — Indecisive  ac- 
tion off  the  Genesee — Chauncy's  partial  victory  off  Bur- 
lington, which  gives  him  the  command  of  the  lake — 
ERIE — Perry's  success  in  creating  a  fleet— His  victory 
— CHAMPLAIN — Loss  of  the  Growler  and  Eagle — Sum- 
mary 

ONTARIO 

WINTER  had  almost  completely  stopped  prep- 
arations on  the  American  side.  Bad 
weather  put  an  end  to  all  communication  with  Al- 
bany or  New  York,  and  so  prevented  the  transit  of 
stores,  implements,  etc.  It  was  worse  still  with  the 
men,  for  the  cold  and  exposure  so  thinned  them  out 
that  the  new  arrivals  could  at  first  barely  keep  the 
ranks  filled.  It  was  moreover,  exceedingly  difficult 
to  get  seamen  to  come  from  the  coast  to  serve  on 
the  lakes,  where  work  was  hard,  sickness  prevailed, 
and  there  was  no  chance  of  prize-money.  The 
British  government  had  the  great  advantage  of  being 
able  to  move  its  sailors  where  it  pleased,  while  in 
the  American  service  at  that  period  the  men  en- 
listed for  particular  ships,  and  the  only  way  to  get 

(267) 


268  Naval  War  of  1812 

them  for  the  lakes  at  all  was  by  inducing  portions 
of  crews  to  volunteer  to  follow  their  officers  thither.1 
However,  the  work  went  on  in  spite  of  interruptions. 
Fresh  gangs  of  shipwrights  arrived,  and,  largely 
owing  to  the  energy  and  capacity  of  the  head  builder, 
Mr.  Henry  Eckford  (who  did  as  much  as  any  naval 
officer  in  giving  us  an  effective  force  on  Ontario) 
the  Madison  was  equipped,  a  small  despatch  sloop, 
The  Lady  of  the  Lake,  prepared,  and  a  large  new 
ship,  the  General  Pike,  28,  begun,  to  mount  13  guns 
in  each  broadside  and  2  on  pivots. 

Meanwhile  Sir  George  Prevost,  the  British  com- 
mander in  Canada,  had  ordered  two  24-gun  ships 
to  be  built  and  they  were  begun;  but  he  committed 
the  mistake  of  having  one  laid  down  in  Kingston 
and  the  other  in  York,  at  the  opposite  end  of  the 
lake.  Earle,  the  Canadian  commodore,  having  proved 
himself  so  incompetent,  was  removed;  and  in  the 
beginning  of  May  Captain  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo 
arrived,  to  act  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  naval 
forces,  together  with  four  captains,  eight  lieutenants, 
twenty-four  midshipmen,  and  about  450  picked  sea- 

1  Cooper,  ii,  557.  One  of  James*  most  comical  misstate- 
ments  is  that  on  the  lakes  the  American  sailors  were  all 
"picked  men."  On  p.  367,  for  example,  in  speaking  of  the 
battle  of  Lake  Erie  he  says:  "Commodore  Perry  had  picked 
crews  to  all  his  vessels."  As  a  matter  of  fact  Perry  had 
once  sent  in  his  resignation  solely  on  account  of  the  very 
poor  quality  of  his  crews,  and  had  with  difficulty  been  in- 
duced to  withdraw  it.  Perry's  crews  were  of  hardly  average 
excellence,  but  then  the  average  American  sailor  was  a  very 
good  specimen. 


On  the  Lakes  269 

men,  sent  out  by  the  home  government  especially  for 
service  on  the  Canada  lakes.2 

The  comparative  force  of  the  two  fleets  or  squad- 
rons it  is  hard  to  estimate.  I  have  already  spoken 
of  the  difficulty  in  finding  out  what  guns  were 
mounted  on  any  given  ship  at  a  particular  time,  and 
it  is  even  more  perplexing  with  the  crews.  A 
schooner  would  make  one  cruise  with  but  thirty 
hands;  on  the  next  it  would  appear  with  fifty,  a 
number  of  militia  having  volunteered  as  marines. 
Finding  the  militia  rather  a  nuisance,  they  would  be 
sent  ashore,  and  on  her  third  cruise  the  schooner 
would  substitute  half  a  dozen  frontier  seamen 
in  their  place.  It  was  the  same  with  the  larger 
vessels.  The  Madison  might  at  one  time  have  her 
full  complement  of  200  men;  a  month's  sickness 
would  ensue,  and  she  would  sail  with  but  150  ef- 
fectives. The  Pike's  crew  of  300  men  at  one  time 
would  shortly  afterward  be  less  by  a  third  in  conse- 
quence of  a  draft  of  sailors  being  sent  to  the  upper 
lakes.  So  it  is  almost  impossible  to  be  perfectly 
accurate;  but,  making  a  comparison  of  the  various 
authorities  from  Lieutenant  Emmons  to  James,  the 
following  tables  of  the  forces  may  be  given  as  very 
nearly  correct.  In  broadside  force  I  count  every 
pivot  gun,  and  half  of  those  that  were  not  on  pivots. 

CHAUNCY'S   SQUADRON 

Broadside 

Name  Rig     Tonnage  Crew  Metal,lbs.  Armament 

Pike  ship  875         300          360  28  long  24*3 

Madison  593          200  364  24  short  32*5 

Oneida  brig  243         100  172  16    "      24*8 

*  James,  vi,  353. 


270 


Naval  War  of  1812 


Name. 


ftamillen. 


Broadside 
Rig.  Tonnnage.Crew.  Metal;  Ibs.  Armament. 

i  longsa 
8      "    *&• 


•choooer    ua 


Conqtutt, 


Grcnulrr, 

Ontario, 

Fair  Amtrtoan*         " 

Ptrt,  " 

A  tf. 

Lady  oflfii  L<t*f.      " 


80 


ISO 

S» 

80 

•          3* 

8  short  u'» 

i  long  32 

8» 

40 

5ft 

4 

IP 
6'a 

f 

3* 

o« 

40 

6a 

1 

IS 

€ 

6'a 

82 

IS 

44 

1 

l 

3> 

ia 

8. 

S3 

44 

1 
i 

3* 
la 

S3 

35 

44 

l 
I 

3> 

ia 

S3 

30 

36 

l 
1 

»4 

la 

S° 

25 

»4              I 

a4 

57 

as 

34            i          a4 

"9 

•S 

9             I    "       9 

«.399 


This  is  not  materially  different  from  James'  ac- 
count (p.  356),  which  gives  Chauncy  114  guns, 
1,193  men,  and  2,121  tons.  The  Lady  of  the  Lake, 
however,  was  never  intended  for  anything  but  a 
despatch  boat,  and  the  Scourge  and  Hamilton  were 
both  lost  before  Chauncy  actually  came  into  col- 
lision with  Yeo.  Deducting  these,  in  order  to  com- 
pare the  two  foes,  Chauncy  had  left  n  vessels  of 
2,265  tons,  with  865  men  and  92  guns  throwing  a 
broadside  of  1,230  pounds. 


YEO'S  SQUADRON. 

Broads!  da 
Rig.     Tonnage.   Crew.  Metal;  Iba.    Armament. 

'  1  '??«  »4 
$iiip  637  220          3Q> 


£<?«/  Gtorgt ,         • 


f  to 


360 


.40  3»» 

3  long  i8'» 
a  short  68'» 
16  "  »»'• 


On  the  Lakes  271 


Broadside 

Rig.  Tonnage.Crew 

Metal;  Ibs.    Armament. 

brig 

«79 

too 

a  to 

*  long  i8'a 
"12  short  ji'a 

n 

262 

too 

«S3 

2  long    g's 
ta  short  74'$ 

schooner 

216 

80 

17* 

2  long  12*9 
10  short  ja's 

i  long  24 

'* 

187 

70 

87 

I       "            0 

6  short  ia's 

a.oo.1 

770 

•,374            9* 

Name. 
Melville, 
Moira, 
Sydney  Sm 

Beresford, 


This  differs  but  slightly  from  James,  who  gives 
Yeo  92  guns  throwing  a  broadside  of  1,374  pounds, 
but  only  717  men.  As  the  evidence  in  the  court- 
martial  held  on  Captain  Barclay,  and  the  official 
accounts  (on  both  sides)  of  Macdonough's  victory, 
convict  him  of  very  much  underrating  the  force  in 
men  of  the  British  on  Erie  and  Champlain,  it  can 
be  safely  assumed  that  he  has  underestimated  the 
force  in  men  on  Lake  Ontario.  By  comparing  the 
tonnage  he  gives  to  Barclay's  and  Downie's  squad- 
rons with  what  it  really  was,  we  can  correct  his 
account  of  Yeo's  tonnage. 

The  above  figures  would  apparently  make  the 
two  squadrons  about  equal,  Chauncy  having  95 
men  more,  and  throwing  at  a  broadside  144  pounds 
shot  less  than  his  antagonist.  But  the  figures  do 
not  by  any  means  show  all  the  truth.  The  Ameri- 
cans greatly  excelled  in  the  number  and  calibre  of 
their  long  guns.  Compared  thus,  they  threw  at 
one  discharge  694  pounds  of  long-gun  metal  and 
536  pounds  of  carronade  metal;  while  the  British 
only  threw  from  their  long  guns  180  pounds,  and 
from  their  carronades  1,194.  This  unequal  dis- 
tribution of  metal  was  very  much  in  favor  of  the 


Naval  War  of  1812 


Americans.  Nor  was  this  all.  The  Pike,  with  her 
15  long  24*8  in  battery,  was  an  overmatch  for  any 
one  of  the  enemy's  vessels,  and  bore  the  same  rela- 
tion to  them  that  the  Confiance,  at  a  later  date,  did 
to  Macdonough's  squadron.  She  should  certainly 
have  been  a  match  for  the  Wolfe  and  Melville  to- 
gether, and  the  Madison  and  Oneida  for  the  Royal 
George  and  Sydney  Smith.  In  fact,  the  three  heavy 
American  vessels  ought  to  have  been  an  overmatch 
for  the  four  heaviest  of  the  British  squadron,  al- 
though these  possessed  the  nominal  superiority. 
And  in  ordinary  cases  the  eight  remaining  Ameri- 
can gun-vessels  would  certainly  seem  to  be  an  over- 
match for  the  two  British  schooners,  but  it  is  just 
here  that  the  difficulty  of  comparing  the  forces  comes 
in.  When  the  water  was  very  smooth  and  the  wind 
light,  the  long  32*5  and  24/5  of  the  Americans  could 
play  havoc  with  the  British  schooners,  at  a  distance 
which  would  render  the  carronades  of  the  latter 
useless.  But  the  latter  were  built  for  war,  pos- 
sessed quarters  and  were  good  cruisers,  while 
Chauncy's  schooners  were  merchant  vessels,  with- 
out quarters,  crank,  and  so  loaded  down  with  heavy 
metal  that  whenever  it  blew  at  all  hard  they  could 
with  difficulty  be  kept  from  upsetting,  and  ceased 
to  be  capable  even  of  defending  themselves.  When 
Sir  James  Yeo  captured  two  of  them  he  would  not 
let  them  cruise  with  his  other  vessels  at  all,  but 
sent  them  back  to  act  as  gunboats,  in  which  capacity 
they  were  serving  when  recaptured;  this  is  a  toler- 
able test  of  their  value  compared  to  their  opponents. 


On  the  Lakes  273 

Another  disadvantage  that  Chauncy  had  to  contend 
with,  was  the  difference  in  the  speed  of  the  various 
vessels.  The  Pike  and  Madison  were  fast,  weatherly 
ships ;  but  the  Oneida  was  a  perfect  slug,  even  going 
free  and  could  hardly  be  persuaded  to  beat  to  wind- 
ward at  all.  In  this  respect  Yeo  was  much  better 
off;  his  six  ships  were  regular  men-of-war  with 
quarters,  all  of  them  seaworthy,  and  fast  enough 
to  be  able  to  act  with  uniformity,  and  not  needing 
to  pay  much  regard  to  the  weather.  His  force 
could  act  as  a  unit;  but  Chauncy's.  could  not. 
Enough  wind  to  make  a  good  working  breeze  for 
his  larger  vessels  put  all  his  smaller  ones  hors  de 
combat;  and  in  weather  that  suited  the  latter,  the 
former  could  not  move  about  at  all.  When  speed 
became  necessary  the  two  ships  left  the  brig  hope- 
lessly behind,  and  either  had  to  do  without  her,  or 
else  perhaps  let  the  critical  moment  slip  by  while 
waiting  for  her  to  come  up.  Some  of  the  schooners 
sailed  quite  as  slowly;  and  finally  it  was  found  out 
that  the  only  way  to  get  all  the  vessels  into  action 
at  once  was  to  have  one  half  the  fleet  tow  the  other 
half.  It  was  certainly  difficult  to  keep  the  com- 
mand of  the  lake  when,  if  it  came  on  to  blow,  the 
commodore  had  to  put  into  port  under  penalty  of 
seeing  a  quarter  of  his  fleet  founder  before  his 
eyes.  These  conflicting  considerations  render  it 
hard  to  pass  judgment;  but  on  the  whole  it  would 
seem  as  if  Chauncy  was  the  superior  in  force,  for 
even  if  his  schooners  were  not  counted,  his  three 
square-rigged  vessels  were  at  least  a  match  for 


274  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  four  square-rigged  British  vessels,  and  the  two 
British  schooners  would  not  have  counted  very 
much  in  such  a  conflict.  In  calm  weather  he  was 
certainly  the  superior.  This  only  solves  one  of  the 
points  in  which  the  official  letters  of  the  two  com- 
manders differ:  after  every  meeting  each  one  in- 
sists that  he  was  inferior  in  force,  that  the  weather 
suited  his  antagonist,  and  that  the  latter  ran  away, 
and  got  the  worst  of  it;  all  of  which  will  be  con- 
sidered further  on. 

In  order  to  settle  toward  which  side  the  balance 
of  success  inclined,  we  must  remember  that  there 
were  two  things  the  combatants  were  trying  to 
do,  viz. : 

(1)  To  damage  the  enemy  directly  by  capturing 
or  destroying  his  vessels.    This  was  the  only  object 
we  had  in  view  in  sending  out  ocean  cruisers,  but 
on  the  lakes  it  was  subordinated  to : 

(2)  Getting  the  control  of  the  lake,  by  which 
invaluable  assistance  could  be  rendered  to  the  army. 
The  most  thorough  way  of  accomplishing  this   of 
course  was  by  destroying  the  enemy's  squadron; 
but  it  could  also  be  done  by  building  ships  too  pow- 
erful for  him  to  face  or  by  beating  him  in  some 
engagement   which,    although    not    destroying   hia 
fleet,  would  force  him  to  go  into  port.    If  one  side 
was   stronger,   then   the   weaker  party  by   skilful 
manoeuvring  might  baffle  the  foe,  and  rest  satisfied 
by  keeping  the  sovereignty  of  the  lake  disputed ;  for, 
as  long  as  one  squadron  was  not  undisputed  master 
it  could  not  be  of  much  assistance  in  transporting 


On  the  Lakes  275 

troops,  attacking  forts,  or  otherwise  helping  the 
military. 

In  1813  the  Americans  gained  the  first  point  by 
being  the  first  to  begin  operations.  They  were 
building  a  new  ship,  afterward  the  Pike,  at  Sackett's 
Harbor;  the  British  were  building  two  new  ships, 
each  about  two-thirds  the  force  of  the  Pike,  one  at 
Toronto  (then  called  York},  one  at  Kingston.  Be- 
fore these  were  built  the  two  fleets  were  just  on 
a  par;  the  destruction  of  the  Pike  would  give  the 
British  the  supremacy;  the  destruction  of  either  of 
the  British  ships,  provided  the  Pike  were  saved, 
would  give  the  Americans  the  supremacy.  Both 
sides  had  already  committed  faults.  The  Ameri- 
cans had  left  Sackett's  Harbor  so  poorly  defended 
and  garrisoned  that  it  invited  attack,  while  the 
British  had  fortified  Kingston  very  strongly,  but 
had  done  little  for  York,  and,  moreover,  ought  not 
to  have  divided  their  forces  by  building  ships  in 
different  places. 

Commodore  Chauncy's  squadron  was  ready  for 
service  on  April  iQth,  and  on  the  25th  he  made  sail 
with  the  Madison,  Lieutenant-commander  Elliott, 
floating  his  own  broad  pennant,  Oneida,  Lieutenant 
McPherson,  Scourge,  Mr.  Osgood,  Tompkins,  Lieu- 
tenant Brown,  Conquest^  Lieutenant  Pettigrew, 
Growler,  Mr.  Mix,  Julia,  Mr.  Trant,  Asp,  Lieuten- 
ant Smith,  Pert,  Lieutenant  Adams,  American,  Lieu- 
tenant Chauncy,  Ontario,  Mr.  Stevens,  Lady  of  the 
Lake,  Mr.  Hinn,  and  Raven,  transport,  having  on 
board  General  Dearborn  and  1,700  troops,  to  at- 


276  Naval  War  of  1812 

tack  York,  which  was  garrisoned  by  about  700 
British  regulars  and  Canadian  militia  under  Major- 
General  Sheafe.  The  new  24-gun  ship  was  almost 
completed,  and  the  Gloucester  lo-gun  brig  was  in 
port ;  the  guns  of  both  vessels  were  used  in  defence 
of  the  port.  The  fleet  arrived  before  York  early 
on  April  27th,  and  the  debarkation  began  at  about 
8  A.M.  The  schooners  beat  up  to  the  fort  under  a 
heavy  cannonade,  and  opened  a  spirited  fire  from 
their  long  guns;  while  the  troops  went  ashore  un- 
der the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Pike.  The 
boats  were  blown  to  leeward  by  the  strong  east 
wind,  and  were  exposed  to  a  galling  fire,  but  landed 
the  troops  under  cover  of  the  grape  thrown  by  the 
vessels.  The  schooners  now  beat  up  to  within  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  principal  work,  and 
opened  heavily  upon  it,  while  at  the  same  time 
General  Pike  and  the  main  body  of  the  troops  on 
shore  moved  forward  to  the  assault,  using  their 
bayonets  only.  The  British  regulars  and  Canadian 
militia,  outnumbered  three  to  one  (including  the 
American  sailors)  and  with  no  very  good  defensive 
works,  of  course  had  to  give  way,  having  lost  heav- 
ily, especially  from  the  fire  of  the  vessels.  An  ex- 
plosion immediately  afterward  killed  or  wounded 
250  of  the  victors,  including  General  Pike.  The 
Americans  lost,  on  board  the  fleet,  4  killed,  includ- 
ing midshipmen  Hatfield  and  Thompson,  and  8 
wounded;3  and  of  the  army,4  14  killed  and  32 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  April  28,  1813. 

4  James,  "Military  Occurrences"  (London,  1818)  i,  p.  151. 


On  the  Lakes  277 

wounded  by  the  enemy's  fire,  and  52  killed  and  180 
wounded  by  the  explosion:  total  loss,  288.  The 
British  regulars  lost  130  killed  and  wounded,  includ- 
ing 40  by  the  explosion;5  together  with  50  Cana- 
dians and  Indians,  making  a  total  of  180,  besides 
290  prisoners.  The  24-gun  ship  was  burned,  her 
guns  taken  away,  and  the  Gloucester  sailed  back  to 
Sackett's  Harbor  with  the  fleet.  Many  military  and 
naval  stores  were  destroyed,  and  much  more  shipped 
to  the  Harbor.  The  great  fault  that  the  British  had 
committed  was  in  letting  the  defences  of  so  impor- 
tant a  place  remain  so  poor,  and  the  force  in  it  so 
small.  It  was  impossible  to  resist  very  long  when 
Pike's  troops  were  landed,  and  the  fleet  in  position. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans  did  the  work  in 
good  style;  the  schooners  were  finely  handled,  fir- 
ing with  great  precision  and  completely  covering  the 
troops,  who,  in  turn,  were  disembarked  and  brought 
into  action  very  handsomely. 

After  being  detained  in  York  a  week  by  bad 
weather  the  squadron  got  out,  and  for  the  next 
fortnight  was  employed  in  conveying  troops  and 
stores  to  General  Dearborn.  Then  it  was  determined 
to  make  an  attack  on  Fort  George,  where  the  British 
General  Vincent  was  stationed  with  from  i,ooo6  to 
i,8oo7  regulars,  600  militia,  and  about  100  Indians. 
The  American  troops  numbered  about  4,500,  prac- 
tically under  the  command  of  Colonel  Scott.  On 

5  Lossing's  "Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  p.  581.     The 
accounts  vary  somewhat. 
'  James,  "Military  Occurrences,"  i.  p.  151. 
T  Lossing,  596. 


278  Naval  War  of  1812 

May  26th  Commodore  Chauncy  carefully  recon- 
noitred the  place  to  be  attacked,  and  in  the  night 
made  soundings  along  the  coast,  and  laid  buoys 
so  as  to  direct  the  small  vessels,  who  were  to  do  the 
fighting.  At  3  A.M.  on  the  27th  the  signal  was  made 
to  weigh,  the  heavy  land  artillery  being  on  the 
Madison,  and  the  other  troops  on  the  Oneida,  the 
Lady  of  the  Lake,  and  in  batteaux,  many  of  which 
had  been  captured  at  York.  The  Julia,  Growler,  and 
Ontario  moved  in  and  attacked  a  battery  near  the 
lighthouse,  opening  a  cross-fire  which  silenced  it. 
The  troops  were  to  be  disembarked  further  along  the 
lake,  near  a  battery  of  one  long  24,  managed  by 
Canadian  militia.  The  Conquest  and  Tompkins 
swept  in  under  fire  to  this  battery,  and  in  10  minutes 
killed  or  drove  off  the  artillerymen,  who  left  the 
gun  spiked,  and  then  opened  on  the  British.  "The 
American  ships  with  their  heavy  discharges  of  round 
and  grape  too  well  succeeded  in  thinning  the  British 
ranks."8  Meanwhile  the  troop-boats,  under  Cap- 
tain Perry  and  Colonel  Scott  dashed  in,  completely 
covered  by  a  heavy  fire  of  grape  directed  point- 
blank  at  the  foe  by  the  Hamilton,  Scourge,  and  Asp. 
"The  fire  from  the  American  shipping  committed 
dreadful  havoc  among  the  British,  and  rendered 
their  efforts  to  oppose  the  landing  of  the  enemy  in- 
effectual." 9  Colonel  Scott's  troops,  thus  protected, 
made  good  their  landing  and  met  the  British  regu- 
lars; but  the  latter  were  so  terribly  cut  up  by  the 
tremendous  discharges  of  grape  and  canister  from 

•  James,  "Military  Occurrences,"  i,  p.  151.         •  Loc.  cit. 


On  the  Lakes  279 

the  schooners,  that  in  spite  of  their  gallantry  and 
discipline  they  were  obliged  to  retreat,  blowing  up 
and  abandoning  the  fort.  One  sailor  was  killed  and 
two  wounded;10  seventeen  soldiers  were  killed  and 
forty-five  wounded;11  making  the  total  American 
loss  sixty-five.  Of  the  British  regulars  52  were 
killed,  44  wounded  and  262  "wounded  and  miss- 
ing," 12  in  addition  to  about  forty  Canadians  and 
Indians  hors  de  combat  and  nearly  500  militia  cap- 
tured; so  that  in  this  very  brilliant  affair  the  as- 
sailants suffered  hardly  more  than  a  fifth  of  the  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  that  the  assailed  did; 
which  must  be  attributed  to  the  care  with  which 
Chauncy  had  reconnoitred  the  ground  and  prepared 
the  attack,  the  excellent  handling  of  the  schooners, 
and  the  exceedingly  destructive  nature  of  their  fire. 
The  British  batteries  were  very  weak,  and,  more- 
over, badly  served.  Their  regular  troops  fought  ex- 
cellently, it  was  impossible  for  them  to  stand  against 
the  fire  of  the  schooners,  which  should  have  been 
engaged  by  the  batteries  on  shore;  and  they  were 
too  weak  in  numbers  to  permit  the  American  army 
to  land  and  then  attack  it  when  away  from  the 
boats.  The  Americans  were  greatly  superior  in 
force,  and  yet  deserve  very  much  credit  for  achiev- 
ing their  object  so  quickly,  with  such  slight  loss 
to  themselves,  and  at  such  a  heavy  cost  to  the  foe. 
The  effect  of  the  victory  was  most  important,  the 

10  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  May  29,  1813. 

11  Letter  of  General  Dearborn,  May  27,  1813. 
19  Letter  of  Brig.-Gen.  Vincent,  May  28,  1813. 


a8o  Naval  War  of  1812 

British  evacuating  the  whole  Niagara  frontier,  and 
leaving  the  river  in  complete  possession  of  the  Amer- 
icans for  the  time  being.  This  offered  the  opportu- 
nity for  despatching  Captain  Perry  up  above  the 
falls  to  take  out  one  captured  brig  (the  Caledonia) 
and  four  purchased  schooners,  which  had  been  lying 
in  the  river  unable  to  get  past  the  British  batteries 
into  Lake  Erie.  These  five  vessels  were  now  carried 
into  that  lake,  being  tracked  up  against  the  current 
by  oxen,  to  become  a  most  important  addition  to  the 
American  force  upon  it. 

While  Chauncy's  squadron  was  thus  absent  at 
the  west  end  of  the  lake  the  Wolfe,  24,  was  launched 
and  equipped  at  Kingston,  making  the  British  force 
on  the  lake  superior  to  that  of  the  Americans.  Im- 
mediately Sir  George  Prevost  and  Sir  James  Lucas 
Yeo,  the  commanders-in-chief  of  the  land  and  water 
forces  in  the  Canadas,  decided  to  strike  a  blow  at 
Sackett's  Harbor  and  destroy  the  General  Pike,  28, 
thus  securing  to  themselves  the  superiority  for  the 
rest  of  the  season.  Accordingly,  they  embarked 
on  May  27th,  in  the  Wolfe,  Royal  George,  Moira, 
Prince  Regent,  Simcoe,  and  Seneca,  with  a  large 
number  of  gunboats,  barges,  and  batteaux;  and  on 
the  next  day  saw  and  attacked  a  brigade  of  19 
boats  transporting  troops  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  un- 
der command  of  Lieutenant  Aspinwall.  Twelve 
boats  were  driven  ashore,  and  70  of  the  men  in 
them  captured;  but  Lieutenant  Aspinwall  and  100 
men  succeeded  in  reaching  the  Harbor,  bringing 
up  the  total  number  of  regulars  there  to  500  men, 


On  the  Lakes  281 

General  Brown  having  been  summoned  to  take  the 
chief  command.  About  400  militia  also  came  in, 
but  were  of  no  earthly  service.  There  were,  how- 
ever, 200  Albany  volunteers,  under  Colonel  Mills, 
who  could  be  relied  on.  The  defences  were  mis- 
erably inadequate,  consisting  of  a  battery  of  one  long 
gun,  and  a  block-house. 

On  the  29th  Sir  George  Prevost  and  800  regulars 
landed,  being  covered  by  the  gunboats  under  Sir 
James  Lucas  Yeo.  The  American  militia  fled  at 
once,  but  the  regulars  and  volunteers  held  their 
ground  in  and  around  the  block-house.  "At  this 
point  the  further  energies  of  the  [British]  troops 
became  unavailing.  The  [American]  block-house 
and  stockade  could  not  be  carried  by  assault  nor  re- 
duced by  field-pieces,  had  we  been  provided  with 
them ;  the  fire  of  the  gunboats  proved  insufficient  to 
attain  that  end;  light  and  adverse  winds  continued, 
and  our  larger  vessels  were  still  far  off."  13  The 
British  re-embarked  precipitately.  The  American 
loss  amounted  to  23  killed  and  114  wounded;  that 
of  the  British  52  killed  and  211  wounded,14  most 
of  the  latter  being  taken  prisoners.  During  the  fight 
some  of  the  frightened  Americans  set  fire  to  the 
storehouses,  the  Pike  and  Gloucester;  the  former 
were  consumed,  but  the  flames  were  extinguished 
before  they  did  any  damage  to  either  of  the  vessels. 
This  attack  differed  especially  from  those  on  Fort 
George  and  York,  in  that  the  attacking  force  was 

13  Letter  of  Adj. -Gen.  Baynes,  May  30,  1813. 

14  James,  "Military  Occurrences,"  p.  173. 


282  Naval  War  of  1812 

relatively  much  weaker;  still  it  ought  to  have  been 
successful.  But  Sir  George  could  not  compare  as 
a  leader  with  Col.  Scott  or  Gen.  Pike ;  and  Sir  James 
did  not  handle  the  gunboats  by  any  means  as  well 
as  the  Americans  did  their  schooners  in  similar  at- 
tacks. The  admirers  of  Sir  James  lay  the  blame  on 
Sir  George,  and  vice  versa;  but  in  reality  neither 
seems  to  have  done  particularly  well.  At  any  rate 
the  affair  was  the  reverse  of  creditable  to  the  British. 
The  British  squadron  returned  to  Kingston,  and 
Chauncy,  having  heard  that  they  were  out,  came 
down  the  lake  and  went  into  port  about  June  2d. 
So  far  the  Americans  had  had  all  the  success,  and 
had  controlled  the  lake;  but  now  Yeo's  force  was 
too  formidable  to  be  encountered  until  the  Pike  was 
built,  and  the  supremacy  passed  undisputed  into  his 
hands,  while  Chauncy  lay  in  Sackett's  Harbor.  Of 
course  with  the  Pike  soon  to  be  built,  Yeo's  uncon- 
tested  superiority  could  be  of  but  short  duration; 
but  he  used  his  time  most  actively.  He  sailed  from 
Kingston  on  the  3d  of  June,  to  co-operate  with  the 
British  army  at  the  head  of  the  lake,  and  intercept 
all  supplies  going  to  tHe  Americans.  On  the  8th 
he  discovered  a  small  camp  of  the  latter  near  Forty 
Mile  Creek,  and  attacked  it  with  the  Beresford, 
Sydney  Smith,  and  gunboats,  obliging  the  Ameri- 
cans to  leave  their  camp,  while  their  equipages,  pro- 
visions, stores,  -and  batteaux  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  British,  whose  troops  occupied  the  post,  thus  as- 
sisting in  the  series  of  engagements  which  ended  in 
the  humiliating  repulse  of  General  Wilkinson's  ex- 


On  the  Lakes  283 

pedition  into  Canada.  On  the  I3th  two  schooners 
and  some  boats  bringing  supplies  to  the  Americans 
were  captured,  and  on  the  i6th  a  depot  of  provisions 
at  the  Genesee  River  shared  the  same  fate.  On  the 
1 9th  a  party  of  British  soldiers  were  landed  by  the 
fleet  at  Great  Sodas,  and  took  off  600  barrels  of 
flour.  Yeo  then  returned  to  Kingston,  where  he 
anchored  on  the  27th,  having  done  good  service  in 
assisting  the  land  forces.15  As  a  small  compensa- 
tion, on  the  1 8th  of  the  same  month  the  Lady  of  the 
Lake,  Lieut.  Wolcott  Chauncy,  captured  off  Presqu* 
Isle  the  British  schooner  Lady  Murray,  containing 
i  ensign,  15  soldiers,  and  6  sailors,  together  with 
stores  and  ammunition.16 

During  the  early  part  of  July  neither  squadron 
put  out  in  force;  although  on  the  first  of  the  month 
Commodore  Yeo  made  an  abortive  attempt  to  sur- 
prise Sackett's  Harbor,  but  abandoned  it  when  it 
was  discovered.  Meanwhile  the  Americans  were 
building  a  new  schooner,  the  Sylph,  and  the  for- 
midable corvette  Pike  was  made  ready  to  sail  by 
July  2 1  st.  On  the  same  day  the  entire  American 
squadron,  or  fleet,  sailed  up  to  the  head  of  the  lake, 
and  reached  Niagara  on  the  27th.  Here  Col.  Scott 
and  some  of  his  regulars  were  embarked,  and  on  the 
3Oth  a  descent  was  made  upon  York,  where  1 1  trans- 
ports were  destroyed,  5  cannon,  a  quantity  of  flour, 
and  some  ammunition  carried  off,  and  the  barracks 

u  Letter  of  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo  to  Mr.  Croker,  June  29, 
1813. 

l*  Letter  of  Lieut.  Wolcott  Chauncy  to  Com.  Chauncy, 
June  18,  1813. 


284  Naval  War  of  1812 

burned.  On  the  3d  of  August  the  troops  were  dis- 
embarked at  the  Niagara,  and  in  officers  and  men 
were  sent  up  to  join  Perry  on  Lake  Erie.  As  this 
left  the  squadron  much  deranged  150  militia  were 
subsequently  lent  it  by  General  Boyd,  but  they 
proved  of  no  assistance  (beyond  swelling  the  num- 
ber of  men  Yeo  captured  in  the  Growler  and  Julia 
from  70  individuals  to  80),  and  were  again  landed. 
Commodore  Yeo  sailed  with  his  squadron  from 
Kingston  on  Aug.  2d,  and  on  the  7th  the  two  fleets 
for  the  first  time  came  in  sight  of  one  another,  the 
Americans  at  anchor  off  Fort  Niagara,  the  British 
six  miles  to  windward,  in  the  W.N.W.  Chauncy's 
squadron  contained  one  corvette,  one  ship  sloop,  one 
brig  sloop,  and  ten  schooners,  manned  by  about  965 
men,  and  throwing  at  a  broadside,  1,390  Ibs.  of  shot, 
nearly  800  of  which  were  from  long  guns.  Yeo's 
included  two  ship  sloops,  two  brig  sloops,  and  two 
schooners,  manned  by  770  men,  and  throwing  at  a 
broadside  1,374  Ibs.,  but  180  being  from  long  guns. 
But  Yeo's  vessels  were  all  built  with  bulwarks,  while 
ten  of  Chauncy's  had  none ;  and,  moreover,  his  ves- 
sels could  all  sail  and  manoeuvre  together,  while,  as 
already  remarked,  one  half  of  the  American  fleet 
spent  a  large  part  of  its  time  towing  the  other  half. 
The  Pike  would  at  ordinary  range  be  a  match  for  the 
Wolfe  and  Melville  together;  yet  in  actual  weight 
of  metal  she  threw  less  than  the  former  ship  alone. 
In  calm  weather  the  long  guns  of  the  American 
schooners  gave  them  a  great  advantage;  in  rough 
weather  they  could  not  be  used  at  all.  Still,  on  the 


On  the  Lakes  285 

whole,  it  could  fairly  be  said  that  Yeo  was  ad- 
vancing to  attack  a  superior  fleet. 

All  through  the  day  of  the  7th  the  wind  blew 
light  and  variable,  and  the  two  squadrons  went 
through  a  series  of  manoeuvres,  nominally  to  bring 
on  an  action.  As  each  side  flatly  contradicts  the 
other  it  'is  hard  to  tell  precisely  what  the  manoeu- 
vres were;  each  captain  says  the  other  avoided  him 
and  that  he  made  all  sail  in  chase.  At  any  rate  it 
was  just  the  weather  for  Chauncy  to  engage  in. 

That  night  the  wind  came  out  squally ;  and  about 
i  A.M.  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  a  heavy  gust  struck 
the  Hamilton  and  Scourge,  forcing  them  to  careen 
over  till  the  heavy  guns  broke  loose,  and  they  foun- 
dered, but  1 6  men  escaping, — which  accident  did  not 
open  a  particularly  cheerful  prospect  to  the  remain- 
der of  the  schooners.  Chauncy's  force  was,  by  this 
accident,  reduced  to  a  numerical  equality  with  Yeo's, 
having  perhaps  a  hundred  more  men,17  and  throw- 
ing 144  Ibs.  less  shot  at  a  broadside.  All  through' 
the  two  succeeding  days  the  same  manoeuvring  went 
on;  the  question  as  to  which  avoided  the  fight  is 
simply  one  of  veracity  between  the  two  commanders, 

11  This  estimate  as  to  men  is  a  mere  balancing  of  proba- 
bilities. If  James  underestimates  the  British  force  on  On- 
tario as  much  as  he  has  on  Erie  and  Champlain,  Yeo  had  as 
many  men  as  his  opponent.  Chauncy,  in  one  of  his  letters 
(preserved  with  the  other  manuscript  letters  in  the  Naval 
Archives),  says:  "I  enclose  the  muster-rolls  of  all  my  ships," 
but  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  them,  and  in  any  event  the 
complements  were  continually  changing  completely.  The 
point  is  not  important,  as  each  side  certainly  had  plenty  of 
men  on  this  occasion. 


286  Naval  War  of  1812 

and  of  course  each  side,  to  the  end  of  time,  will  be- 
lieve its  own  leader.  But  it  is  not  of  the  least  con- 
sequence, as  neither  accomplished  anything. 

On  the  loth  the  same  tedious  evolutions  were 
continued,  but  at  7  P.M.  the  two  squadrons  were 
tolerably  near  one  another,  Yeo  to  windward,  the 
breeze  being  fresh  from  the  S.W.  Commodore 
Chauncy  formed  his  force  in  two  lines  on  the  port 
tack,  while  Commodore  Yeo  approached  from  be- 
hind and  to  windward,  in  single  column,  on  the 
same  tack.  Commodore  Chauncy's  weather  line 
was  formed  of  the  Julia,  Growler,  Pert,  Ash,  On- 
tario, and  American,  in  that  order,  and  the  lee  line 
of  the  Pike,  Oneida,  Madison,  Tompkins,  and  Con- 
quest. Chauncy  formed  his  weather  line  of  the 
smaller  vessels,  directing  them,  when  the  British 
should  engage,  to  edge  away  and  form  to  leeward 
of  the  second  line,  expecting  that  Sir  James  would 
follow  them  down.  At  u  the  weather  line  opened 
fire  at  very  long  range;  at  11.15  it  was  returned, 
and  the  action  became  general  and  harmless;  at 
11.30  the  weather  line  bore  up  and  passed  to  lee- 
ward, except  the  Julia  and  Growler,  which  tacked. 
The  British  ships  kept  their  luff  and  cut  off  the  two 
that  had  tacked,  while  Commodore  Chauncy's  lee 
line  "edged  away  two  points,  to  lead  the  enemy 
down,  not  only  to  engage  him  to  more  advantage, 
but  to  lead  him  from  the  Julia  and  Growler"  18  Of 
course  the  enemy  did  not  come  down,  and  the  Julia 
and  Growler  were  not  saved.  Yeo  kept  on  till  he 

18  Letter  of  Commodore  Isaac  Chauncy,  Aug.  13,  1813. 


On  the  Lakes 


287 


had  cut  off  the  two  schooners,  fired  an  ineffectual 
broadside  at  the  other  ships,  and  tacked  after  the 
Growler  and  Julia.  Then,  when  too  late,  Chauncy 


3=1 


.ll 

-  c«  a 

It! 
•§.§« 


tacked  also,  and  stood  after  him.  The  schooners, 
meanwhile,  kept  clawing  to  windward  till  they  were 
overtaken,  and,  after  making  a  fruitless  effort  to  run 


288  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  gantlet  through  the  enemy's  squadron  by  put- 
ting before  the  wind,  were  captured.  Yeo's  account 
is  simple :  "Came  within  gunshot  of  Pike  and  Madi- 
son, when  they  immediately  bore  up,  fired  their 
stern  chase  guns,  and  made  all  sail  for  Niagara, 
leaving  two  of  their  schooners  astern,  which  we 
captured."  19  The  British  had  acted  faultlessly,  and 
the  honor  and  profit  gained  by  the  encounter  rest- 
ed entirely  with  them.  On  the  contrary,  neither 
Chauncy  nor  his  subordinates  showed  to  advantage. 
Cooper  says  that  the  line  of  battle  was  "singu- 
larly well  adapted  to  draw  the  enemy  down,"  and 
"admirable  for  its  advantages  and  ingenuity."  In 
the  first  place  it  is  an  open  question  whether  the 
enemy  needed  drawing  down;  on  this  occasion  he 
advanced  boldly  enough.  The  formation  may  have 
been  ingenious,  but  it  was  the  reverse  of  advanta- 
geous. It  would  have  been  far  better  to  have  had  the 
strongest  vessels  to  windward,  and  the  schooners, 
with  their  long  guns,  to  leeward,  where  they  would 
not  be  exposed  to  capture  by  any  accident  happen- 
ing to  them.  Moreover,  it  does  not  speak  well  for 
the  discipline  of  the  fleet,  that  two  commanders 
should  have  directly  disobeyed  orders.  And  when 
the  two  schooners  did  tack,  and  it  was  evident  that 
Sir  James  would  cut  them  off,  it  was  an  extraordi- 
nary proceeding  for  Chauncy  to  "edge  away  two 
points  ...  to  lead  the  enemy  from  the  Growler  and 
Julia."  It  is  certainly  a  novel  principle,  that  if  part 
of  a  force  is  surrounded  the  true  way  to  rescue 

19  Letter  of  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo,  Aug.  10,  1813. 


On  the  Lakes  289 

it  is  to  run  away  with  the  balance,  in  hopes  that  the 
enemy  will  follow.  Had  Chauncy  tacked  at  once, 
Sir  James  would  have  been  placed  between  two  fires, 
and  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  him  to  cap- 
ture the  schooners.  As  it  was,  the  British  com- 
mander had  attacked  a  superior  force  in  weather 
that  had  just  suited  it,  and  yet  had  captured  two 
of  its  vessels  without  suffering  any  injury  beyond 
a  few  shot  holes  in  the  sails.  The  action,  however, 
was  in  no  way  decisive.  All  next  day,  the  i  ith,  the 
fleets  were  in  sight  of  one  another,  the  British  to 
windward,  but  neither  attempted  to  renew  the  en- 
gagement. The  wind  grew  heavier,  and  the  vil- 
lanous  little  American  schooners  showed  such  strong 
tendencies  to  upset,  that  two  had  to  run  into  Ni- 
agara Bay  to  anchor.  With  the  rest  Chauncy  ran 
down  the  lake  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  which  he  reached 
on  the  1 3th,  provisioned  his  squadron  for  five  weeks, 
and  that  same  evening  proceeded  up  the  lake  again. 
The  advantage  in  this  action  had  been  entirely 
with  the  British,  but  it  is  simply  nonsense  to  say, 
as  one  British  historian  does,  that  "on  Lake  Ontario, 
therefore,  we  at  last  secured  a  decisive  predomi- 
nance, which  we  maintained  until  the  end  of  the 
war."  20  This  "decisive"  battle  left  the  Americans 
just  as  much  in  command  of  the  lake  as  the  British ; 

80  "History  of  the  British  Navy,"  by  Charles  Duke  Yonge 
(London,  1866),  iii,  p.  24.  It  is  apparently  not  a  work  of  any 
authority,  but  I  quote  it  as  showing  probably  the  general 
feeling  of  British  writers  about  the  action  and  its  results, 
which  can  only  proceed  from  extreme  partisanship  and  igno- 
rance of  the  subject. 

VOL.  IX.— 13 


290  Naval  War  of  1812 

and  even  this  very  questionable  "predominance" 
lasted  but  six  weeks,  after  which  the  British  squad- 
ron was  blockaded  in  port  most  of  the  time.  The 
action  has  a  parallel  in  that  fought  on  the  22d  of 
July,  1805,  by  Sir  Robert  Calder's  fleet  of  15  sail 
of  the  line  against  the  Franco-Spanish  fleet  of  20 
sail  of  the  line,  under  M.  Villeneuve.21  The  two 
fleets  engaged  in  a  fog,  and  the  English  captured 
two  ships,  when  both  sides  drew  off,  and  remained 
in  sight  of  each  other  the  next  day  without  either  re- 
newing the  action.  "A  victory  therefore  it  was  that 
Sir  Robert  Calder  had  gained,  but  not  a  'decisive' 
nor  a  'brilliant'  victory."  22  This  is  exactly  the  criti- 
cism that  should  be  passed  on  Sir  James  Lucas 
Yeo's  action  of  the  loth  of  August. 

From  the  i3th  of  August  to  the  loth  of  Septem- 
ber both  fleets  were  on  the  lake  most  of  the  time, 
each  commodore  stoutly  maintaining  that  he  was 
chasing  the  other;  and  each  expressing  in  his  let- 
ters his  surprise  and  disgust  that  his  opponent  should 
be  afraid  of  meeting  him  "though  so  much  superior 
in  force."  The  facts  are  of  course  difficult  to  get  at, 
but  it  seems  pretty  evident  that  Yeo  was  determined 
to  engage  in  heavy,  and  Chauncy  in  light,  weather ; 

91  "Batailles  Navales  de  la  France,"  par  O.  Troude,  iii,  352. 
It  seems  rather  ridiculous  to  compare  these  lake  actions, 
fought  between  small  flotillas,  with  the  gigantic  contests 
which  the  huge  fleets  of  Europe  waged  in  contending  for 
the  supremacy  of  the  ocean ;  but  the  difference  is  one  of  de- 
gree and  not  of  kind,  and  they  serve  well  enough  for  pur- 
poses of  illustration  or  comparison. 

"  James'  "Naval  History,"  iv,  14. 


On  the  Lakes  291 

and  that  the  party  to  leeward  generally  made  off. 
The  Americans  had  been  reinforced  by  the  Sylph, 
schooner,  of  300  tons  and  70  men,  carrying  four 
long  32's  on  pivots,  and  six  long  6's.  Theoreti- 
cally her  armament  would  make  her  formidable ;  but 
practically  her  guns  were  so  crowded  as  to  be  of 
little  use,  and  the  next  year  she  was  converted  into 
a  brig,  mounting  24-pound  carronades. 

On  the  nth  of  September  a  partial  engagement, 
at  very  long  range,  in  light  weather,  occurred  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Genesee  River ;  the  Americans  suf- 
fered no  loss  whatever,  while  the  British  had  one 
midshipman  and  three  seamen  killed  and  seven 
wounded,  and  afterward  ran  into  Amherst  Bay. 
One  of  their  brigs,  the  Melville,  received  a  shot  so 
far  under  water  that  to  get  at  and  plug  it,  the  guns 
had  to  be  run  in  on  one  side  and  out  on  the  other. 
Chauncy  describes  it  as  a  running  fight  of  3  ^2  hours, 
the  enemy  then  escaping  into  Amherst  Bay.23  James 
(p.  38)  says  that  "at  sunset  a  breeze  sprang  up 
from  the  westward,  when  Sir  James  steered  for  the 
American  fleet;  but  the  American  commodore 
avoided  a  close  action,  and  thus  the  affair  ended." 
This  is  a  good  sample  of  James'  trustworthiness; 
his  account  is  supposed  to  be  taken  from  Commo- 
dore Yeo's  letter,24  which  says :  "At  sunset  a  breeze 
sprang  up  from  the  westward,  when  I  steered  for 
the  False  Duck  Islands,  under  which  the  enemy 
could  not  keep  the  weather-gage,  but  be  obliged  to 

**  Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Sept.  13,  1813. 
84  Letter  to  Admiral  Warren,  Sept.  12,  1813. 


292  Naval  War  of  1812 

meet  us  on  equal  terms.  This,  however,  he  carefully 
avoided  doing."  In  other  words,  Yeo  did  not  steer 
for  but  away  from  Chauncy.  Both  sides  admit  that 
Yeo  got  the  worst  of  it  and  ran  away,  and  it  is  only 
a  question  as  to  whether  Chauncy  followed  him  or 
not.  Of  course  in  such  light  weather  Chauncy's  long 
guns  gave  him  a  great  advantage.  He  had  present 
10  vessels ;  the  Pike,  Madison,  Oneida,  Sylph,  Tomp- 
kins,  Conquest,  Ontario,  Pert,  American,  and  Asp, 
throwing  1,288  Ibs.  of  shot,  with  a  total  of  98 
guns.  Yeo  had  92  guns,  throwing  at  a  broadside 
1,374  Ibs.  Nevertheless,  Chauncy  told  but  part  of 
the  truth  in  writing  as  he  did :  "I  was  much  disap- 
pointed at  Sir  James  refusing  to  fight  me,  as  he  was 
so  much  superior  in  point  of  force,  both  in  guns  and 
men,  having  upward  of  20  guns  more  than  we  have, 
and  heaves  a  greater  weight  of  shot."  His  inferi- 
ority in  long  guns  placed  Yeo  at  a  great  disadvan- 
tage in  such  a  very  light  wind;  but  in  his  letter 
he  makes  a  marvelous  admission  of  how  little  able 
he  was  to  make  good  use  of  even  what  he  had.  He 
says :  "I  found  it  impossible  to  bring  them  to  close 
action.  We  remained  in  this  mortifying  situation 
five  hours,  having  only  six  guns  in  all  the  squadron 
that  would  reach  the  enemy  (not  a  carronade  being 
fired)."  Now  according  to  James  himself  ("Naval 
Occurrences,"  p.  297)  he  had  in  his  squadron  2  long 
24*5,  13  long  i8's,  2  long  I2's,  and  3  long  9's,  and, 
in  a  fight  of  five  hours,  at  very  long  range,  in  smooth 
water,  it  was  a  proof  of  culpable  incompetency  on 
his  part  that  he  did  not  think  of  doing  what  Elliott 


On  the  Lakes  293 

and  Perry  did  in  similar  circumstances  on  Lake  Erie 
— substitute  all  his  long  guns  for  some  of  the  car- 
ronades  on  the  engaged  side.  Chauncy  could  place 
in  broadside  7  long  32*5,  18  long  24*8,  4  long  I2's, 
8  long  6's ;  so  he  could  oppose  37  long  guns,  throw- 
ing 752  Ibs.  of  shot,  to  Yeo's  20  long  guns,  throwing 
333  Ibs.  of  shot.  The  odds  were  thus  more  than  two 
to  one  against  the  British  in  any  case ;  and  their  com- 
mander's lack  of  resource  made  them  still  greater. 
But  it  proved  a  mere  skirmish,  with  no  decisive  re- 
sults. 

The  two  squadrons  did  not  come  in  contact  again 
till  on  the  28th,  in  York  Bay.  The  Americans  had 
the  weather-gage,  the  wind  being  fresh  from  the 
east.  Yeo  tacked  and  stretched  out  into  the  lake, 
while  Chauncy  steered  directly  for  his  centre.  When 
the  squadrons  were  still  a  league  apart  the  British 
formed  on  the  port  tack,  with  their  heavy  vessels 
ahead;  the  Americans  got  on  the  same  tack  and 
edged  down  toward  them,  the  Pike  ahead,  towing 
the  Asp;  the  Tompkins,  under  Lieut.  Bolton  Finch, 
next;  the  Madison  next,  being  much  retarded  by 
having  a  schooner  in  tow ;  then  the  Sylph,  with  an 
other  schooner  in  tow,  the  Oneida,  and  the  two  other 
schooners.  The  British,  fearing  their  sternmost  ves- 
sels would  be  cut  off,  at  12.10  came  round  on  the 
starboard  tack,  beginning  with  the  Wolfe,  Commo- 
dore Yeo,  and  Royal  George,  Captain  William 
Howe  Mulcaster,  which  composed  the  van  of  the 
line.  They  opened  with  their  starboard  guns  as 
soon  as  they  came  round.  When  the  Pike  was 


294  Naval  War  of  1812 

abeam  of  the  Wolfe,  which  was  past  the  centre  of 
the  British  line,  the  Americans  bore  up  in  succes- 
sion for  their  centre. 

The  Madison  was  far  back,  and  so  was  the  Sylph, 
neither  having  cast  off  their  tows;  so  the  whole 
brunt  of  the  action  fell  on  the  Pike,  Asp,  and  Tomp- 
kins.  The  latter  kept  up  a  most  gallant  and  spirited 


fire  till  her  foremast  was  shot  away.  But  already 
the  Pike  had  shot  away  the  Wolfe's  maintopmast 
and  main  yard,  and  inflicted  so  heavy  a  loss  upon 
her  that  Commodore  Yeo,  not  very  heroically,  put 
dead  before  the  wind,  crowding  all  the  canvas  he 
could  on  her  forward  spars,  and  she  ran  completely 
past  all  her  own  vessels,  who  of  course  crowded  sail 


On  the  Lakes  295 

after  her.  The  retreat  of  the  commodore  was  most 
ably  covered  by  the  Royal  George,  under  Captain 
Mulcaster,  who  was  unquestionably  the  best  British 
officer  on  the  lake.  He  luffed  up  across  the  com- 
modore's stern,  and  delivered  broadsides  in  a  man- 
ner that  won  the  admiration  even  of  his  foes.  The 
Madison  and  Sylph,  having1  the  schooners  in  tow, 
could  not  overtake  the  British  ships,  though  the 
Sylph  opened  a  distant  fire;  the  Pike  kept  on  after 
them,  but  did  not  cast  off  the  Asp,  and  so  did  not 
gain;  and  at  3.15  the  pursuit  was  relinquished;25 
when  the  enemy  were  running  into  the  entirely  un- 
defended port  of  Burlington  Bay,  whence  escape 
would  have  been  impossible.  The  Tompkins  had 
lost  her  foremast,  and  the  Pike  her  foretopgallant 
mast,  with  her  bowsprit  and  mainmast  wounded; 
and  of  her  crew  five  men  were  killed  or  wounded, 
almost  all  by  the  guns  of  the  Royal  George.  These 
were  the  only  injuries  occasioned  by  the  enemy's  fire, 
but  the  Pike's  starboard  bow-chaser  burst,  killing 
or  wounding  22  men,  besides  blowing  up  the  topgal- 
lant forecastle,  so  that  the  bow  pivot  gun  could  not 
be  used.  Among  the  British  ships,  the  Wolfe  lost 
her  maintopmast,  mizzentopmast,  and  mainyard,  and 
the  Royal  George  her  foretopmast;  both  suffered 
a  heavy  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  according  to 
the  report  of  the  British  officers  captured  in  the 
transports  a  few  days  afterward. 

As  already  mentioned,  the  British  authorities  no 
longer  published  accounts  of  their  defeats,  so  Com- 

98  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  Sept.  28,  1813. 


296  Naval  War  of  1812 

modore  Yeo's  report  on  the  action  was  not  made 
public.  Brenton  merely  alludes  to  it  as  follows  (Vol. 
II,  p.  503)  :  "The  action  of  the  28th  of  September, 
1813,  in  which  Sir  James  Yeo  in  the  Wolfe  had  his 
main  and  mizzentopmasts  shot  away,  and  was 
obliged  to  put  before  the  wind,  gave  Mulcaster  an 
opportunity  of  displaying  a  trait  of  valor  and  sea- 
manship which  elicited  the  admiration  of  friends 
and  foes,  when  he  gallantly  placed  himself  between 
his  disabled  commodore  and  a  superior  enemy." 
James  speaks  in  the  vaguest  terms.  He  first  says, 
"Commodore  Chauncy,  having  the  weather-gage, 
kept  his  favorite  distance,"  which  he  did  because 
Commodore  Yeo  fled  so  fast  that  he  could  not  be 
overtaken;  then  James  mentions  the  injuries  the 
Wolfe  received,  and  says  that  "it  was  these  and  not, 
as  Mr.  Clark  says,  'a  manoeuvre  of  the  commodore's' 
that  threw  the  British  in  confusion."  In  other 
words,  it  was  the  commodore's  shot  and  not  his  ma- 
noeuvring that  threw  the  British  into  confusion — 
a  very  futile  distinction.  Next  he  says  that  "Com- 
modore Chauncy  would  not  venture  within  car- 
ronade  range,"  whereas  he  was  within  carronade 
range  of  the  Wolfe  and  Royal  George,  but  the  lat- 
ter did  not  wait  for  the  Madison  and  Oneida  to  get 
within  range  with  their  carronades.  The  rest  of  his 
article  is  taken  up  with  exposing  the  absurdities  of 
some  of  the  American  writings,  miscalled  histories, 
which  appeared  at  the  close  of  the  war.  His  criti- 
cisms on  these  are  very  just,  but  afford  a  funny  in- 
stance of  the  pot  calling  the  kettle  back.  This  much 


On  the  Lakes  297 

is  clear,  that  the  British  were  beaten  and  forced  to 
flee,  when  but  part  of  the  American  force  was  en- 
gaged. But  in  good  weather  the  American  force 
was  so  superior  that  being  beaten  would  have  been 
no  disgrace  to  Yeo,  had  it  not  been  for  the  claims 
advanced  both  by  himself  and  his  friends,  that  on 
the  whole  he  was  victorious  over  Chauncy.  The 
Wolfe  made  anything  but  an  obstinate  fight,  leav- 
ing almost  all  the  work  to  the  gallant  Mulcaster,  in 
the  Royal  George,  who  shares  with  Lieutenant  Finch 
of  the  Tompkins  most  of  the  glory  of  the  day.  The 
battle,  if  such  it  may  be  called,  completely  estab- 
lished Chauncy's  supremacy,  Yeo  spending  most  of 
the  remainder  of  the  season  blockaded  in  Kingston. 
So  Chauncy  gained  a  victory  which  established  his 
control  over  the  lakes;  and,  moreover,  he  gained  it 
by  fighting  in  succession,  almost  single-handed,  the 
two  heaviest  ships  of  the  enemy.  But  gaining  the 
victory  was  only  what  should  have  been  expected 
from  a  superior  force.  The  question  is,  Did 
Chauncy  use  his  force  to  the  best  advantage?  And 
it  can  not  be  said  that  he  did.  When  the  enemy  bore 
up  it  was  a  great  mistake  not  to  cast  off  the  schooners 
which  were  being  towed.  They  were  small  craft, 
not  of  much  use  in  the  fight,  and  they  entirely  pre- 
vented the  Madison  from  taking  any  part  in  the  con- 
test, and  kept  the  Sylph  at  a  great  distance;  and  by 
keeping  the  Asp  in  tow  the  Pike,  which  sailed  faster 
than  any  of  Yeo's  ships,  was  distanced  by  them. 
Had  she  left  the  Asp  behind  and  run  in  to  engage 
the  Royal  George  she  could  have  mastered,  or  at 


298  Naval  War  of  1812 

any  rate  disabled,  her;  and  had  the  swift  Madison 
cast  off  her  tow  she  could  also  have  taken  an  effective 
part  in  the  engagement.  If  the  Pike  could  put  the 
British  to  flight  almost  single-handed,  how  much 
more  could  she  not  have  done  when  assisted  by  the 
Madison  and  Oneida?  The  cardinal  error,  however, 
was  made  in  discontinuing  the  chase.  The  British 
were  in  an  almost  open  roadstead,  from  which  they 
could  not  possibly  escape.  Commodore  Chauncy 
was  afraid  that  the  wind  would  come  up  to  blow  a 
gale,  and  both  fleets  would  be  thrown  ashore;  and, 
moreover,  he  expected  to  be  able  to  keep  a  watch 
over  the  enemy,  and  to  attack  him  at  a  more  suit- 
able time.  But  he  utterly  failed  in  this  last;  and 
had  the  American  squadron  cast  off  their  tows  and 
g-one  boldly  in,they  certainly  ought  to  have  been  able 
to  destroy  or  capture  the  entire  British  force  before 
a  gale  could  blow  up.  Chauncy  would  have  done 
well  to  keep  in  mind  the  old  adage,  so  peculiarly 
applicable  to  naval  affairs :  "L'audace !  toujours  1'au- 
dace!  et  encore  1'audace!"  Whether  the  fault  was 
his  or  that  of  his  subordinates,  it  is  certain  that  while 
the  victory  of  the  28th  of  September  definitely  set- 
tled the  supremacy  of  the  lake  in  favor  of  the  Amer- 
icans, yet  this  victory  was  by  no  means  so  decided 
as  it  should  have  been,  taking  into  account  his  su- 
periority in  force  and  advantage  in  position,  and  the 
somewhat  spiritless  conduct  of  his  foe. 

Next  day  a  gale  came  on  to  blow,  which  lasted 
till  the  evening  of  the  31  St.  There  was  no  longer 
any  apprehension  of  molestation  from  the  British, 


On  the  Lakes  299 

so  the  troop  transports  were  sent  down  the  lake  by 
themselves,  while  the  squadron  remained  to  watch 
Yeo.  On  Oct.  2d  he  was  chased,  but  escaped  by  his 
better  sailing;  and  next  day  false  information  in- 
duced Chauncy  to  think  Yeo  had  eluded  him  and 
passed  down  the  lake,  and  he  accordingly  made 
sail  in  the  direction  of  his  supposed  flight.  On  the 
5th,  at  3  P.M.,  while  near  the  False  Ducks,  seven  ves- 
sels were  made  out  ahead,  which  proved  to  be  Brit- 
ish gunboats,  engaged  in  transporting  troops.  All 
sail  was  made  after  them ;  one  was  burned,  another 
escaped,  and  five  were  captured,  the  Mary,  Drum- 
mond,  Lady  Gore,  Confiance,  and  Hamilton™ — the 
two  latter  being  the  rechristened  Julia  and  Growler. 
Each  gun-vessel  had  from  one  to  three  guns,  and 
they  had  aboard  in  all  264  men,  including  seven 
naval  (three  royal  and  four  provincial)  and  ten  mili- 
tary officers.  These  prisoners  stated  that  in  the  ac- 
tion of  the  28th  the  Wolfe  and  Royal  George  had 
lost  very  heavily. 

After  this  Yeo  remained  in  Kingston,  blockaded 
there  by  Chauncy  for  most  of  the  time;  on  Nov. 
loth  he  came  out  and  was  at  once  chased  back  into 
port  by  Chauncy,  leaving  the  latter  for  the  rest  of  the 
season  entirely  undisturbed.  Accordingly,  Chauncy 
was  able  to  convert  his  small  schooners  into  trans- 
ports. On  the  i /th  these  transports  were  used  to 
convey  1,100  men  of  the  army  of  General  Harrison 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Genesee  to  Sackett's  Harbor, 
while  Chauncy  blockaded  Yeo  in  Kingston.  The 

86  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  Oct.  8,  1813. 


joo  Naval  War  of  1812 

duty  of  transporting  troops  and  stores  went  on  till 
the  27th,  when  everything  had  been  accomplished; 
and  a  day  or  two  afterward  navigation  closed. 

As  between  the  Americans  and  British,  the  suc- 
cess of  the  season  was  greatly  in  favor  of  the  for- 
mer. They  had  uncontested  control  over  the  lake 
from  April  ipth  to  June  3d,  and  from  Sept.  28th  to 
Nov.  29th,  in  all  107  days;  while  their  foes  only 
held  it  from  June  3d  to  July  2ist,  or  for  48  days; 
and  from  that  date  to  Sept.  28th,  for  69  days,  the 
two  sides  were  contending  for  the  mastery.  York 
and  Fort  George  had  been  taken,  while  the  attack 
on  Sackett's  Harbor  was  repulsed.  The  Americans 
lost  but  two  schooners,  both  of  which  were  recap- 
tured ;  while  the  British  had  one  24-gun  ship  nearly 
ready  for  launching  destroyed,  and  one  lo-gun 
brig  taken,  and  the  loss  inflicted  upon  each 
other  in  transports,  gunboats,  storehouses,  stores, 
etc.,  was  greatly  in  favor  of  the  former.  Chauncy's 
fleet,  moreover,  was  able  to  co-operate  with  the  army 
for  over  twice  the  length  of  time  Yeo's  could  (107 
days  to  48). 

It  is  more  difficult  to  decide  between  the  respective 
merits  of  the  two  commanders.  We  had  shown  so 
much  more  energy  than  the  Anglo-Canadians  that 
at  the  beginning  of  the  year  we  had  overtaken  them 
in  the  building  race,  and  the  two  fleets  were  about 
equally  formidable.  The  Madison  and  Oneida  were 
not  quite  a  match  for  the  Royal  George  and  Sydney 
Smith  (opposing  12  32-pound  and  8  24-pound  car- 
ronades  to  2  long  i8's>  i  long  12,  I  68-pound  and  13 


On  the  Lakes  301 

32-pound  carronades) ;  and  our  ten-gun-schooners 
would  hardly  be  considered  very  much  of  an  over- 
match for  the  Melville,  Moira,  and  Beresford.  Had 
Sir  James  Yeo  been  as  bold  and  energetic  as  Bar- 
clay or  Mulcaster  he  would  certainly  not  have  per- 
mitted the  Americans,  when  the  forces  were  so  equal, 
to  hold  uncontested  sway  over  the  lake,  and  by  re- 
ducing Fort  George,  to  cause  disaster  to  the  Brit- 
ish land  forces.  It  would  certainly  have  been  better 
to  risk  a  battle  with  equal  forces  than  to  wait  till 
each  fleet  received  an  additional  ship,  which  ren- 
dered Chauncy's  squadron  the  superior  by  just  about 
the  superiority  of  the  Pike  to  the  Wolfe.  Again, 
Yeo  did  not  do  particularly  well  in  the  repulse  be- 
fore Sackett's  Harbor;  in  the  skirmish  off  Genesee 
River  he  showed  a  marked  lack  of  resource ;  and  in 
the  action  of  the  28th  of  September  (popularly 
called  the  "Burlington  Races"  from  the  celerity  of 
his  retreat)  he  evinced  an  amount  of  caution  that 
verged  toward  timidity,  in  allowing  the  entire  brunt 
of  the  fighting  to  fall  on  Mulcaster  in  the  Royal 
George,  a  weaker  ship  than  the  Wolfe.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  gave  able  co-operation  to  the  army  while  he 
possessed  control  of  the  lake ;  he  made  a  most  gallant 
and  successful  attack  on  a  superior  force  on  the  loth 
of  August;  and  for  six  weeks  subsequently  by  skil- 
ful manoeuvring  he  prevented  this  same  superior 
force  from  acquiring  the  uncontested  mastery. 
It  was  no  disgrace  to  be  subsequently  block- 
aded; but  it  is  very  ludicrous  in  his  admirers  to 
think  that  he  came  out  first  best. 


302  Naval  War  of  1812 

Chauncy  rendered  able  and  invaluable  assistance 
to  the  army  all  the  while  that  he  had  control  of  the 
water;  his  attacks  on  York  and  Fort  George  were 
managed  with  consummate  skill  and  success,  and  on 
the  28th  of  September  he  practically  defeated  the 
opposing  force  with  his  own  ship  alone.  Neverthe- 
less he  can  by  no  means  be  said  to  have  done  the  best 
he  could  with  the  materials  he  had.  His  stronger 
fleet  was  kept  two  months  in  check  by  a  weaker 
British  fleet.  When  he  first  encountered  the  foe, 
on  August  loth,  he  ought  to  have  inflicted  such  a 
check  upon  him  as  would  at  least  have  confined  him 
to  port  and  given  the  Americans  immediate  supe- 
riority on  the  lake;  instead  of  which  he  suffered  a 
mortifying,  although  not  at  all  disastrous,  defeat, 
which  allowed  the  British  to  contest  the  supremacy 
with  him  for  six  weeks  longer.  On  the  28th  of  Sep- 
tember, when  he  only  gained  a  rather  barren  victory, 
it  was  nothing  but  excessive  caution  that  prevented 
him  from  utterly  destroying  his  foe.  Had  Perry 
on  that  day  commanded  the  American  fleet  there 
would  have  been  hardly  a  British  ship  left  on  On- 
tario. Chauncy  was  an  average  commander;  and 
the  balance  of  success  inclined  to  the  side  of  the 
Americans  only  because  they  showed  greater  energy 
and  skill  in  shipbuilding,  the  crews  and  commanders 
on  both  sides  being  very  nearly  equal. 


On  the  Lakes  303 

LAKE    ERIE 

Captain  Oliver  Hazard  Perry  had  assumed  com- 
mand of  Erie  and  the  upper  lakes,  acting  under 
Commodore  Chauncy.  With  intense  energy  he  at 
once  began  creating  a  naval  force  which  should  be 
able  to  contend  successfully  with  the  foe.  As  al- 
ready said,  the  latter  in  the  beginning  had  exclusive 
control  of  Lake  Erie;  but  the  Americans  had  cap- 
tured the  Caledonia,  brig,  and  purchased  three 
schooners,  afterward  named  the  Somers,  Tigress, 
and  Ohio,  and  a  sloop,  the  Trippe.  These  at  first 
were  blockaded  in  the  Niagara,  but  after  the  fall 
of  Fort  George  and  retreat  of  the  British  forces, 
Captain  Perry  wras  enabled  to  get  them  out,  tracking 
them  up  against  the  current  by  the  most  arduous 
labor.  They  ran  up  to  Presque  Isle  (now  called 
Erie),  where  two  2O-gun  brigs  were  being  con- 
structed under  the  directions  of  the  indefatigable 
captain.  Three  other  schooners,  the  Ariel,  Scorpion, 
and  Porcupine,  were  also  built. 

The  harbor  of  Erie  was  good  and  spacious,  but 
had  a  bar  on  which  there  was  less  than  seven  feet 
of  water.  Hitherto  this  had  prevented  the  enemy 
from  getting  in;  now  it  prevented  the  two  brigs 
from  getting  out.  Captain  Robert  Heriot  Barclay 
had  been  appointed  commander  of  the  British  forces 
on  Lake  Erie ;  and  he  was  having  built  at  Amherst- 
burg  a  2o-gun  ship.  Meanwhile  he  blockaded 
Perry's  force,  and  as  the  brigs  could  not  cross  the 
bar  with  their  guns  in,  or  except  in  smooth  water, 
they  of  course  could  not  do  so  in  his  presence.  He 


304  Naval  War  of  1812 

kept  a  close  blockade  for  some  time ;  but  on  the  2d 
of  August  he  disappeared.  Perry  at  once  hurried 
forward  everything;  and  on  the  4th,  at  2  P.M.,  one 
brig,  the  Lawrence,  was  towed  to  that  point  of  the 
bar  where  the  water  was  deepest.  Her  guns  were 
whipped  out  and  landed  on  the  beach,  and  the  brig 
got  over  the  bar  by  a  hastily  improvised  "camel." 

"Two  large  scows,  prepared  for  the  purpose,  were 
hauled  alongside,  and  the  work  of  lifting  the  brig 
proceeded  as  fast  as  possible.  Pieces  of  massive 
timber  had  been  run  through  the  forward  and  after 
ports,  and  when  the  scows  were  sunk  to  the  water's 
edge,  the  ends  of  the  timbers  were  blocked  up,  sup- 
ported by  these  floating  foundations.  The  plugs 
were  now  put  in  the  scows,  and  the  water  was 
pumped  out  of  them.  By  this  process  the  brig  was 
lifted  quite  two  feet,  though  when  she  was  got  on 
the  bar  it  was  found  that  she  still  drew  too  much 
water.  It  became  necessary,  in  consequence,  to 
cover  up  everything,  sink  the  scows  anew,  and  block 
up  the  timbers  afresh.  This  duty  occupied  the 
whole  night."  27 

Just  as  the  Lawrence  had  passed  the  bar,  at  8  A.M. 
on  the  5th,  the  enemy  reappeared,  but  too  late;  Cap- 
tain Barclay  exchanged  a  few  shots  with  the 
schooners  and  then  drew  off.  The  Niagara  crossed 
without  difficulty.  There  were  still  not  enough  men 
to  man  the  vessels,  but  a  draft  arrived  from  On- 
tario, and  many  of  the  frontiersmen  volunteered, 
while  soldiers  also  were  sent  on  board.  The  squad- 

"  Cooper,  ii,  389.     Perry's  letter  of  Aug.  sth  is  very  brief. 


On  the  Lakes  305 

ron  sailed  on  the  i8th  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  whose 
ship  was  now  ready.  After  cruising  about  some 
time  the  Ohio  was  sent  down  the  lake,  and  the 
other  ships  went  into  Put-in-Bay.  On  the  9th  of 
September  Captain  Barclay  put  out  from  Amherst- 
burg,  being  so  short  of  provisions  that  he  felt  com- 
pelled to  risk  an  action  with  the  superior  force 
opposed.  On  the  loth  of  September  his  squadron 
was  discovered  from  the  masthead  of  the  Lawrence 
in  the  northwest.  Before  going  into  details  of  the 
action  we  will  examine  the  force  of  the  two  squad- 
rons, as  the  accounts  vary  considerably. 

The  tonnage  of  the  British  ships,  as  already  stated, 
we  know  exactly,  they  having  been  all  carefully 
appraised  and  measured  by  the  builder,  Mr.  Henry 
Eckford,  and  two  sea-captains.  We  also  know  the 
dimensions  of  the  American  ships.  The  Lawrence 
and  Niagara  measured  480  tons  apiece.  The  Cale- 
'donia,  brig,  was  about  the  size  of  the  Hunter,  or 
1 80  tons.  The  Tigress,  Somers,  and  Scorpion  were 
subsequently  captured  by  the  foe  and  were  then 
said  to  measure,  respectively,  96,  94,  and  86  tons; 
in  which  case  they  were  larger  than  similar  boats 
on  Lake  Ontario.  The  Ariel  was  about  the  size  of 
the  Hamilton;  the  Porcupine  and  Trippe  about  the 
size  of  the  Asp  and  Pert.  As  for  the  guns,  Captain 
Barclay  in  his  letter  gives  a  complete  account  of 
those  on  board  his  squadron.  He  has  also  given  a 
complete  account  of  the  American  guns,  which  is 
most  accurate,  and,  if  anything,  underestimates 
them.  At  least  Emmons  in  his  "History"  gives  the 


306  Naval  War  of  1812 

Trippe  a  long  32,  while  Barclay  says  she  had  only 
a  long  24;  and  Lossing  in  his  "Field-Book"  says 
(but  I  do  not  know  on  what  authority)  that  the 
Caledonia  had  3  long  24*8,  while  Barclay  gives  her 
2  long  24*5  and  one  32-pound  carronade;  and  that 
the  Somers  had  two  long  32*8,  while  Barclay  gives 
her  one  long  32  and  one  24-pound  carronade.  I 
shall  take  Barclay's  account,  which  corresponds  with 
that  of  Emmons,  the  only  difference  being  that  Em- 
mons  puts  a  24-pounder  on  the  Scorpion  and  a  32  on 
the  Trippe,  while  Barclay  reverses  this.  I  shall  also 
follow  Emmons  in  giving  the  Scorpion  a  32-pound 
carronade  instead  of  a  24. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  give  the  strength  of  the  re- 
spective crews.  James  says  the  Americans  had  580, 
all  "picked  men."  They  were  just  as  much  picked 
men  as  Barclay's  were,  and  no  more;  that  is,  the 
ships  had  "scratch"  crews.  Lieutenant  Emmons 
gives  Perry  490  men;  and  Lossing  says  he  "had 
upon  his  muster-roll  490  names."  In  Vol.  XIV,  p. 
566,  of  the  American  State  Papers,  is  a  list  of  the 
prize-moneys  owing  to  each  man  (or  to  the  survi- 
vors of  the  killed),  which  gives  a  grand  total  of 
532  men,  including  136  on  the  Lawrence  and  155  on 
the  Niagara,  45  of  whom  were  volunteers — frontiers- 
men. Deducting  these  we  get  487  men,  which  is 
pretty  near  Lieutenant  Emmons'  490.  Possibly 
Lieutenant  Emmons  did  not  include  these  volun- 
teers; and  it  may  be  that  some  of  the  men  whose 
names  were  down  on  the  prize  list  had  been  so  sick 
that  they  were  left  on  shore.  Thus  Lieutenant  Yar- 


On  the  Lakes  307 

nail  testified  before  a  Court  of  Inquiry  in  1815,  that 
there  were  but  131  men  and  boys  of  every  descrip- 
tion on  board  the  Lawrence  in  the  action;  and  the 
Niagara  was  said  to  have  had  but  140.  Lieutenant 
Yarnall  also  said  that  "but  103  men  on  board  the 
Lawrence  were  fit  for  duty" ;  as  Captain  Perry  in  his 
letter  said  that  31  were  unfit  for  duty,  this  would 
make  a  total  of  134.  So  I  shall  follow  the  prize- 
money  list;  at  any  rate  the  difference  in  number  is 
so  slight  as  to  be  immaterial.  Of  the  532  men  whose 
names  the  list  gives,  45  were  volunteers,  or  lands- 
men, from  among  the  surrounding  inhabitants;  158 
were  marines  or  soldiers  (I  do  not  know  which, 
as  the  list  gives  marines,  soldiers,  and  privates,  and 
it  is  impossible  to  tell  which  of  the  two  former  heads 
include  the  last)  ;  and  329  were  officers,  seamen, 
cooks,  pursers,  chaplains,  and  supernumeraries.  Of 
the  total  number,  there  were  on  the  day  of  action, 
according  to  Perry's  report,  116  men  unfit  for  duty, 
including  31  on  board  the  Lawrence,  28  on  board 
the  Niagara,  and  57  on  the  small  vessels. 

All  the  later  American  writers  put  the  number  of 
men  in  Barclay's  fleet  precisely  at  "502,"  but  I  have 
not  been  able  to  find  out  the  original  authority. 
James  ("Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  289)  says  the  Brit- 
ish had  but  345,  consisting  of  50  seamen,  85  Cana- 
dians, and  210  soldiers.  But  the  letter  of  Adjutant- 
General  E.  Bayne,  Nov.  24,  1813,  states  that  there 
were  250  soldiers  aboard  Barclay's  squadron,  of 
whom  23  were  killed,  49  wounded,  and  the  balance 
(178)  captured;  and  James  himself  on  a  previous 


jo8  Naval  War  of  1812 

page  (284)  states  that  there  were  102  Canadians 
on  Barclay's  vessels,  not  counting  the  Detroit,  and 
we  know  that  Barclay  originally  joined  the  squad- 
ron with  19  sailors  from  the  Ontario  fleet,  and  that 
subsequently  50  sailors  came  up  from  the  Dover. 
James  gives  at  the  end  of  his  "Naval  Occurrences" 
some  extracts  from  the  court-martial  held  on  Cap- 
tain Barclay.  Lieut.  Thomas  Stokes,  of  the  Queen 
Charlotte,  there  testified  that  he  had  on  board  "be- 
tween 120  and  130  men,  officers  and  all  together,"  of 
whom  "16  came  up  from  the  Dover  three  days  be- 
fore." James,  on  p.  284,  says  her  crew  already 
consisted  of  no  men;  adding  these  16  gives  us  126 
(almost  exactly  "between  120  and  130").  Lieu- 
tenant Stokes  also  testified  that  the  Detroit  had  more 
men  on  account  of  being  a  larger  and  heavier  ves- 
sel; to  give  her  150  is  perfectly  safe,  as  her  heavier 
guns  and  larger  size  would  at  least  need  24  men 
more  than  the  Queen  Charlotte.  James  gives  the 
Lady  Prevost  76,  Hunter  39,  Little  Belt,  15,  and 
Chippeway  13  men;  Canadians  and  soldiers,  a  total 
of  143 ;  supposing  that  the  number  of  British  sailors 
placed  on  them  was  proportional  to  the  amount 
placed  on  board  the  Queen  Charlotte,  we  could  add 
21.  This  would  make  a  grand  total  of  440  men, 
which  must  certainly  be  near  the  truth.  This  num- 
ber is  corroborated  otherwise:  General  Bayne,  as 
already  quoted,  says  that  there  were  aboard  250 
soldiers,  of  whom  72  were  killed  or  wounded.  Bar- 
clay reports  a  total  loss  of  135,  of  whom  63  must 
therefore  have  been  sailors  or  Canadians,  and  if  the 


On  the  Lakes 


309 


loss  suffered  by  these  bore  the  same  proportion  to 
their  whole  number  as  in  the  case  of  the  soldiers, 
there  ought  to  have  been  219  sailors  and  Canadians, 
making  in  all  469  men.  It  can  thus  be  said  with 
certainty  that  there  were  between  440  and  490  men 
aboard,  and  I  shall  take  the  former  number,  though 
I  have  no  doubt  that  this  is  too  small.  But  it  is 
not  a  point  of  very  much  importance,  as  the  battle 
was  fought  largely  at  long  range,  where  the  number 
of  men,  provided  there  were  plenty  to  handle  the 
sails  and  guns,  did  not  much  matter.  The  following 
statement  of  the  comparative  force  must  therefore  be 
very  nearly  accurate: 

PERRY'S  SQUADRON. 


Total      Crew 

Broad. 

Name. 

Rig. 

Tons. 

Cre\r.     fit  for 

side  ; 

Armament. 

Duty. 

Ibs. 

Lawrence, 

brig 

480 

136         105 

300 

2  long  12*3 
18  short  32*8 

Niagara, 

•• 

480 

«SS          m 

300       • 

2  long  12*5 
18  short  32*9 

Caledonia, 

" 

180 

S3" 

80 

2  long  24's 
i  short  32 

Ariel,        schooner 

112 

36 

48 

4  long   12*8 

Scorpion, 

" 

86 

35 

-    1 

•     "      32 

i  short  32 

Somert, 

" 

94 

3° 

184 

*    1 

ii  long  24 
i  short  32 

Porcupine, 

0 

83 

25 

3* 

>  long  32 

Tigrtss, 

" 

96 

27 

3* 

i     "     32 

Trippe, 

sloop 

60 

35} 

24 

l     "      24 

9  vessels, 

1,671 

53*        (4i6) 

936  Ibs. 

During  the  action,  however,  the  Lawrence  and 
Niagara  each  fought  a  long  12  instead  of  one 
of  the  carronades  on  the  engaged  side,  making  a 
broadside  of  896  Ibs.,  288  Ibs.  being  from  long 
guns. 


310 


Naval  War  of  1812 


BARCLAY'S  SQUADRON. 


Broadside ; 


Name. 

Rig. 

Tons. 

Crew. 

Ibs.            Armament. 

i  long    18 

a    "     »4'« 

4/ffrettf 

•hip 

49» 

•So 

u8 

6    "'     «»'• 

8     "         g'» 

i  short  24 

i     "       18 

i  long   it 

Quttn  Charlotte,  " 

400 

126 

189 

«i        » 
a    "      9'$ 

14  short  n't 

Lady  Prtvost, 

schooner 

*JO 

86 

73 

i  long  o 
a    "     o's 

10  short  12*8 

4  long  6's 

Hunter, 

trig 

180 

45 

30 

*  r.  «> 

a     "    a's 

a  short  n's 

Ckippeway, 

schooner 

70 

»$ 

9                i  long  9 

Lit  tit  Belt, 

sloop 

90 

18 

I    i     M     i* 

i    a    «      6'« 

6  vessels, 


440          459  Ibs. 


These  six  vessels  thus  threw  at  a  broadside  459 
Ibs.,  of  which  195  were  from  long  guns. 

The  superiority  of  the  Americans  in  long-gun 
metal  was  therefore  nearly  as  three  is  to  two,  and 
in  corronade  metal  greater  than  two  to  one.  The 
chief  fault  to  be  found  in  the  various  American  ac- 
counts is  that  they  sedulously  conceal  the  compara- 
tive weight  of  metal,  while  carefully  specifying  the 
number  of  guns.  Thus,  Lossing  says :  "Barclay  had 
35  long  guns  to  Perry's  15,  and  possessed  greatly 
the  advantage  in  action  at  a  distance";  which  he 
certainly  did  not.  The  tonnage  of  the  fleets  is  not 
so  very  important;  the  above  tables  are  probably 
pretty  nearly  right.  It  is,  I  suppose,  impossible  to 
tell  exactly  the  number  of  men  in  the  two  crews. 
Barclay  almost  certainly  had  more  than  the  440 
men  I  have  given  him,  but  in  all  likelihood  some 
of  them  were  unfit  for  duty,  and  the  number  of  his 


On  the  Lakes  311 

effectives  was  most  probably  somewhat  less  than 
Perry's.  As  the  battle  was  fought  in  such  smooth 
water,  and  part  of  the  time  at  long  range,  this,  as 
already  said,  does  not  much  matter.  The  Niagara 
might  be  considered  a  match  for  the  Detroit,  and 
the  Lawrence  and  Caledonia  for  the  five  other  Brit- 
ish vessels;  so  the  Americans  were  certainly  very 
greatly  superior  in  force. 

At  daylight  on  Sept.  loth  Barclay's  squadron  was 
discovered  in  the  N.W.,  and  Perry  at  once  got  under 
way;  the  wind  soon  shifted  to  the  N.E.,  giving  us 
the  weather-gage,  the  breeze  being  very  light.  Bar- 
clay lay  to  in  a  close  column,  heading  to  the  S.W. 
in  the  following  order :  Chippeway,  Master's  Mate  J. 
Campbell;  Detroit,  Captain  R.  H.  Barclay;  Hunter, 
Lieutenant  G.  Bignell ;  Queen  Charlotte,  Captain  R. 
Finnis;  Lady  Prevost,  Lieutenant  Edward  Buchan; 
and  Little  Belt,  by  whom  commanded  is  not  said. 
Perry  came  down  with  the  wind  on  his  port  beam, 
and  made  the  attack  in  column  ahead,  obliquely. 
First  in  order  came  the  Ariel,  Lieut.  John  H.  Packet, 
and  Scorpion,  Sailing-Master  Stephen  Champlin, 
both  being  on  the  weather  bow  of  the  Lawrence, 
Captain  O.  H.  Perry;  next  came  the  Caledonia, 
Lieut.  Daniel  Turner ;  Niagara,  Captain  Jesse  D.  El- 
liott; Somers,  Lieutenant  A.  H.  M.  Conklin;  Por- 
cupine, Acting-Master  George  Serrat;  Tigress, 
Sailing-Master  Thomas  C.  Almy,  and  Trippe,  Lieu- 
tenant Thomas  Holdup.28 

w  The  accounts  of  the  two  commanders  tally  almost  ex- 
actly.    Barclay's  letter  is  a  model  of  its  kind  for  candor  and 


312  Naval  War  of  1812 

As,  amid  light  and  rather  baffling  winds,  the 
American  squadron  approached  the  enemy,  Perry's 
straggling  line  formed  an  angle  of  about  fifteen  de- 
grees with  the  more  compact  one  of  his  foes.  At 
11.45  the  Detroit  opened  the  action  by  a  shot  from 
her  long  24,  which  fell  short;  at  11.50  she  fired  a 
second  which  went  crashing  through  the  Lawrence, 
and  was  replied  to  by  the  Scorpion's  long  32.  At 
11.55  the  Lawrence,  having  shifted  her  port  bow- 
chaser,  opened  with  both  the  long  i2's,  and  at  me- 
ridian began  with  her  carronades,  but  the  shot  from 
the  latter  all  fell  short.  At  the  same  time  the  action 
became  general  on  both  sides,  though  the  rearmost 
American  vessels  were  almost  beyond  the  range  of 
their  own  guns,  and  quite  out  of  range  of  the  guns 
of  their  antagonists.  Meanwhile  the  Lawrence  was 
already  suffering  considerably  as  she  bore  down  on 
the  enemy.  It  was  twenty  minutes  before  she  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  within  good  carronade  range,  and 
during  that  time  the  action  at  the  head  of  the  line 
was  between  the  long  guns  of  the  Chippeway  and 
Detroit,  throwing  123  pounds,  and  those  of  the 
Scorpion,  Ariel,  and  Lawrence,  throwing  104 

generosity.  Letter  of  Captain  R.  H.  Barclay  to  Sir  James, 
Sept.  2,  1813;  of  Lieutenant  Inglis  to  Captain  Barclay,  Sept. 
loth ;  of  Captain  Perry  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Sept. 
loth  and  Sept.  i3th,  and  to  General  Harrison,  Sept.  nth  and 
Sept.  i3th.  I  have  relied  mainly  on  Lossing's  "Field- Book 
of  the  War  of  1812"  (especially  for  the  diagrams  furnished 
him  by  Commodore  Champlin),  on  Commander  Ward's 
"Naval  Tactics,"  p.  76,  and  on  Cooper's  "Naval  History." 
Extracts  from  the  court-martial  on  Captain  Barclay  are 
given  in  James'  "Naval  Occurrences,"  Ixxxiii. 


On  the  Lakes  313 

pounds.  As  the  enemy's  fire  was  directed  almost 
exclusively  at  the  Lawrence  she  suffered  a  great 
deal.  The  Caledonia,  Niagara,  and  Somers  were 
meanwhile  engaging,  at  long  range,  the  Hunter  and 
Queen  Charlotte,  opposing  from  their  long  guns 
96  pounds  to  the  39  pounds  of  their  antagonists, 
while  from  a  distance  the  three  other  American  gun- 
vessels  engaged  the  Prevost  and  Little  Belt.  By 
1 2. 20  the  Lawrence  had  worked  down  to  close  quar- 
ters, and  at  12.30  the  action  was  going  on  with 
great  fury  between. her  and  her  antagonists,  within 
canister  range.  The  raw  and  inexperienced  Ameri- 
can crews  committed  the  same  fault  the  British  so 
often  fell  into  on  the  ocean,  and  overloaded  their 
carronades.  In  consequence,  that  of  the  Scorpion 
upset  down  the  hatchway  in  the  middle  of  the  action, 
and  the  sides  of  the  Detroit  were  dotted  with  marks 
from  shot  that  did  not  penetrate.  One  of  the  Ariel's 
long  I2*s  also  burst.  Barclay  fought  the  Detroit 
exceedingly  well,  her  guns  being  most  excellently 
aimed,  though  they  actually  had  to  be  discharged  by 
flashing  pistols  at  the  touchholes,  so  deficient  was  the 
ship's  equipment.  Meanwhile  the  Caledonia  came 
down  too,  but  the  Niagara  was  wretchedly  handled, 
Elliott  keeping  at  a  distance  which  prevented  the 
use  either  of  his  carronades  or  of  those  of  the  Queen 
Charlotte,  his  antagonist;  the  latter,  however,  suf- 
fered greatly  from  the  long  guns  of  the  opposing 
schooners,  and  lost  her  gallant  commander,  Captain 
Finnis,  and  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Stokes,  who  were 
killed  early  in  the  action;  her  next  in  command, 

VOL.  IX.— 14 


314  Naval  War  of  1812 

Provincial  Lieutenant  Irvine,  perceiving  that  he 
could  do  no  good,  passed  the  Hunter  and  joined  in 
the  attack  on  the  Lawrence,  at  close  quarters.  The 
Niagara,  the  most  efficient  and  best-manned  of  the 
American  vessels,  was  thus  almost  kept  out  of  the 
action  by  her  captain's  misconduct.  At  the  end  of 
the  line  the  fight  went  on  at  long  range  between  the 
Somers,  Tigress,  Porcupine,  and  Trippe  on  one  side, 
and  Little  Belt  and  Lady  Prevost  on  the  other ;  the 
Lady  Prevost  making  a  very  noble  fight,  although 
her  12-pound  carronades  rendered  her  almost  help- 
less against  the  long  guns  of  the  Americans.  She 
was  greatly  cut  up,  her  commander,  Lieutenant 
Buchan,  was  dangerously,  and  her  acting  first  lieu- 
tenant, Mr.  Roulette,  severely,  wounded,  and  she 
began  falling  gradually  to  leeward. 

The  fighting  at  the  head  of  the  line  was  fierce 
and  bloody  to  an  extraordinary  degree.  The  Scor- 
pion, Ariel,  Lawrence,  and  Caledonia,  all  of  them 
handled  with  the  most  determined  courage,  were 
opposed  to  the  Chippeway,  Detroit,  Queen  Char- 
lotte, and  Hunter,  which  were  fought  to  the  full 
as  bravely.  At  such  close  quarters  the  two  sides 
engaged  on  about  equal  terms,  the  Americans  being 
superior  in  weight  of  metal,  and  inferior  in  number 
of  men.  But  the  Lawrence  had  received  such  dam- 
age in  working  down  as  to  make  the  odds  against 
Perry.  On  each  side  almost  the  whole  fire  was  di- 
rected at  the  opposing  large  vessel  or  vessels ;  in  con- 
sequence the  Queen  Charlotte  was  almost  disabled, 
and  the  Detroit  was  also  frightfully  shattered,  es- 


On  the  Lakes  315 

pecially  by  the  raking  fire  of  the  gunboats,  her  first 
lieutenant,  Mr.  Garland,  being  mortally  wounded, 
and  Captain  Barclay  so  severely  injured  that  he  was 
obliged  to  quit  the  deck,  leaving  his  ship  in  the 
command  of  Lieutenant  George  Inglis.  But  on 
board  the  Lawrence  matters  had  gone  even  worse, 
the  combined  fire  of  her  adversaries  having  made 
the  grimmest  carnage  on  her  decks.  Of  the  103 
men  who  were  fit  for  duty  when  she  began  the  ac- 
tion, 83,  or  over  four-fifths,  were  killed  or  wounded. 
The  vessel  was  shallow,  and  the  ward-room,  used  as 
a  cock-pit,  to  which  the  wounded  were  taken,  was 
mostly  above  water,  and  the  shot  came  through  it 
continually,  killing  and  wounding  many  men  under 
the  hands  of  the  surgeon. 

The  first  lieutenant,  Yarnall,  was  three  times 
wounded,  but  kept  to  the  deck  through  all ;  the  only 
other  lieutenant  on  board,  Brooks,  of  the  marines, 
was  mortally  wounded.  Every  brace  and  bowline 
was  shot  away,  and  the  brig  almost  completely  dis- 
mantled ;  her  hull  was  shattered  to  pieces,  many  shot 
going  completely  through  it,  and  the  guns  on  the 
engaged  side  were  by  degrees  all  dismounted.  Perry 
kept  up  the  fight  with  splendid  courage.  As  the 
crew  fell  one  by  one,  the  commodore  called  down 
through  the  skylight  for  one  of  the  surgeon's  as- 
sistants; and  this  call  was  repeated  and  obeyed  till 
none  was  left;  then  he  asked,  "Can  any  of  the 
wounded  pull  a  rope?"  and  three  or  four  of  them 
crawled  up  on  deck  to  lend  a  feeble  hand  in  placing 
the  last  guns.  Perry  himself  fired  the  last  effective 


316  Naval  War  of  1812 

heavy  gun,  assisted  only  by  the  purser  and  chaplain. 
A  man  who  did  not  possess  his  indomitable  spirit 
would  have  then  struck.  Instead,  however,  although 
failing  in  the  attack  so  far,  Perry  merely  determined 
to  win  by  new  methods,  and  remodeled  the  line  ac- 
cordingly. Mr.  Turner,  in  the  Caledonia,  when  or- 
dered to  close,  had  put  his  helm  up,  run  down  on  the 
opposing  line,  and  engaged  at  very  short  range, 
though  the  brig  was  absolutely  without  quarters. 
The  Niagara  had  thus  become  the  next  in  line  astern 
of  the  Lawrence,  and  the  sloop  Trippe,  having 
passed  the  three  schooners  in  front  of  her,  was  next 
ahead.  The  Niagara  now,  having  a  breeze,  steered 
for  the  head  of  Barclay's  line,  passing  over  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  to  windward  of  the  Lawrence,  on  her  port 
beam.  She  was  almost  uninjured,  having  so  far 
taken  very  little  part  in  the  combat,  and  to  her  Perry 
shifted  his  flag.  Leaping  into  a  row  boat,  with  his 
brother  and  four  seamen,  he  rowed  to  the  fresh  brig, 
where  he  arrived  at  2.30,  and  at  once  sent  Elliott 
astern  to  hurry  up  the  three  schooners.  The  Trippe 
was  now  very  near  the  Caledonia.  The  Lawrence, 
having  but  14  sound  men  left,  struck  her  colors,  but 
could  not  be  taken  possession  of  before  the  action  re- 
commenced. She  drifted  astern,  the  Caledonia  pass- 
ing between  her  and  her  foes.  At  2.45  the 
schooners  having  closed  up,  Perry  in  his  fresh  ves- 
sel, bore  up  to  break  Barclay's  line. 

The  British  ships  had  fought  themselves  to  a 
standstill.  The  Lady  Prevost  was  crippled  and 
sagged  to  leeward,  though  ahead  of  the  others.  The 


On  the  Lakes  317 

Detroit  and  Queen  Charlotte  were  so  disabled  that 
they  could  not  effectually  oppose  fresh  antagonists. 
There  could  thus  be  but  little  resistance  to  Perry, 
as  the  Niagara  stood  down,  and  broke  the  British 
line,  firing  her  port  guns  into  the  Chippeway,  Little 
Belt,  and  Lady  Prevost,  and  the  starboard  ones  into 
the  Detroit,  Queen  Charlotte,  and  Hunter,  raking  on 
both  sides.  Too  disabled  to  tack,  the  Detroit  and 
Charlotte  tried  to  wear,  the  latter  running  up  to  lee- 
ward of  the  former;  and,  both  vessels  having  every 
brace  and  almost  every  stay  shot  away,  they  fell 
foul.  The  Niagara  luffed  athwart  their  bows,  with- 
in half  pistol-shot,  keeping  up  a  terrific  discharge  of 
great  guns  and  musketry,  while  on  the  other  side  the 
British  vessels  were  raked  by  the  Caledonia  and 
the  schooners  so  closely  that  some  of  their  grape 
shot,  passing  over  the  foe,  rattled  through  Perry's 
spars.  Nothing  further  could  be  done,  and  Bar- 
clay's flag  was  struck  at  3  P.M.,  after  three  and  a 
quarter  hours'  most  gallant  and  desperate  fighting. 
The  Chippeway  and  Little  Belt  tried  to  escape,  but 
were  overtaken  and  brought  to  respectively  by  the 
Trippe  and  Scorpion,  the  commander  of  the  latter, 
Mr.  Stephen  Champlin,  firing  the  last,  as  he  had  the 
first,  shot  of  the  battle.  "Captain  Perry  has  be- 
haved in  the  most  humane  and  attentive  manner,  not 
only  to  myself  and  officers,  but  to  all  the  wounded," 
writes  Captain  Barclay. 

The  American  squadron  had  suffered  severely, 
more  than  two-thirds  of  the  loss  falling  upon  the 
Lawrence,  which  was  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a 


318  Naval  War  of  1812 

perfect  wreck,  her  starboard  bulwarks  being  com- 
pletely beaten  in.  She  had,  as  already  stated,  22 
men  killed,  including  Lieutenant  of  Marines  Brooks 
and  Midshipman  Lamb;  and  61  wounded,  including 
Lieutenant  Yarnall,  Midshipman  (acting  second 
leutenant)  Forrest,  Sailing-master  Taylor,  Purser 
Hambleton,  and  Midshipmen  Swartout  and  Clax- 
ton.  The  Niagara  lost  2  killed  and  25  wounded  (al- 
most a  fifth  of  her  effective),  including  among 
the  latter  the  second  lieutenant,  Mr.  Edwards,  and 
Midshipman  Cummings.  The  Caledonia  had  3, 
the  Somers  2,  and  Trippe  2,  men  wounded.  The 
Ariel  had  i  killed  and  3  wounded;  the  Scorpion  2 
killed,  including  Midshipman  Lamb.  The  total  loss 
was  123 ;  27  were  killed  and  96  wounded,  of  whom 
3  died. 

The  British  loss,  falling  most  heavily  on  the  De- 
troit and  Queen  Charlotte,  amounted  to  41  killed 
(including  Capt.  S.  J.  Garden,  R.N.,  and  Captain  R. 
A.  Finnis),  and  94  wounded  (including  Captain 
Barclay  and  Lieutenants  Stokes,  Buchan,  Roulette, 
and  Bignall)  :  in  all  145.  The  first  and  second  in 
command  on  every  vessel  were  killed  or  wounded, 
a  sufficient  proof  of  the  desperate  nature  of  the 
defence. 

The  victory  of  Lake  Erie  was  most  important, 
both  in  its  material  results  and  in  its  moral  effect. 
It  gave  us  complete  command  of  all  the  upper  lakes, 
prevented  any  fears  of  invasion  from  that  quarter, 
increased  our  prestige  with  the  foe  and  our  confi- 
dence in  ourselves,  and  ensured  the  conquest  of  up- 


On  the  Lakes  319 

per  Canada;  in  all  these  respects  its  importance  has 
not  been  overrated.  But  the  "glory"  acquired  by  it 
most  certainly  has  been  estimated  at  more  than  its 
worth.  Most  Americans,  even  the  well  educated,  if 
asked  which  was  the  most  glorious  victory  of  the 
war,  would  point  to  this  battle.  Captain  Perry's 
name  is  more  widely  known  than  that  of  any  other 
commander.  Every  schoolboy  reads  about  him,  if 
of  no  other  sea-captain;  yet  he  certainly  stands  on 
a  lower  grade  than  either  Hull  or  Macdonough, 
and  not  a  bit  higher  than  a  dozen  others.  On  Lake 
Erie  our  seamen  displayed  great  courage  and  skill; 
but  so  did  their  antagonists.  The  simple  truth  is, 
that,  where  on  both  sides  the  officers  and  men  were 
equally  brave  and  skilful,  the  side  which  possessed 
the  superiority  in  force,  in  the  proportion  of  three  to 
two,  could  not  well  help  winning.  The  courage 
with  which  the  Lawrence  was  defended  has  hardly 
ever  been  surpassed,  and  may  fairly  be  called  heroic ; 
but  equal  praise  belongs  to  the  men  on  board  the 
Detroit,  who  had  to  discharge  the  great  guns  by 
flashing  pistols  at  the  touchholes,  and  yet  made  such 
a  terribly  effective  defence.  Courage  is  only  one 
of  the  many  elements  which  go  to  make  up  the  char- 
acter of  a  first-class  commander;  something  more 
than  bravery  is  needed  before  a  leader  can  be  really 
called  great. 

There  happened  to  be  circumstances  which  ren- 
dered the  bragging  of  our  writers  over  the  victory 
somewhat  plausible.  Thus  they  could  say  with  an 
appearance  of  truth  that  the  enemy  had  63  guns 


Naval  War  of  1812 


to  our  54,  and  outnumbered  us.  In  reality,  as  well 
as  can  be  ascertained  from  the  conflicting  evidence, 
he  was  inferior  in  number;  but  a  few  men  more  or 

The  following  diagrams  will  serve  to  explain  the  movements. 


less  mattered  nothing.  Both  sides  had  men  enough 
to  work  the  guns  and  handle  the  ships,  especially 
as  the  fight  was  in  smooth  water,  and  largely  at 


On  the  Lakes  321 

long  range.  The  important  fact  was  that  though 
we  had  nine  guns  less,  yet,  at  a  broadside,  they 
threw  half  as  much  metal  again  as  those  of  our 
antagonist.  With  such  odds  in  our  favor  it  would 


twrrexu 


teunojt  out 


JliiCMlt 


8^0  P.M. 


•MOM 

«™y      ^B-J&*ir 

•Wi 


have  been  a  disgrace  to  have  been  beaten.  The 
water  was  too  smooth  for  our  two  brigs  to  show 
at  their  best ;  but  this  very  smoothness  rendered  our 
gunboats  more  formidable  than  any  of  the  British 


322  Naval  War  of  1812 

vessels,  and  the  British  testimony  is  unanimous, 
that  it  was  to  them  the  defeat  was  primarily  due. 
The  American  fleet  came  into  action  in  worse  form 
than  the  hostile  squadron,  the  ships  straggling  badly, 
either  owing  to  Perry  having  formed  his  line  badly, 
or  else  to  his  having  failed  to  train  the  subordinate 
commanders  how  to  keep  their  places.  The  Niagara 
was  not  fought  well  at  first,  Captain  Elliott  keeping 
her  at  a  distance  that  prevented  her  from  doing  any 
damage  to  the  vessels  opposed,  which  were  battered 
to  pieces  by  the  gunboats  without  the  chance  of  re- 
plying. It  certainly  seems  as  if  the  small  vessels 
at  the  rear  of  the  line  should  have  been  closer  up, 
and  in  a  position  to  render  more  effectual  assistance ; 
the  attack  was  made  in  too  loose  order,  and,  whether 
it  was  the  fault  of  Perry  or  of  his  subordinates,  it 
fails  to  reflect  credit  on  the  Americans.  Cooper,  as 
usual,  praises  all  concerned;  but  in  this  instance 
not  with  very  good  judgment.  He  says  the  line- 
of -battle  was  highly  judicious,  but  this  may  be 
doubted.  The  weather  was  peculiarly  suitable  for 
the  gunboats,  with  their  long,  heavy  guns;  and  yet 
the  line-of-battle  was  so  arranged  as  to  keep  them 
in  the  rear,  and  let  the  brunt  of  the  assault  fall  on 
the  Lawrence,  with  her  short  carronades.  Cooper 
again  praises  Perry  for  steering  for  the  head  of 
the  enemy's  line,  but  he  could  hardly  have  done  any- 
thing else.  In  this  battle  the  firing  seems  to  have 
been  equally  skilful  on  both  sides,  the  Detroit's  long 
guns  being  peculiarly  well  served;  but  the  British 
captains  manoeuvred  better  than  their  foes  at  first, 


On  the  Lakes  323 

and  supported  one  another  better,  so  that  the  dis- 
parity in  damage  done  on  each  side  was  not  equal 
to  the  disparity  in  force.  The  chief  merit  of  the 
American  commander  and  his  followers  was  indom- 
itable courage,  and  determination  not  to  be  beaten. 
This  is  no  slight  merit;  but  it  may  well  be  doubted 
if  it  would  have  ensured  victory  had  Barclay's  force 
been  as  strong  as  Perry's.  Perry  made  a  headlong 
attack ;  his  superior  force,  whether  through  his  fault 
or  his  misfortune  can  hardly  be  said,  being  brought 
into  action  in  such  a  manner  that  the  head  of  the 
line  was  crushed  by  the  inferior  force  opposed. 
Being  literally  hammered  out  of  his  own  ship,  Perry 
brought  up  its  powerful  twin-sister,  and  the  already 
shattered  hostile  squadron  was  crushed  by  sheer 
weight.  The  manoeuvres  which  marked  the  close 
of  the  battle,  and  which  ensured  the  capture  of  all 
the  opposing  ships,  were  unquestionably  very  fine. 
The  British  ships  were  fought  as  resolutely  as 
their  antagonists,  not  being  surrendered  till  they 
were  crippled  and  helpless,  and  almost  all  the  offi- 
cers, and  a  large  proportion  of  the  men  placed  hors 
de  combat.  Captain  Barclay  handled  his  ships  like 
a  first-rate  seaman.  It  was  impossible  to  arrange 
them  so  as  to  be  superior  to  his  antagonist,  for  the 
latter's  force  was  of  such  a  nature  that  in  smooth 
water  his  gunboats  gave  him  a  great  advantage, 
while  in  any  sea  his  two  brigs  were  more  than  a 
match  for  the  whole  British  squadron.  In  short, 
our  victory  was  due  to  our  heavy  metal.  As  regards 
the  honor  of  the  affair,  in  spite  of  the  amount  of 


324  Naval  War  of  1812 

boasting  it  has  given  rise  to,  I  should  say  it  was  a 
battle  to  be  looked  upon  as  in  an  equally  high  degree 
creditable  to  both  sides.  Indeed,  if  it  were  not  for 
the  fact  that  the  victory  was  so  complete,  it  might 
be  said  that  the  length  of  the  contest  and  the  trifling 
disparity  in  loss  reflected  rather  the  most  credit  on 
the  British.  Captain  Perry  showed  indomitable 
pluck  and  readiness  to  adapt  himself  to  circum- 
stances; but  his  claim  to  fame  rests  much  less  on 
his  actual  victory  than  on  the  way  in  which  he  pre- 
pared the  fleet  that  was  to  win  it.  Here  his  energy 
and  activity  deserve  all  praise,  not  only  for  his 
success  in  collecting  sailors  and  vessels  and  in  build- 
ing the  two  brigs,  but  above  all  for  the  manner 
in  which  he  succeeded  in  getting  them  out  on  the 
lake.  On  that  occasion  he  certainly  out-generaled 
Barclay;  indeed  the  latter  committed  an  error  that 
the  skill  and  address  he  subsequently  showed  could 
not  retrieve.  But  it  will  always  be  a  source  of  sur- 
prise that  the  American  public  should  have  so  glori- 
fied Perry's  victory  over  an  inferior  force,  and  have 
paid  comparatively  little  attention  to  Macdonough's 
victory,  which  really  was  won  against  decided  odds 
in  ships,  men,  and  metal. 

There  are  always  men  who  consider  it  unpatriotic 
to  tell  the  truth,  if  the  truth  is  not  very  flattering; 
but,  aside  from  the  morality  of  the  case,  we  never 
can  learn  how  to  produce  a  certain  effect  unless  we 
know  rightly  what  the  causes  were  that  produced 
a  similar  effect  in  times  past.  Lake  Erie  teaches  us 
the  advantage  of  having  the  odds  on  our  side; 


On  the  Lakes  325 

Lake  Champlain,  that,  even  if  they  are  not,  skill 
can  still  counteract  them.  It  is  amusing  to  read 
some  of  the  pamphlets  written  "in  reply"  to  Cooper's 
account  of  this  battle,  the  writers  apparently  regard- 
ing him  as  a  kind  of  traitor  for  hinting  that  the  vic- 
tory was  not  "Nelsonic,"  "unsurpassed,"  etc.  The 
arguments  are  stereotyped :  Perry  had  9  fewer  guns, 
and  also  fewer  men  than  the  foe.  This  last  point 
is  the  only  one  respecting  which  there  is  any  doubt. 
Taking  sick  and  well  together,  the  Americans  un- 
questionably had  the  greatest  number  in  crew;  but 
a  quarter  of  them  were  sick.  Even  deducting  these 
they  were  still,  in  all  probability,  more  numerous 
than  their  foes. 

But  it  is  really  not  a  point  of  much  consequence, 
as  both  sides  had  enough,  as  stated,  to  serve  the 
guns  and  handle  the  ships.  In  sea-fights,  after  there 
are  enough  hands  for  those  purposes  additional  ones 
are  not  of  so  much  advantage.  I  have  in  all  my 
accounts  summed  up  as  accurately  as  possible  the 
contending  forces,  because  it  is  so  customary  with 
British  writers  to  follow  James'  minute  and  inac- 
curate statements,  that  I  thought  it  best  to  give 
everything  exactly;  but  it  was  really  scarcely  nec- 
essary, and,  indeed,  it  is  impossible  to  compare 
forces  numerically.  Aside  from  a  few  exceptional 
cases,  the  number  of  men,  after  a  certain  point  was 
reached,  made  little  difference.  For  example,  the 
Java  would  fight  just  as  effectually  with  377  men, 
the  number  James  gives  her,  as  with  426,  the  num- 
ber I  think  she  really  had.  Again,  my  figures  make 


326  Naval  War  of  1812 

the  Wasp  slightly  superior  in  force  to  the  Frolic, 
as  she  had  25  men  the  most;  but  in  reality,  as  the 
battle  was  fought  under  very  short  sail,  and  decided 
purely  by  gunnery,  the  difference  in  number  of  crew 
was  not  of  the  least  consequence.  The  Hornet  had 
nine  men  more  than  the  Penguin,  and  it  would  be 
absurd  to  say  that  this  gave  her  much  advantage. 
In  both  the  latter  cases,  the  forces  were  practically 
equal,  although,  numerically  expressed,  the  odds 
were  in  favor  of  the  Americans.  The  exact  reverse 
is  the  case  in  the  last  action  of  the  Constitution. 
Here,  the  Levant  and  Cyane  had  all  the  men  they 
required,  and  threw  a  heavier  broadside  than  their 
foe.  Expressed  in  numbers,  the  odds  against  them 
were  not  great,  but  numbers  could  not  express  the 
fact  that  carronades  were  opposed  to  long  guns,  and 
two  small  ships  to  one  big  one.  Again,  though  in 
the  action  on  Lake  Champlain  numbers  do  show  a 
slight  advantage  both  in  weight,  metal,  and  number 
of  men  on  the  British  side,  they  do  not  make  the 
advantage  as  great  as  it  really  was,  for  they  do  not 
show  that  the  British  possessed  a  frigate  with  a 
main-deck  battery  of  24-pounders,  which  was  equal 
to  the  two  chief  vessels  of  the  Americans,  exactly 
as  the  Constitution  was  superior  to  the  Cyane  and 
Levant.29  And  on  the  same  principles  I  think  that 

**  It  must  always  be  remembered  that  these  rules  cut  both 
ways.  British  writers  are  very  eloquent  about  the  disadvan- 
tage in  which  carronades  placed  the  Cyane  and  Levant,  but 
do  not  hint  that  the  Essex  suffered  from  a  precisely  similar 
cause,  in  addition  to  her  other  misfortunes;  either  they 


On  the  Lakes  327 

every  fair-minded  man  must  admit  the  great  supe- 
riority of  Perry's  fleet  over  Barclay's,  though  the 
advantage  was  greater  in  carronades  than  in  long 
guns. 

But  to  admit  this  by  no  means  precludes  us  from 
taking  credit  for  the  victory.  Almost  all  the  victo- 
ries gained  by  the  English  over  the  Dutch  in  the 
1 7th  century  were  due  purely  to  great  superiority 
in  force.  The  cases  have  a  curious  analogy  to  this 
lake  battle.  Perry  won  with  54  guns  against  Bar- 
clay's 63;  but  the  odds  were  largely  in  his  favor. 
Blake  won  a  doubtful  victory  on  the  i8th  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1653,  with  80  ships  against  Tromp's  70;  but 
the  English  vessels  were  twice  the  size  of  the  Dutch, 
and  in  number  of  men  and  weight  of  metal  greatly 
their  superior.  The  English  were  excellent  fighters, 

should  give  the  Constitution  more  credit  or  the  Phoebe  less. 
So  the  Confiance,  throwing  480  pounds  of  metal  at  a  broad- 
side, was  really  equal  to  both  the  Eagle  and  Saratoga,  who 
jointly  threw  678.  From  her  long  guns  she  threw  384  pounds, 
from  her  carronades  96.  Their  long  guns  threw  168,  their 
carronades  510.  Now  the  32-pound  carronade,  mounted  on 
the  spar-deck  of  a  s8-gun  frigate,  was  certainly  much  less 
formidable  than  the  long  18  on  the  main-deck;  indeed,  it 
probably  ranked  more  nearly  with  a  long  12,  in  the  ordinary 
chances  of  war  (and  it  must  be  remembered  that  Downie 
was  the  attacking  party  and  chose  his  own  position,  so  far 
as  Macdonough's  excellent  arrangements  would  let  him). 
So  that  in  comparing  the  forces,  the  carronades  -should  not 
be  reckoned  for  more  than  half  the  value  of  the  long  guns, 
and  we  get,  as  a  mere  approximation,  384  +  48  =  432,  against 
168  4-  255  =  423.  At  any  rate,  British  writers,  as  well  as 
Americans,  should  remember  that  if  the  Constitution  was 
greatly  superior  to  her  two  foes,  then  the  Confiance  was 
certainly  equal  to  the  Eagle  and  Saratoga ,  and  vice  -versa. 


328  Naval  War  of  1812 

but  no  better  than  the  Dutch,  and  none  of  their 
admirals  of  that  period  deserves  to  rank  with  De 
Ruyter.  Again,  the  great  victory  of  La  Hogue  was 
won  over  a  very  much  smaller  French  fleet,  after 
a  day's  hard  fighting,  which  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  one  vessel!  This  victory  was  most  exultingly 
chronicled,  yet  it  was  precisely  as  if  Perry  had 
fought  Barclay  all  day  and  only  succeeded  in  captur- 
ing the  Little  Belt.  Most  of  Lord  Nelson's  suc- 
cesses were  certainly  won  against  heavy  odds  by 
his  great  genius  and  the  daring  skill  of  the  captains 
who  served  under  him;  but  the  battle  of  the  Baltic, 
as  far  as  the  fighting  went,  reflected  as  much  honor 
on  the  defeated  Danes  as  on  the  mighty  sea-chief 
who  conquered  them.  Many  a  much-vaunted  vic- 
tory, both  on  sea  and  land,  has  really  reflected  less 
credit  on  the  victors  than  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie 
did  on  the  Americans.  And  it  must  always  be  re- 
membered that  a  victory,  honorably  won,  if  even 
over  a  weaker  foe,  does  reflect  credit  on  the  nation 
by  whom  it  is  gained.  It  was  creditable  to  us  as  a 
nation  that  our  ships  were  better  made  and  better 
armed  than  the  British  frigates,  exactly  as  it  was 
creditable  to  them  that  a  few  years  before  their  ves- 
sels had  stood  in  the  same  relation  to  the  Dutch 
ships.30  It  was  greatly  to  our  credit  that  we  had 

10  After  Lord  Duncan's  victory  at  Camperdown,  James 
chronicled  the  fact  that  all  the  captured  line-of-battle  ships 
were  such  poor  craft  as  not  to  be  of  as  much  value  as  so 
many  French  frigates.  This  at  least  showed  that  the  Dutch 
sailors  must  have  done  well  to  have  made  such  a  bloody  and 


On  the  Lakes  329 

been  enterprising  enough  to  fit  out  such  an  effective 
little  flotilla  on  Lake  Erie,  and  for  this  Perry  de- 
serves the  highest  praise.31 

Before  leaving  the  subject  it  is  worth  while  mak- 
ing a  few  observations  on  the  men  who  composed 
the  crews.  James,  who  despised  a  Canadian  as 
much  as  he  hated  an  American,  gives  as  one  excuse 
for  the  defeat,  the  fact  that  most  of  Barclay's  crew 
were  Canadians,  whom  he  considers  to  be  "sorry 
substitutes."  On  each  side  the  regular  sailors,  from 
the  seaboard,  were  not  numerous  enough  to  permit 
the  battle  to  be  fought  purely  by  them.  Barclay 
took  a  number  of  soldiers  of  the  regular  army,  and 
Perry  a  number  of  militia,  aboard;  the  former  had 
a  few  Indian  sharp-shooters,  the  latter  quite  a  num- 
ber of  negroes.  A  great  many  men  in  each  fleet 
were  lake  sailors,  frontiersmen,  and  these  were  the 
especial  objects  of  James'  contempt;  but  it  may  be 
doubted  if  they,  thoroughly  accustomed  to  lake  navi- 
gation, used  to  contests  with  Indians  and  whites, 
naturally  forced  to  be  good  sailors,  and  skilful  in 
the  use  of  rifle  and  cannon,  were  not,  when  trained 
by  good  men  and  on  their  own  waters,  the  very  best 
possible  material.  Certainly  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie, 
fought  mainly  by  Canadians,  was  better  contested 

obstinate  fight  as  they  did,  with  the  materials  they  had. 
According  to  his  own  statements,  the  loss  was  about  proper 
tional  to  the  forces  in  action.  It  was  another  parallel  to 
Perry's  victory. 

31  Some  of  my  countrymen  will  consider  this  but  scant  ap- 
probation, to  which  the  answer  must  be  that  a  history  is  not 
a  panegyric. 


Naval  War  of  1812 


than  that  of  Lake  Champlain,  fought  mainly  by 
British. 

The  difference  between  the  American  and  British 
seamen  on  the  Atlantic  was  small,  but  on  the  lakes 
what  little  there  was  disappeared.  A  New  Eng- 
lander  and  an  Old  Englander  differed  little  enough, 
but  they  differed  more  than  a  frontiersman  born 
north  of  the  line  did  from  one  born  south  of  it. 
These  last  two  resembled  one  another  more  nearly 
than  either  did  the  parent.  There  had  been  no  long- 
established  naval  school  on  the  lakes,  and  the  British 
sailors  that  came  up  there  were  the  best  of  their 
kind;  so  the  combatants  were  really  so  evenly 
matched  in  courage,  skill,  and  all  other  fighting 
qualities,  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  award  the  palm 
to  either  for  these  attributes.  The  dogged  obstinacy 
of  the  fighting,  the  skilful  firing  and  manoeuvring, 
and  the  daring  and  coolness  with  which  cutting-out 
expeditions  were  planned  and  executed,  were  as 
marked  on  one  side  as  the  other.  The  only  un- 
English  element  in  the  contest  was  the  presence 
among  the  Canadian  English  of  some  of  the  de- 
scendants of  the  Latin  race  from  whom  they  had 
conquered  the  country.  Otherwise  the  men  were 
equally  matched,  but  the  Americans  owed  their  suc- 
cess —  for  the  balance  of  success  was  largely  on  their 
side  —  to  the  fact  that  their  officers  had  been  trained 
in  the  best  and  most  practical,  although  the  smallest, 
navy  of  the  day.  The  British  sailors  on  the  lakes 
were  as  good  as  our  own,  but  no  better.  None  of 
their  commanders  compares  with  Macdonough. 


On  the  Lakes  331 

Perry  deserves  all  praise  for  the  manner  in  which 
he  got  his  fleet  ready;  his  victory  over  Barclay  was 
precisely  similar  to  the  quasi-victories  of  Blake  over 
the  Dutch,  which  have  given  that  admiral  such 
renown.  Blake's  success  in  attacking  Spanish  and 
Algerian  forts  is  his  true  title  to  fame.  In  his 
engagements  with  the  Dutch  fleets  (as  well  as  in 
those  of  Monk,  after  him)  his  claim  to  merit  is  no 
greater  and  no  less  than  Perry's.  Each  made  a 
headlong  attack,  with  furious,  stubborn  courage,  and 
by  dint  of  sheer  weight  crushed  or  disabled  a  greatly 
inferior  foe.  In  the  fight  that  took  place  on  Feb. 
18,  1653,  De  Ruyter's  ship  carried  but  34  guns,32 
and  yet  with  it  he  captured  the  Prosperous  of  54; 
which  vessel  was  stronger  than  any  in  the  Dutch 
fleet.  The  fact  that  Blake's  battles  were  generally 
so  indecisive  must  be  ascribed  to  tfie  fact  that  his 
opponents  were,  though  inferior  in  force,  superior 
in  skill.  No  decisive  defeat  was  inflicted  on  the 
Dutch  until  Tromp's  death.  Perry's  operations  were 
on  a  very  small,  and  Blake's  on  a  very  large,  scale; 
but  whereas  Perry  left  no  antagonists  to  question 
his  claim  to  victory,  Blake's  successes  were  suffi- 
ciently doubtful  to  admit  of  his  antagonists  in  almost 
every  instance  claiming  that  they  had  won,  or  else 
that  it  was  a  draw.  Of  course  it  is  absurd  to  put 
Perry  and  Blake  on  a  par,  for  one  worked  with  a 

18  "La  Vie  et  Les  Actions  Memorables  de  Lt. -Admiral 
Michel  De  Ruyter"  (Amsterdam,  1677),  p.  23.  By  the  way, 
why  is  Tromp  always  called  Van  Tromp  by  English  writers? 
It  would  be  quite  as  correct  for  a  Frenchman  to  speak  of 
MacNelson. 


Naval  War  of  1812 


fleet  forty  times  the  strength  of  the  other's  flotilla; 
but  the  way  in  which  the  work  was  done  was  very 
similar.  And  it  must  always  be  remembered  that 
when  Perry  fought  this  battle  he  was  but  27  years 
old;  and  the  commanders  of  his  other  vessels  were 
younger  still. 

CHAMPLAIN 

The  commander  on  this  lake  at  this  time  was 
Lieutenant  Thomas  Macdonough,  who  had  super- 
seded the  former  commander,  Lieutenant  Sydney 
Smith,  —  whose  name  was  a  curious  commentary  on 
the  close  inter-relationship  of  the  two  contesting 
peoples.  The  American  naval  force  now  consisted 
of  two  sloops,  the  Growler  and  Eagle,  each  mount- 
ing ii  guns,  and  six  galleys,  mounting  one  gun 
each.  Lieutenant  Smith  was  sent  down  with  his 
two  sloops  to  harass  the  British  gunboats,  which 
were  stationed  round  the  head  of  Sorel  River,  the 
outlet  to  Lake  Champlain.  On  June  3d  he  chased 
three  gunboats  into  the  river,  the  wind  being  aft, 
up  to  within  sight  of  the  fort  of  Isle-aux-noix.  A 
strong  British  land-force,  under  Major-General  Tay- 
lor, now  came  up  both  banks  of  the  narrow  stream^ 
and  joined  the  three  gunboats  in  attacking  the  sloops. 
The  latter  tried  to  beat  up  the  stream,  but  the  cur- 
rent was  so  strong  and  the  wind  so  light  that  no 
headway  could  be  made.  The  gunboats  kept  out 
of  range  of  the  sloop's  guns,  while  keeping  up  a 
hot  fire  from  their  long  24*5,  to  which  no  reply 
could  be  made;  but  the  galling  fire  of  the  infantry 
who  lined  the  banks  was  responded  to  by  showers 


On  the  Lakes  333 

of  grape.  After  three  hours'  conflict,  at  12.30, 
a  24-pound  shot  from  one  of  the  galleys  struck  the 
Eagle  under  her  starboard  quarter,  and  ripped  out 
a  whole  plank  under  water.  She  sank  at  once,  but 
it  was  in  such  shoal  water  that  she  did  not  settle 
entirely,  and  none  of  the  men  were  drowned.  Soon 
afterward  the  Growler  had  her  forestay  and  main- 
boom  shot  away,  and,  becoming  unmanageable,  ran 
ashore  and  was  also  captured.  The  Growler  had 
i  killed  and  8  wounded,  the  Eagle  n  wounded; 
their  combined  crews,  including  34  volunteers, 
amounted  to  112  men.  The  British  gunboats 
suffered  no  loss;  of  the  troops  on  shore  three 
were  wounded,  one  dangerously,  by  grape.33  Lieu- 
tenant Smith  had  certainly  made  a  very  plucky 
fight,  but  it  was  a  great  mistake  to  get  cooped  up 
in  a  narrow  channel,  with  wind  and  current  dead 
against  him.  It  was  a  very  creditable  success  to 
the  British,  and  showed  the  effectiveness  of  well- 
handled  gunboats  under  certain  circumstances.  The 
possession  of  these  two  sloops  gave  the  command 
of  the  lake  to  the  British.  Macdonough  at  once 
set  about  building  others,  but  with  all  his  energy 
the  materials  at  hand  were  so  deficient  that  he  could 
not  get  them  finished  in  time.  On  July  3ist,  1,000 
British  troops,  under  Col.  J.  Murray,  convoyed  by 
Captain  Thomas  Everard,  with  the  sloops  Chubb 
and  Finch  (late  Growler  and  Eagle}  and  three  gun- 

88  Letter  from  Major-General  Taylor  (British)  to  Major- 
General  Stone,  June  3,  1813.  Lossing  says  the  loss  of  the 
British  was  "probably  at  least  one  hundred"— on  what  au- 
thority, if  any,  I  do  not  know. 


334 


Naval  War  of  1812 


boats,  landed  at  Plattsburg  and  destroyed  all  the 
barracks  and  stores  both  there  and  at  Saranac.  For 
some  reason  Colonel  Murray  left  so  precipitately 
that  he  overlooked  a  picket  of  20  of  his  men,  who 
were  captured;  then  he  made  descents  on  two  or 
three  other  places,  and  returned  to  the  head  of  the 
lake  by  Aug.  3d.  Three  days  afterward,  on  Aug. 
6th,  Macdonough  completed  his  three  sloops,  the 
President,  Montgomery,  and  Preble,  of  7  guns  each, 
and  also  six  gunboats;  which  force  enabled  him  to 
prevent  any  more  plundering  expeditions  taking 
place  that  summer,  and  to  convoy  Hampton's  troops 
when  they  made  an  abortive  effort  to  penetrate  into 
Canada  by  the  Sorel  River  on  Sept.  2ist. 

BRITISH  LOSS  ON  THE  LAKES  DURING  1813. 


Name. 

Tons. 

Gun*. 

Remarks. 

Skip, 

600 

24 

Burnt  on  stocks. 

Gloucester, 

1  80 

IO 

Taken  at  York. 

Mary, 

80 

3 

Burnt. 

Drummond, 
Lady  Gore, 

80 
80 

3 
3 

Captured. 

H 

Schoontr, 

80 

3 

• 

Detroit, 

490 

»9 

M 

Owen  CAarhtUt 

400 

i? 

• 

Lady  Prevost, 
Hunter, 

X 

'3 

to 

M 

a 

Ckippeway, 
Little  Belt, 

70 
90 

i 

3 

a 

a 

12  vessels, 


Name. 

Crawler, 
Eagle, 

»  vessels. 


2,560 


109 


AMERICAN  LOSS.* 


Tons. 

112 
110 

*— — 

222 


Guns. 

II 

II 


Remarks. 
Captured. 


84  Excluding  the  Growler  und/utt'a,  which  were  recaptured. 


DATE  DUE 


pr.-fft*^ 

^?  IGfifi 

DEC  2 

i>1995 

1       f* 

»£3             pFP.n  nrn  2 

7   1985 

SicDji 

7  iswiERLIBKAJI 

YUDAHS 

9  1    I07jl 

MAR  25 

ml 

OCT 
A 

2  *  iTlrfl 

TH    NfH/-^ 

s  W74i  °  1 

1QQ7 

1 

0 

J  JTA  rl  ^  L 

ICO/ 
'.p,n"7 

- 

JUL    6 

'        ik  t§|     •    f 

198/ 

tmAT 

TONu\ 

r  23  IMU 

D  JUN  IS 

1987 

,->          -  -,  ^ 

kinu 

2  5  199^ 

n  - 
RECI 

/     "  u     !  -  '  '                        Ff  U  W 

ocr  05  id?? 

|'       MAY2 

2 

^    197ftl7Q 

r;co  &P 

^  IT'W'9 

k        JUN 

5  "  1979 

"*'" 

V 

1  n  1Q7Q 

fc;   JUL 

1  U    191  9 

RECD  JU! 

1  1  1979 

I*       J' 

N     ^  1980 

RECO  JAf 

•  2  8-1980 

FEB    , 

1.1985 

RECD  JAI 

I  2  0   1985 

CAYLORO 

PRINTED  IN  U.S.  A. 

UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL 


LIBRARY.  AC  LITY 


I Ilili'l Illili'i'''"'  r\  A   OQ*7       Q 


3  1970  00 


